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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal has recently acknowledged the existence of a 
freestanding tort of invasion of privacy in Hosking v Runting. The tort is in its infancy 
and the courts are still grappling with essential problems, the most prominent of which 
is the conflict with countervailing interests in freedom of speech. In need of guidance, 
the courts turn to overseas authorities, predominantly from the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America. The commonly found descriptive nature of the comparison 
invites a broader analysis of these jurisdictions.  
 
In this thesis, I offer a theoretically informed comparative law analysis of New 
Zealand’s new tort with the American public disclosure of private facts tort and the 
British extended breach of confidence action. In all three jurisdictions, the conflict of 
privacy with individual and societal concerns in freedom of speech has led to an exten-
sion of (quasi-) constitutional norms derived, for instance, from the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 into the common law sphere – the horizontal effect. The horizontal 
application of constitutional rights poses significant legal problems to the common law, 
because it has learned to deal with duties rather than rights. The time has come to re-
consider the nature of rights in both constitutional and tort law. The comparison shows 
that New Zealand has effectively adopted two torts – one following the duty-based lead 
of the United States of America and an alternative modelled along the lines of the more 
rights-orientated British law. The law of the United Kingdom and the USA differ to a 
degree that calls their comparability into question. I present the preferable British ap-
proach as a ‘constitutionalised common law tort of privacy.’ The results also show that 
this model represents a competitive third way to traditional solutions based on common 
law or statute by means of utilising a statutory human rights instrument as an analytical 
framework for the common law. 
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Smith:  Privacy is a very valuable thing. Everyone wants a place where they could be alone occasion-
ally. And when they have such a place, it is only common courtesy in anyone else who knows 
of it to keep his knowledge for himself.1
 
Palmer: Unfortunately privacy has some unruly qualities. There is a tendency for people to rush about 
all over the place and raise the privacy flag, saying you must not do this and you must not do 
that or you will be invading privacy.2
  
Sir Geoffrey Palmer, of course, never had this conversation with Winston Smith, 
the reluctant hero of George Orwell’s caco-topia ‘1984.’ Sir Geoffrey was nevertheless 
a key figure behind the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, which will be of signifi-
cant importance in the following. As an eminently important right, freedom of speech 
has been affirmed in the Act whilst a right of privacy was omitted. Winston’s interest, 
as it were, is not directly protected in New Zealand. Privacy, it was thought, was a 
nebulous concept with uncertain boundaries and its affirmation would have had perilous 
consequences for the protection of other interests.3 However, this stance has recently 
been subject to reconsideration.4 Under the presidency of Sir Geoffrey, the New Zea-
land Law Commission has begun an extensive general review of the law concerning 
privacy and the first results are very impressive.  
 
The elusiveness of the concept of privacy is indeed almost proverbial and the 
following analysis is much narrower in focus, viz, confined to the dissemination of per-
sonal or private information. Alas, the notion of disseminating private information is 
also particularly problematic due to an unavoidable encounter with interests in freedom 
of speech. Pending further consideration given by the Supreme Court, a common law 
1 Adapted from the beginning of part 2 chapter IV of George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (Every-
man’s Library, 1992) 144.  
2 G Palmer, ’Privacy and the Law’ [1975] New Zealand Law Journal 747, 748. 
3 See Minister of Justice, A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper (1985) para 10.144 (‘White 
Paper’). 
4 Privacy: concepts and issues: review of the Law of Privacy part 1 (New Zealand Law Commission 
Study Paper; 19), para 4.107 (p 96). 
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tort of privacy has nevertheless been acknowledged in the landmark decision of Hosk-
ing v Runting5. At the heart of this tort lies the outlined conflict – the need for individ-
ual privacy and its reconciliation with the demands of societal life, for instance, in free-
dom of speech. Three main categories may suffice to sketch the contours of the prob-
lem.  
 
Firstly, many would agree that the things Winston mentioned are important and 
probably worth protecting. Neither do we want uninvited strangers intruding on these 
places we perhaps instinctively call ‘private’ nor do we want these people to trumpet to 
the world what they might have found out. Privacy is dear under these circumstances, in 
fact so precious that some might even want to stop ‘people from talking about you.’6 
The freedom of speech that enables us to talk freely about truthful matters will usually 
not have much force when it is pitted against Winston’s personal interest in hiding these 
facts from the public gaze. Our protagonist, as is well known, nevertheless intended to 
use his newly found privacy to engage in illicit sexual activity. Despite the intensely 
intimate nature of the information at issue, all things forbidden usually attract an inter-
est to impart and receive information about them. As a result, the solution to this seem-
ingly clear example defies an unambiguous answer. 
          
One can be almost sure, however, that this category was not what worried Sir 
Geoffrey, who reminds us that the tirelessly invoked Big Brother is indeed just around 
the corner if privacy is raised as a defence to every attack.7 His concern seems to centre 
on where ‘the line’ is to be drawn once this can of worms has been opened. This leads 
us to our second example. Given that Winston has found the private place he was look-
ing for, as soon as he leaves the doorstep his actions may attract the attention of his so-
cial environment. Linguistically at least, it seems doubtful whether there could be such 
a thing as privacy in a public place. If he just walks the street back and forth, his 
neighbours seem perfectly entitled to discuss his actions freely as this is a normal inci-
. 
5 [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) (“Hosking”). 
6 This phrase was coined by E Volokh, ‘Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking about You’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1049
7 See J Black, ’Privacy: To every attack a Defence’ published on 22 July 2003 in Business Newsweek 
<http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jul2003/tc20030722_9870_PG3_tc125.htm> 02 De-
cember 2006). 
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dent of social life. Privacy interests, on the other hand, may be regarded as relinquished. 
Notwithstanding these daily activities, one’s judgment would perhaps differ if he was 
involved in an accident which exposed shocking or piquant details of his bodily appear-
ance. The answer to these cases seems to be shrouded in fog, because the nature of the 
location may not be an all-consuming factor. An Australian court has consequently held 
that a bright line cannot be drawn between private facts and public facts;8 there is a 
large area of in-between stages, which is why the conundrum seems to lie in the solu-
tion of the speech/privacy conflict in these cases. 
 
Lastly, the situation seems straightforward again if Winston decides to enter into 
political activities. His actions, then, no longer only affect his affairs, but also those of 
his neighbours and the community he lives in. Thus, many would agree that his privacy 
interest would not have much force when it is pitted against his neighbours’ interest in 
knowing certain things about him. One argument against subjecting politicians to re-
lentless scrutiny contends, however, that able minds might be unwilling to enter into 
politics if the complete loss of one’s private life is the price to pay.9 A degree of pri-
vacy may be important even to so-called public figures and a bright line is, once more, 
difficult to draw.  
 
In brief, the two positions represented in the fictional dialogue between Sir 
Geoffrey and Winston may not be mutually exclusive, but particularly how interests in 
privacy and freedom of speech should be reconciled in an inherently coherent manner is 
an onerous task. ‘It depends,’ is perhaps the most suitable answer, because it would al-
lude to the contextual sensitivity of the conflict. We may nevertheless extrapolate two 
key themes from the previous three examples: firstly, plaintiffs just ‘waving the privacy 
flag’ have to be distinguished from those claiming legitimate interferences with their 
privacy interests; secondly, given that this problem could be solved,10 a resolution to 
8 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 226 (HC). 
9 See Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 239 per Tipping J. 
10 Many scholars have observed the vagueness of privacy – see, eg, D J Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ 
(2006)154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 477, 478 for further details. 
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the equally intricate conflict with countervailing interests in freedom of expression 
needs to be found.11
 
This thesis seeks to offer a comparative survey and analysis of the response to 
these issues in the jurisdictions of New Zealand, the United Kingdom12 and the United 
States of America.13 The analysis concentrates on tort law regulating the relationships 
between private persons, more specifically New Zealand’s recently acknowledged inva-
sion of privacy tort, the US public disclosure of private facts tort14 and the - strictly 
speaking - equitable remedy known as extended breach of confidence in English and 
Welsh law.15 Nevertheless, the discussion is not confined to the law of torts. All three 
jurisdictions have at least one feature in common: they fall back upon constitutional 
norms in order to solve the aforementioned conflict between freedom of speech and 
privacy. The analysis will therefore pay due regard to this constitutional dimension.  
 
Three issues need to be clarified before we may start the analysis. First, I must 
outline the analytical approach. When Lord Steyn gave the inaugural Robin Cooke Lec-
ture at Victoria University of Wellington, he mentioned that ‘comparative law has come 
of age’ due to the European dimension of British law.16 What does comparative law 
mean in this context? Essentially, the analysis will proceed in two parts distinguishing a 
macro-level comparison from a micro-level comparison. Aside from descriptive ele-
ments, both levels provide a material or dogmatic comparison of the jurisdictions in-
volved.  
11 Many scholars acknowledge that this problem is perhaps the most difficult and crucial to the success of 
the law – eg, G Phillipson, ‘The ‘right’ of privacy in England and Strasbourg compared’ in M Richardson 
and A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 184, 212-3. 
12 Hereinafter ‘the UK.’ Note that this is not a reference to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. The term ‘UK’ or ‘UK common law’ used in this analysis refers to the common law as 
applied in England and Wales. When the present writer sometimes refers only to England, it is always 
meant to have the same implication for the common law as applied in Wales.   
13 Hereinafter interchangeably USA, US or America. Note that the term ‘common law’ in the context of 
this country might be a misnomer – see K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (T 
Weir trans, 3rd ed, 1998) 238-55 for a brief introduction. However, many American scholars and judges 
seem to regard their tort regime as common law. For the sake of transparency, this view is to some extent 
shared in the following.  
14 Note that this tort will also be addressed as ‘private facts tort’ or ‘public disclosure tort.’ 
15 Extended breach of confidence is functionally equivalent to a tort of privacy and is therefore an appro-
priate subject of comparative law - K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (T Weir 
trans, 3rd ed, 1998) 34.  
16 Lord Steyn, ‘Democracy through Law’ [2002] European Human Rights Law Review 723, 736. 
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The macro-level will address the constitutional or quasi-constitutional frame-
work in each jurisdiction, that is, the framework provided by the United States Consti-
tution, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the English Human Rights Act 
1998. The importance of constitutional norms influencing the private law sphere will be 
illustrated briefly as follows: judges and scholars commenting on the protection of pri-
vacy in relevant American tort law often conclude that this interest has faded into insig-
nificance under the might of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
tecting, among others, the freedom of speech.17 While correct, these suggestions occa-
sionally ride roughshod over the fact that the First Amendment is part of the United 
States Bill of Rights. It does not seem evident, however, why the litigation of private 
persons governed by common law is influenced by a constitutional provision. As is well 
known, constitutional rights primarily regulate the vertical relationship between the 
state and those who are governed by the state.18 Freedom of speech, in contrast, has 
also long been protected as a principle of the common law. Granted that the First 
Amendment (as opposed to the common law principle) has obliterated the protection of 
possible privacy interests in the law of torts, it could be argued that the constitutional 
norm had been applied horizontally, that is to say that it governs additionally the rela-
tionship between two private persons. A similar observation can be made with regard to 
the relevant context of the common law in the UK and New Zealand; it will be ad-
dressed as the ‘constitutionalisation of private law.’ Particularly in New Zealand, how-
ever, it is generally held that the common law determines the interpretation of quasi-
constitutional rights and not vice versa. The macro-analysis of the constitutional 
framework will therefore provide insights into the implications of extending (quasi-) 
constitutional norms to the common law sphere by means of their horizontal applica-
tion. This inquiry will predominantly deal with questions about the nature and concept 
of rights as well as different balancing techniques in order to place limits on these 
rights. I hope to demonstrate that different constitutional frameworks have significantly 
different implications for the common law. 
 
17 Eg, Sir S Sedley, ‘Sex, Libels and Video-surveillance’ (The Blackstone Lecture 2006) available at 
www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications_media/speeches/2006/sp130506, last accessed on 16 January 2008. 
18 Eg, Lord Steyn, ‘Democracy through Law’ [2002] European Human Rights Law Review 723, 733. 
 
 
6 
The analysis on the micro-level, by contrast, is concerned with the private law 
sphere, viz, with common law and equity including aspects of respective adjudication 
techniques. Apart from attempting to show the transformative impact of the respective 
constitutional framework on the common law, this part focuses largely on tort law and 
its theory. The fact that a new tort has formed part of the common law in New Zealand 
signifies an important recent development. The preoccupation with privacy and its rec-
onciliation with conflicting interests in current scholarly literature are understandable 
and important. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that torts can be concep-
tualised quite differently. Different conceptions of tort law, as will be suggested, have 
implications for the comparability of individual cases. Hence, the recognition of a new 
tort also provides an opportunity to reconsider basic features of determining tort liabil-
ity. In this respect, two main approaches will be distinguished. On the one hand, a tort 
regime may focus on remedies without an underlying right such as a common law right 
to privacy. In this scenario, the plaintiff is vested with a right to take action. It is, then, 
of primary importance whether a duty is to be imposed on the defendant. Given that the 
action has been made out, a right to compensation is conferred. By and large, this can 
be regarded as the prevalent approach. The 1990s have nevertheless seen a revived in-
terest in tort theory. We will see that some theorists base their basic conceptions on the 
dichotomy of right and correlative obligation. In this case, the invasion of an individual 
right constitutes a civil wrong, which gives rise to a particular cause of action. This ap-
proach is favoured in this thesis. The micro-analysis will therefore provide an overview 
on how the application of different tort regimes may influence the protection of relevant 
privacy interests. Ultimately, I will attempt to align the constitutional dimension of the 
conflict with the common law sphere. In this respect, tentative suggestions will be made 
to the effect that a particular understanding of constitutional norms and their limitation 
(macro-level) accords with a particular understanding of conceptualising tort law (mi-
cro-level).  
 
Secondly, a brief account of the author’s understanding of the somewhat murky 
privacy interest must be provided. Apart from a necessary overview of this interest and 
its conception, a detailed discussion of privacy is not provided. The context of constitu-
tional and tort law rather provides an analytically informed overview on how the rele-
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vant aspect of privacy could be protected in law without unduly impinging on counter-
vailing interests. However, I seek to demontrate that privacy interests (despite numer-
ous claims to the contrary) arguably cannot be confined to a single overarching defini-
tion. Instead, I will argue that different concepts of privacy work best in different con-
texts. In other words, the question concerned with the appropriateness of a particular 
privacy concept cannot be examined in isolation. Instead, tort law and its theory should 
inform the identification of the appropriate concept. In this respect, an ‘intrusion tort’ is 
most likely to occur as a distinct common law rule in addition to a tort protecting 
against the dissemination of personal information. Although both actions are frequently 
related, I seek to show that they should be distinguished from the very beginning. The 
query about the appropriate concept for present purposes may therefore be confined to 
the distinction between both torts. I will argue that ‘intrusion’ and ‘dissemination’ rep-
resent two distinct tortious ‘wrongs.’ The disclosure tort regulates the communication 
of personal information to others while an optional intrusion tort is concerned with 
physical behaviour (such as eavesdropping etcetera). Therefore, each ‘wrong’ requires 
distinguishable forms of conduct by the defendant. As causes of action, they ideally 
may be traced to the infringement of a common law right to privacy. However, both 
privacy based causes of action should only protect a particular aspect of the right to pri-
vacy and not privacy as a whole. As a result, I will suggest the application of a concept 
dovetailed for the purposes of the newly adopted tort, viz, a suitable concept for the 
unwarranted dissemination of personal information. This concept of privacy should be 
based on ‘control’ over personal information.      
 
Lastly, the purpose of this thesis needs to be addressed. The fact that the com-
parative method is not restricted to descriptive elements, but also includes dogmatic as-
pects, implies that the thesis is aimed at a result. Thus, a suggestion for an ideal tort for 
New Zealand will be provided.19 In this respect, I should like to call the reader’s atten-
tion to my personal role. The present writer is a German civil lawyer and thus not from 
one of the countries involved in this analysis. The cultural background is certainly very 
important in the privacy context. Moreover, as a civil lawyer I am not versed in matters 
19 Note that no suggestions with regard to available remedies are made. This analysis will also neglect the 
relationship between the privacy tort and, for example, the tort of defamation.    
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concerning the common law. The lack of intimate knowledge may call the usefulness of 
the following discussion into question. Nevertheless, humble contributions can be made 
inasmuch as unimpeded first impressions on most of the legal issues will be presented. 
My role, and one for which I am entirely qualified, is that of an ignoramus or outside 
observer. This is not to say, however, that I do not have prior expectations as regards 
privacy torts. As a German jurist, I am used to an equal protection of both privacy and 
freedom of speech, which means that no automatic preference is given to one of the in-
terests. In brief, this writer is neither for privacy nor against freedom of speech, but 
tends towards a meaningful protection of both interests impinging no more than neces-
sary on either of them. As for American law, it is widely known that the First Amend-
ment has submerged other important values.20 Since German law is of minor or no im-
portance in the following, I gravitate towards a position that protects privacy and free-
dom of speech justly. Among the jurisdictions involved in this analysis, the law of the 
UK represents this position. English law, as will be suggested, is indeed in many ways 
the answer to the problems involved. I hope to demonstrate that objectively ascertain-
able arguments support this view. Although the approach taken in the UK is ultimately 
favoured here, its law will enjoy the least coherent attention. In lieu of an isolated 
analysis, it will be dealt with largely during the discussion of the torts of New Zealand 
and the USA. The broad scope of this thesis makes it generally difficult (and perhaps 
not even desirable), to distinguish the discussion of the legal systems strictly. Instead, 
the jurisdictions are sometimes also compared ‘on the spot,’ that is, where it is relevant. 
  
This analysis nevertheless focuses on the relevant law of New Zealand. John 
Burrows has observed that the new tort raises the familiar question whether the com-
mon law or statute is most appropriate for a new development.21 I will attempt to carve 
out a preference for a third way, which I will refer to as a ‘constitutionalised common 
law tort.’ The New Zealand Court of Appeal’s decision in Hosking, as will be sug-
gested, effectively contains two versions of an invasion of privacy tort. On the one 
hand, there exists a version emulating largely the American approach, and, on the other, 
20 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 74 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
21 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 409. 
See U J Cheer, ‘The Future of Privacy – Recent Legal Developments in New Zealand’ (2007) 13 Canter-
bury Law Review 169, 200 for additional possibilities the Law Commission might identify. 
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an alternative exposition that resembles British law. I conclude that the current ap-
proach taken in the UK is preferable. This approach is both compatible with the over-
arching human rights instrument and can be interpreted as incorporating a competitive 
conception of torts, that is, a mixed conception of corrective justice based on rights. In 
order to adapt such a model in New Zealand, the only necessary, and indeed desirable, 
legislative action should be confined to incorporating a right to privacy in the NZBoRA. 
The horizontal application of the rights to privacy and freedom of speech will in turn 
provide an analytical framework, which is necessary for a formal yet useful reconcilia-
tion of both conflicting interests. 
 
In Chapter Two, I analyse the American law and conclude that the USA lacks 
the systematic capability necessary to protect the individual from the public dissemina-
tion of private information. The constitutional side of the analysis will show that the 
First Amendment is predominantly of systemic importance, which effectively renders 
any form of limiting the free flow of truthful information impossible. Interests in lib-
erty, as will be suggested, are detached from individual responsibility. The subsequent 
analysis of the common law tort will display a similar result. The cause of action fol-
lows an instrumentalist conception of torts; it is comprised of strict liability rules aim-
ing at a high level of predictability. The individualistic liberty interests of the defendant 
are emphasised to the detriment of interests in privacy. The elements of the tort will be 
analysed and, insofar as relevant, contrasted predominantly with English law. Gener-
ally, a tort regime based on strict liability rules will be compared to the preferred solu-
tion based on rights. In terms of substance and structure, the analysis shows that a con-
stitutionalised tort presents nothing completely new to common lawyers. I seek to illus-
trate that the ‘substance’ of such a tort could be explained with reference to Lord At-
kin’s ‘neighbour’ principle.22 The ‘structure’ of the tort, in contrast, would be akin to 
Lord Wilberforce’s two-step approach to negligence law as espoused in Anns v Merton 
LBC23. As for the American law, I finally conclude that the horizontally applied First 
Amendment has practically ‘swallowed’ the private facts tort. 
 
22 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580. 
23 [1978] AC 728, 741. 
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In Chapter Three, the quasi-constitutional framework in the context of English 
law (as provided by HRA and ECHR) will be discussed. Here I attempt to establish that 
the courts have given a strong indirect effect to relevant quasi-constitutional rights. A 
separate analysis in this respect is necessary, because the horizontally applied rights 
provide the formal framework functioning as a substitute for legislation. Because the 
ultimate aim is a ‘constitutionalised common law tort,’ it is necessary to rebut argu-
ments to the effect that the common law has been relegated by giving horizontal effect 
to human rights norms. Instead, I seek to show that the incremental method of develop-
ing the common law gives way to an approach based on principles. The common law, 
as will be suggested, nevertheless remains an autonomous source of law. 
 
Chapter Four starts with a discussion of New Zealand’s quasi-constitutional 
framework. As regards the interpretation of the NZBoRA, I argue that problems rele-
vant for a horizontal application of the Act have not been solved yet. Furthermore, I 
seek to demonstrate the striking similarities of the NZBoRA and the HRA/ECHR. As 
for the analysis of the common law action, I attempt to show that only the alternative 
version of the tort following the British lead is consistent with the NZBoRA. An impor-
tant aspect of this part of the analysis will be to show the inappropriateness of the 
highly offensive to a reasonable person test. I seek to show that this test could be re-
placed by means of employing a proportionality balancing exercise. In Chapter Five, 
the results are drawn together and a suggestion for an ideal ‘constitutionalised common 
law tort of privacy’ is made.            
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CHAPTER TWO - THE LAW OF THE USA 
 
 
 
 
The recognition of privacy interests in the common law has its origin in the 
USA. The famous article ‘The Right to Privacy’24 by Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis initially triggered off this development. The article did not of course invent 
privacy more than a century ago, but identified it eloquently as a societal concern.25 As 
for common law systems, the USA therefore has a long history in protecting this inter-
est.26 The development finally led to the recognition of constitutional interests related to 
privacy, and the protection of privacy aspects by statute in some states, as well as to the 
recognition of causes of action within the common law.27 With regard to the latter, a 
second article, ‘Privacy’ by William Prosser,28 was of seminal importance. In it, Prosser 
distilled a tort composed of four branches, one of which granted protection against the 
public disclosure of private information. 
 
Unfortunately, this is also the most controversial branch and still one of the most 
fascinating puzzles of US tort law.29 Consequently, both the courts and the legal teach-
ing profession have devoted a vast amount of effort in order to defend or criticise the 
acceptance of the tort.30 The bone of contention is almost always its uneasy relationship 
with interests in free speech.31  
24 (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193. 
25 G E White, Tort law in America: An Intellectual History (expanded ed, 2003) 173; L E Rothenberg, 
‘Re-Thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and the Failure of Criminal Law to Recognize a 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space’ (2000) 49 American University Law Review 
1127, 1133. See R P Bezanson, ‘The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 
1890-1990’ (1992) 80 California Law Review 1133 for a more detailed discussion of the historical back-
ground. 
26 The French ‘Loi Relative a la Presse’, 11 May 1868 is, for instance, older – see S D Warren and L D 
Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193, 214; L Brazell, ‘Confidence, Pri-
vacy and Human Rights: English Law in the Twentieth Century’ (2005) 27 European Intellectual Prop-
erty Review 405, 406.  
27 See E Tison, ‘Straddling the Fence: Justice Breyer's concurrence in Bartnicki v Vopper gives Protec-
tion of Privacy and still Manages to Protect the Press: Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514 (2001)’ (2003) 27 
Southern Illinois University Law Journal 661, 665. 
28 W L Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383.  
29 D J Solove, ‘The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure’ (2003) 
53 Duke Law Journal 967, 970-71; see also J R Rolfs, ‘The Florida Star v BJF: The Beginning of the End 
for the Tort of Public Disclosure’ [1990] Wisconsin Law Review 1107, 1108. 
30 See also A J McClurg, ‘Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy through Implied Con-
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As we will later see during the discussion of New Zealand’s law, many of the 
problems, which occurred in this country at an early stage of the tort’s development, 
were already well known in the USA. The following discussion should predominantly 
serve as a basis to deal properly with the question whether the influential experience32 
gained in the USA should or even could be transferred into the New Zealand legal sys-
tem. As I seek to demonstrate, the reason why US jurisdictions are struggling to recon-
cile privacy interests and free speech for more than a century stems not only from the 
vagueness of the concept of privacy.33 It is rather the inability to protect both interests 
(for example, by means of balancing competing interests) and the interpretation of the 
First Amendment contribute at least equally to these difficulties. Not without irony, the 
importance of freedom of speech to legal and political culture in the USA is often 
stressed; however, very little has been written on the line between the freedom of 
speech protected by the First Amendment and that which is not protected.34 Effectively, 
I will suggest, the right to freedom of speech is treated as an ‘absolute,’ which is why a 
great deal of the dispute entwining itself around the tort could be reduced to two irrec-
oncilable positions: balancers and absolutists. In the following, we will follow the sug-
gested method and distinguish between the constitutional framework (macro-level) and 
the public dissemination tort itself (micro-level of the analysis). 
 
 
 
 
tracts of Confidentiality’ (2006) 74 University of Cincinnati Law Review 887, 896, who observes that the 
tort has a ‘distinguished academic pedigree.’ 
31 See, eg, D M Worley, ‘Shulman v Group W Productions: Invasion of Privacy by Publication of Private 
Facts - Where Does California Draw the Line Between Newsworthy Information and Morbid Curiosity’ 
(1999-2000) 27 Western State University Law Review 535, 538; D A Richards, ‘Public and Private in the 
Discourse of the First Amendment’ (2000) 12 Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 61, 88; J B Mintz, 
‘The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain’ (1996) 55 Maryland 
Law Review 425, 448; M Schadrack, ‘Privacy and the Press: A Necessary Tension’ (1985) 18 Loyola of 
Los Angeles Law Review 949, 950; J Lenow, ‘First Amendment Protection for the Publication of Private 
Information’ (2007) 60 Vanderbilt Law Review 235, 246; J R Rolfs, ‘The Florida Star v BJF:  The Begin-
ning of the End for the Tort of Public Disclosure’ [1990] Wisconsin Law Review 1107, 1109. 
32 Eg, Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 para 210 per Keith J.  
33 The main difficulty in this area is to distinguish ‘private’ from ‘public facts’ - R A Smolla, ‘Accounting 
for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law’ (2002) 27 Nova Law Review 289, 296. 
34 N M Richards, ‘Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment’ (2005) 52 UCLA Law Review 
1149, 1169-70. 
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1   Constitutional background of the speech-privacy conflict 
 
Privacy, as distinct from freedom of speech, is not explicitly protected by any of 
the Amendments to the US Constitution.35 While illuminating the viability of privacy 
upon constitutional provisions, a difference has to be made between the acknowledge-
ment of privacy as an interest of constitutional stature (protecting against governmental 
interference)36 on the one hand and the constitutional viability of a particular ‘right’ of-
fering protection against public disclosure of private, albeit truthful, facts on the other. 
The acknowledgement of the latter interest causes problems, because it would establish 
tort liability for the publication of truthful information and thereby directly conflicts 
with First Amendment interests. Hence, the general debate about the US privacy tort 
does not seem to focus on whether or not such an interest should be recognised by law 
(and what form this protection should take). It rather centres on its theoretical compati-
bility with the current free speech doctrine. The tort’s viability is therefore inextricably 
entangled with the comprehension of the protection granted by the First Amendment, 
which will be illuminated in the following.  
1.1 Foundations of a constitutional ‘right to privacy’ 
Despite some legal dispute, privacy, charitably understood, was finally recog-
nised as a fundamental interest protected by the US Constitution. Although not directly 
relevant to the public disclosure tort, a brief discussion nevertheless seems advanta-
geous particularly with regard to the acknowledgement of the corresponding common 
law action in New Zealand. As detailed below, the NZBoRA does not recognise a gen-
eral right to privacy either, which is arguably why this country witnessed a very similar 
discussion on this point in Hosking.     
 
35 Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 508 per Black J (dissenting). 
36 Note that these privacy interests are more appropriately addressed as interests in individual autonomy. 
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The essential case37 in this context is Griswold v. Connecticut38 in which the 
majority of the US Supreme Court advocated protecting a right of privacy in order to 
strike down a law prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married persons.39 Justice 
Goldberg, writing for the Court, identified penumbras ‘formed by emanations’ amidst 
the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, which ‘help and give them substance.’40 
The purpose of the 14th Amendment and the history of the Ninth Amendment supported 
the recognition of such a right.41 Particularly the Ninth Amendment was said to imply 
the recognition of unenumerated rights existing without being expressly mentioned.42 
The Ninth Amendment reads:  
 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, will not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people.  
 
The right to (marital) privacy was deemed older than the Bill of Rights and 
older than the political parties.43 The majority’s opinion can hence be summarised as 
saying that several enumerated rights44 ‘create[d] zones of privacy’,45 all of which es-
tablished a general constitutional right protected under the Ninth Amendment.  
 
Justice Goldberg, thus, found a constitutional basis for a right of privacy al-
though an explicit basis within the Bill of Rights was not necessary. Instead, he pointed 
out that the Ninth Amendment gave textual recognition of the fact that there were other 
37 E J Eberle, ‘Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American Constitutional Law’ 
[1997] Utah Law Review 963 fn 574. As a result of this case several states included ‘a specific clause 
protecting privacy in their state constitutions’ - A Ku, ‘Talk is Cheap, but a Picture is Worth a Thousand 
Words: Privacy Rights in the Era of Camera Phone Technology’ (2005) 45 Santa Clara Law Review 679, 
690. 
38 Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 486 (1965). 
39 The US Supreme Court provided beforehand, for instance, for the right of parents to educate their chil-
dren in religious or private schools in Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925); additionally, this 
authority granted the right to procreate by precluding governments the relation of convicted criminals on 
the commission of any felony in Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535 (1942). 
40 Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 484, 487 (1965). 
41 Ibid, at p 488. 
42 Ibid, at p 492.  
43 Ibid, at p 486. 
44 The Court mentioned the First Amendment right to association; the Third Amendment; the Fourth 
Amendment concerned with search and seizure and the Self Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment – ibid, at p 484.  
45 Ibid, at p 484. 
 
 
15 
                                                          
values of equal importance to the specific provisions to the Bill of Rights.46 According 
to the learned Judge, the Ninth Amendment showed a belief of the Constitution’s au-
thors that fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight 
amendments; this reasoning implies an intention that the list of rights is not to be 
deemed exhaustive.47 As detailed below, this line of argument resembles Tipping J’s 
reasoning on the recognition of the privacy interest in Hosking. In the author’s view, 
one can take advantage of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in order to subsume the rec-
ognition of privacy interests under s 28 NZBoRA.   
 
The historical background of the Ninth Amendment was an argument concern-
ing the question as to whether a bill of rights was necessary at all. The group answering 
this question in the negative argued that it would be impossible to list all existing rights. 
In their opinion, it would have been dangerous to enshrine even some of them. The op-
posing group feared that there would be those who would cease on the absence of the 
omitted rights to assert that government was unrestrained as to those.48 The incorpora-
tion of the Ninth Amendment was the response to those concerns.49  
 
Harlan J, in contrast, recognised a ‘right to privacy’ based on natural law.50 The 
Judge focused on whether the statute violated basic values ‘implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.’51 In doing so, he was moving perfectly within the tradition of the 
46 This approach has been described as the ‘most cogent’ explanation for a constitutional right to privacy 
- W J Chriss, ‘Personhood and the Right to Privacy in Texas’ (2007) 48 South Texas Law Review 575, 
595. 
47 Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 492; see also S Breyer, ‘Our Constitutional Democracy’ (2002) 
77 New York University Law Review 245, 269-70 who argues that the Ninth Amendment was added ‘to 
make clear that ‘rights, like law itself, should never be fixed, frozen, that new dangers and needs will 
emerge, and that to respond to these dangers and needs, rights must be newly specified to protect the in-
dividual's integrity and inherent dignity’ (internal citation omitted). 
48 The Federalist No 84, <http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa84.htm> 03 March 2008. 
49 According to 1 Annals of Congress 439 (1789) as cited in Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 489-90 
James Madison said: ‘It has been objected also against the bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular 
exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights, which were not placed in that enumera-
tion; and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be 
assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the 
most plausible arguments I have ever heard against the admission of the bill of rights into this system; 
but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to 
the last clause of the fourth resolution.’ 
50 Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 511 per Black J (dissenting). 
51 Ibid, p 500 (internal citations omitted). A similar point was made by Justice White (concurring) – at p 
502.   
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Court. According to Nowak, the Court has always actively enforced values, which a 
majority of the Justices felt were essential to American society. The fact that they had 
no specific textural basis in the Constitution was of minor importance.52 With this ap-
proach, Supreme Court judges selected and protected certain liberties under the Due 
Process Clause (the 14th Amendment).53  
 
However, Justice Black, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented in Griswold and 
objected to the recognition of a general privacy interest. The main reason for his oppo-
sition was an inability to find a clear textual basis for this right in the Bill of Rights.54 In 
his view, particularly the Fourth Amendment protecting against unreasonable searches 
and seizures was only an example demonstrating that guarantees in certain constitu-
tional provisions were designed in part to protect privacy in certain times and places 
with respect to certain activities.55 According to Black J, the majority of the Court was 
‘exalting a phrase which Warren and Brandeis used in discussing grounds for tort relief, 
to the level of a constitutional rule.’56 Absent any explicit recognition, it was for the 
legislator to decide whether an aspect of privacy was worthy of protection.57 This line 
of argument, in its juridical substance, resembles particularly Keith J’s reasoning in 
Hosking.58  
 
Later in Roe v Wade,59 the US Supreme Court held that a constitutional right to 
privacy protects a woman’s control over her body in terms of terminating a pregnancy. 
The Court made a brief reference to the Ninth Amendment but based its holding on the 
concept of liberty protected by the 14th Amendment.60 In each of the mentioned cases a 
general right of privacy was seemingly granted apart from the particular facts of the 
case. Nevertheless, it is still questionable as to whether the Court was protecting spe-
cifically a right of access to contraceptives, a right to inter-racial marriages or a right to 
52 J E Nowak, Constitutional Law (5th ed, 1995) 399, see also Griswold v Connecticut, US 479, 487 fn 1 
(1965). 
53 Ibid. 
54 Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 508-9 (1965); see also at p 530. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid, at p 510 fn 1. 
57 See ibid, at p 512. 
58 [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) paras 185-207. 
59 410 US 113 (1973). 
60 Ibid, at p 153. 
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have an abortion as such, or whether it was developing a principle of individual auton-
omy.61 Justice Marshall later summarised the implications of Roe v Wade and its prog-
eny as saying that these cases were not so much about medical procedures, but about 
the woman’s fundamental right to self determination and the freedom from government 
domination in making the most intimate and personal decisions.62 This seems to be an 
isolated view however. In the following decades, the Supreme Court several times had 
to decide about the scope of the constitutional ‘right to privacy.’63 These decisions did 
not reverse the initial step of recognising this interest; they rather shaped its extent in a 
slightly inconsistent manner.64 It is fair to say that the US constitutional law is generally 
‘episodic’ rather than ‘systematic;’ this system therefore closely resembles common law 
methodology, which might explain its attractiveness for some jurists in New Zealand 
and the UK.65  
1.2 First Amendment viability of the public disclosure of private facts 
As we have seen, the majority of the American Supreme Court stood quite ready 
to recognise a constitutional interest in privacy or rather personal autonomy protecting 
against governmental intrusion. The protection is less definite with regard to the prob-
lem as to whether this interest entails protection against public disclosure of truthful 
private information.66 Prosser opined that the constitutional ‘right to privacy’ embraces 
the privacy interests protected by the common law.67 However, a newer trend rather 
61 See D Vetri, Tort law and practice (1998) 984-5. 
62 Ibid, at p 985. These decisions therefore seem to be better subsumed under the headline ‘autonomy’ 
rather than ‘privacy’ - J Kahn, ‘Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance’ (2003) 33 Seton 
Hall Law Review 371, 385. Another approach to the same effect distinguishes ‘informational privacy’ 
from ‘decisional privacy’ - N M Richards, ‘The Information Privacy Law Project’ (2006) 94 Georgetown 
Law Journal 1087, 1105. 
63 Eg, Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186 (1986).   
64 See E J Eberle, ‘Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American Constitutional 
Law’ [1997] Utah Law Review 963, 991; see also A J Rappaport, ‘Beyond Personhood and Autonomy: 
Moral Theory and the Premises of Privacy’ [2001] Utah Law Review 441, 448 (‘One might be skeptical, 
especially if the Court's jurisprudence is defined with any degree of specificity. The Supreme Court, after 
all, does not appear to be guided by an overarching set of normative principles’ – internal citations omit-
ted). 
65 See E J Eberle, ‘Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American Constitutional 
Law’ [1997] Utah Law Review 963, 992. 
66 It is still not clear, ‘to what extent the constitutional right of privacy overlaps the tort right of privacy’ - 
M Schadrack, ‘Privacy and the Press: A Necessary Tension’ (1985) 18 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Re-
view 949, 954; D J Solove, ‘The Virtues Of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Dis-
closure’ (2003) 53 Duke Law Journal 967, 994 (2003).  
67 W P Keeton (ed), Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed, 1984) 866; to the same effect see also J Wagner 
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seems to distinguish between privacy protected as constitutional liberty and a private 
‘right of privacy’ grounded in tort.68 Both interests are analytically different.69 Not-
withstanding, the ‘episodic’ aspect of privacy we have to deal with here is particularly 
problematic. It should be kept in mind that this branch of the tort is concerned with 
truthful information, which may be regarded as lying at the heart of First Amendment 
protection. Furthermore, the tort represents a content-based interference with speech,70 
which requires the strictest standards of constitutional review in the USA.71 As a rule of 
thumb, information of this kind is unlikely to be upheld as commensurate with First 
Amendment standards.72 ‘Content-based’ speech restriction has to be distinguished 
from ‘content-neutral’ speech control, which has to satisfy a lower degree of scrutiny. 
An example for a ‘content neutral’ speech control would be a law even-handedly re-
stricting the dissemination of information obtained through ‘eavesdropping’ regardless 
of its nature or contents. Thus, the constitutional viability of the public dissemination 
tort will be analysed next. This analysis will carve out (1) the primary function of the 
First Amendment, (2) why it influences especially the ‘public interest’ element of the 
public disclosure tort, and (3) what the implications of this influence are.     
1.2.1 Function and doctrinal framework of the First Amendment  
The use of the term speech-privacy ‘conflict’ already indicates the necessity to 
clarify why the First Amendment standard is so strict and, hence, requires identifying 
the concept or primary function of free speech in that country. If it were otherwise, one 
 
De Cew, ‘The Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics’ (1986) 5 Law and Philosophy 145, 173. 
68 J B Mintz, ‘The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain’ (1996) 
55 Maryland Law Review 425, 442; Richard v Wal-Mart Stores Inc, (2007) Westlaw 1521467 at p 5. 
69 J R Rolfs, ‘The Florida Star v BJF:  The Beginning of the End for the Tort of Public Disclosure’ [1990] 
Wisconsin Law Review 1107, 1108. See too R Gavison, ‘Too Early for a Requiem: Warren and Brandeis 
were Right on Privacy v Free Speech’ (1992) 43 South Carolina Law Review 437, 447, who argues that 
both interests have ‘no connection whatsoever.’ 
70 D J Solove, ‘The Virtues Of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure’ (2003) 
53 Duke Law Journal 967, 984; J Lenow, ‘First Amendment Protection for the Publication of Private 
Information’ (2007) 60 Vanderbilt Law Review 235, 247. 
71 See Police Department of the City of Chicago v Mosley, 92 S Ct 2286, 2290 (1972) – the Court argued 
that ‘the essence of forbidden censorship is content control’; state actors are thus not allowed to ‘restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas and its content’; see also New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 
254, 270 (1964). A restriction is merely valid if it is ‘necessary to serve a compelling state interest and 
[...] narrowly drawn to achieve that end’ - Perry Educators Association v Perry Local Educators’ Asso-
ciation, 460 US 37, 45 (1983).        
72 Daily Mail Pub Co v Smith, 443 US 97, 102 (1979); E Volokh, ‘Freedom of Speech and Information 
Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking about You’ (2000) 52 
Stanford Law Review 1049, 1089.  
 
 
19 
                                                          
would not know, if at all, on which occasion a privacy interest actually could or has to 
prevail. In brief, any solution to the conflict would be difficult.73 As long as the courts 
are reluctant to determine what kind of speech is at stake in a particular case, an elabo-
rate concept of privacy will arguably never be developed. Privacy rather clashes with a 
monolithic protection of speech interests and loses.74
 
The Supreme Court has unfortunately not fostered a single rationale underlying 
First Amendment speech.75 Instead, there are a large number of doctrines championed 
by single judges as opposed to a single doctrine applied by the Court.76 For the pur-
poses of this analysis, it is nevertheless fair to identify the Court’s prevalent emphasis 
on the systemic value of speech; this in turn requires the courts to maintain content neu-
trality as far as possible.77 An emphasis on the systemic importance focuses on the 
needs of the audience whereas the rights based approach concentrates on the autonomy 
of the speaker.78 The systemic approach is best encapsulated by the ‘marketplace of 
ideas’ metaphor, which was first circumscribed by John Milton and John Stuart Mill.79 
 73 See also C Hart, ‘Y.G. v Jewish Hospital of St. Louis: Breathing Life into the “Disclosure of Private 
Facts” Tort’ (1991) 35 Saint Louis University Law Journal 931, 939. 
74 Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are equated during this analysis. The press is therefore 
regarded as a distinct constitutional speaker and not as an institution – see R P Bezanson, ‘The Develop-
ing Law of Editorial Judgment’ (1999) 78 Nebraska Law Review 754, 759. 
75 V Mayer-Schonberger and T E Foster, ‘More Speech, Less Noise: Amplifying Content-Based Speech 
Regulations Through Binding International Law’ (1995) 18 Boston College International and Compara-
tive Law Review 59, 65-6. 
76 E Kagan, ’Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment 
Doctrine’ (1996) 63 University of Chicago Law Review 413; C E Wells, ’Reinvigorating Autonomy: 
Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence’ (1997) 32 Harvard 
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 159, 171 fn 47 citing R C Post, ‘Racist Speech, Democracy, and 
the First Amendment’ [1991] William and Mary Law Review 267, 278, who notes that ‘first amendment 
doctrine [...] is a vast Sargasso Sea of drifting and entangling values, theories, rules, exceptions, predilec-
tions’). 
77 J Lenow, ‘First Amendment Protection for the Publication of Private Information’ (2007) 60 Vander-
bilt Law Review 235, 240; see also V Mayer-Schonberger, T E Foster, ‘ More Speech, Less Noise: Am-
plifying Content-Based Speech Regulations Through Binding International Law’ (1995) 18 Boston Col-
lege International and Comparative Law Review 59, 61-2; C E Wells ,’ Reinvigorating Autonomy: Free-
dom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence’ (1997) 32 Harvard Civil 
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 159, 162 for a discussion of different scholarly interpretations of  the 
different reasons for the Court’s hostility towards contents-based speech restrictions; S Ingber, ‘The Mar-
ketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth’ [1984] Duke Law Journal 1, 43.  
78 E Kagan, ’Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment 
Doctrine’ (1996) 63 University of Chicago Law Review 413, 413; see also R Wacks, ‘Why there will 
never be an English common law privacy tort’ in M Richardson and A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions 
in Privacy Law (2006) 154, 169. 
79 V Mayer-Schonberger, T E Foster, ‘ More Speech, Less Noise: Amplifying Content-Based Speech 
Regulations Through Binding International Law’ (1995) 18 Boston College International and Compara-
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Oliver Wendell Holmes coined the actual phase however.80 Holmes will be a pivotal 
figure in the following due to his contributions to both First Amendment doctrine and 
tort theory. His predominant influence on the development of both the common law and 
First Amendment jurisprudence has been described as ‘positivistic’ due to a strict sepa-
ration of ‘law’ and ‘morality.’81 However, it is rather apposite to suggest that Holmes 
was clearly influenced by early utilitarian thinkers, but his legal theory is more accu-
rately addressed as ‘legal realism’ or ‘pragmatic instrumentalism.’82 According to 
Summers, pragmatism is the ‘only indigenous theory of law’ ever developed in the 
USA;83 legal positivism is just one tenet of it. It is nevertheless difficult to put Holmes 
in any pigeonhole – both as a person and jurist. His peers have lauded Holmes as ‘the 
great overlord of the law and its philosophy’84 while other compatriot detractors likened 
him to Adolf Hitler.85 The complexity of his personality was perhaps best captured in 
Catharine Wells’ book review title ‘The Hidden, Inner Life of a Cynical, Ambitious, 
Detached, and Fascistic Old Judge without Values.’86
 
Be that as it may, to this writer at least Holmes’ marketplace of ideas has been 
adequately described as amounting to a crude appeal to ‘the amoral deliverances of So-
 
tive Law Review 59, 64; see also P Lahav, ‘Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican Justifica-
tions for Free Speech’ (1988) 4 Journal of Law and Politics 451, 455; S Ingber, ‘The Marketplace of 
Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth’ [1984] Duke Law Journal 1, 3; D A Logan, ‘Tort Law and the Central 
Meaning of the First Amendment’ (1990) 51 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 493, 540. 
80 Abrams v United States 250 US 616, 630 (1919) - Holmes famously argued, ‘the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market;’ for a recent case emphasis-
ing the theory see Virginia v Black, 538 US 343, 358 (2003). 
81 T A Reed, ‘Holmes and the Paths of the Law’ (1993) 37 American Journal of Legal History 273, 279; 
see also J Knudson, ‘The Influence of the German Concepts of Volksgeist and Zeitgeist on the Thought 
and Jurisprudence of Oliver Wendell Holmes’ (2002) 11 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 407, 
415-6; R M Dworkin, ‘Hart's Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy’ (2004) 24 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 1, 33. 
82 R S Summers, ‘On Identifying and Reconstructing a General Legal Theory – Some Thoughts Prompted 
by Professor Moore's Critique’ (1984) 69 Cornell Law Review 1014, 1014-20. 
83 R S Summers, ‘Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century Legal Thought – A Synthesis and 
Critique of our Dominant Legal Theory about the Law and its Use’ (1980-81) 66 Cornell Law Review 
861, 862. 
84 J Knudson, ‘The Influence of the German Concepts of Volksgeist and Zeitgeist on the Thought and 
Jurisprudence of Oliver Wendell Holmes’ (2002) 11 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 407, 413 
(2002) (internal citation omitted). 
85 T A Reed, ‘Holmes and the Paths of the Law’ (1993) 37 American Journal of Legal History 273, 279. 
86 C P Wells, ‘Reinventing Holmes: The Hidden, Inner, Life of a Cynical, Detached, Ambitious and Fas-
cistic old Judge without Values’ (2002) 37 Tulsa Law Review 801 review of A Alschuler, Law Without 
Values: The Life, Work and Legacy of Mr Justice Holmes (internal citations omitted). Wells does not 
share this critical view of Holmes. 
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cial Darwinian competition.’87 Later on, we will see that his tort theory is based on 
foresight and predictability measured on ‘common experience’ (and thus external legal 
standards) as opposed to individual experience.88 This will prove illuminating, because 
mainstream US tort theory has remained deeply Holmesian.89 The inherent foregone 
conclusion with regard to reconciling a privacy interest (considered as purely individual 
in this intellectual context) with a societal (and thus systemic) interest in free speech 
will be examined below. Furthermore, Holmes is frequently quoted as saying that ‘the 
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.’90 This statement seems to 
some extent representative for the common law. I should nevertheless point out that the 
law does certainly not follow mathematical logic, but where appropriate logic will be 
used in the following if it helps solve a problem easily.91
 
However, two general points will be made because they may have influenced 
Holmes’ view on the purpose of both freedom of speech and common law: (1) Holmes 
had apparently nothing but scorn for Kant’s moral philosophy and its central dictum 
that human beings should be treated as an end in themselves and never as means to an 
end;92 and (2) according to Grant Gilmore ‘Holmes was savage, harsh, cruel, a bitter 
87 D A Richards, ‘Public and Private in the Discourse of the First Amendment’ (2000) 12 Cardozo Stud-
ies in Law and Literature 61 (emphasis added). Holmes work is indeed deeply rooted in Social Darwin-
ism – J Knudson, ‘The Influence of the German Concepts of Volksgeist and Zeitgeist on the Thought and 
Jurisprudence of Oliver Wendell Holmes’ (2002) 11 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 407, 413; 
and N Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (1995) 43–6 on the influence of Darwinism on 
Holmes. 
88 H Hovenkamp, ‘The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought’ (1993) 46 Vanderbilt Law Review 305, 
336; see also J C Goldberg and B C Zipursky, ‘The Moral of MacPherson’ (1998) 146 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1733, 1738; D M Rabban, ‘The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doc-
trine’ (1983) 50 University of Chicago Law Review 1205, 1267. 
89 J C Goldberg and B C Zipursky, ‘The Moral of MacPherson’ (1998) 146 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1733, 1738; see too their ‘Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and 
Hart on Legal Duties’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1563, 1570. 
90 V Blasi, ‘Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas’ [2004] Supreme Court Review 1, 2-3 (internal citation 
omitted); for a brief discussion on the development of this view see Note ‘Holmes: A Legend in Search 
of Demystification’ (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 800, 801-3; see also N Duxbury, Patterns of Ameri-
can Jurisprudence (1995) 39, who suggests that Holmes subscribed to a legal philosophy far from being 
intolerant of logic. 
91 See generally R Scragg, New Zealand’s Legal System (2005) 24; E W Thomas, The Judicial Process 
(2005) 187. 
92 D M Rabban, ‘The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine’ (1983) 50 University Chicago 
Law Review 1205, 1268-9; T A Reed, ‘Holmes and the Paths of the Law’ (1993) 37 American Journal of 
Legal History 273, 294; see also C E Wells ,’ Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in 
the Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence’ (1997) 32 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties 
Law Review 159, 172 fn 52 (1997); S J Heyman, ‘Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations 
and Limits of Freedom of Expression’ (1998) 78 Boston University Law Review 1275, 1299.  
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and lifelong pessimist who saw in the course of human life nothing but a continuing 
struggle in which the rich and the powerful impose their will on the poor and weak.’93 
Justice Brandeis, for instance, championed both privacy and free speech and was appar-
ently a judge of different character.94 Suffice it to say at this point that even a cautious 
interpretation of both statements reveals a deeply rooted scepticism with regard to in-
trinsic worth and needs of the individual human being. This premise provides in turn a 
rather unfavourable intellectual climate for a meaningful protection of relevant privacy 
interests – particularly under the influence of modern human rights instruments in other 
countries. Thus, my intention is not to discredit Holmes. His work arguably provides 
indeed the perfect compliment to a business-run society.95 However, it is advantageous 
to sharpen one’s senses that he might also be a ‘devil incarnate’ rather than a magnifi-
cent curator for the protection of the relevant privacy interest.  
1.2.2 Early implications for New Zealand and the UK  
The intrinsic problems of a legal theory conveying an outspoken disregard of the 
individual human being become evident once contemporary US tort rules (and First 
Amendment doctrine) are rendered into a different legal environment – most notably in 
New Zealand where an almost identical common law tort was announced to be consis-
tent with the NZBoRA. Consider, for instance, a significant statement from Anderson 
J’s judgment in Hosking. His Honour did not acknowledge the tort and remarked:  
 
‘[f]reedom of expression is the first and the last trench in the protection of liberty. All of the 
rights affirmed in the NZBoRA are protected by that particular right.’ 96
93 V Blasi, ‘Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas’ [2004] Supreme Court Review 1, 14 (internal citation 
omitted); see also P Lahav, ‘Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican Justifications for Free 
Speech’ (1988) 4 Journal of Law and Politics 451, 454, who observes that one’s temperament influences 
the philosophical view; Lahav continues by pointing out, ‘Holmes was basically a skeptic and a pessi-
mist, Brandeis an optimist.’  
94 P Lahav, ‘Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican Justifications for Free Speech’ (1988) 4 
Journal of Law and Politics 451, 469 (‘Brandeis was born into a family that made progress and moral 
universalism a religion’); and at p 470 (‘Above all, he had confidence in the individual, in each person's 
power to reform society and themselves’); D M Rabban, ‘The Emergence of Modern First Amendment 
Doctrine’ (1983) 50 University of Chicago Law Review 1205, 1321 (‘Unlike the aloof Holmes, detached 
from and often contemptuous of human efforts to change society, Brandeis became an activist who com-
bined a genuine humanitarianism with a firm belief in individual dignity and autonomy’). 
95 For examples see, eg, E Volokh, ‘Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implica-
tions of a Right to Stop People From Speaking about You’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1049, 1073.  
96 [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 267 (emphasis added). 
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I perceive this statement as a platitude,97 which is afflicted by the basic problem 
that there is not an iota of truth in the latter sentence. The first sentence paraphrases the 
systemic value of freedom of speech in the context of Political Liberalism as espoused, 
for instance, by Mill and in a simplistic manner by Holmes.98 Viewed in isolation, this 
sentence is perfectly arguable given that modern human rights instruments such as the 
NZBoRA or HRA would not be applied to govern a legal dispute. According to Ander-
son J’s following suggestion, however, all rights are shoehorned under the aegis of the 
right of freedom of speech since the advent of the NZBoRA. This writer respectfully 
disagrees with his Honour’s last proposition.  
 
For the time being, Anderson J’s proposition will be contrasted with an alterna-
tive view of the Canadian Privacy Commissioner:99
 
[o]ur fundamental rights and freedoms – of thought, belief, expression and association – depend 
in part upon a meaningful measure of privacy. Unless we retain the power to decide who should 
know our political allegiances, our sexual preferences, our confidences, our fears and aspira-
tions then the very basis of a free and democratic society could be undermined. 
 
This statement, I suggest, reflects the accurate approach to be taken - at least 
under the aegis of modern human rights instruments. The ‘rights’ are based on the con-
cept of the autonomous, socially responsible individual with inherent dignity.100 The 
need of privacy, in this context, may be seen as a manifestation of human dignity.101 In 
my view, both HRA and NZBoRA incorporate those ideals (sometimes associated with 
97 His Honour’s statement is often used in order to emphasise the importance of free speech in contempo-
rary legal debates. See, for instance, J Wilson, ‘Media Law Symposium: Prior Restraint of the Press’ 
[2006] New Zealand Law Review 551, 558; M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC 
MP19 para 91. 
98 Mill’s theory proposes restrictions of harmful speech on a utilitarian basis. Mill was also alert of the 
‘tyranny of the majority’ – a threat from ‘coercive public opinion’ which also includes a threat of mass 
media to individual opinion. But within Mill’s framework, the distinction between ‘persuasion’ and ‘co-
ercion’ is difficult to identify - J J Ofseyer ‘Talking Liberty with John Stuart Mill’ [1999] Annual Survey 
of American Law 395, 414.       
99 Genetic Testing and Privacy (Ottawa, 1995) 2 as cited by J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking 
and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389. 
100 See also s 23(5) NZBoRA. See for the situation in the UK see G Moon and A Allen, ‘Dignity Dis-
course in Discrimination Law: A Better Route to Equality’ (2006) 6 European Human Rights Law Re-
view 610.  
101 The majority got it right - see Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 22 per Gault P and Blanchard J; 
paras 239 and 258 per Tipping J. 
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Kant) that Holmes so despised and Anderson J so ignores. Hence, I suggest that ‘pri-
vacy’ should be approached in a ‘bottom-up’ manner starting from human dignity.102 
The US approach, in contrast, is ‘top-down’ guided by the protection of freedom of 
speech as a systemic value. Indeed, this leads to a clash of diametrically opposed sys-
tems if US tort rules and First Amendment doctrine are supposed to be consistent par-
ticularly with the implications of the NZBoRA.103 To my mind, particularly some ju-
rists in New Zealand play on the nomenclature of their human rights instrument, but 
subcutaneously handle privacy actions in a ‘top-down’ manner by emphasising the sys-
temic value of freedom of speech. Anderson J is an apt example of this phenomenon.104 
In order to get the premise straight,105 it is suggested that his Honour’s statement should 
be reformulated as follows:  
 
Human dignity is the first and the last trench in the protection of individual lib-
erty. All of the rights affirmed in the NZBoRA are protecting that particular con-
cept.106
102 Compare Richardson and Hitchens, who query whether ‘the current emphasis on privacy supports the 
conclusion that a shift has occurred towards a dignitary conception’ – M Richardson and L Hitchens, 
‘Celebrity privacy and the benefits from simple history’ in M Richardson and A T Kenyon (eds), New 
Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 250, 264.  
103 See also R Wacks, ‘Why there will never be an English common law privacy tort’ in M Richardson 
and A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 154, 169-70 (Wacks describes a systemic 
interpretation of free speech and a rights based approach on privacy and mentions, ‘[p]roblems instantly 
loom’). 
104 See also J Q Whitman, ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty’ (2004) 113 
Yale Law Journal 1151. Distinguishing individuality from community generally seems to be difficult for 
some scholars in the USA but is crucial to understand the difference of the systems. See for the protection 
human dignity in Israel - I Englard, ‘Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel’s Constitutional 
Framework’ (2000) 21 Cardozo Law Review 1903 for further details.         
105 In my view, privacy follows from human dignity as embodied in modern human rights texts. Accord-
ingly, a tort protecting this interest has to be fashioned in a ‘bottom up’ manner once HRA or NZBoRA 
have been held applicable to a private law dispute. By choosing the term ‘premise’, I presuppose that 
privacy is also a moral claim. Privacy must therefore follow from its underlying premises. The premise is 
important because ‘it would be self-contradictory for anyone to assert the premise and at the same time to 
deny the conclusion’ – see A J Rappaport, ‘Beyond Personhood and Autonomy: Moral Theory and the 
Premises of Privacy’ [2001] Utah Law Review 441, 451.     
106 The characterisation of human dignity as a ‘concept’ has been used deliberately as the lowest common 
denominator – see G Moon and A Allen ‘Dignity Discourse in Discrimination Law: A Better Route to 
Equality’ (2006) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 610, 615 for further details (the authors discuss 
human dignity as a concept, interest, value and right). See also Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC) 
para 177 per Thomas J. This is also the basis of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) as evidenced in its Preamble: ‘The States Parties to the present covenant […] Recognizing that 
these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person […] Realizing that the individual, hav-
ing duties to other individuals and to community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive 
 
 
25 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
It may sound like a ‘verbal quibble,’ but it means something completely differ-
ent. In more illustrative terms, history repeats itself and a Kantian approach with its fo-
cus on the individuals’ intrinsic worth has ‘another go’ on Holmesian common law 
once modern human rights instruments have been held applicable. Someone used to a 
system as implemented in the HRA and NZBoRA is indeed likely to be instantly re-
pulsed by the doctrinal framework underlying the US privacy tort. However, this must 
always be seen in the light of the law’s cultural setting. It should be stressed that US 
law is generally committed to an individualistic ideology and has consequently uncou-
pled liberty from individual responsibility to a large extent.107 We will see later that this 
primarily negative understanding of liberty is well attuned to a tort law regime, which 
also focuses on the liberty interests of defendants. Security interests of plaintiffs in their 
personal (private) information therefore do not feature prominently in this socio-
political climate. Thus, it should already be indicated that certain forms of constitution-
alism work smoothly together with certain understandings of tort law and its underlying 
theory. The uncompromising emphasis on liberty in US law, by contrast, may be the 
chief reason for a practically defunct privacy tort. However, we will now return to First 
Amendment issues. 
1.2.3 Constitutionalisation of private law       
Why is the interpretation of the First Amendment important for the common law 
tort in the first place? The Supreme Court held in New York Times v Sullivan, ‘the Con-
stitution delimits a State’s power to award damages in libel actions brought by public 
officials against critics of their official conduct.’108 The Fourteenth Amendment (the 
Due Process Clause) made the First Amendment applicable to the states.109 Beforehand, 
the Court had never accepted that a libel case raises constitutional questions; previous 
rulings rather said that libellous publications were not protected by the scope of the 
 
for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant, agree upon the fol-
lowing articles: […].’ 
107 E J Eberle, ‘Public Discourse in Contemporary Germany’ (1997) 47 Case Western Reserve Law Re-
view 797, 900-01. 
108 New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 283 (1964). 
109 Ibid, at p 295 (Black J concurring); see also E Tison, ‘Straddling the Fence: Justice Breyer's concur-
rence in Bartnicki v Vopper gives Protection of Privacy and still Manages to Protect the Press: Bartnicki 
v Vopper,  532 US 514 (2001)’ (2003) 27 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 661, 662.   
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First Amendment at all.110 The underlying rationale of the extension was to provide 
breathing space for the press to report about matters of public concern.111 An important 
implication of this ruling was the ‘constitutionalisation’ of the private law sphere.112 
One of the major issues the Court had to deal with was as to whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment is directed against state action as distinct from private conduct. According 
to the Court, it matters not that private parties were involved in a civil action based on 
common law.113  
 
This constitutional privilege was later explicitly applied to the public disclosure 
tort.114 The exact constitutional impact on private law is opaque though. It is neverthe-
less plain that the constitution operates directly to control and delimit governmental 
power; it does not (directly) govern the relationship of purely private actors.115 The 
Constitution provides a value-neutral scheme of negative liberties and therefore concen-
trates on limiting official power; the state has thus no positive obligation to protect the 
rights of citizens.116 The Supreme Court of California later observed that ‘newsworthi-
ness’ was an element of the tort as well as a constitutional defence. It is hence not nec-
110 J Rozenberg Privacy and the Press (2004) 175; see also D A Logan, ‘Tort Law and the Central Mean-
ing of the First Amendment’ (1990) 51 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 493, 505. The Court cited 
John Stuart Mill and John Milton in support of its opinion – New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 272 
fn 13, at p 279 fn 19 (1964).   
111 R A Smolla, ‘Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News’ (1999) 67 George Washington 
Law Review 1097, 1135.
112 See E J Eberle, ‘Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American Constitutional 
Law’ [1997] Utah Law Review 963 fn 170; see also G E White, Tort Law in America: An intellectual 
History (expanded ed, 2003) 176, where White observes that the tort became nearly ‘constitutionalized’ 
by the 1970s; W P Keeton (ed), Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed, 1984) 857; S W Halpern, ‘The ‘In-
violate Personality’ Warren and Brandeis after One Hundred Years’ [1990] Northern Illinois University 
Law Review 387, 397; D A Logan, ‘Tort Law and the Central Meaning of the First Amendment’ (1990) 
51 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 493, 494, who argues that the result of New York Times v Sulli-
van has been ‘an overlay of constitutional protections.’ 
113 New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 265 (1964). 
114 Gilbert v Medical Economics Co, 665 F 2d 305, 307 (1981); Campbell v Seabury Press, 614 F 2d 395, 
397 (1980). See also D A Logan, ‘Tort Law and the Central Meaning of the First Amendment’ (1990) 51 
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 493, 494 and B Gormley, ‘A Hundred Years of Privacy’ [1992] 
Wisconsin Law Review 1335, 1387. 
115 J Lenow, ‘First Amendment Protection for the Publication of Private Information’ (2007) 60 Vander-
bilt Law Review 235, 252-3. Lenow also mentions a ‘state action doctrine,’ which can subject private 
persons to Constitutional obligation, but concludes with the inapplicability of this doctrine in the relevant 
context – at p 253 fn 76. For further details regarding this doctrine see S Gardbaum, ‘The "Horizontal 
Effect" of Constitutional Rights’ (2003) 102 Michigan Law Review 387, 412-3.   
116 E J Eberle, ‘Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American Constitutional Law’ 
[1997] Utah Law Review 963, 969, 1048; see also M Tushnet, ‘An Essay on Rights’ (1984) 62 Texas Law 
Review 1363, 1393. 
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essary to attempt ‘to keep rigorously separate the tort and constitutional issues as re-
gards newsworthiness.’117 A principled approach is arguably not identifiable,118 but 
there are broad similarities to what will be addressed as ‘indirect horizontal effect’ (due 
to the fact that the power of the states to award civil damages is delimited by the First 
Amendment)119 later on during the discussion of the remaining legal systems.120  
1.2.4 Constitutional viability of the public disclosure tort 
What are the implications of this extension? The essential problem with which 
the courts were confronted henceforth could be outlined as follows: if the First 
Amendment is understood to protect the dissemination of truthful information at its un-
touchable core, such a right to privacy is in direct conflict with the First Amendment.121 
Consequently, any attempt to regulate the flow of true private information would inevi-
tably impose unconstitutional restrictions on speech rights. Such a First Amendment 
doctrine, as outlined above, would make the existence of the public disclosure branch of 
the privacy tort impossible; the First Amendment would entirely ‘swallow’ the private 
facts tort simply because it cannot exist within this constitutional framework.122 On the 
other hand, if the essence of the First Amendment speech is understood as guaranteeing 
the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of ‘public interest’ or ‘public concern’ 
respectively, restricting the dissemination of truthful information cannot be regarded as 
unconstitutional per se.123 Instead, the settlement of the conflict between privacy and 
free speech would consist in a balancing process of some kind in order to determine 
117 Shulman v Group W Productions Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 216 (1998). 
118 S W Halpern, ‘Rethinking the Right of Privacy: Dignity, Decency, and the Law’s Limitations’ (1991) 
43 Rutgers Law Review 539, 549 - Halpern recognises that a ‘Byzantine structure’ has developed as a 
result of constitutionalisation of communicative torts. 
119 See, eg, Morgan by and through Chambon v Celender, 780 F Supp 307, 310 (1992). 
120 See also P Gewirtz, ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Review 139, 180; R A Smolla, ‘Ac-
counting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law’ (2002) 27 Nova Law Review Nova Law Review 
289, 297, who notes that the newsworthiness element is ‘incorporated by common law doctrine and man-
dated by First Amendment.’ 
121 R A Smolla, ‘Information as a Contraband:  The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in 
Speech’ (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1099, 1110. 
122 Ibid, at p 1112; see also P Gewirtz, ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Review 139, 156-7; J 
B Mintz, ‘The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain’ (1996) 55 
Maryland Law Review 425, 443-4; J Lenow, ‘First Amendment Protection for the Publication of Private 
Information’ (2007) 60 Vanderbilt Law Review 235, 281. 
123 E J Bloustein, ‘Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Un-
constitutional as Well?’ (1968) 46 Texas Law Review 611, 622. 
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whether speech on matters of public concern is at issue.124 The dilemma in the United 
States can probably be best be summed up by the difficulty in explaining precisely why 
and under which circumstances an interest in privacy protecting against the public dis-
semination of truthful information is consonant with the aforementioned democratic 
traditions of robust protection for free speech.125 Thus, the major challenge is to con-
strue a so-called newsworthiness element consonant with First Amendment doctrine, 
which does not swallow up the tort.126    
 
The Supreme Court first dealt with this question in Cox Broadcasting Corp v 
Cohn.127 The plaintiff’s 17-year-old daughter was a rape victim whose identity was 
published by the defendant who received this information from a court clerk. The Court 
was reluctant to ‘address the broader question whether truthful publications may ever be 
subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the First and 14th Amend-
ment.’128 On the other hand, the Court acknowledged ‘powerful arguments’ in favour of 
a ‘zone of privacy’ worth of state protection whilst sidestepping its delineation.129 
These concessions notwithstanding, the public dissemination tort was singled out as 
particular problematic.130 These statements circumscribe the underlying question 
whether the public dissemination tort is consonant with the supreme law; in other words 
whether or not this kind of ‘violation of privacy is, as a tort, to be written out of the 
law.’131 On this occasion, it was not necessary to address the question because for the 
decision it was sufficient to deny recovery for the disclosure of facts that are a matter of 
public record.132 The US Supreme Court therefore only ruled that the privilege for 
124 R A Smolla, ‘Information as a Contraband:  The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in 
Speech’ (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1099, 1110.  
125 According to P Gewirtz, the US Supreme Court has not marked out ‘any area in which privacy trumps 
media prerogatives’ - ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Review 139, 157. 
126 See J A Jurata, ‘The Tort That Refuses To Go Away: The Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure of 
Private Facts’ (1999) 36 San Diego Law Review 489, 537. 
127 Cox Broadcasting Corp v Cohn, 420 US 469 (1975). 
128 Ibid, at p 491; D A Richards, ‘Public and Private in the Discourse of the First Amendment’ (2000) 12 
Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 61, 88-89. 
129 Cox Broadcasting Corp v Cohn, 420 US 469, 487 (1975) citing Warren and Brandeis, ‘The Right to 
Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193, 196. 
130 Ibid, at p 489. 
131 Virgil v Time Inc, 527 F 2d 1122, 1127 (1975); M Schadrack, ‘Privacy and the Press: A Necessary 
Tension’ (1985) 18 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 949, 953. 
132 See Florida Star v BJF, 491 US 524, 532 (1989); K Ruckdaschel-Haley, ‘The Florida Star v BJF: Bal-
ancing Freedom of the Press and the Right to Privacy upon Publication of a Rape Victim's Identity’ 
(1990) 35 South Dakota Law Review 94, 105. 
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truthful, lawfully obtained public records was absolute; to hold otherwise, the Judges 
opined, would ‘invite timidity and self-censorship.’133  
 
In Virgil v Time Inc134, the Federal Appellate Court attempted to further eluci-
date the relationship of privacy with freedom of speech. The Court opined that the pro-
tection of all true information ‘would seem to deny the existence’ of the public disclo-
sure tort.135 Instead, the Court explicitly adopted the ‘public concern’ standard, based 
on community mores, of the common law.136 Accordingly, non-newsworthy true pri-
vate facts were held to be not privileged by the First Amendment.137     
 
Later in Florida Star v BJF138 the Supreme Court held that the revelation of a 
rape victim’s identity was privileged under the First Amendment.139 In contrast to Cox, 
this case did not involve facts already available from a public record.140 The Court ex-
tended First Amendment protection nevertheless because the victim’s identity was ‘le-
gally obtain[ed] truthful information about a matter of public significance.’141 More-
over, the reportage about the commission and examination of a violent crime involved a 
‘matter of paramount public importance.’142 The interest of protecting the identities of 
rape victims, by contrast, did not amount to the necessary ‘state interest of the highest 
order.’143 This case exemplifies the general approach with which the courts determine a 
matter of legitimate public concern – the remaining central problem. The issue, at least 
known since 1967,144 is usually treated at the highest level of generality, for instance, 
133 Cox Broadcasting Corp v Cohn, 420 US 496 (1975); see also P J Mc Nulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of 
Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 Drake Law Review 93, 103; W P Keeton (ed), 
The Law of Torts (5th ed, 1984) 863, noting that the Court indicated receptivity to possible liability of 
facts that are not a matter of public record. 
134 527 F 2d 1122 (1975). 
135 Ibid, at p 1128. 
136 Ibid, at p 1129. 
137 Gilbert v Medical Economics Co, 665 F 2d 305, 308 (1981). 
138 491 US 524, 536-37 (1989). 
139 Ibid, at pp 530-1. 
140 However, the case was primarily decided on the ground that the state may not punish the publication 
of information provided by the state itself - J A Jurata, ‘The Tort That Refuses To Go Away: The Subtle 
Reemergence of Public Disclosure of Private Facts’ (1999) 36 San Diego Law Review 489, 500. 
141 Florida Star v BJF, 491 US 524, 536 (1989). 
142 Ibid, at p 536-7. 
143 Ibid, at p 537-8. 
144 E J Bloustein, ‘Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Un-
constitutional as Well?’ (1968) 46 Texas Law Review 611, 628. 
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the public interest in rape as a criminal offence.145 On the other hand, the Supreme 
Court paid little attention to the issue whether the victim’s identity involved a public 
concern.146 The determinative point was whether private information is ‘relevant’ to the 
report of the crime as the general matter.147 The rape victim’s identity was thus of pub-
lic significance.148 What should be regarded as relevant is to a high degree left up to the 
journalist, as the courts are reluctant to perform a judicial second-guessing on the mat-
ter.149 The distinct issue as to whether mentioning of the identity, for instance, adds 
something to the understanding of the general matter is often left out by the courts.150 
However, the relevance-characteristic seems consistent with First Amendment doctrine 
inasmuch as speech is even-handedly treated, that is, regardless of its contents. As de-
terminant for identifying matters of public concern as an element of the common law 
tort, we will revisit the relevance-requirement as a ‘logical nexus’ between specific pri-
vate information and general matters of public concern.  
 
The dissenting opinion151 criticised the majority’s absolutist view and demanded 
balancing the interest in a free press ‘against rival interests in a civilized and humane 
society.’152 This case is important because the Federal Supreme Court arguably laid the 
public disclosure tort to rest with its decision; it is today at least ‘for most practical pur-
145 D A Anderson, ‘The Failure of American Privacy Law’ in B S Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy 
(1999) 139, 151; K W Bacon, ‘Florida Star v BJF: The Right of Privacy Collides with the First Amend-
ment’ (1990) 76 Iowa Law Review 139, 150-51 (1990); K Ruckdaschel-Haley, ‘The Florida Star v BJF: 
Balancing Freedom of the Press and the Right to Privacy upon Publication of a Rape Victim's Identity’ 
(1990) 35 South Dakota Law Review 94, 111; J Lenow, ‘First Amendment Protection for the Publication 
of Private Information’ (2007) 60 Vanderbilt Law Review 235, 272-3. 
146 J M Hilmert, ‘The Supreme Court Takes on the First Amendment Privacy Conflict and Stumbles: 
Bartnicki v Vopper, the Wiretapping Act, and the Notion of Unlawfully Obtained Information’ (2002) 77 
Indiana Law Journal 639, 647; J Siprut, ‘Privacy Through Anonymity: An Economic Argument for Ex-
panding the Right of Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 33 Pepperdine Law Review 311, 331. 
147  D A Anderson, ‘The Failure of American Privacy Law’ in B S Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy 
(1999) 139, 151.   
148 K W Bacon, ‘Florida Star v BJF: The Right of Privacy Collides with the First Amendment’ (1990) 76 
Iowa Law Review 139, 149; J Lenow, ‘First Amendment Protection for the Publication of Private Infor-
mation’ (2007) 60 Vanderbilt Law Review 235, 250 (2007). 
149 See also P J Mc Nulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 
50 Drake Law Review 93, 108. 
150  D A Anderson, ‘The Failure of American Privacy Law’ in B S Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy 
(1999) 139, 152; see also P J Mc Nulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after Flor-
ida Star’ (2001) 50 Drake Law Review 93, 111-2. 
151 Written by Justice White and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor. 
152 Florida Star v BJF, 491 US 524, 547 (1989). 
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poses dead.’153 According to Justice White, the ruling ‘obliterate[s] one of the most 
noteworthy legal inventions of the 20th century: the tort of the publication of private 
facts.’154 However, the Court has consciously avoided pronouncing a general rule as to 
how the tension between freedom of speech and this privacy interest should be re-
solved.155 The narrow holding of the Court in Florida Star did not mean that ‘truthful 
publication is automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of per-
sonal privacy within which the State may protect the individual from intrusion by the 
press.’156 The Court rather emphasised that the conflict between privacy and free 
speech has been solved in the discrete factual context of the specific case.157  
 
Shortly afterwards, Federal Courts were quick to declare that the public disclo-
sure tort was not totally defunct.158 Nevertheless, reviewed in aggregate it is fair to con-
clude that the Supreme Court left the tort theoretically intact, but left even less room for 
claimants to argue a successful claim – hence the practical death of the action.159 The 
Court, as scholars emphasised in the aftermath, nonetheless placed particular emphasis 
on the lawfulness with which the personal material was obtained in Cox and Florida 
Star. The ‘lawfully obtained’ standard was therefore interpreted as the key to the tort’s 
constitutional viability.160 The protection of legally obtained truthful information is 
deeply rooted in the USA.161  
153 A J McClurg, ‘Bringing Privacy out of the Closet: A Tort Theory for Intrusions in Public Places’ 
(1995) 73 North Carolina Law Review 989, 1002. See also P B Edelman, ‘Free Press v Privacy: Haunted 
by the Ghost of Justice Black’ (1990) 68 Texas Law Review 1195, 1198; P J McNulty, ‘The Public Dis-
closure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 Drake Law Review 93, 111; R A 
Smolla, ‘Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News’ (1999) 67 George Washington Law 
Review 1097, 1101, who notes that the tort exists ‘more “in the books” than in practice.’
154 Florida Star v BJF, 491 US 524, 550 (1989) 
155 Gates v Discovery Communication Inc, 131 Cal Rptr 2d 534, 544 (2003); see also Virgil v Time Inc, 
527 F 2d 1122, 1127 (1975); Ozer v Borquez, 940 P 2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997). 
156 Florida Star v BJF, 491 US 524, 541 (1989). 
157 Ibid, at p 530; see also J R Rolfs, ‘The Florida Star v BJF:  The Beginning of the End for the Tort of 
Public Disclosure’ [1990] Wisconsin Law Review 1107, 1112. 
158 Haynes v Alfred A Knopf Inc, 8 F 3d 1222, 1232 (1993). 
159 See also J Lenow, ‘First Amendment Protection for the Publication of Private Information’(2007) 60 
Vanderbilt Law Review 235, 275, who argues that ‘no plaintiff stands a realistic chance’; J R Rolfs, ‘The 
Florida Star v BJF: The Beginning of the End for the Tort of Public Disclosure’ [1990] Wisconsin Law 
Review 1107, 1111; S W Halpern, ‘The ‘Inviolate Personality’ Warren and Brandeis after One Hundred 
Years’ [1990] Northern Illinois University Law Review 387, 398. 
160 J B Mintz, ‘The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain’ (1996) 
55 Maryland Law Review 425, 456 citing C J Shapiro, The First Amendment and the Private Domain; see 
also P J Mc Nulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 
Drake Law Review 93, 97; J R Rolfs, ‘The Florida Star v BJF: The Beginning of the End for the Tort of 
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It was only much later in Bartnicki v Vopper162, a case concerned with the con-
stitutionality of the Wiretapping Act’s disclosure provisions, that these hopes were par-
tially disappointed.163 The defendant broadcast an illegally taped phone call164 made by 
the plaintiffs revealing a telephone number among other personal information. The me-
dia defendant in this case had lawfully obtained the information from its source.165 The 
main question was whether the government would punish the ensuing publication based 
on a defect in the chain when the source for her part obtained the information unlaw-
fully.166 The case was concerned with private communication and therefore exemplifies 
the conflict as well as the interdependency of privacy and freedom of speech.167  
 
Once more, the US Supreme Court refused to answer the crucial question as to 
whether the publication of truthful material may ever be punished consistently with the 
First Amendment.168 The Justices stated that the ‘significance of the interests presented 
in clashes between the First Amendment and the privacy rights’ led to a narrow ruling 
confined to the particular circumstances of the case.169 However, all nine Justices ac-
cepted the premise that the conflict posed between speech and privacy was one between 
 
Public Disclosure’ [1990] Wisconsin Law Review 1107, 1127-8. The lawfully obtained doctrine provides 
‘that publicizing private information is constitutionally protected if three factors are met: (1) the informa-
tion publicized was lawfully obtained; (2) the information concerns a matter of public significance; and 
(3) the imposition of liability does not serve a compelling state interest’ - S M Scott, ‘The Hidden First 
Amendment Values of Privacy’ (1996) 71 Washington Law Review 683, 693. 
161 R A Smolla, ‘Accounting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law’ (2002) 27 Nova Law Re-
view 289, 304. 
162 532 US 514 (2001). 
163 The case is nevertheless instructive with regard to the public disclosure tort - R A Smolla, ‘Accounting 
for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law’ (2002) 27 Nova Law Review 289, 305. 
164 An unidentified person intercepted and recorded a cell phone conversation - Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 
US 514, 514 (2001). 
165 The defendant argued that he was not personally involved in the illegal recording, but the Court never-
theless accepted that he knew or had reason to believe that the interception was intentional and therefore 
unlawful – ibid, at p 525.  
166 Ibid, at p 515. See J H Hunt, ‘Bartnicki v Vopper: Another Media Victory or Ominous Warning of a 
Potential Change in Supreme Court First Amendment Jurisprudence?’ (2003) 30 Pepperdine Law Review 
367, 374 for further details. 
167 Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514, 537 (2001) per Justice Breyer (concurring); see also J Lenow, ‘First 
Amendment Protection for the Publication of Private Information’ (2007) 60 Vanderbilt Law Review 235, 
257-8. For a discussion of the interdependency of both interests see R Gavison, ‘Too Early for a Req-
uiem: Warren and Brandeis were Right on Privacy v Free Speech’ (1992) 43 South Carolina Law Review 
437, 458. 
168 Ibid, at p 529 per Justice Stevens, at p 535 per Justice Breyer (concurring). 
169 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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two rights of constitutional stature.170 Of greater interest was, of course, the reconcilia-
tion of the conflict.  
 
A 6-3 (or rather 4-2-3)171 majority held that the First Amendment protected the 
publicity given to this phone call, but it reached this conclusion by ‘weighing’ the plain-
tiff’s interest in privacy (of communication) versus free speech interests. It has to be 
stressed, however, that the ‘pure’ conflict between privacy and freedom of speech was 
not at issue here. Since the privacy interest was related to private communication, both 
sides of the balance bore a relationship to interests in freedom of speech. Bartnicki is 
arguably not instructive if privacy interests unrelated to speech are at stake.172  
 
The decisive factor was the ‘newsworthiness’ of the information taped. Justice 
Stevens argued for the nominal majority as follows: 173
 
[i]n these cases privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing 
matters of public importance. As Warren and Brandeis stated in their classic law review article: 
“The right of privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general 
interest.” […] One of the costs associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss 
of privacy.  
 
Even though it might be misleading to talk about balancing,174 the majority put 
special emphasis on the public interest of the information involved. One scholar re-
garded this as a ‘backhanded’ victory for privacy as some judges ‘endorse[d] the prin-
170 Ibid, at p 533 per Justice Stevens, at p 536 per Justice Breyer (concurring), at p 544 per Justices 
Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas (dissenting); see also J H Hunt, ‘Bartnicki v Vopper: Another Media Vic-
tory or Ominous Warning of a Potential Change in Supreme Court First Amendment Jurisprudence?’ 
(2003) 30 Pepperdine Law Review 367, 374. 
171 Stevens J delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, O'Connor and 
Breyer JJ joined. Breyer J filed a concurring opinion, in which O'Connor J joined. Rehnquist CJ filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas JJ joined. 
172 P Gewirtz, ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Review 139, 194. See also R Kilkenney, ‘In-
vasion of Privacy for the Greater Good: Why Bartnicki v Vopper Disserves the Right of Privacy and the 
First Amendment’ (2003) 64 Ohio State Law Journal 999, 1002; E W Tiritilli, ‘You Never Call Me 
Anymore: Bartnicki v Vopper and the Supreme Court's Abridgement of the Right of Privacy in Favor of 
the First Amendment Right of a Free Press’ (2002) 35 Creighton Law Review 729, 775. 
173 Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514, 534 (2001). 
174  First Amendment scholars often contend that the Supreme Court is ‘smoking out’ illegitimate pur-
poses for use of freedom of speech rather than performing a balancing exercise – eg, J Rubenfeld, ‘The 
First Amendment’s Purpose’ (2001) 53 Stanford Law Review 767, 786.
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cipal ingredients of the “publication of private facts” tort, with its “newsworthiness” 
defence built in, as it exists at common law.’175 Rodney Smolla argues that those courts 
that have struggled with this question most seriously over the years appear to recognise 
that the existence of this branch of the tort is only possible if juries and judges deter-
mine ‘newsworthiness’ through some balancing process including an assessment of 
community norms.176  
 
Nevertheless, the determination of a public concern was again crucial. The four 
judges of the nominal majority, represented by Stevens J, embarked on an attempt to 
develop ‘rigid constitutional rules’177 but left the elusive public concern concept unex-
plored.178 Consistent with Florida Star, the sole determinant of the nominal majority 
seems to have been the relevance of the disclosed personal material for the media cov-
erage’s main topic.179 Scholars interpret this as a modified version of Diane Zimmer-
man’s famous ‘leave it to the press model,’ because almost every private fact can be 
construed as being relevant to a public concern.180  
 
The remaining judges of the majority, Justices Breyer and O’Conner, favoured 
an ad hoc balancing test. Justice Breyer tried to strike a ‘reasonable balance’ by adopt-
ing a proportionality test.181 The learned Judge argued: 182
175 R A Smolla, ‘Information as a Contraband:  The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in 
Speech’ (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1099, 1149 -50; see also D P Paradis, ‘Bartnicki 
v Vopper: Cell Phones and Throwing Stones’ (2003) 37 New England Law Review 1117, 1150.   
176 Ibid, at p 1110. 
177 D P Paradis, ‘Bartnicki v Vopper: Cell Phones and Throwing Stones’ (2003) 37 New England Law 
Review 1117, 1141; see also E Tison, ‘Straddling the Fence: Justice Breyer's concurrence in Bartnicki v 
Vopper gives Protection of Privacy and still Manages to Protect the Press: Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 
514 (2001)’ (2003) 27 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 661, 683-4. 
178 E W Tiritilli, ‘You Never Call Me Anymore: Bartnicki v Vopper and the Supreme Court's Abridge-
ment of the Right of Privacy in Favor of the First Amendment Right of a Free Press’ (2002) 35 Creighton 
Law Review 729, 786. 
179 See E Tison, ‘Straddling the Fence: Justice Breyer's concurrence in Bartnicki v Vopper gives Protec-
tion of Privacy and still Manages to Protect the Press: Bartnicki v Vopper,  532 US 514 (2001)’ (2003) 27 
Southern Illinois University Law Journal 661, 682. 
180 E W Tiritilli, ‘You Never Call Me Anymore: Bartnicki v Vopper and the Supreme Court's Abridge-
ment of the Right of Privacy in Favor of the First Amendment Right of a Free Press’ (2002) 35 Creighton 
Law Review 729, 786; see also P Gewirtz, ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Review 139, 154; 
E Tison, ‘Straddling the Fence: Justice Breyer's concurrence in Bartnicki v Vopper gives Protection of 
Privacy and still Manages to Protect the Press: Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514 (2001)’ (2003) 27 South-
ern Illinois University Law Journal 661, 686-7.  
181 P Gewirtz, ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Review 139, 195; see also R Kilkenney, ‘In-
vasion of Privacy for the Greater Good: Why Bartnicki v Vopper Disserves the Right of Privacy and the 
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I would ask whether the statutes strike a reasonable balance between their speech-restricting 
and speech-enhancing consequences. Or do they instead impose restrictions on speech that are 
disproportionate when measured against their corresponding privacy and speech-related bene-
fits, taking into account the kind, the importance, and the extent of these benefits, as well as the 
need for the restrictions in order to secure those benefits? 
 
One scholar regarded this opinion as the beginning of greater privacy protection 
in speech-privacy cases.183 Thus, the difference between both majority opinions could 
be found in the determination of a matter of a public concern. To Smolla, however, this 
broad acceptance appears to have another dimension since ‘it has been forcefully ar-
gued that treating the balance between privacy and speech interests as a conflict be-
tween two constitutional rights is misleading and wrong, because the Constitution only 
prohibits restrictions on speech or invasions of privacy by the government, and is silent 
about similar restrictions when they come from private actors.’ 184 Smolla seems to im-
ply that the acceptance of the newsworthiness defence would also be a backhanded vic-
tory for those arguing in favour of the applicability of a constitutional ‘right’ to privacy 
in cases between private litigators on both sides. The scholar therefore seems to outline 
a horizontal application of this ‘right.’ 
 
Solove summarises the implications of Bartnicki by mentioning, ‘it is appropri-
ate to turn to the public disclosure tort cases for guidance on how courts have distin-
 
First Amendment’ (2003) 64 Ohio State Law Journal 999, 1025; J M Hilmert, ‘The Supreme Court Takes 
on the First Amendment Privacy Conflict and Stumbles: Bartnicki v Vopper, the Wiretapping Act, and 
the Notion of Unlawfully Obtained Information’ (2002) 77 Indiana Law Journal 639, 655 (‘[…] amor-
phous sort of ad hoc balancing test’); E Tison, ‘Straddling the Fence: Justice Breyer's concurrence in 
Bartnicki v Vopper gives Protection of Privacy and still Manages to Protect the Press: Bartnicki v Vop-
per, 532 US 514 (2001)’ (2003) 27 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 661, 684; E B Easton, ‘Pub-
lic Importance: Balancing Proprietary Interests and the Right to Know’ (2003) 21 Cardozo Arts and En-
tertainment Law Journal 139, 173.  
182 Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514, 536 (emphasis added). 
183 P Gewirtz, ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Review 139, 141; see also B C Murchison, 
‘Revisiting the American action for public disclosure of private facts’ in M Richardson and A T Kenyon 
(eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 32, 50. 
184 R A Smolla, ‘Information as a Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in 
Speech’ (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1099, 1110 (emphasis added).   
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guished between matters of public and private concern.’185 Balancing is what seems to 
be required and ‘balancing means assessing the value of particular forms of speech 
against their costs.’186 Privacy enthusiasts therefore seem to regard the implementation 
of the newsworthiness element187 of the common law as First Amendment doctrine as a 
chance to revitalise the private facts tort.188 There is one basic caveat though. ‘Assess-
ing the value of particular forms of speech’ results in a content-based restriction of 
speech.189 This would presuppose the possibility to distinguish, by way of illustration, 
the value of ‘political speech’ from ‘commercial speech.’190 On this basis, however, the 
newsworthiness defence could not be implemented successfully without ‘anything short 
of a complete overhaul’ of the First Amendment doctrine.191 The present doctrine dis-
tinguishes between personal information relevant to a general matter of public concern 
and personal information irrelevant to such a matter. This approach, in contrast, strives 
for maintaining content-neutrality.   
 
In sum, one can surely write volumes about this issue but at the end of the day 
the constitutional viability of the public disclosure tort depends on the following: a 
readiness to accord different weight or importance to different kinds of speech as dis-
tinct from maintaining content-neutrality at all costs. To my mind, this seemingly in-
nocuous difference might distinguish a ‘civilised and humane society’192 from a society 
185 D J Solove, ‘The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protection against Disclosure’ (2003) 
53 Duke Law Journal 967, 1001; see also P J Mc Nulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is 
Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 Drake Law Review 93, 133. 
186 Ibid, at p 1037; see also P B Edelman, ‘Free Press v Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black’ 
(1990) 68 Texas Law Review 1195, 1215.  
187 As accepted in Virgil v Time Inc, 527 F 2d 1122, 1129 (1975).  
188 See also N M Richards, ‘Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment’ (2005) 52 UCLA Law 
Review 1149, 1200, who observes that scholars generally try to rejuvenate the private facts tort by deter-
mining ‘private’ speech or at least speech that is not a matter of public concern. 
189 D J Solove, ‘The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protection against Disclosure’ (2003) 
53 Duke Law Journal 967, 984-5.  
190 See J Rubenfeld, ‘The First Amendment’s Purpose’ (2001) 53 Stanford Law Review 767, 824-6 for the 
concomitant difficulties and further details. 
191 J Elford, ‘Trafficking in Stolen Information: A “Hierarchy of Rights” Approach to the Private Facts 
Tort’ (1995) 105 Yale Law Journal 727, 735; see also D J Solove, ‘The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justify-
ing Privacy Protection Against Disclosure’ (2003) 53 Duke Law Journal 967, 984-5.  
192 Florida Star v BJF, 491 US 524, 547 (1989). 
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in which a mildly disguised ‘eat or be eaten’193 doctrine epitomises both ethereal 
heights and reality’s dull planes of constitutional speech review. 
1.3 Brief excursion to ‘hate speech’ and ‘fighting words’ 
A meaningful account of the First Amendment’s constitutional review should 
include a brief overview of the ‘tough’ cases. Perhaps every jurisdiction struggles with 
the appropriate handling of so-called hate speech and fighting words. Similar to the ad-
judication of private information, both categories require a restriction based on con-
tent.194 Translated into real world experience, content-neutrality means in this area of 
speech adjudication that a state may prohibit ‘fighting words’ as a whole, but not selec-
tive fighting words based, for instance, on race and colour.195  
 
The Court has initially used shorthand formulas saying that these types of 
speech are ‘not within the area of constitutionally protected speech’ or that the ‘protec-
tion of the First Amendment does not extend’ to them.196 This technique will be dis-
cussed later as definitional balancing. The Court has indicated, however, that these 
categories may not be regulated freely without any First Amendment protection. Ac-
cording to Lenow, the US Supreme Court’s First Amendment conflict resolution in this 
area ‘appear to be rather clumsy attempts to mask what ultimately is a simple exercise 
in balancing the weight of the interests on each side of the speech equation discounted 
by the available alternative means available to further these interests.’197  
 
193 The central principle of Darwinism is, of course, the theory of evolution by natural selection – H Ho-
venkamp, ‘The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought’ (1993) 46 Vanderbilt Law Review 305, 306.  
194 See RAV v City of St Paul, 505 US 377, 400 (1992); see also P J Mc Nulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of 
Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 Drake Law Review 93, 138 who points to simi-
larities of the tort’s public concern element with the adjudication of so-called obscene speech. See also P 
Rishworth, G Hushcroft, S Optician and R Mahoney, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) 323 (Here-
inafter Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003)). 
195 E Kagan, ’Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment 
Doctrine’ (1996) 63 University of Chicago Law Review 413, 417 citing R A V v City of St Paul, 505 US 
377 (1992); see also S J Heyman, ‘Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of 
Freedom of Expression’ (1998) 78 Boston University Law Review 1275, 1380-81. Compare Virginia v 
Black, 538 US 343, 358 (2003), where the Court singled out Ku Klux Klan related cross burning because 
of its ‘particularly virulent form of intimidation.’  
196 RAV v City of St Paul, 505 US 377, 383 (1992) (internal citations omitted). 
197 J Lenow, ‘First Amendment Protection for the Publication of Private Information’ (2007) 60 Vander-
bilt Law Review 235, 246 (2007); see also B L Pedersen, ‘Florida Star v BJF: The Rape of the Right to 
Privacy’ (1990) 23 John Marwill Law Review 731, 751. 
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The Court’s unexpected reference to ‘responsibility’ and ‘morality’ is neverthe-
less significant. These notions are, as we have seen, otherwise absent from the First 
Amendment’s doctrinal framework. Interestingly, one scholar interprets these decisions 
as being consistent with Kant’s concepts of the autonomous and socially responsible 
individual.198 Wells argues cautiously and this observation might indeed be overambi-
tious since the Court takes refuge in communal responsibility199 and the communal in-
terest in morality.200 Individual responsibility is therefore irrelevant as distinct from a 
Kantian approach.201 Nonetheless, it is important to observe the Court’s unusual readi-
ness to engage in ‘normative’ or ‘value judgments.’ Proponents of negative liberty usu-
ally concede that liberty must sometimes yield to other values at some point. The re-
striction of liberty, however, is regarded as a ‘politically neutral statement of what lib-
erty, properly understood, really is;’ a value or normative judgment is in theorem 
strictly to be eschewed.202 This might explain the problems of the Supreme Court – 
such an approach is arguably only possible by means of definitional balancing as op-
posed to the balancing of conflicting interests. Rubenfeld argues that even this limited 
form of balancing is unconstitutional, because it attributes a lower value to certain kinds 
of speech.203 Nevertheless, the Court’s jurisprudence regarding relevant privacy inter-
ests and fighting words can be summarised by saying that they reflect ‘both an inability 
198 C E Wells, ’Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First 
Amendment Jurisprudence’ (1997) 32 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 159, 193; see 
also E Volokh, ‘Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to 
Stop People From Speaking about You’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1049, 1113 - Volokh notes that 
scholars have defended restrictions of sexually themed speech on grounds of dignity. 
199 RAV v City of St Paul, 505 US 377, 392 (1992) (‘[i]t is the responsibility, even the obligation, of di-
verse communities to confront such notions in whatever form they appear’ – emphasis added, internal 
citations omitted). 
200 Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 571-2 (1942) (‘There are certain well-defined and nar-
rowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise 
any Constitutional problem[...]. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit  that may be de-
rived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality’ – emphasis added); 
RAV v City of St Paul, 505 US 377, 400 (1992) (‘within the confines of [these] given classification[s], the 
evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process 
of case-by-case adjudication is required’ – emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted).   
201 For a distinction between the two approaches see also more specifically K Kersch, ‘The New Legal 
Transnationalism, the Globalized Judiciary, and the Rule of Law’ (2005) 4 Washington University Global 
Studies Law Review 345, 370 (‘Were the Court to look abroad to Europe's free speech jurisprudence, par-
ticularly as it concerns matters of ‘hate speech,’ it would trouble many who value the Court's recent ex-
pansive readings of free speech protections’). 
202 R M Dworkin, ‘Hart's Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 1, 6 (emphasis added).  
203 J Rubenfeld, ‘The First Amendment’s Purpose’ (2001) 53 Stanford Law Review 767, 824. 
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and an unwillingness to come to terms, directly and plainly, with the regulation of con-
tent of what a speaker says.’204  
 
The reason may well be the constitutional focus on ‘negative liberty’ and the 
‘episodic’ rather than ‘systematic’ nature of the approach adopted for interpreting the 
First Amendment. On the other hand, modern human rights instruments contain limita-
tion clauses such as s 5 NZBoRA or art 8 (2) ECHR, which require a systematic rather 
than episodic approach on speech regulation.205 As will be discussed below, Tipping J’s 
approach in Hosking is an illustrative example of such an approach.  
1.4 Conclusion on the constitutional law  
Seen from the perspective of comparative law, the US approach is generally 
‘quite extreme’ and ‘at the far end of the spectrum;’ according to Gewirtz, ‘[n]o other 
democratic country forbids restrictions on expressive conduct as completely as the 
United States.’206 One may thus argue that the country’s interpretation of free speech is 
not particularly successful on a global marketplace of ideas.207 The US Supreme Court 
strongly emphasises the systemic value of speech, which provides the fertile ground al-
lowing these extreme results to blossom. All utterances are of equal importance to pub-
lic discourse, as the argument goes slightly simplified, any ideas entering the market-
place will thus not be restricted. The Court has consequently established a tradition of 
extremely narrow rulings,208 which left the speech-privacy conflict itself ‘uncharted’209 
however. If and under which circumstances the publication of true information may im-
204 See V Mayer-Schonberger, T E Foster, ‘More Speech, Less Noise: Amplifying Content-Based Speech 
Regulations Through Binding International Law’ (1995) 18 Boston College International and Compara-
tive Law Review 59, 60.  
205 See generally A Barak, ‘Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience’ (2007) 57 University of Toronto 
Law Journal 369, 369-70  
206 P Gewirtz, ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Review 139, 188; see also D A Elder, ‘Truth, 
Accuracy and Neutral Reportage: Beheading the Media Jabberwork’s Attempts to Circumvent New York 
Times v Sullivan’ (2007) 9 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 551, 552. 
207 See K Kersch, ‘The New Legal Transnationalism, the Globalized Judiciary, and the Rule of Law’ 
(2005) 4 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 345, 347 (2005). 
208 D P Paradis, ‘Bartnicki v Vopper: Cell Phones and Throwing Stones’ (2003) 37 New England Law 
Review 1117, 1143 (2003).  
209 Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514, 530 fn 5 (2001). 
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pose civil liability is vague as a result.210 In the law’s present state, the conflict’s solu-
tion will be a matter of legal first impression each time.211  
 
From here, two key implications can be distilled. First, the Supreme Court tac-
itly implicated a possible co-existence of the private facts torts with the First Amend-
ment.212 The Court was well aware of the conflict’s gravity and had the chance to write 
the tort out of the law several times. It did not do so.213 The reason for this is most 
likely the Court’s acknowledgement of the public concern or newsworthiness element, 
which nourishes the tort’s theoretical constitutional viability. Secondly, the Court’s 
natural preference for bright-line-tests in order to perform constitutional review (of 
speech restriction based on its content) is arguably incompatible with the necessity to 
decide what actually is and what is not in the generally acknowledged public interest. In 
the background lurks the context sensibility, which evolved as a prevalent characteristic 
of the speech-privacy conflict.214 A supposed bright line test which ‘sweep[s] no more 
broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case’215 simply is no such rigid con-
stitutional rule. The analytical approach of the Supreme Court is hence entirely ad 
hoc.216  
 
Even though the rulings can be interpreted as saying that the public dissemina-
tion tort is not unconstitutional per se, informational privacy was not afforded the sys-
210 M Schadrack, ‘Privacy and the Press: A Necessary Tension’ (1985) 18 Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review 949, 950; see also B L Pedersen, ‘Florida Star v BJF: The Rape of the Right to Privacy’ (1990) 23 
John Marwill Law Review 731, 751; E W Tiritilli, ‘You Never Call Me Anymore: Bartnicki v Vopper 
and the Supreme Court's Abridgement of the Right of Privacy in Favor of the First Amendment Right of 
a Free Press’ (2002) 35 Creighton Law Review 729, 764; J Lenow, ‘First Amendment Protection for the 
Publication of Private Information’ (2007) 60 Vanderbilt Law Review 235, 281-2. 
211 J M Hilmert, ‘The Supreme Court Takes on the First Amendment Privacy Conflict and Stumbles: 
Bartnicki v Vopper, the Wiretapping Act, and the Notion of Unlawfully Obtained Information’ (2002) 77 
Indiana Law Journal 639, 659. 
212 J A Jurata, ‘The Tort That Refuses To Go Away: The Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure of 
Private Facts’ (1999) 36 San Diego Law Review 489, 504; see also D J Solove, ‘The Virtues Of Knowing 
Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure’ (2003) 53 Duke Law Journal 967, 988. 
213 See also J R Rolfs, ‘The Florida Star v BJF: The Beginning of the End for the Tort of Public Disclo-
sure’ [1990] Wisconsin Law Review 1107, 1111, who observes, ‘[y]et if the Court is reluctant to punish 
truthful publication, it is equally reluctant to grant the press a blanket privilege to publish truth.’ 
214 See Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514, 529 per Stevens J. 
215 Florida Star v BJF, 491 US 524, 533 (1989).  
216 J Lenow, ‘First Amendment Protection for the Publication of Private Information’ (2007) 60 Vander-
bilt Law Review 235, 237.  
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temic value arguably necessary to challenge free speech interests in that country.217 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the determination of the public interest element 
of the tort is firmly in the hands of First Amendment jurisprudence. The element origi-
nates from the public disclosure tort and as such from the common law,218 but it has to 
be interpreted in the light of the Supreme Court decisions.219 Judges deciding a com-
mon law case unavoidably have to reproduce First Amendment doctrine while deter-
mining a matter of public concern. To turn the argument on its head, it says that judges 
in other common law jurisdictions (for instance New Zealand) cannot use modern 
common law cases provided by US jurisdictions – at least not without importing First 
Amendment jurisprudence through the back door.220    
    
All relevant decisions addressing the speech-privacy conflict have in common 
that the courts have consistently ruled against the protection of the privacy interest.221 If 
privacy were an interest worth protecting, it would mock this interest straightaway if 
defendants could control liability by defining ‘newsworthy’ interests.222 The control 
about personal information is nonetheless largely vested in the defendant’s hands. The 
clearest determinant for a public concern seems to be the relevance-criterion, which al-
lows balancing of speech and privacy interests only to a marginal extent. The basic hin-
drance is again the Court’s strong emphasis on the marketplace of ideas theory, which 
postulates that content-neutrality has to be maintained. The single determinant of judg-
ing a particular thought’s power is then the competition in the marketplace.223 Since 
finding the ‘truth’ is perhaps the chief purpose of this theory, a State cannot restrict the 
flow of truthful information in general – including the type of information theoretically 
217 See P Gewirtz, ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Review 139, 165, 172. The systemic im-
portance had been mentioned in Virgil v Time Inc, 527 F 2d 1122, 1128 fn 7 (1975). 
218 Vassiliades v Garfinkel’s Brooks Bros Inc, 492 A 2d 580, 589 (1985). 
219 See also B C Murchison, ‘Revisiting the American action for public disclosure of private facts’ in M 
Richardson and A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 32, 46. 
220 We will later see, however, that precisely this happened (obiter) in Andrews v TVNZ Ltd High Court 
Auckland CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J). 
221J B Mintz, ‘The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain’ 55 
Maryland Law Review 425, 448 (1996); J Lenow, ‘First Amendment Protection for the Publication of 
Private Information’ (2007) 60 Vanderbilt Law Review 235, 276.  
222 Ibid, at p 443; see also Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 76 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
223 Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) per Holmes J (dissenting). 
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protected by the public disclosure tort.224 As McClurg has observed: ‘[g]iven the cur-
rent state of the law, it is quite possible that the public disclosure tort is "unconstitu-
tional" under the First Amendment.’225 In sum, given that the Court would follow its 
usual path consequently as opposed to ping-ponging between irreconcilable positions, 
the public dissemination tort would have to be written out of the law.226  
 
For the meaningful protection of private information in other jurisdictions, this 
has in turn two important implications: 
 
• Restricting truthful private information must be possible;227 
• Speech itself should be categorised according to the importance of 
its contents to informed public discourse. 
 
This becomes clear when one takes a closer look at Breyer J’s judgment in 
Bartnicki. Murchison has argued that ‘Justice Breyer strongly suggested that the analo-
gous public disclosure was neither dead nor obsolete.’228 However, such a statement 
must continue to point out why this is the case. The Judge tried to strike a ‘reasonable 
balance’, a balance where the ‘restrictions on speech’ are not ‘disproportionate’ to the 
‘speech related benefits.’229 In order to determine the benefits of speech, one has to 
look at its content however. Gewirtz’s assumption that this judgment marks the begin-
ning of greater privacy protection in the USA seems unlikely though – Breyer J’s ap-
224 See B L Pedersen, ‘Florida Star v BJF: The Rape of the Right to Privacy’ (1990) 23 John Marwill Law 
Review 731, 743. 
225 A J McClurg, ‘Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy through Implied Contracts of 
Confidentiality’ (2006) 74 University of Cincinnati Law Review 887, 888. 
226 See also J Lenow, ‘First Amendment Protection for the Publication of Private Information’ (2007) 60 
Vanderbilt Law Review 235, 268 (2007); J B Mintz, ‘The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Ex-
ploration of the Private Domain’ (1996) 55 Maryland Law Review 425, 431 fn 35 (arguing that resort to 
‘marketplace’ merely accentuates the problem); A J McClurg, ‘Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Rela-
tionship Privacy through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality’ (2006) 74 University of Cincinnati Law 
Review 887, 888; E Volokh, ‘Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of 
a Right to Stop People From Speaking about You’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1049, 1122 (arguing 
that restriction of personal information is unconstitutional unless contents protected by explicit or implied 
contract); E B Easton, ‘Public Importance: Balancing Proprietary Interests and the Right to Know’ (2003) 
21 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 139, 174 – Easton identifies the most sensible interpre-
tation of Bartnicki v Vopper as saying: ‘the right to know simply trumps all privacy interests.’  
227 See Virgil v Time Inc, 527 F 2d 1122, 1128 (1975). 
228 B C Murchison, ‘Revisiting the American action for public disclosure of private facts’ in M Richard-
son and A T Kenyon (ed), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 32, 49. 
229 Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514, 536 (2001) Breyer and O’Connor JJ concurring. 
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proach represents nothing short of the complete overhaul of First Amendment doc-
trine.230 The Judge is open-minded with respect to comparative law231 and his ruling 
seems to invoke the terminology used in Europe and elsewhere – in short, in systems 
not as extreme as the US model.232 The very notion of regarding comparative law as an 
option while interpreting the Constitution, as required by Breyer J’s judgment, seems to 
make other judges of the Supreme Court run for the door however.233 At least with the 
current majority in the Court, this attitude is unlikely to change.234             
 
2   The public dissemination tort 
We will now turn to the ‘micro-level’ of our analysis and, thus, to the private 
facts tort itself. As we know, the famous law review article ‘The Right to Privacy’235 is 
commonly regarded as the basis for the recognition of privacy interests in the USA. 
Warren, one of its authors, felt uncomfortable with the way the ‘yellow press’ observed 
the social life of his family and himself.236 Hence, it seems as if a typical ‘paparazzo 
scenario’ triggered off the discovery of a right to privacy with the later public disclosure 
tort being Warren and Brandeis’ chief concern.237 Even though they clearly identified 
230 Gewirtz explicitly recognises this by mentioning Justice Breyer’s ‘little observed but important ongo-
ing effort to develop a new approach to the First Amendment generally’ - P Gewirtz, ‘Privacy and 
Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Review 139, 141. 
231 See K Kersch, ‘The New Legal Transnationalism, the Globalized Judiciary, and the Rule of Law’ 
(2005) 4 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 345-6 Kersch argues that the judgments of, 
inter alia, Justices Breyer and O’Conner are calculated steps ‘to bring the [US Supreme] Court's ap-
proach toward constitutional interpretation into line with new approaches being taken by justices in the 
courts of other countries.’ 
232 D Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2007) 57 Univer-
sity of Toronto Law Journal 383, 384 (‘In a number of recent decisions Justice Breyer has shown an in-
terest in introducing proportionality analysis into US constitutional law, […]’). 
233 See K Kersch, ‘The New Legal Transnationalism, the Globalized Judiciary, and the Rule of Law’ 
(2005) 4 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 345, 370; see also W Brown Scott, ‘Oliver 
Wendell Holmes on Equality and Adarand’ (2003) 47 Howard Law Journal 59, 63; D Grimm, ‘Propor-
tionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 383, 384. 
234 See also D Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2007) 57 
University of Toronto Law Journal 383, 384. A thoughtful account concerned with the underlying prob-
lems is R C Post and R Siegel, ‘Originalism as a political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution’ 
(2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 545-592. 
235 S D Warren and L Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193. 
236 W L Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383. 
237 See also A J McClurg, ‘Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy through Implied Con-
tracts of Confidentiality’ (2006) 74 University of Cincinnati Law Review 887, 896; R A Smolla, ‘Ac-
counting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law’ (2002) 27 Nova Law Review 289, 296; S W 
Halpern, ‘Rethinking the Right of Privacy: Dignity, Decency, and the Law’s Limitations’ (1991) 43 Rut-
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the conflict with freedom of speech,238 both authors could not possibly foresee the con-
stitutional problems that occurred later on due to the Supreme Court’s rulings. When 
the article was published in 1890, no court had held the First Amendment applicable to 
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.239  
 
However, it seems worthwhile mentioning that this seminal article on privacy 
was published around the same time when Social Darwinism influenced First Amend-
ment marketplace of ideas theory back in 1919. The time roughly around 1890-1920 
was called the ‘progressive era’ in the USA in which particularly Social Darwinism and 
marginalism240 were ‘viewed as complementary models of human behavio[u]r.’241 It 
seems as if the public disclosure tort originates from the same historical period as the 
cause for its later death for practical purposes. Particularly the stronger influence of So-
cial Darwinian First Amendment doctrine in the wake of New York Times v Sullivan 
would offer an instructive insight into Harry Kalven’s observation; the scholar fa-
mously noticed that the newsworthiness element of the public disclosure branch was ‘so 
overpowering as virtually to swallow the tort’242 with its protected privacy interest. This 
observation is paraphrasing, of course, the classic theme of Darwinism. As will pres-
ently appear, with the extension of the constitutional privilege to speech involved in the 
common law privacy action, quintessentially Holmesian tort theory was finally united 
with Holmesian First Amendment doctrine. Whitman argues that Warren and Brandeis’ 
article, by contrast, was rather an aberration in this doctrinal framework due to incom-
patible European influences.243 As a result, cases once regarded as flagships244 of a 
 
gers Law Review 539, 543-4. 
238 S D Warren and L D Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy, (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193, 214; see 
also Note ‘The Right of Privacy’ (1906-07) 12 Virginia Law Register 91, 92; Brents v Morgan, 299 SW 
967, 970 (1927). 
239 Hall v Post, 372 SE 2d 711, 713 (1988). 
240 See H Hovenkamp, ‘The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought’ (1993) 46 Vanderbilt Law Review 
305, 308 for further details.  
241 Ibid; see also his ‘Knowledge about Welfare: Legal Realism and the Separation of Law and Econom-
ics’ (2000) 84 Minnesota Law Review 805, 808. Hovenkamp mentions - at p 810 - a third characteristic 
underlying the progressive thought: ‘objective welfare judgments, which are basically judgments about 
welfare that do not depend on assumptions about other people's mental states.’ See generally R S Sum-
mers, ‘Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century Legal Thought – A Synthesis and Critique of our 
Dominant Legal Theory about the Law and its Use’ (1980-81) 66 Cornell Law Review 861, 869-70. 
242 H Kalven, Jr, ‘Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?’ (1966) 31 Law and Contem-
porary Problems 326, 336. 
243 J Q Whitman, ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty’ (2004) 113 Yale Law 
Journal 1151, 1205-6. Whitman may be right in the conclusion to which he came and yet he does not 
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successful public disclosure tort, such as Briscoe v Reader's Digest245, were later ex-
plicitly overruled in the light of the Supreme Court’s expansive First Amendment juris-
prudence.246 The New Zealand Court of Appeal, in contrast, still called Melvin v 
Reid247 ‘the leading case in this area.’248
 
In the following, the elements of the public disclosure tort will be discussed. 
Maintaining the modesty of the approach I adopt, the following expositions will pre-
dominantly serve as a counterexample as to how a tort is perhaps not to be fashioned 
ideally – particularly in the light of its supposed consistency with a human rights in-
strument such as the NZBoRA. It might hence be advantageous to pretend that 
Prosser’s widely shared views are by some remarkable set of circumstances not sculp-
tured in marble. The USA has after all a quite chequered history in protecting informa-
tional privacy.249         
2.1 Elements of the tort according to the Restatement 
The credit for the contemporary formulation of the torts is routinely attributed to 
Prosser. Back in 1960, he evaluated about 300 cases, which he categorised into four dif-
ferent branches.250 Outside the USA, on the other hand, it is accepted that only 
 
capture the full picture. The problem rather seems to be that human dignity withers under the might of 
First Amendment doctrine – see Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 243 (1998) per 
Kennard J (concurring) for an illuminating analysis. Virgil v Time Inc, 527 F 2d 1122, 1128 fn 8 (1975) 
(‘[…] for privacy, no less than reputation, “reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dig-
nity and worth of every human being - a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty”’ – 
internal citation omitted). 
244 Eg, Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 69 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
245 Briscoe v Reader's Digest Association Inc, 93 Cal Rptr 866 (1971). 
246 Gates v Discovery Communications Inc, 131 Cal Rptr 2d 534, 539 (2003); see also Shulman v Group 
W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 246 (1998) per Kennard J (concurring); the same conclusion was 
reached by R Gavison, ‘Too Early for a Requiem: Warren and Brandeis were Right on Privacy v Free 
Speech’ (1992) 43 South Carolina Law Review 437, 452 fn 44 (1992).  
247 112 Cal App 285 (1931). 
248 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 69 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
249 Consider J Rosen, ‘Continental Divide’ [2004] Legal Affairs 49, 53; see also A J McClurg, ‘Bringing 
Privacy Law Out of The Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places’ (1995) 73 
North Carolina Law Review 989, 1004, who observes that ‘[r]eview of the case law discloses a judicial 
wariness of - if not outright hostility towards - the invasion of privacy torts.’ 
250 W L Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, 389: (1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s 
seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about 
the plaintiff (3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in the public eye; (4) Appropriation, for the defen-
dant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness. However, Prosser discussed the so-called ‘Right of 
Privacy’ under ‘Miscellaneous’ torts in his first edition (1941) of Handbook of the Law of Torts. In it, 
Prosser cited in passing an article from 1936 by a Gerald Dickler tellingly named ‘The Right of Privacy: 
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Prosser’s ‘intrusion’ and ‘public disclosure branch’ ‘are squarely within anyone's con-
ception of invasion of privacy’ while the other two branches seem to be disregarded.251 
By 2001, forty-one states recognized the public disclosure tort.252 It is important to 
note, however, that some states have acknowledged the public dissemination branch no 
earlier than the late 1990s although the tort had been repeatedly pronounced ‘dead’ at 
that time.253 This branch was generally rather slow to appear in the decisions of the 
courts.254 The reason for this moderate development is most likely the focus on intangi-
ble harm, which in turn was only slowly recognized as a tortious wrong.255 Prosser de-
lineated the limits of the public disclosure of private facts tort as follows: 
 
• the disclosure of the private facts must be a public disclosure, and not a 
private one; 
• the facts disclosed to the public must be private facts, and not public 
ones; 
• the matter made public must be one which would be offensive and ob-
jectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities. 256 
 
 
A Proposed Redefinition.’ Dickler distilled the first three categories – A L Peikoff, ‘The Right to Privacy: 
Contemporary Reductionists and their Critics‘(2006) 13 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law 
474, 489 (‘It seems that Prosser owes much to Dickler, much more than he acknowledges in his various 
works on privacy […]’); see also at p 489 fn 97, ‘[n]owhere does Prosser credit Dickler with identifying 
the original three categories of privacy cases.’ 
251 J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.4.01 at p 751; S 
W Halpern, ‘Rethinking the Right of Privacy: Dignity, Decency, and the Law’s Limitations’ (1991) 43 
Rutgers Law Review 539, 543. 
252 P J Mc Nulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 
Drake Law Review 93, 94; see also J B Mintz, ‘The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Explora-
tion of the Private Domain’ (1996) 55 Maryland Law Review 425, 432 fn 37 for an exhaustive enumera-
tion. 
253 Examples are Colorado in Ozer v Borquez, 940 P 2d 371, 376-7 (1997), Washington (State) in Reid v 
Pierce County, 961 P 2d 333, 339 (1998) and Minnesota in Lake v Wal-Mart Stores Inc, 582 NW 2d 231, 
236 (1998). Indiana, by contrast, seems undecided: compare Doe v Methodist Hospital, 690 NE 2d 681 
(1997) with Dietz v Finley Fine Jewellery Corp, 754 NE 2d 958, 966 (2001), but the state is at least seri-
ously considering the tort’s application - see Munsell v Hambright, 776 NE 2d 1272, 1282 (2002).  
254 W L Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, 392. 
255 G E White, Tort Law in America: An intellectual History (expanded ed, 2003) 173. The first case was 
Brents v Morgan, 299 SW 967 (1927). The courts still seem to allow only little leeway to impose liability 
for causing emotional distress - K M. Beasley, ‘Up-Skirt and other Dirt: Why Cell Phone Cameras and 
other Technologies Require a New Approach to Protecting Personal Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 31 
Southern Illinois University Law Journal 69, 73. 
256 W L Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed, 1971) 810-1. 
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Even though the elements of the private-facts tort vary slightly from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction,257 the formulation of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977)258 is 
widely relied upon by the courts within the USA because it provides a useful general 
summary of the law.259 § 652 D of the Restatements characterises the tort as follows: 
 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability 
to the other for invasion of his privacy if the matter publicised is of a kind that 
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public. 
 
This definition involves the fourth feature of a successful tort – the problematic 
‘legitimate public concern’ element. The Restatement refers to Cox Broadcasting Co v 
Cohn and mentions that it has not been established with certainty that liability of this 
nature is consistent with the free speech and free press provisions of the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution.260   
2.2 The gist of the action – common law or one-man-project? 
We will first turn to the gist of the action, which is still the subject of lively de-
bate. In this respect, it is a seldom pronounced truism that the chosen ‘civil wrong’ af-
fects the appropriateness of means to protect it.261 Therefore, if one does not know what 
kind of interest the tort actually protects, it will be difficult to determine how these in-
terests could be protected meaningfully. At least for the ‘bottom up’ approach pursued 
here this is an essential point. We have noted that US law faces formidable problems 
when determining the protected interest on the speech-side of the speech-privacy con-
257 For recent formulations of the tort see, eg, Taus v Loftus, 40 Cal 4th 683, 717 (2007); Cordts v Chi-
cago Tribune Comp, 860 NE 2d 444, 450 (2006); Ozer v Borquez, 940 P 2d 371, 377 (1997). 
258 The Restatement contains ‘compilations of legal rules in a semi-legislative (or code) form’ - S E Her-
get and S Wallace, ‘The German Free Law Movement as the Source of American Legal Realism’ (1987) 
73 Virginia Law Review 399, 399. The American Law Institute has not yet attempted to reformulate the 
privacy torts for the Restatement (Third) - A J McClurg, ‘Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship 
Privacy through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality’ (2006) 74 University of Cincinnati Law Review 
887, 907. 
259 D L Zimmerman, ‘Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort’ 
(1983) 68 Cornell Law Review 291, 300; see also S K Sandeen, ‘Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advo-
cates Can Learn from Trade Secret Law’ [2006] Michigan State Law Review 667, 691. 
260 Special Note on Relation of § 652 D to the First Amendment to the Constitution. 
261 See, eg, P Kelley, ‘Infancy, Insanity and Infirmity in the Law of Torts’ (2003) 48 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 179, 185 (‘[…] the definition of the wrong suffered in negligence may affect the tort liabil-
ity of infants for alleged negligence’). 
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flict due to its focus on content neutrality. That the gist of the action is still subject to 
academic debates in the USA very much sums up the fundamental problems the country 
has with the public disclosure tort. It is not only the speech side but also the conflicting 
privacy interest that remains to be clarified. How a proper conflict resolution can be 
achieved under these circumstances stays in the dark.262  
 
Prosser, however, formulated the gist of the public disclosure tort as follows: 263
 
[t]his branch of the tort is evidently something quite distinct from intrusion. The interest pro-
tected is that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress that are present in libel or 
slander. It is in reality an extension of defamation, into the field of publication which do not fall 
within the narrow limits of the old torts, with the elimination of the defence of truth.264
 
The starting point for the relevant privacy tort is therefore the defamatory char-
acter of truthful but embarrassing facts. It is clear from this assertion that Prosser had a 
‘reductionist’ view on privacy; privacy is not a distinct legal value to be protected in its 
own name but is necessarily related to other interests.265 The gravamen of the offence in 
defamation actions, however, was harm to reputation through falsity from their earliest 
appearance and long predating the development of English common law.266 Thus, one 
may wonder whether ‘defamatory truth’ exemplifies an oxymoron;267 other commenta-
262 See also R Gavison, ‘Too Early for a Requiem: Warren and Brandeis were Right on Privacy v Free 
Speech’ (1992) 43 South Carolina Law Review 437, 456-7. 
263 W L Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, 398 (emphasis added); see also the dis-
cussion in Doe v Methodist Hospital, 690 NE 2d 681, 686-692 (1997).   
264 For a recent repetition see Doe v Methodist Hospital, 690 NE 2d 681, 686 (1997). In Beaumont v 
Brown, 237 NW 2d 501, 505 (1976) the Court of Appeals of Michigan observed that the categorisation of 
a general ‘right to privacy’ into Prosser’s tort composed of four branches was the result of solidifying 
earlier general pronouncements concerned with a ‘right to privacy.’ Citing Prosser the Court opined that 
this process was triggered off ‘particularly in recognition of the fact that the tort of invasion of privacy 
overlaps with the torts of defamation and intentional infliction of mental distress [...]’ – emphasis pro-
vided).  
265 See A L Peikoff, ‘The Right to Privacy: Contemporary Reductionists and their Critics' (2006) 13 Vir-
ginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law 474, 478, 496; E J Bloustein, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human 
Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser’ (1964) 39 New York University Law Review 962, 965. See also D J 
Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1124-5. 
266 D L Zimmerman, ‘Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort’ 
(1983) 68 Cornell Law Review 291, 307. 
267 See S J Heyman, ‘Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of 
Expression’ (1998) 78 Boston University Law Review 1275, 1338-9 (1998) for distinctions and similari-
ties of ‘privacy’ and ‘reputation.’ ‘Privacy’ is, for instance, virtually the only area of communication 
where ‘more speech or information can never rectify the wrong’ - S Ingber, ‘Rethinking Intangible Inju-
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tors have indeed contended that the tort protects only against emotional harm and ig-
nore or deny the relevance of reputational injury.268 Rather unsurprisingly, Prosser’s 
gist of the action has sparked a vast body of scholarly work parts of which will be dis-
cussed in detail during the discussion of New Zealand’s tort. 
  
Suffice to say at this point that all critics are united probably in only one respect 
– in identifying the inappropriateness of Prosser’s approach. His views nevertheless 
truculently prevailed. It seems important to note that Prosser characterised himself as a 
‘packrat’ who was ‘at best a collector; and the most that can ever be said for him is that 
he sometimes chooses well.’269 As regards his pre-eminence Prosser has done sterling 
work. If so, why all this criticism? Gavison has suggested that he was a scholar who 
started ‘from decisions without an external concept of privacy’ and was ‘led to rely on 
the concept that may be derived from the decisions themselves.’270 Prosser was none-
theless regarded as such a pivotal figure that his ‘capacity for synthesis had become a 
capacity to create doctrine.’271 It is thus tempting to think (and many have succumbed) 
that the privacy torts were Prosser’s own invention.272 As one scholar observed with 
regard to the legal analysis of the courts, ‘judicial analysis of the issue of intrusions 
[into privacy] in public places seldom progresses beyond rote recitation of [Prosser’s] 
 
ries: A Focus on Remedy’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 772, 842. Compare Doe v Methodist Hospi-
tal, 690 NE 2d 681, 686 (1997). 
268 Eg, E W Bloustein, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser’ (1964) 39 
New York University Law Review 962, 970-1. This was also Warren and Brandeis’ original intention - 
‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193, 197; see also D W Leebron, ’The Right to 
Privacy’s Place in the Intellectual History of Tort Law’ (1991) 41 Case Western Reserve Law Review 
769, 778. 
269 G E White, Tort Law in America: An intellectual History (expanded ed, 2003) 176 (internal citation 
omitted); see also G Joyce, ‘Keepers of the Flame: Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (Fifth Edi-
tion) and the Prosser Legacy’ (Book review) (1986) 39 Vanderbilt Law Review 851, 859.  
270 R Gavison, ’Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Review 421, 460; see also G Joyce, 
‘Keepers of the Flame: Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (Fifth Edition) and the Prosser Legacy’ 
(Book review) (1986) 39 Vanderbilt Law Review 851, 862. 
271 See G E White, Tort Law in America: An intellectual History (expanded ed, 2003) 176; A J McClurg, 
‘Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality’ 
(2006) 74 University of Cincinnati Law Review 887, 897 (Prosser ‘succeeded in getting his fairly narrow 
views about privacy etched deeply and permanently into law’ – internal citation omitted).  
272 A L Peikoff, ‘The Right to Privacy: Contemporary Reductionists and their Critics ‘ (2006)13 Virginia 
Journal of Social Policy and the Law  474, 493; see also S K Sandeen, ‘Relative Privacy: What Privacy 
Advocates Can Learn From Trade Secret Law’ [2006] Michigan State Law Review 667, 690; G Joyce, 
‘Keepers of the Flame: Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (Fifth Edition) and the Prosser Legacy’ 
(Book review) (1986) 39 Vanderbilt Law Review 851, 861. For a similar suggestion regarding the ‘false 
light’ branch of the tort see J Clark Kelso, ‘False Light Privacy: A Requiem’ (1992) 32 Santa Clara Law 
Review 783, 788-9. 
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observations.’273 Since Prosser has supposedly not analysed anything and the courts in 
turn routinely ‘analyse’ nothing but his observations, virtually no analysis of the private 
facts tort took or takes place outside academic circles.274 At first blush, such an ap-
proach appears to have turned clairvoyance successfully into firmly established com-
mon law. By continuously repeating Prosser’s findings, a jurisdiction can surely collect 
an impressive amount of experience.275 On the other hand, this might also be a deli-
cious recipe for entrenching a wholly dysfunctional tort. 
 
Notwithstanding, to this writer it seems almost too obvious to need mentioning 
that ‘synthesis’ alone rather than analysis of the underlying legal problems does not suf-
fice to mould a cause of action. It occurs to me that regarding Prosser merely as the 
tort’s midwife (by means of evaluating 300 cases) would not capture the whole picture. 
As we will see later, Prosser’s view on the nature and function of tort law in general 
might well have influenced what he chose as appropriate means to fashion the public 
dissemination tort in particular.276 In other words, since the tort is largely Prosser’s own 
invention and therefore akin to a ‘one-man-project’ it seems rather likely that not only 
his syntheses hardened into doctrine, but that his general tort doctrine hardened as doc-
trine of the privacy torts. Prosser tried to tidy up the body of law loosely evolving under 
the privacy banner. Such a process, however, is unlikely to begin without a ‘tidy’ pic-
ture in mind.277 This picture is, thus, what we will attempt to fathom in the following. 
Prosser’s view on torts was largely Holmesian, which is why we also meet our ‘devil 
incarnate’ again. Although it goes without saying that ad hominem arguments are inap-
propriate, the views of those two scholars have been particularly influential for the de-
273 A J McClurg, ‘Bringing Privacy out of the Closet: A Tort Theory for Intrusions in Public Places’ 
(1995) 73 North Carolina Law Review 989, 1036. 
274 See also L M Jennings, ‘Paying the Price for Privacy: Using the Private Facts Tort to Control Social 
Security Number Dissemination and the Risk of Identity Theft’ (2004) 43 Washburn Law Journal 725, 
731. 
275 This experience impressed particularly Keith J - Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 210. 
276 See also G E White, Tort Law in America: An intellectual History (expanded ed, 2003) 162 – White 
notes that Prosser’s findings were not supported merely by generalisations made in the text; see too J 
Clark Kelso, ‘False Light Privacy: A Requiem’ (1992) 32 Santa Clara Law Review 783, 789; G Joyce, 
‘Keepers of the Flame: Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (Fifth Edition) and the Prosser Legacy’ 
(Book review) (1986) 39 Vanderbilt Law Review 851, 859 who indicates that Prosser’s self-styled ‘pack-
rat’ image ‘is one of the great understatements in all legal writing.’ 
277 See generally W N R Lucy, Philosophy of Private Law (2007) 214. 
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velopment of the US public disclosure tort.278 We must therefore pay close attention to 
them. 
 
As for the gist of the action, Prosser’s protected interest (reputation with over-
tones of emotional distress) seems too narrow. As this thesis proceeds on the assump-
tion that the chosen ‘wrong’ or ‘gist’ - if it matters at all - has a bearing on the means to 
protect this interest, this could well have consequences for the structure of the tort. But 
let us now turn to the elements of the tort as established by Prosser. Although the two 
articles of Prosser and Warren and Brandeis are usually mentioned all in the same 
breath in treatises concerned with the privacy torts, only the former matters for contem-
porary purposes. The original conception of the latter has been wholly replaced in fa-
vour of Prosser’s and Holmes’ views as we will see next. 
2.3 The private facts test  
As one scholar remarks with regard to the tort’s initial private facts test, ‘[t]he 
inherent confusion in the public disclosure tort is evidenced by the inconsistent facts 
which courts have defined as private.’279 The courts have been reluctant to define pri-
vate facts particularly due to the perilous intimidation of conflicting First Amendment 
interests.280 It is nonetheless plain that matters taken from public records enjoy absolute 
protection since Cox Broadcasting Co v Cohn; ‘private facts’ cannot be established un-
der these circumstances.281 Social values other than the public availability of ‘public 
records’ are thus irrelevant; any information contained in a public record may be dis-
seminated even if it consists of unproven coarse innuendo dating from several decades 
278 Clark Kelso has argued that Prosser had a special talent to identify general trends in tort law - ‘False 
Light Privacy: A Requiem’ (1992) 32 Santa Clara Law Review 783, 788. This implies, however, that his 
views were widely accepted. 
279 G Dendy, ‘The Newsworthiness Defense to the Public Disclosure Tort’ (1997) 85 Kentucky Law 
Journal 147, 150-151; see also S M Scott, ‘The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy’ (1996) 71 
Washington Law Review 683, 689. 
280 C Hart, ‘Y.G. v Jewish Hospital of St. Louis:  Breathing Life into the “Disclosure of Private Facts” 
Tort’ (1991) 35 Saint Louis University Law Journal 931, 939; see also B C Murchison, ‘Revisiting the 
American action for public disclosure of private facts’ in M Richardson and A T Kenyon (eds), New Di-
mensions in Privacy Law (2006) 32, 38. 
281 Romaine v Kallinger, 537 A 2d 284, 298 (1988); Cumrine v Harte-Hanks Television, 37 SW 3d 124, 
127 (2001); Hogan v Hearst Corp, 945 SW 2d 246, 250 (1995); Uranga v Federated Publications Inc, 67 
P 3d 29, 33 (2003). For a brief critique see also S Ingber, ‘Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on 
Remedy’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 772, 848-9. It should be noted that, for instance, Ohio’s juve-
nile court records are not public records in this sense – Roe v Heap, (2004) Westlaw 1109849 para 78.  
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ago.282 McNulty characterises this absolute privilege as a ‘hard and fast rule of no li-
ability [that] fosters predictability of result and certainty of expectation.’283  
 
Apart from absolutely privileged public records, ‘family matters, health prob-
lems, and sex lives’ are ‘clearly private.’284 We can see similar types of personal infor-
mation emerging as ‘obviously private’ in England and Wales and in perhaps more 
evocative terms as ‘privacy paradigm’ in New Zealand. Particularly as regards the ex-
ample of public records, however, it has to be added that this would not explain the con-
fusion about the ‘private facts’ test in the USA. Rather a generally overpowering impact 
stemming from the blurred ‘line between public and private life’285 has to be noted. 
Once matters occur in public places,286 plaintiffs’ fortunes take quite a bit of a tumble.  
 
In the following, I attempt to dissect particularly this phenomenon and thereby 
hope to shed light on the protection of privacy interests in the USA generally. The lack 
of protection in public places, as I will argue, stems (1) superficially in terms of adjudi-
cation technique from a formalistic application of the private facts test; and (2) in terms 
of tort theory, from the absence of anything in the near vicinity of either a concept of 
right or genuine duty observed from an ‘internal point of view.’287 The theory underly-
ing the US tort law regards tort as being comprised of strict ‘liability rules’ ordered by 
282 Uranga v Federated Publications Inc, 67 P 3d 29, 35 (2003) - the defendant newspaper reproduced a 
‘handwritten, one-page, unsworn statement’ containing homosexual innuendo concerned with oral sex 
from a more than 40 year old court file. The Supreme Court of Idaho held that there ‘is no indication that 
the First Amendment provides less protection to historians than to those reporting current events. No 
suggestion can be found in the Constitution that the freedom there guaranteed for speech and the press 
bears an inverse ratio to the timeliness and importance of the ideas seeking expression’ (emphasis added; 
internal citation omitted). See also Romaine v Kallinger, 537 A 2d 284, 299 (1988). 
283 P J McNulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 
Drake Law Review 93, 103. 
284 Eg, Johnson v K Mart Corp, 723 NE 2d 1192, 1197 (2000); Alvarado v KOB-TV LLC, (2007) West-
law 2019752 at p 5; § 652 D comment b Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977); J B Mintz, ‘The Remains 
of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain’ (1996) 55 Maryland Law Review 
425, 439. 
285 Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 207 (1998); R A Smolla, ‘Privacy and the First 
Amendment Right to Gather News’ (1999) 67 George Washington Law Review 1097, 1098.
286 In US law, a public place ‘includes anywhere that is visible from a publicly accessible vantage point’ - 
E Paton-Simpson, ‘Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in Public Places’ 
(2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 322. 
287 See also G P Fletcher, ‘Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 537, 556 
who argues that there are ‘two radically different paradigms for analy[s]ing tort liability’; methods of 
analysis include ‘the appropriate style of legal reasoning, and […] the relationship between the resolution 
of individual disputes and the community’s welfare.’  
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judges from an ‘external point of view,’ which is a matter of social engineering. As will 
presently appear, the ‘right to privacy’ which might have afforded recognition of indi-
vidual interests - as originally proposed by Warren and Brandeis - ceased to exit if 
ceased is the word. Furthermore, even the correlation between the defendant’s conduct 
and harm done to plaintiff remains to a large extent unexamined by the courts. The 
same holds true for disputed material in the category of ‘clearly private’ information in 
the aforementioned sense.  
 
Building upon the joint judgment’s unfounded rejection of a rights-based ap-
proach in Hosking, we will proceed by proposing an alternative view based on a ‘right 
to privacy.’ This analysis will in turn prepare the ground for supporting Tipping J’s dis-
tinct approach.  
2.3.1 Adjudication technique  
By turning first to the adjudication technique of the courts, we will loosely 
speaking return to the non-pejorative term ‘legal positivism,’ which some scholars have 
associated with Holmes.288 Whilst English law has seen a distinguished line of positiv-
istic jurists, most leading English positivists have been moralists and did not distinguish 
‘is’ and ‘ought’ in law out of scepticism or cynicism as Holmes arguably did.289 It 
should be reiterated that Holmes was clearly influenced by early utilitarian thinkers, but 
his legal theory is more appropriately addressed as ‘legal realism’ or ‘pragmatic instru-
mentalism.’290 Nowadays, the US courts have apparently cultivated what H L A Hart 
has addressed as ‘slot machine’ adjudication under the headline of ‘formalism.’291 What 
he meant by that was the inappropriateness of interpreting a legal term of art in a man-
ner ‘which is blind to social values and consequences’ and therefore neglects what he 
288 T A Reed, ‘Holmes and the Paths of the Law’ (1993) 37 American Journal of Legal History 273, 279. 
289 W Twining, ‘Other People’s Power: The Bad Man and English Positivism, 1897-1997’ (1997) 63 
Brooklyn Law Review 189, 196. 
290 R S Summers, ‘On Identifying and Reconstructing a General Legal Theory – Some Thoughts 
Prompted by Professor Moore's Critique’ (1984) 69 Cornell Law Review 1014, 1014-20. 
291 H L A Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593, 
610 (internal citation omitted). Hart, however, seems to be rather adverse to such stigmatisations. These 
terms stem from the so-called “Realists” who criticised the judicial process in the USA, because the 
‘courts make an excessive use of logic, [and] take a thing to “a dryly logical extreme”’ – at p 610 (inter-
nal citation omitted). Hart claims, convincingly, that criticisms of these “Realists” have in fact nothing to 
do with logic. See S E Herget and S Wallace, ‘The German Free Law Movement as the Source of Ameri-
can Legal Realism’ (1987) 73 Virginia Law Review 399 (1987) for a brief overview.  
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described as ‘penumbral area[s]’ within which the judge necessarily has to legislate.292 
Even though Hart seems first and foremost concerned with the interpretation of legisla-
tion, he stresses that penumbral decisions are not about judicial legislation.293 It should 
be noted, although only in passing, that British positivistic theory is predominantly 
aimed at general jurisprudence rather than ‘a theory of common law adjudication.’294 
The difference is nevertheless not so much one between ‘law as it is’ and ‘law as it 
ought to be’ in a positivistic sense as defended by Hart; it is rather one between an ‘in-
telligent decision’ guided by various social aims (not necessarily propelled by morality) 
and one that is merely an ‘automatic’ or ‘mechanic’ form of quintessentially deductive 
reasoning.295 In short, what seems to be required instead is a ‘value judgment’296 as 
sketched in New Zealand by Tipping J in Hosking.297  
 
With regard to the reasoning of the US courts on the ‘private facts’ test it has to 
be noted that the notion of penumbral areas between public and private seems to be 
largely unknown.298 We will see later on, however, that the formalistic reasoning of 
judges correlates with a tort theory strongly striving for predictability. In this respect, 
formalism should not be understood pejoratively; formalism is rather a means to 
achieve certain ends in law.299 In this context, predictability of decisions (as an example 
292 Ibid, at p 610-1; see also H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon 2nd ed, 1994) 204. 
293 Ibid, at p 612. 
294 W Twining, ‘Other People’s Power: The Bad Man and English Positivism, 1897-1997’ (1997) 63 
Brooklyn Law Review 189, 196-7 (1997). 
295 H L A Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593, 
614. On formalism see generally E W Thomas, The Judicial Process (2005) particularly at pp 55, 57; A J 
Sebok, ‘Misunderstanding Positivism’ (1995) 93 Michigan Law Review 2054, 2076. 
296 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 250 per Tipping J; see also M Waterfield, ‘Now You See It, 
Now You Don't: the Case for a Tort of Infringement of Privacy in New Zealand’ (2004) 10 Canterbury 
Law Review 182, 186. Hart seems to use the phrase ‘value statement’ in a similar way – see H L A Hart, 
‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593, 625. 
297 For the recognition of ‘social aims and consequences’ see Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 239. 
For a similar view see also S M Scott, ‘The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy’ (1996) 71 
Washington Law Review 683, 712. 
298 It should be reiterated that the courts are anxious to define ‘private facts’ because of a possible intimi-
dation of freedom of speech. One may thus argue - analogous to Hart - that the decisions represent a ‘de-
termined choice’ in order to protect  freedom of speech as a ‘social aim’, a matter to which we will return 
- see H L A Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 
593, 611. Notwithstanding, there is a difference between a judgment that states something ‘is a private 
fact but newsworthy’ and a judgment which rules that something ‘is not a private fact in the first place.’ It 
is the very purpose of this tort to delimit free speech interests. Assuming that any consideration concern-
ing the privacy side of the conflict would be impossible without paying attention to free speech interests, 
the whole tort seems quite pointless. 
299 See R S Summers, ‘How Law is Formal and Why it Matters’ (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review 1165, 
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of such an end) may well be the driving force behind formalistic reasoning. Switching 
to the more mundane, probably even sordid reality, Shulman v Group W Productions as 
a case of fairly recent date will give eloquent testimony to this proposition.  
 
The two plaintiffs, private persons as distinct from public or involuntary public 
figures,300 were trapped in their car after being involved in an accident. The rescue team 
was accompanied by a ‘ride-along’ camera operator working for the defendant, a televi-
sion programme producer. The corporation was gathering material for the ‘reality-TV’ 
format On Scene: Emergency Response. The camera operator filmed the plaintiffs’ ex-
trication from the vehicle and the efforts of the medical team to provide care.301 The 
Court was genteelly discreet, however, about the injuries suffered particularly by one 
plaintiff who was left a paraplegic by the accident.302 It may set one wondering though, 
in which state a patient might be who utters ‘this is terrible, am I dreaming?’, ‘I just 
want to die’ or ‘I just want to die […] I don't want to go through this.’303  
 
Courts, of course, merely state facts of the case that matter with regard to their 
following legal reasoning. We will now see that the US tort usually protects abstract 
places, not plaintiffs, and thus their interest in privacy. The Court of Appeal ruled as 
follows: 
 
Appellants’ accident occurred on a heavily travelled public highway [...]. The videotape itself 
shows a crowd of onlookers peering down at the rescue scene below. Appellants could be seen 
and heard by anyone at the accident site itself and could not have had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy at the scene in regard to what they did or said. Their statements or exclamations could 
be freely heard by all who passed by and were thus public, not private.304 
 
 
1167. 
300 With the dissolution of the distinction between public and private spheres, the distinction between 
private and public figures has apparently vanished, too - R A Smolla, ‘Privacy and the First Amendment 
Right to Gather News’ (1999) 67 George Washington Law Review 1097, 1098.
301 See for all above mentioned facts of the case Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 209 
(1998).
302 This plaintiff was ‘critically injured’; ‘[b]lood, bare parts of her body distorted by injury […] [were] 
visible’ - A J McClurg, ‘Bringing Privacy Law Out of The Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability for Intru-
sions in Public Places’ (1995) 73 North Carolina Law Review 989, 995. 
303 Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 211 (1998). 
304 Ibid, at p 213. 
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Once the plaintiffs were brought into the helicopter, however, they enjoyed a 
reasonable expectation of privacy from being surreptitiously filmed because they were 
located in a ‘private space.’305 The broadcast was nevertheless deemed newsworthy, a 
matter to which we will return.306
 
The stoic delight with which the courts address the possibility of maintaining 
privacy in public places can be found already in Prosser’s work. Photographing a person 
in public, Prosser opined, does not constitute a privacy violation ‘since this amounts to 
nothing more than making a record, not differing essentially from a full written descrip-
tion, of a public sight which any one present would be free to see.’307 This observation, 
by way of illustration, is blind to the social consequence of Hart’s ‘slot machine adjudi-
cation’ that photographs are a particularly intrusive permanent record and could be dis-
seminated more broadly than the original observation.308 As for the consequences and 
thus intrusiveness of ‘reality-TV’ and ride-along journalism, even photographs of acci-
dent scenes very rarely say ‘I just want to die’ out loud. In Shulman, it may not have 
been self-evident why a group of persons looking at an accident scene should determine 
whether or not an individual plaintiff has a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’ The 
supposed decisiveness of the implication that the rescue team (including a nurse wear-
305 Ibid. 
306 Note that the Supreme Court of California concentrated on the newsworthiness element as far as the 
public disclosure tort was concerned.  
307 W L Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, 391-92; see also A J Lum, ‘Don’t 
Smile, Your Image Has Just Been Recorded on a Camera-Phone: The Need for Privacy in the Public 
Sphere' (2005) 27 University of Hawaii Law Review 377, 411. Reasonably well known is the passage 
stating that ‘merely because a fact is one that occurred at a public place and in the view of the general 
public, which may have been only a few persons or merely because it can be found in the public record, 
does not mean that it should receive widespread publicity if it does not involve a matter of public con-
cern’ - W P Keeton (ed), Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed, 1984) 858. In the USA at least, this state-
ment is to my knowledge not reflected in the decisions of the courts.  
308 See D M Worley, ‘Shulman v Group W Productions: Invasion of Privacy by Publication of Private 
Facts - Where Does California Draw the Line Between Newsworthy Information and Morbid Curiosity’ 
(1999-2000) 27 Western State University Law Review 535, 541; N A Moreham, ‘Privacy in Public 
Places’ (2006) 65(3) Cambridge Law Journal 606, 618. For further ‘social consequences’ see also E Pa-
ton-Simpson, ‘Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in Public Places’ (2000) 
50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 327-8; P J McNulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: 
There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 Drake Law Review 93, 102; A J Lum, ‘Don’t Smile, Your Im-
age Has Just Been Recorded On A Camera-Phone: The Need For Privacy In The Public Sphere ‘ (2005) 
27 University of Hawaii Law Review 377, 411-2; L E Rothenberg, ‘Re-Thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, 
Video Voyeurs, and the Failure of Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in 
the Public Space’ (2000) 49 American University Law Review 1127, 1157; K M. Beasley, ‘Up-Skirt and 
other Dirt: Why Cell Phone Cameras and other Technologies Require a New Approach to Protecting Per-
sonal Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 31 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 69, 81-2. 
 
 
57 
                                                          
ing ‘a small microphone’309) at the accident site itself witnessed the spectacle310 may or 
may not be regarded as bordering upon the absurd.311 Assuming that this would consti-
tute a veritable argument, the media defendant could not only determine the ‘newswor-
thiness’ of the facts but also turn ‘private facts’ into non-actionable ‘public facts’ 
merely by joining a cooperative medical team. The Court’s initial argumentation imply-
ing that those driving on the ‘heavily travelled public highway’ might have seen or 
heard anything from the ‘rescue scene below’ (the car fell down an embankment)312 is 
therefore the most honest one.313 It indicates that it is not necessary that somebody has 
actually seen the incident; it is rather determinative that anybody could have seen the 
incident hypothetically because of the location’s nature. In brief, the reasoning of the 
court is rather an embellishment of an already fixed outcome.314
 
Law has to be seen in its context however. In defence of the US approach it 
should hence be noted that Shulman shows a vivid manifestation of the demand for ‘ex-
posure out of a combination of voyeurism, desire for emotional connection, [and] de-
mocratic suspicion that reticence is a sign of elitism’ which Rosen certainly had in mind 
when he addressed the framework of a so-called market democracy.315 As we will see 
309 Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 209 (1998).
310 An early concern of privacy scholars was that what was at issue was ‘the debasement of his sense of 
himself as a person that results because [an individual's] life has become a public spectacle against his 
will. There is anguish and mortification, a blow to human dignity, in having the world intrude as an un-
wanted witness to private tragedy’ - E J Bloustein, ‘Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren 
and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?’ (1968) 46 Texas Law Review 611, 619. Cases 
such as Shulman particularly show how right he was.  
311 A similar (abstract) criticism of legal formalism could be found in E W Thomas, The Judicial Process 
(2005) 55, who observes that even today ‘absurd’ judicial decisions are regarded as legally sound. See 
also C R Sunstein, ‘On Analogical Reasoning’ (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 741, 749.      
312 According to A J McClurg, the car ‘plunge[d] one hundred feet and overturn[ed]’ - ‘Bringing Privacy 
Law Out of The Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places’ (1995) 73 North 
Carolina Law Review 989, 994 (1995). 
313 The Californian Supreme Court questioned the reasoning of the Court of Appeal during the discussion 
of the intrusion tort - Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 233 (1998). 
314 See also J Siprut, ‘Privacy Through Anonymity: An Economic Argument for Expanding the Right of 
Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 33 Pepperdine Law Review 311, 319 who argues that the courts regard 
events taking place in public as ‘by definition not private’; S M Scott, ‘The Hidden First Amendment 
Values of Privacy’ (1996) 71 Washington Law Review 683, 689. 
315 J Rosen, ‘Continental Divide’ [2004] Legal Affairs 49, 53; for growing voyeuristic tendencies see also 
A Allen, ‘Coercing Privacy’ (1999) 40 William and Mary Law Review 723, 737-8; J Siprut, ‘Privacy 
Through Anonymity: An Economic Argument for Expanding the Right of Privacy in Public Places’ 
(2006) 33 Pepperdine Law Review 311, 320-1. It is not without reason that other scholars insist on pri-
vacy protection beyond the reach of market forces – see, eg, J Kahn, ‘Privacy as a Legal Principle of 
Identity Maintenance’ (2003) 33 Seton Hall Law Review 371, 373. This is possible, according to Kahn, 
by grounding privacy in human dignity – see ibid, at p 383. Since ‘dignity’ is not a value that is either 
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later, the theoretical approach on torts taken in that country likewise appeals to ‘a dis-
tinctively American style of individualist ideology.’316 In a sense, the law suits the soci-
ety that it is supposed to serve perfectly well.317 The notion of a ‘Continental Divide’ is 
nonetheless misplaced;318 at issue are rather distinct functions of freedom of speech in 
respective societal and constitutional contexts.319  
 
In sum, social consequences of any kind which we have associated with ‘intelli-
gent decisions’ do not play any role; the US courts rather decide ‘automatically’ or 
‘mechanically.’320 Hence, many judges dismiss privacy claims by using these hack-
neyed phrases contending that a matter cannot be private because it occurred in a public 
place.321 Likewise, the notion of ‘public places’ is occasionally also equated with per-
 
protected or likely to be protected in the USA, a theoretical solution will most likely be based on eco-
nomic considerations – see J Siprut, at p 322-3 for a suggestion to this effect.  
316 P Cane, ‘The Anatomy of Private Law Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 203, 204 citing N Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (1995) 418. See also A 
Taslitz, ‘The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy and Human Emo-
tions’ (2002) 65 Law and Contemporary Problems 125, 172-3.  
317 Bloustein noted early on that the identification of individuals in generally ‘newsworthy’ articles 
merely ‘pandered to the public taste for emotional colo[u]r, gossip, and sensation without serving in the 
least to inform the public of any matter of public concern’ - ‘Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is 
Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?’ (1968) 46 Texas Law Review 611, 623. 
318 Democracy, equality etc are of course malleable concepts. It should be stressed that the USA is a di-
verse country in many ways. There is (certainly among others) a group of scholars calling themselves 
‘Brennan liberals.’ These scholars seem to regard the constitutionalisation of the common law, for in-
stance, in South Africa, as a democratisation of the law that would be a desirable yet impossible devel-
opment in their country - see for such a view, eg, F I Michelman, ‘The Bill of Rights, the Common Law, 
and the Freedom-Friendly State’ (2003) 58 University of Miami Law Review 401, 416.      
319 In the Canadian context free speech is ‘one of a group of rights that together create the fabric of free-
dom and democracy for a multicultural, pluralistic and tolerant society’ – see L Weinrib, comment in G 
Nolte (ed), European and US Constitutionalism (2005) 74 as cited in D Halberstam, ‘Desperately Seek-
ing Europe: On Comparative Methodology and the Conception of Rights’ (2007) 5 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 166, 178.  
320 An anticipated criticism would probably point to Daily Times Democrat v Graham, 162 So 2d 474 
(1964). In that case, the defendant was photographed in a public place while her skirt was blown up. The 
court upheld her claim because of an ‘indecent and vulgar intrusion’ into the privacy interest. What is 
more, the Court opined that ‘a purely mechanical application of legal principles should not be permitted 
to create an illogical conclusion’ - at p 478 (emphasis added)).That the photograph was deemed vulgar 
and indecent in Daily Times Democrat (decided a mere fortnight after New York Times v Sullivan) seems 
to be an exception - see, eg, McNamara v Freedom Newspapers Inc, 802 SW 2d 901, 905 (1991); Barn-
hart v Paisano Publications LLC, 457 F Supp 2d 590, 593 (2006).  
321 See, eg, Richard v Wal-Mart Stores Inc, (2007) Westlaw 1521467 at p 3; Barnhart v Paisano Publica-
tions, LLC, 457 F Supp 2d 590, 593 (2006); Mayall v Dennis Stuff Inc, (2002) Westlaw 32113761 at p 2; 
Furman v Sheppard, 744 A.2d 583, 586 (2000); American Broadcasting Companies Inc v Gill, 6 SW 3d 
19, 28 (1999); Reeves v Fox Television Network, 983 F Supp 703, 709 (1997); Solomon v National In-
quirer Inc, (1996) Westlaw 635384 at p 4; McNamara v Freedom Newspapers Inc, 802 SW 2d 901, 902 
(1991); Batts v City of Baton Rouge, 501 So 2d 302, 304 (1987); Benally v Hundreds Arrow Press Inc, 
614 F Supp 969, 981 (1985); Jaubert v Crowley Post-Signal Inc, 375 So 2d 1386, 1391 (1979). 
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sonal information already being in the ‘public domain’ which is not actionable per 
se.322 Thus, a positivist such as H L A Hart would perhaps conclude, ‘[d]ecisions made 
in a fashion as blind as this […] scarcely deserve the name of decisions; we might as 
well toss a penny in applying a rule of law.’323  
 
An Australian case broke through the shackles and may point the way ahead for 
jurisdictions outside the USA. Cleeson CJ famously held that there is ‘a large area in 
between what is necessarily public and what is necessarily private.’324 Such a statement 
calls for the recognition and exploration of ‘penumbral areas’, not necessarily larger 
than Hart would allow,325 but within which the judge has to ‘legislate.’ Incidentally, the 
same phenomenon and problem occurs with regard to freedom of speech given that 
speech is classed into categories such as ‘commercial speech.’326 That this is empha-
sised as a privacy problem seems unjustified.327 Hence, it is advantageous to acknowl-
edge that judges ‘make’ or discover ‘law endlessly’ anyway.328  
2.3.2 Litigant’s right and court’s permission  
Being confronted with a ruling such as Shulman one may wonder what law ac-
tually is.329 At the outset, we have already noted that, inter alia, health problems are 
322 See White v Township of Winthrop, 116 P 3d 1034, 1037 (2005); see also P J McNulty, ‘The Public 
Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 Drake Law Review 93, 102. 
323 H L A Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593, 
611. 
324 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 226 (HC); 
for examples of ‘intelligent decisions’ see Andrews v TVNZ High Court Auckland CIV 2004-404-3536 
(unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) para 29 (New Zealand); Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 All ER 995 
(HL) para 72 per Lord Hoffmann (UK) (“Campbell”). 
325 See H L A Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 
593, 614 (‘[…] to insist on the utilitarian distinction is to emphasi[s]e that the hard core of settled mean-
ing is law in some centrally important sense and that even if there are borderlines, there must be first 
lines’).   
326 M Hertig Randall, ‘Commercial Speech under the European Convention on Human Rights: Subordi-
nate or Equal?’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 53, 57. 
327 See, eg, J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 
389, 391 citing R v Broadcasting Complaints Commission, ex parte BBC [2001] QB 885, 892 as saying, 
‘[w]e are here in an area [ie privacy] involving open textured concepts.’ There is, in the author’s view, 
nothing new or unusual about it – see H L A Hart The Concept of Law (Clarendon 2nd ed, 1994) 124 for a 
general discussion. 
328 See E W Thomas, The Judicial Process (2005) 3-4. See also Lai v Chamberlains [2006] NZSC 70 
para 57 per Tipping J and generally S Coyle, ‘Positivism, Idealism and the Rule of Law’ (2006) 26 Ox-
ford Journal of Legal Studies 257, 272. . 
329 H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon 2nd ed, 1994) 1. 
 
 
60 
                                                          
routinely regarded as ‘clearly private’ matters in the USA.330 As soon as matters occur 
in a public place, however, it is not even worthwhile considering the important issues 
the tort is supposedly meant to protect from dissemination. A mainland European, by 
contrast, is used to being entitled to certain rights protecting his or her individual inter-
ests. In this context, for example, a right to privacy would rather unpretentiously sug-
gest that a substantial health issue has at least a bearing on the court’s decision. In 
Shulman on the other hand, it was only after the plaintiffs were brought into the rescue 
helicopter that they enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy. This expectation was 
nevertheless not ‘reasonable’ because of respect for clearly private matters, but because 
they were transferred to a ‘private space’ (the helicopter), which was deemed analogous 
‘to a hospital room.’331 In this respect, some may take umbrage particularly at the actu-
ality that individual interests do not seem to be relevant at all – this does not fit the no-
tion of a ‘right’ in its broadest sense.  
 
Those, however, who are most indignant about invoking the notion of rights in 
the present context at all, may perhaps acknowledge that the interaction or relationship 
of the litigants plays barely any role in such reasoning. Instead, the judgment is wholly 
made by reference to ‘external factors.’ A yardstick as to how the defendant has to con-
duct herself (perhaps in terms of blameworthiness or wrongful conduct) is difficult to 
identify given that ‘private facts’ of the plaintiff were gathered in a public place. The 
location alone seems to give the defendant carte blanche regardless of other circum-
stances and considerations such as intentions, motives, consequences etc. In other 
words, what may be described as ‘internal factors’ are not assessed by the courts.   
 
330 The information involved in Shulman does furthermore without much ado qualify as ‘humiliating ill-
ness’ in terms of § 652 D comment (b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
331 Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 213 (1998). For a brief discussion of this analogy 
see R A Smolla, ‘Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News’ (1999) 67 George Washington 
Law Review 1097, 1119-20. Smolla asks, for instance, ‘[d]oes it matter whether the door to the ambu-
lance or helicopter is open or shut?’ – at p 1120. For similar argumentation see Daly v Viacom Inc, 238 F 
Supp 2d 1118, 1125 fn 3 (2002).
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What may be the reason? Current explanations for the lack of privacy protection 
in public places suggest a ‘fallacious view of privacy as an all-or-nothing concept’332 or 
that courts conceptualise ‘privacy as a form of secrecy.’333 While these observations are 
appealing, we will attempt to develop a more general and thus further reaching ap-
proach predominantly grounded in tort theory.334 In the following I hope to show that, 
inter alia, this phenomenon does not necessarily have anything to do with particular 
concepts of privacy.335 By referring to tort theory instead, I mean that the purpose and 
therefore the nature and function of US tort law in general may contribute to a proper 
understanding of at least some of the privacy tort’s elements in particular. Tort theory 
has generally seen a revived interest since the 1990s. It is nevertheless important to note 
that I by no means adopt a particular tort theory - my leitmotiv is rather ensuring consis-
tency particularly with the NZBoRA. Tort law theories usually presuppose (and try to 
elaborate) the distinctive normative foundation of private law.336 The constitutionalisa-
tion of the common law, in contrast, links a tort closely to a human rights instrument. 
The latter is rather the domain of constitutional theory. Such a process involves import-
ing elements of public law into the private law sphere. For the purposes of a constitu-
tionalised tort, we must therefore try to blend both strands of theory in a compelling 
manner. As for English law, we will see that a tort theory based on a ‘mixed conception 
of corrective justice’ might harmonise well with a theory conceptualising constitutional 
rights as principles. The result, as it were, incidentally seems compatible with such a 
tort theory. Theoretical aspects aside, this approach might also be rewarding because it 
is possible to canvass some basic differences between the US system on one hand and 
the systems of New Zealand and the UK on the other.  
332 E Paton-Simpson, ‘Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in Public Places’ 
(2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 322; A J McClurg, ‘Bringing Privacy out of the 
Closet: A Tort Theory for Intrusions in Public Places’ (1995) 73 North Carolina Law Review 989, 1041. 
333 D J Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1147; a similar expla-
nation was given by J B Mintz, ‘The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private 
Domain’ (1996) 55 Maryland Law Review 425, 441.  
334 This approach therefore follows the assumption that ‘[l]aw fuses theory and practice’- E J Weinrib, 
‘Understanding Tort Law’ (1989) 23 Valparaiso University Law Review 485, 486. Weinrib also argues 
that every development in tort law ‘implies a theory of tort law.’  
335 See also J B Mintz, ‘The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Do-
main’ (1996) 55 Maryland Law Review 425, 437 (‘Publicizing facts that already appear in some zone of 
the public does not give rise to liability under the disclosure tort, even if the facts are “private by na-
ture”’). 
336 See W N R Lucy, Philosophy of Private Law (2007) 419-20. 
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2.3.2.1 The status of privacy and freedom of speech    
In order to protect privacy legally, the first question to be asked in each jurisdic-
tion should be concerned with the status of privacy.337 Is the status of privacy in law 
that of a right, value, principle, or social policy? This status may of course differ from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction which could also show in the decisions reached.338 Pedantic 
as it might sound, legal systems such as those involved here can surely be compared, 
but single decisions are not necessarily comparable in a narrow sense because of differ-
ent preconditions regarding the standing of the conflicting values. A subsequent second 
question is concerned with elaborating characteristics of privacy in order to form its le-
gal contents.339 In the context of informational privacy, these characteristics may in-
clude, for instance, the already familiar ‘clearly private’ matters such as health prob-
lems or information related to one’s sexuality.  
 
As for US tort law, the protection of the privacy interest is peculiar inasmuch as 
it is generally spoken of in terms of a right rather than being characterised by the defen-
dant’s conduct.340 A right to privacy would usually afford some protection to the char-
acteristics of privacy however. It has already been suggested that the decisions of the 
US courts do not sit comfortably on the notion of rights. The initial observation there-
fore seems to be obfuscated by the fact that the label ‘right to privacy’ does not neces-
sarily have to mean anything. As regards US law, one may thus argue that some ‘char-
acteristics’ of privacy have been ascertained whilst their ‘status’ in law remains opaque.    
 
337 Before Ruth Gavison starts developing her concept of privacy she asks: ‘[t]he first [question] relates to 
the status of the term: is privacy a situation, a right, a claim, a form of control, a value?’ - ’Privacy and 
the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Review 421, 424 (emphasis hers); see also Brooker v Police 
[2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC) para 163 per Thomas J. 
338 Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC) para 163 per Thomas J. 
339 Gavison's convincing second question before developing her account reads: ‘[t]he second [basic ques-
tion] relates to the characteristics of privacy: is it related to information, to autonomy, to personal iden-
tity, to physical access?’ - ’Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Review 421, 424 (empha-
sis hers). 
340 W Leebron, ’The Right to Privacy’s Place in the Intellectual History of Tort Law’ (1991) 41 Case 
Western Reserve Law Review 769, 780. Both authors never equated their ‘right to privacy’ with Cooley’s 
‘right to be let alone’ - R Gavison, ’Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Review  421, 437 
fn 48. A similar status of privacy in New Zealand has been indicated by Thomas J in Brooker v Police 
[2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC) para 224. 
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However, the US law is only a means to an end in this analysis; the focus 
chiefly lies on the New Zealand law. Why is the status of privacy relevant particularly 
with regard to a constitutionalised tort? Let us elaborate this point systematically and in 
small steps. The plaintiffs in Hosking alleged at High Court level ‘an invasion of their 
right to privacy’; on appeal they apparently merely argued that a ‘cause of action’ 
should be recognised.341 First, it is suggested that right and remedy can be seen as quite 
different matters.342 The joint judgment (correctly in my opinion) pointed out that the 
British extended breach of confidence action reflected the impact of a rights-based ap-
proach influenced by the HRA whereas the traditional equitable remedy represents the 
historical approach based on wrongful conduct.343 For Britain, this indicates that the 
status of privacy is in a broad sense rather akin to a right whose infringement or inva-
sion gives rise to the remedy of extended breach of confidence. We will see in due 
course that the implication of a right to privacy lends itself easily to a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy even if matters occur in public places. Contrary to the situation in the 
USA, ‘clearly private’ matters (regarded as ‘obviously private’ in Britain) enjoy at least 
recognition regardless of the location. At the very least, it is clear that freedom of 
speech has no presumptive priority over privacy.344 Irrespective of the precise nature of 
the privacy interest, it is clear that the competing interests are equal in their status. 
Thus, the scales are even – something that is difficult to observe with regard to the 
situation in the USA.  
 
341 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA); see also Hosking [2003] 3 NZLR 385 (HC) para 23 per Randerson J; 
A Geddis, ‘Hosking v Runting: A Privacy Tort for New Zealand’ (2005) 13 Tort Law Review 5, 11. 
342 See Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62, 66 (CA) per Lord Glidewell (‘It is well-known that in English 
law there is no right to privacy, and accordingly there is no right of action for breach of a person’s pri-
vacy’ – emphasis added); Wainwright v Home Office [2003] 4 All ER 969 (HL) para 31 per Lord Hoff-
mann (‘There seems to me a great difference between identifying privacy as a value which underlies the 
existence of a rule of law (and may point the direction in which the law should develop) and privacy as a 
principle of law in itself’ – emphasis added). Lord Justice Sedley was bolder: ‘The two first-named 
claimants have a legal right to respect for their privacy, which has been infringed. […] The circum-
stances of the infringement are such that the claimants should be left to their remedy in damages’ - Doug-
las v Hello! Ltd (No1) [2001] 2 All ER 289 (CA) para 105 (emphasis added). See also Hellewell v Chief 
Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 4 All ER 473, 476 per Laws J. 
343 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 42; see also N A Moreham, ’Privacy in the Common Law: A 
Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 628, 629. Compare for an uncon-
vincing rebuttal Associated Newspapers Ltd v His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales [2006] EWCA 
Civ 1776 paras 64, 65 per Lord Phillips MR.  
344 Eg, Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No1) [2001] 2 All ER 289 (CA) para 137 per Sedley LJ; Lord Browne of 
Madingley v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EMLR 19 (QB) para 38 per Eady J; [2007] 3 WLR 289 
(CA) para 22 per Clarke MR; McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 46 per Buxton LJ. 
 
 
64 
                                                          
This observation surely risks oversimplification but provides a clear basis for 
discussing the situation in New Zealand. New Zealand’s situation is both difficult to 
understand and portray since influences from both British and US sources are continu-
ally mixed with one another. This is almost exclusively true with regard to the joint 
judgment whose approach will be considered first. As regards privacy, it is plain that 
their Honours implicitly rejected a rights-based approach by implementing a ‘highly 
offensive to a reasonable person’ test.345 The outcome closely resembled the US formu-
lation of the tort.346 Their Honours nonetheless held that this development of the com-
mon law had to be consistent with the ‘rights and freedoms’ of the NZBoRA particu-
larly with s 14 (freedom of speech).347 Given that freedom of speech is a right and pri-
vacy as a limit is not characterised – how would one reconcile both in a principled 
manner?348 In other words, how can a court reject a rights-based approach to privacy 
and still ensure consistency with the right to freedom of speech? What is the status of 
privacy in this tort then?   
 
We will now briefly turn to Tipping J’s approach. His Honour was discreet 
about the status of privacy in his approach and described it as a ‘value or interest’349 or 
at one point as ‘rule or principle.’350 Despite its label, the Judge nonetheless found the 
British extended breach of confidence action programmatically instructive.351 However, 
if the British cause of action reflects in turn a ‘rights-based approach’, as the joint 
judgment rightly pointed out, how can the outcome be the same thing? As we will see 
later Tipping J’s formulation omits a separate ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’ 
test, which the joint judgment used to reject a rights-based approach. What, then, is the 
status of privacy in Tipping J’s formulation?  
 
345 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 125; compare M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ 
NZLC MP19 para 34.2.1 fn 42 who interprets their Honours’ approach as a ‘weaker form of right’ as 
opposed to a ‘stringent’ right.  
346 Ibid, para 210 per Keith J. 
347 Ibid, para 111. 
348 See also ibid, para 230 per Tipping J. 
349 Ibid, paras 224, 225.  
350 Ibid, para 253.  
351 Ibid, paras 247, 248. 
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For New Zealand courts it is of course possible to compare British and US cases 
freely; if it is accepted, however, that the status of privacy in the litigation of these 
countries differs significantly, it might be questionable whether these decisions are 
comparable. Let the joint judgment continue the argument with regard to the protection 
of personal information in public places: 
 
[t]here is a considerable line of cases in the United States establishing that generally there is no 
right to privacy when a person is photographed on a public street. Cases [from the UK] such as 
Peck and perhaps Campbell qualify this to some extent, so that in exceptional cases a person 
might be entitled to restrain additional publicity being given to the fact that they were present on 
the street in particular circumstances. 352
 
This is in my opinion a non sequitur. It is by no means clear why two cases from 
the UK, based on an equal status of privacy and freedom of speech, alter a considerable 
line of cases from the US based on a status of privacy that is significantly inferior to 
freedom of speech. We have already noted that many US courts dismiss claims me-
chanically regardless of ‘particular circumstances’ of the case. Hence, US courts would 
most likely not qualify their reasoning ‘to some extent’ if cases like Peck or Campbell 
were presented. Why should a New Zealand court, apart from historical reasons, be im-
pressed by these decisions from the UK? On which basis are ‘exceptional cases’353 dis-
tinguished from ‘ordinary cases’ and why do the ‘circumstances’ contrary to the situa-
tion in the US suddenly matter at all? The joint judgment, as we will see later, most 
likely envisaged a so-called incremental development of the tort, inter alia, by reference 
to cases from the UK and the USA. It is nonetheless suggested that the status of privacy 
needs clarification. 
 
With a fair measure of simplification, one could finally ask whether there is a 
right, which - if ‘wronged’ by the defendant - gives rise to a right of action as distinct 
from a model based on liability rules where ‘the core of having a right is having a claim 
352 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 164 (emphasis added); this passage was also cited in Andrews v 
TVNZ High Court Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) para 41. 
353 ‘Exceptional circumstances’ may arise where there is a need to do justice in an individual case – E W 
Thomas, ‘A Return to Principle in Judicial Reasoning and an Acclamation of judicial Autonomy’ (1993) 
23 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review Monograph 5, p 12.  
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for compensation if a certain kind of injury is suffered.’354 By and large, the distinction 
could be seen as one between a remedy-driven approach based on duty and a rights-
based approach.355 The distinction between both will be further elaborated in the fol-
lowing.  
2.3.2.2 Ubi jus ibi remedium - the US ‘right to privacy’ from right to duty  
Thus far, we have been confronted with a confusing language concerned with 
rights, rules, principles, values etc. Outside the USA, this confusion is certainly a prod-
uct of infusing common law methodology with ‘rights talk’ of human rights instru-
ments. It is obvious, however, that the notion of rights is not particularly popular and 
often carefully eschewed. Although torts may be based on conduct rather than rights 
nowadays, they normally do not appear out of nowhere.356 The same holds true for the 
torts of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional harm - the two causes of ac-
tion with which Prosser associated the ‘harm’ protected by his public disclosure of pri-
vate facts tort.  
 
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm (or Wilkinson principle/rule) 
is comparatively young.357 Acknowledged in 1896, the remedy was based on a ‘legal 
354 B C Zipursky, ’Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts’ (1998) 51 Vanderbilt Law Review 
1, 56 - in the first case the plaintiff has suffered a ‘wrong’, ie an invasion into her right. The distinct right 
of action is concerned with compensation but the plaintiff may have been ‘wronged’ regardless of 
whether compensation is paid; E J Weinrib, ‘Understanding Tort Law’ (1989) 23 Valparaiso University 
Law Review 485, 513 who argues that if the plaintiff has no (prima facie) right independent of a cause of 
action, she rather acts as a ‘private enforcer of a public interest in wealth maximization’ and other social 
goals not directly related to tort law. See also W N R Lucy, Philosophy of Private Law (2007) 315 (‘One 
way in which rights can be protected is by liability rules: these protect rights by conferring a right to 
compensation on rights holders in the event that someone takes that to which the rights holder is entitled’ 
– internal citation omitted); J L Coleman and J Kraus, ‘Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights’ (1986) 95 
Yale Law Journal 1335, 1340. It is probably advantageous to speak of ‘putative rights holders’ in this 
context in order to avoid confusion with a ‘prima facie rights holder’ to which we will return in due 
course.  
355 See also J Wright, Tort Law and Human Rights (2001) 164 (‘This case [Kaye v Robertson] is the clas-
sic example of the limitations to the protection of human rights in a system which has developed as sys-
tem of “remedies”, rather than rights’ – emphasis added). 
356 This notion was eloquently captured by M Richardson, ‘Privacy and Precedent: The Court of Appeal’s 
Decision in Hosking v Runting’ (2005) 11 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 82; see also D Butler, 
‘A Tort of Invasion of Privacy in Australia?’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 339, 356-7.  
357 In his early writings, Prosser thought, ‘if intentional infliction of emotional distress were ever to re-
ceive general recognition in the US, ‘the great majority of the privacy cases might be expected to be ab-
sorbed into it’ - internal citation omitted) - G Joyce, ‘Keepers of the Flame: Prosser and Keeton on the 
Law of Torts (Fifth Edition) and the Prosser Legacy’ (Book review) (1986) 39 Vanderbilt Law Review 
851, 861. 
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right to personal safety’ whose infringement constituted a ‘wilful injuria’ by the defen-
dant.358 This right which also encompassed a person’s reputation seemed to be a relic of 
Blackstone’s heyday.359 Defamation, on the other hand, remained in English law a strict 
liability tort arguably because of its origin from a right to reputation.360 Strict liability, 
at least in Europe, is seldom imposed absent an infringement of fundamental individual 
rights.361     
 
The situation is similar as regards privacy protection in the USA. Warren and 
Brandeis tried to influence the recognition of a fundamental right to privacy.362 The 
violation of this general right was distinguished from the tort remedy as one of the en-
visaged legal responses to its infringement.363 The first case echoing Warren and 
Brandeis’ call364 was Pavesich v New England Life Ins Co365. The Pavesich-court ac-
358 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57. This right ‘derives from the relationship between the body and 
the self’ – see S J Heyman, ‘Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Free-
dom of Expression’ (1998) 78 Boston University Law Review 1275, 1319. See S Todd, ‘Review: Tort’ 
[2004] New Zealand Law Review 585, 602-3 for the limited importance of the rule in contemporary law. 
359 ‘The right of personal security consists in a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his 
limbs, his body, his health and his reputation’ – Sir W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(16th ed, 1825) Book I ch 1 at p 128. Health in this context is restricted to physical harm - see Wilkinson v 
Downton [1897] 2 QB 57.     
360 N Jansen, ’Duties and Rights in Negligence: A Comparative and Historical Perspective on the Euro-
pean Law of Extracontractual Liability’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 443, 465. See also Sir 
W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (16th ed, 1825) Book I ch 1 at p 133. 
361 Ibid, at p 466 (observation restricted to England, France and Germany). Whether the tort contains a 
fault standard is still unclear – see, eg, Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) paras 211 and 214 per Keith J. A 
few US jurisdictions have employed an explicit fault standard – see, eg, Ozer v Borquez, 940 P 2d 371, 
377 (1997). 
362 S D Warren and L D Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193, 198 (‘The 
existence of this right [to privacy] does not depend upon the particular method of expression adopted. It 
is immaterial […]’). 
363 S D Warren and L D Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193, 213 (‘It 
remains to consider […] what remedies may be granted for the enforcement of the right’ – emphasis 
added); see also at p 219 where the authors argue that there should be a remedy in tort law available for 
an invasion of the right to privacy. See also Brents v Morgan, 299 SW 967, 971 (1927) (‘We are content 
to hold that there is a right of privacy, and that the unwarranted invasion of such right may be made the 
subject of an action in tort to recover damages for such unwarranted invasion’). 
364 See W L Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, 386; A L Peikoff, ‘The Right to 
Privacy: Contemporary Reductionists and their Critics ‘(2006) 13 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and 
the Law 474; A Allen, ‘Coercing Privacy’ (1999) 40 William and Mary Law Review 723, 738. 
365 50 SE 68 (1905). The Supreme Court of Georgia derived a ‘right of privacy’ from natural law –  at p 
70; see also Brents v Morgan, 299 SW 967, 971 (1927). The right had been rejected before in Roberson v 
Rochester Folding Box Co, 64 NE 442 (1902). The recognition on a natural law basis was questioned and 
rejected later on by some courts – R Lisle, ‘The Right of Privacy (A Contra View)’ (1930) 19 Kentucky 
Law Journal 137, 142. 
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knowledged a right to privacy as being embraced by a ‘right of personal security’366 
and therefore by the same right from which the tort remedies of defamation and inten-
tional infliction of emotional harm followed.367 Seen from this perspective, Prosser’s 
‘reductionist’ approach to privacy seems inconsequent – since all three causes of action 
originally stem from the same personal right, it seems arbitrary to deny privacy the 
status of an interest worth protecting for its own sake.368      
 
So what happened on the way from Warren and Brandeis to Prosser? The 
change is illustratively encapsulated in Bloustein’s famous response to Prosser’s semi-
nal article, which spawned the contemporary quadripartite tort. Bloustein vigorously 
insisted that a privacy violation results in an injury to one’s individuality ‘and the legal 
remedy represents a social vindication of the human spirit thus threatened rather than a 
recompense for the loss suffered.’369 This seems to presuppose the existence of an indi-
vidual right to privacy from which relational duties follow; the plaintiff should be able 
to seek recourse ‘through law that belongs to the right holder whose rights have been 
violated.’370 Bloustein’s criticism was not directed against the categorisation into dif-
ferent remedies, but he denounced the fact that privacy as a distinct underlying and 
unifying rationale had gone missing. However, this was not necessarily happenstance 
and we will now turn to Prosser’s theoretical conception of tor
 
366 The Court defined the right as protecting the ‘legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, 
his body, his health, and his reputation’ - Pavesich v New England Life Ins Co, 50 SE 68, 70 (1905). For 
further details concerned with the transformation of the original ‘external right to personal security’ to 
privacy as an ‘internal right to personal security’ see S J Heyman, ‘Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into 
the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression’ (1998) 78 Boston University Law Review 1275, 
1324. 
367 The Court also discussed the ‘injuria’ concept of Roman law - Pavesich v New England Life Ins Co, 
50 SE 68, 71 (1905). 
368 Note that neither Blackstone nor any other common law commentator referred to a right of privacy. 
The Pavesich-court argued, ‘the illustrations given by [these commentators] as to what would be a viola-
tion of the absolute rights of individuals are not to be taken as exhaustive, but the language should be 
allowed to include any instance of a violation of such rights which is clearly within the true meaning and 
intent of the words used to declare the principle’ - Pavesich v New England Life Ins Co, 50 SE 68, 70 
(1905). 
369 E J Bloustein, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser’ (1964) 39 New 
York University Law Review 962, 1002. A similar point was made by S Ingber, ‘Rethinking Intangible 
Injuries: A Focus on Remedy’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 772, 841. 
370 See J C Goldberg and B C Zipursky, ‘Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and 
Hart on Legal Duties’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1563, 1567; see also L R Meyer, ‘Unruly Rights’ 
(2000) 22 Cardozo Law Review 1, 12. 
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Our starting point will be the previous observation that contemporary main-
stream tort theory in the USA is still regarded as quintessentially Holmesian. Holmes 
was sceptical about the notion of individual rights and obligations.371 Instead, Holmes’ 
perception of the law was akin to that of commands similar to the early utilitarian 
thinkers who influenced him.372 His work therefore stood in stark contrast to the rights-
based solutions favoured by Cooley or Brandeis.373
 
Prosser on the other hand was Holmes’ disciple and therefore had a virtually 
identical view on torts.374 Both scholars understood tort law as consisting of liability 
rules, which made it necessary to eliminate the notion of individual right and correlative 
duty of classic common law.375 What followed from there was that the focus shifted 
from a right of the plaintiff to the duty of the defendant. The resulting method in order 
to determine liability is quite remarkable; ‘[t]here is a duty if the court says there is a 
371 See B C Zipursky, ‘Rawls in Tort Theory: Themes and Counter-Themes’ (2004) 72 Fordham Law 
Review 1923, 1927 (‘[…] the dominant trend of American tort theory grows out of Holmes’ brash and 
unapologetic s[c]epticism about concepts of duty and right’); J C Goldberg and B C Zipursky, ‘The 
Moral of MacPherson’ (1998) 146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1733, 1781-2 (‘On Holmes’s 
view, duties, or more accurately, the state directives and sanctions which regulate conduct, ‘“precede 
rights logically and chronologically”’ internal citation omitted); W Leebron, ‘The Right to Privacy’s 
Place in the Intellectual History of Tort Law’ (1991) 41 Case Western Reserve Law Review 769, 783; T C 
Grey, ‘Holmes and Legal Pragmatism’ (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 787; 830; P S Atiyah, ‘The Leg-
acy of Holmes through English Eyes’ (1983) 63 Boston Law Review 341, 350 and 381. 
372 J C Goldberg and B C Zipursky, ‘Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart 
on Legal Duties’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1563, 1566-7; see also their ‘The Moral of MacPher-
son’ (1998) 146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1733, 1781-2. Scholars, as already indicated, see 
a lot of different things in Holmes. Of importance here is exclusively his disdain for individual rights and 
duties. From a Social-Darwinian perspective, conferring rights to an individual seems impossible; the 
same holds true if one would regard Holmes as a so-called ‘pragmatist’ (position of, eg, E W Thomas, 
The Judicial Process (2005) 303) - see R M Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) 152 (‘Pragmatism, […], de-
nies that people ever have legal rights […]’). 
373 W Leebron, ‘The Right to Privacy’s Place in the Intellectual History of Tort Law’ (1991) 41 Case 
Western Reserve Law Review 769, 782. Leebron also mentions that around the time The Right to Privacy 
was published two conceptions of tort law had emerged: one based on rights, the other based on liability 
rules – at p 785. See also T Cooley, The Elements of Torts (1895) 27. 
374 J C Goldberg and B C Zipursky, ‘The Moral of MacPherson’ (1998) 146 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1733, 1756. 
375 T C Grey, ‘Holmes and Legal Pragmatism’(1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 787, 831; see also G 
Joyce, ‘Keepers of the Flame: Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (Fifth Edition) and the Prosser 
Legacy’ (Book review) (1986) 39 Vanderbilt Law Review 851, 862 (‘In his typical fashion, Prosser had 
collected the cases, rationali[s]ed their results by distilling the underlying concerns of the courts, bal-
anced the interests at stake in each of the various (but previously unrecognized) branches of the tort, and 
stated general rules for use in deciding future cases’ – emphasis added). ‘Typical fashion’ means that 
Prosser collected, for example, over 15.000 cases for the first edition of his Handbook of the Law of Torts 
in order ‘to dramati[s]e the diversity of the reported decisions and presumably also to emphasize the need 
for general rules’ - at p 856. 
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duty; the law, like the Constitution is what we make it’ as Prosser put it.376 This duty 
therefore does not correspond with a right of the plaintiff.377 Furthermore, the court im-
poses ‘duties of all the world to all the world’ according to Holmes.378 The relationship 
between individual litigants has apparently no decisive bearing on the outcome of the 
case either – whether the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff is irrelevant.379 The 
same holds true for fairness considerations in individual cases.380 The judge rather has 
to ask herself whether it is for the good of society to permit liability under certain cir-
cumstances.381 This approach implies an instrumentalist view, which is characterised by 
focusing on social goals (such as wealth maximisation) tort law is supposed to fur-
ther.382 These social goals are established independently of tort law itself. With Prosser, 
one could thus argue that tort law is primarily a form of ‘social engineering.’383 An im-
portant aspect of this process is ensuring predictability of the law. As regards negli-
gence theory, for instance, Holmes opined that his duties to the world are ‘nothing but a 
prediction’ that someone will be held liable.384 Such an instrumentalist approach, as 
376 W L Prosser, ‘Palsgraf Revisited’ (1953) 52 Michigan Law Review 1, 15. For a convincing critique of 
this peculiar view see H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon 2nd ed, 1994) 141 - this implies for  
instance a denial that courts are bound by any rules – ‘the score is what the scorer says it is’; that is ‘the 
game of the “scorer’s discretion”’). 
377 All this is not to be misunderstood as a critique. Tushnet, for instance, argues that positive rights are 
simply foreign to US culture. Instead, the focus lies on negative liberty because of fear that others might 
‘crush their individuality.’ Tushnet also indicates that what might be inappropriate in the USA is not nec-
essarily unsuitable for other societies - ‘An Essay on Rights’ (1984) 62 Texas Law Review 1363, 1392.   
378 O W Holmes, ‘The Theory of Torts’ (1873) American Law Review 652, 660 as cited in J C Goldberg 
and B C Zipursky, ‘The Moral of MacPherson’ (1998) 146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1733, 
1759-60; see also W L Prosser, ‘Palsgraf Revisited’ (1953) 52 Michigan Law Review 1, 6. 
379 See also W L Prosser, ‘Palsgraf Revisited’ (1953) 52 Michigan Law Review 1, 6 and 22; J C Goldberg 
and B C Zipursky, ‘Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties’ 
(2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1563, 1568 (Holmesian liability rules (so-called ‘duties’) are ‘created by 
the state, and owed to the state’). See also R A Smolla, ‘Privacy and the First Amendment Right to 
Gather News’ (1999) 67 George Washington Law Review 1097, 1120 who argues that privacy torts, in 
contrast to defamation as a ‘classic example’ are not conceptualised as ‘relational.’ 
380 See G P Fletcher, ‘Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 537, 556. 
381 J C Goldberg and B C Zipursky, ‘The Moral of MacPherson’ (1998) 146 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1733, 1740  
382 See P Cane, ‘The Anatomy of Private Law Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 203, 204; see also E J Weinrib, ‘Understanding Tort Law’ (1989) 23 Valparaiso 
University Law Review 485, 513 (1989); J L Coleman, ‘The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice’ 
(1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 427, 431-2. 
383 W L Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941) 17 as cited by C P Goldberg, ‘The Constitutional 
Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs’ (2005) 115 Yale Law 
Journal 524, 582. 
384  Grey, ‘Holmes and Legal Pragmatism’ (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 787, 834 fn 218 (1989) (inter-
nal citation omitted); W L Prosser, ‘Palsgraf Revisited’ (1953) 52 Michigan Law Review 1, 22.  
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some say, thereby appeals to ‘a distinctively American style of individualist ideol-
ogy.’385   
 
The aforementioned liability rules are aimed at clarifying the range of permissi-
ble individual choices; the rules therefore do not focus on wrongdoing (in terms of 
some form of harm done to the plaintiff’s interest) since this might imply a ‘chilling ef-
fect’ on the range of these choices.386 It seems as if ‘[t]he wrong involved is the failure 
to compensate [the plaintiff], not the infliction of damage.’387 In more concrete terms 
one could argue that the public dissemination tort as a communicative tort has to pay 
due regard to the maintenance of the marketplace of ideas, which requires the applica-
tion of strict formal rules in order to avoid a ‘chilling effect’ on private choices and 
therefore on the marketplace itself.388 Liability rules are, then, to be understood as 
minimal restraints on an otherwise unfettered self-interest of the defendant.389 One may 
therefore hazard a guess that such a conception of tort law is the congenial partner to 
protect the liberty interests of defendants and thus freedom of speech. In Romaine v 
Kallinger,390 for instance, the court stressed the tension between the First Amendment 
and the publication of truthful information and concluded, ‘[t]his constitutional dimen-
sion explains the stringency of the requirements that must be met in order to success-
fully establish this privacy-invasion cause of action.’ In sum, these liability rules posit 
only minimal restraints whereas the newsworthiness element is granted virtually with-
out any constraints leaving behind a practically defunct tort.   
 
385 P Cane, ‘The Anatomy of Private Law Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 203, 204 citing N Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (1995) 418. See also D 
Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1975) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685 (‘[…] 
individualism seems to harmonize with an insistence on rigid rules rigidly applied’). For general discus-
sion of ‘instrumentalism’ see D Lyons, ‘Legal Formalism and Instrumentalism – A Pathological Study’ 
(1980-81) 66 Cornell Law Review 949, 952. 
386 See D Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1975) 89 Harvard Law Review 
1685, 1695, 1698. 
387 Ibid, at p1694. 
388 Kennedy suggests that the deductive process of determining the boundaries of legal liability were part 
of a larger ‘individualist argument designed to link the very general proposition, that the American sys-
tem is based on freedom, with the very concrete legal rules and doctrines of the legal order’ - ‘Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1975) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685, 1730-1. 
389 Ibid, at pp 1695, 1718. 
390 537 A 2d 284, 298 (1988). 
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The already familiar example saying that photographing a person in public (or 
filming as in Shulman) cannot constitute a privacy violation seems to be such a liability 
rule - the court simply does not permit legal liability for taking photographs in a public 
place regardless of the circumstances. Prosser, as we recollect, thought that taking a 
photograph does not differ from ‘making a record, not differing essentially from a full 
written description, of a public sight which any one present would be free to see.’391 
What Prosser describes are private choices ranging from ‘seeing’, making a ‘record’, a 
‘full written description’ or a ‘photograph.’ Singling out ‘taking a photograph’ as ac-
tionable conduct would thus be understood to ‘chill’ the choices available to the defen-
dant’s self-interest. The examination focuses entirely on the conduct of the defendant, 
but the possible harm or wrongdoing inflicted upon the individual plaintiff - as required 
for a genuine relational duty - is irrelevant.392 In other words, to abstain from filming or 
photographing persons in public places, as it were, does not imply a duty of the defen-
dant to the entire world. The social goal is obviously that everything happening in these 
locations should be freely discussed. In the author’s respectful view, any consideration 
or analysis of the privacy interests of the plaintiff or what privacy as a legal concept 
may entail is absent from this framework.393  
 
This becomes perhaps more intelligible when we turn to the publicity element of 
the tort. Without dwelling too much on this point in this context – the claimant has to 
show a dissemination of private facts to the public at large.394 This could be easily in-
terpreted as being a minimum restraint on the defendant’s self-interest. As long as the 
private information is merely communicated to one person, a small group or a larger 
group that does not constitute dissemination to the public at large (whatever that may 
be), the range of permissible actions is not to be chilled unless they exceed the minimal 
391 W L Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, 391.  
392 In Holmes’ tort theory, for instance, ‘blameworthiness’ is to be understood as ‘socially blameworthy’ 
not ‘morally blameworthy’; ‘fault’ is to be understood as ‘social fault’ not individual ‘moral fault’ - P S 
Atiyah, ‘The Legacy of Holmes through English Eyes’ (1983) 63 Boston University Law Review 341, 
351. 
393 See also Note ‘In the Face of Danger: Facial Recognition and the Limits of Privacy Law’ (2007) 120 
Harvard Law Review 1870, 1876 citing Fogel v Forbes Inc, 500 F Supp 1081, 1087 (1980) as saying that 
the intrusion tort simply does ‘not apply to matters which occur in a public place or a place otherwise 
open to the public eye.’ Suggestions to the same effect have also been made with regard to the Fourth 
Amendment – A Taslitz, ‘The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy and 
Human Emotions’ (2002) 65 Law and Contemporary Problems 125,150.  
394 W L Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, 393 (1960). 
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restraint. Again, whether harm is done to the plaintiff by dissemination to a small group 
etc is irrelevant - the duty is not owed to the plaintiff, as a ‘duty of the entire world’ it is 
owed ‘to the entire world.’395 The test thereby also provides an illustrative example of 
tort law conceptualised as a form of social engineering.396 Nevertheless, this approach 
ensures a high degree of predictability; the defendant knows very well in advance that 
she is unlikely to be held liable even if private information is disseminated to a small 
group of people.397        
 
In sum, to assume particularly a ‘fallacious view of privacy as an all-or-nothing 
concept’ or ‘privacy as secrecy’ seems to project sophistication into the law that just is 
not there.398 The tort and the decisions of the courts represent, if anything, an all-or-
nothing commitment to an individualistic concept. In brief, I should like to suggest that 
the reason is rather to be found in a tort theory striving for predictability, which pro-
duces in practice formalistic or mechanical reasoning of the courts as a symptom.399 
This tort regime accords well with the constitutional protection of freedom of speech. In 
both areas of the law, I suggest, liberty interests do not correspond with individual re-
sponsibility; prevalent is rather a strong tendency to avoid ‘chilling effects.’ 
 
Within those minimal restraints erected by these general liability rules, however, 
it is expected that ‘it is up to the parties to look after themselves.’400 And in this respect, 
I heartily agree with Paton-Simpson’s splendid metaphor that especially the plaintiff has 
395 See also Kaletha v Bortz Elevator Co Inc, 383 NE 2d 1071, 1075 (1978) - the court dismissed the 
claim because disclosure was not ‘directed toward the entire world’; A B Vickery, ‘Breach of Confi-
dence: An Emerging Tort’ (1982) 82 Columbia Law Review 1426, 1440 (‘Privacy is a right against the 
public at large. Its doctrinal limits narrowly circumscribe the zone of proscribed conduct in order to pre-
vent hindrance of public expression’). 
396 This point was perhaps unwittingly circumscribed by R C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: 
Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 77 California Law Review 957, 992: ‘The justifi-
cation of such a requirement [publicity] obviously cannot be the protection of individuals from mental 
distress or suffering. Its purpose must instead be understood in specifically social terms, as the mainte-
nance of spontaneous and expressive forms of group interaction.’ 
397 For an abstract discussion on this point see J Smillie, ‘Formalism, Fairness and Efficiency: Civil Ad-
judication in New Zealand’ [1996] New Zealand Law Review 254, 257. 
398 See also S K Sandeen, ‘Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn From Trade Secret 
Law’ [2006] Michigan State Law Review 667, 692-3 who argues that the protection of privacy in public 
places  ‘appears to be the product of happenstance and not of a reasoned and principled discussion of the 
desired scope of privacy protection.’ 
399 See also N Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (1995) 41. 
400 See D Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1975) 89 Harvard Law Review 
1685, 1739. 
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to behave like a ‘reasonable paranoid’401 in order to look after herself in real life. To 
this writer, this is nevertheless just a reflex of conceptualising tort law in terms of lib-
erty of the defendant. As an interim result, it may be recorded that the aforementioned 
peculiarity of the privacy interest as being spoken of as a right of the plaintiff is seman-
tic rather than substantial.402  
 
It is therefore not without reason that scholars a mere 110 odd years after War-
ren and Brandeis’ article intensify a discussion concerned with ‘privacy as liberty.’403 
The difficulties with privacy as liberty, however, are already well known for more than 
a century - since 1905.404 It does not seem self-evident why this should work any easier 
these days than more than a century ago. Moreover, it requires a shift as regards the 
general approach to privacy as a concept that is not based on human dignity.405 Privacy 
as liberty equates ‘privacy’ with ‘freedom’, which is ‘an almost exact inversion of the 
concept of privacy as dignity.’406 This also seems to imply that the distinction between 
401 E Paton-Simpson, ‘Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in Public Places’ 
(2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305. 
402 Jurisdictions which recently adopted the public disclosure tort merely referred to the Restatement as 
authority instead of an underlying right – see Borquez v Ozer, 923 P 2d 166, 172 (Colo App 1995). 
403 See, eg, B C Murchison, ‘Revisiting the American action for public disclosure of private facts’ in M 
Richardson and A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 32, 44; see also the illuminat-
ing discussion in Bonome v Kaysen and Random House, (2004) Westlaw 1194731 at p 3 (‘The right of 
privacy is unquestionably limited by the right to speak and print. It may be said that to give liberty of 
speech and of the press such wide scope […] would impose a very serious limitation upon the right of 
privacy; but if it does, it is due to the fact that the law considers that the welfare of the public is better 
served [observation phrased in utilitarian terms of cost/benefit maximisation] by maintaining the liberty 
of speech and of the press than by allowing an individual to assert his right to privacy in such a way as to 
interfere with the free expression of one's sentiments and the publication of every matter in which the 
public may be legitimately interested’ – emphasis added). The Court in Bonome cited Pavesich v New 
England Life Ins Co, 50 SE 68, 74 (1905). I would suggest that the US law has thus returned to where it 
started.  
404 Bonome v Kaysen and Random House, (2004) Westlaw 1194731 at p 3 fn 5 citing Pavesich v New 
England Life Ins Co, 50 SE 68, 72 (1905): ‘It may be said that to establish a liberty of privacy would in-
volve in numerous cases the perplexing question to determine where this liberty ended and the rights of 
others and of the public began [...] It may be that there will arise many cases which lie near the border 
line which marks the right of privacy on the one hand and the right of another individual or of the public 
on the other’ (emphasis added). 
405 The language formerly based on dignity parlance has changed in parts of US scholarship since J Q 
Whitman’s article ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty’ (2004) 113 Yale Law 
Journal 1151. For the effect see J Rosen, ‘The Purposes of Privacy: A Response’ (2001) 89 Georgetown 
Law Journal 2117, 2126 (instead of being based on human dignity and equality, German laws against 
sexual discrimination allegedly seek ‘to universali[s]e hierarchy and elevate all women so that they are 
legally entitled to the hono[u]r that used to be reserved for aristocratic women’). The new parlance can 
now be found in J Rosen, ‘Continental Divide’ [2004] Legal Affairs 49, 53 (‘Americans have always 
conceived of privacy primarily in terms of liberty […]’).  
406 See R C Post, ‘Three Concepts of Privacy’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2087, 2095.  
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privacy as constitutional liberty and a distinct ‘right to privacy’ grounded in tort is mis-
leading if not misconceived.407 Holmes’ rejection of the notion of right and correlative 
obligation408 seems rather consequent in this context. It is arguably impossible to pit a 
right of privacy against freedom of speech broadly granted as liberty, which is why it 
seems advantageous to work towards a properly understood right to privacy409 that is to 
be pitted against a right to freedom of speech, for instance, in a constitutionalised tort.  
 
The turning away from rights to the conduct of the defendant and her ‘duties’ is 
nonetheless not restricted to US law as the joint judgment rightly pointed out in Hosk-
ing.410 We will therefore briefly examine whether the duties of US law differ in nature 
or character from those imposed in New Zealand, Wales and England.          
2.3.2.3 Ubi remedium ibi jus - Duties in New Zealand, the UK and the USA 
The joint judgment has winningly argued that a freestanding privacy tort fits 
into New Zealand’s legal landscape.411 Even though this issue was nipped in the bud,412 
the discussion as to whether the probably parochial understanding of duties in the USA 
fits New Zealand’s legal framework has not received that much attention. Generally, it 
might be fruitful considering that relevant jurisdictions outside the USA have found the 
‘justice tradition’ more appealing than the instrumentalist approach with its focus on 
social engineering.413 The former is also more in tune with modern trends of affording 
legal protection to those suffering personal injury, which leads away from conduct-
based approaches favoured by Holmes or Prosser.414 A tort, which, as already indicated, 
407 Compare Richard v Wal-Mart Stores Inc, (2007) Westlaw 1521467 at p 5. 
408 The difference between obligation and duty is that ‘obligations are normally owed to definite indi-
viduals.’ A ‘duty’ usually requires considering other tasks and responsibilities towards others – J Rawls, 
A Theory of Justice (OUP, 1971) 113.   
409 This would be a positive or ‘claim’ right -see M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC 
MP19 para 34.2.1. 
410 See also P S Atiyah, ‘The Legacy of Holmes through English Eyes’ (1983) 63 Boston University Law 
Review 341, 376 who argues that Holmes’ tort theory was in tune with the contemporary English view; N 
Jansen, ’Duties and Rights in Negligence: A Comparative and Historical Perspective on the European 
Law of Extracontractual Liability’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 443, 460. 
411 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) paras 91–116. 
412 At least pending further consideration in the Supreme Court of New Zealand - Rogers v TVNZ Ltd 
[2007] NZSC 91 para 144 per Anderson J; para 99 per McGrath J. 
413 See P Cane, ‘The Anatomy of Private Law Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 203, 204. 
414 See generally P S Atiyah, ‘The Legacy of Holmes through English Eyes’ (1983) 63 Boston University 
Law Review 341, 376; see also N Jansen, ’Duties and Rights in Negligence: A Comparative and Histori-
 
 
76 
                                                                                                                                                                         
entirely focuses on the defendant’s conduct while it does not recognise the harm done to 
the plaintiff at least to a small degree, provides a useful incentive for heightened atten-
tion. To the best of my knowledge, there is admittedly no privacy-related discussion in 
this area. We will therefore superficially examine the duty of care in professional negli-
gence and try to extrapolate general features for the privacy tort afterwards.415     
Genuine duties and strict liability rules 
Generally, the rules or duties which replaced the rights of classic common law 
can be determined in two different ways: they could be either seen as (1) ‘a law of li-
ability rules’ stipulating certain conditions which are either met or not regardless of any 
other particular fact of the case; or (2) ‘a law that imposes [genuine] duties of conduct’ 
based in part on the relationship of the litigants under the circumstances of the case.416  
 
In English negligence law, by way of illustration, the basis for imposing cate-
gory (2) duties (or ‘guidance rules’417) was laid with Lord Atkin’s famous ‘neighbour’ 
principle developed in Donoghue v Stevenson.418 This principle, following the ‘love thy 
neighbour as thyself’ theme, contains altruistic as opposed to wholly individualistic 
elements.419 From a mainland European perspective there is a right of the plaintiff at 
work beneath the surface.420 A New Zealand example of imposing a category (2) duty 
is Rolls Royce New Zealand Ltd v Carter Holt Harvey Ltd421. Disputes seem numerous 
in this area of the law but the chief problem in both countries seems to be as to how the 
 
cal Perspective on the European Law of Extracontractual Liability’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 443, 448 who argues that modern tort law is guided by the idea of fair compensation. 
415 The joint judgment, for instance, spoke of ‘new duties of care’ where claims relate to the plaintiff’s 
reputation – Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 136. This analysis proceeds on the assumption that 
generalisations with regard to the character of these ‘duties’ are possible.    
416 See J C Goldberg and B C Zipursky, ‘Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and 
Hart on Legal Duties’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1563, 1572. 
417 Ibid, at p1563. 
418 [1932] AC 562, 580; see also Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728 per Lord 
Wilberforce. 
419 See also D Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1975) 89 Harvard Law Re-
view 1685, 1695, 1717. The joint judgment regarded Stevenson as representing ‘the foundation of con-
sumers’ rights - Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 2. 
420 N Jansen, ’Duties and Rights in Negligence: A Comparative and Historical Perspective on the Euro-
pean Law of Extracontractual Liability’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 443, 462. 
421 [2005] 1 NZLR 324 (CA). For the discussion of a relational duty based on the facts of the case see S 
Todd, ‘Twenty Years of Professional Negligence in New Zealand’ (2005) 21(4) Professional Negligence 
257, 264-65. 
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multifarious circumstances of various cases may be encapsulated in principles accord-
ing to which the law can be developed.422 It seems nonetheless settled that the conduct 
of the defendant has to be evaluated in the light of all circumstances in order determine 
whether imposition of liability is ‘just and reasonable.’423 This area of the law might 
therefore be summarised as being consonant with the aforementioned justice tradition. 
 
Prosser, in contrast, had this to say: the neighbour principle is ‘so vague as to 
have little meaning, and as a guide to decision [it has] no value at all.’424 Again, in 
Prosser’s understanding the word duty ‘serves a useful purpose in directing attention to 
the obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, rather than the casual sequence of 
events; beyond that it serves none.’425 As regards the ‘proximate cause’ element Prosser 
opined, ‘all that it does is to direct attention to the plaintiff as well as the defendant, to 
the role of the consequences as well as that of the fault.’426 Relational duties owed to 
the plaintiff are a form of ‘gibberish’ 427 and were to be replaced by duties to the world - 
the law is what we (or better you) make it.428 In sum, this implies an instrumentalist 
view on tort law. In the context of professional negligence Prosser’s views would per-
haps not be particularly successful outside the USA, but the question remains why a 
New Zealand court would accept his ‘duties to the world’ as outlined in the emulated 
privacy action.429 How, if possible at all, could this initial step be brought into accor-
dance with the justice tradition as reflected, eg, in the law of negligence?    
 
422 See S Todd, ‘Twenty Years of Professional Negligence in New Zealand’ (2005) 21(4) Professional 
Negligence 257, 265; see also his ‘Negligence and Policy’ in P Rishworth (ed), The struggle for simplic-
ity in the law (1997) 105, 110-1.  
423 Ibid; see also his ‘Negligence and Policy’ in P Rishworth (ed), The struggle for simplicity in the law 
(1997) 105, 110-1. Compare J Smillie, ‘The Future of Negligence’ (2007) 15 Tort Law Journal 300, 308 
who argues that tort liability for negligence should be abolished by statute. 
424 W L Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (2nd ed, 1955) 168 as cited by J C Goldberg and B C 
Zipursky, ‘The Moral of MacPherson’ (1998) 146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1733, 1759. 
Prosser therefore seems to have embraced the dissenting opinion of Judge Andrews in Palsgraf - W L 
Prosser, ‘Palsgraf Revisited’ (1953) 52 Michigan Law Review 1, 15, 24. Prosser quoted the Judge as say-
ing, ‘[t]here is a duty to the world at large not to be negligent toward any person and when an injury re-
sults from a breach of this duty, she may have an action for negligence’ - at p 6 (emphasis added).  
425 W L Prosser, ‘Palsgraf Revisited’ (1953) 52 Michigan Law Review 1, 15 (emphasis provided). 
426 Ibid, at p 22 (emphasis supplied). 
427 See J C Goldberg and B C Zipursky, ‘The Moral of MacPherson’ (1998) 146 University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review 1733, 1758. 
428 W L Prosser, ‘Palsgraf Revisited’ (1953) 52 Michigan Law Review 1, 15, 22. 
429 See S Todd, ‘Twenty Years of Professional Negligence in New Zealand’ (2005) 21 (4) Professional 
Negligence 257, 265-66 for the importance of the ‘proximity’ element in New Zealand. 
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In this respect, we will attempt to distinguish genuine category (2) duties from 
category (1) strict liability rules. The relevant distinction lies in the perspective, because 
one may take either an ‘external’ or an ‘internal point of view’ in order to examine a 
legal rule.430 In Holmes’ theory of criminal as of tort law431, legal standards are ‘exter-
nal, public, communal, or objective standards.’432 Basically, they have the character of 
community mores tests. External standards insist on the fact that conduct may be evalu-
ated ‘without regard to the intent or state of mind of the individual actor.’433 Instead, 
they focus for instance on the result of an act rather than the motivation behind the 
act.434
 
Take, by way of illustration, a quick glance at the ‘highly offensive to a reason-
able person’ test.435 The test will be discussed in detail later on, but the problem is 
widely known. This model person, as the argument runs, can either stand in the shoes of 
the plaintiff or may be an outside observer who does not participate in the litigation it-
self (such as a reader of a newspaper learning about the plaintiff’s personal informa-
tion). The first reasonable person takes an ‘internal point of view’ whilst the second 
430 H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon: 2nd ed, 1994) 89; R M Dworkin Law’s Empire (1986) 
13-4. 
431 Holmes is one of the very few modern common law legal theorists proposing the same liability stan-
dards for torts and for criminal law – P S Atiyah, ‘The Legacy of Holmes through English Eyes’ (1983) 
63 Boston University Law Review 341, 342.  
432 N Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (1995) 40; see also R M Dworkin, Law’s Empire 
(1986) 14. For a more detailed discussion of the underlying psychological concept of the human being 
see C S Dailey, ‘Holmes and the Romantic Mind’ (1998) 48 Duke Law Journal 429, 438-9.  
433 See H Hovenkamp, ‘Knowledge about Welfare: Legal Realism and the Separation of Law and Eco-
nomics’ (2000) 84 Minnesota Law Review 805, 847; Hovenkamp also notes that Holmes ‘described the 
external standard as a device used by courts to add consistency and predictive power to the law’ – empha-
sis added); see also W A Lindquist, ‘Oliver Wendell Holmes and External Standards of Criminal and Tort 
Liability’ (1979) 28 Buffalo Law Review 607, 608. As a result, subjective motivations as a standard for 
imposing legal liability are rejected and supplanted by enshrining behaviourism as liability standard - C S 
Dailey, ‘Holmes and the Romantic Mind’ (1998) 48 Duke Law Journal 429, 484. 
434 See W A Lindquist, ‘Oliver Wendell Holmes and External Standards of Criminal and Tort Liability’ 
(1979) 28 Buffalo Law Review 607, 617; H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon 2nd ed, 1994) 89; P 
S Atiyah, ‘The Legacy of Holmes through English Eyes’(1983) 63 Boston University Law Review 341, 
350. 
435 Prosser’s own view is ambivalent on this matter. He merely mentioned that the test constitutes some-
thing in the nature of a mores test ‘under which there will be liability only for those things which the cus-
toms and ordinary views of the community would regard as highly objectionable’ – Handbook of the Law 
of Torts (4th ed, 1971) 812. Arguments may be mounted both ways but the author interprets this as an 
external test. See also A B Vickery, ‘Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort’ (1982) 82 Columbia Law 
Review 1426, 1440  – Vickery quotes the Restatement (Second) of torts as saying that ‘the matter publi-
cized is of a kind that […] would be highly offensive to a reasonable person’; he interprets this standard 
as focusing on the contents of the publicised material. 
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perspective of examination is external. Interestingly, an internal standpoint has been 
associated with the recognition of the full circumstances of the particular case in order 
to determine the plaintiff’s ‘state of mind.’436 By and large, this test represents a genu-
ine English/New Zealand category (2) duty. The subsequent problem, as we will see in 
due course, is then as to how objective an objective test remains under these auspices. 
 
An external point of view, by contrast, is exclusively concerned with the inher-
ent offensiveness of the disseminated material. The external standpoint represents a 
category (1) strict liability rule because only a limited condition (offensiveness of the 
facts themselves) has to be met while the remainder of the context is irrelevant.437 
However, as Burrows pointed out, only a few facts are inherently offensive and for a 
‘just and reasonable’ judgment, the disclosure has to be examined from an internal 
viewpoint.438 This seems to be the generally preferred viewpoint in England. The exter-
nal point of view taken by the Court of Appeal in Campbell was astutely identified as 
‘quite unreal’ by Lord Hope.439 In this context, it is perhaps important to note that the 
internal perspective is also taken in order to determine an ‘obligation of confidence’ as 
an element of the classic breach of confidence doctrine.440 This element was in turn 
based on an analogy from the ‘duty of care’ in tort law.441
 
436 See also R M Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) 13, who argues that the ‘internal actor’ takes ‘the view 
of those who make the claims’; Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 99 per Lord Hope (‘The mind 
that has to be examined is that, not of the reader in general, but of the person who is affected by the pub-
licity’ – emphasis added).  
437 See also J Smillie, ‘Formalism, Fairness and Efficiency: Civil Adjudication in New Zealand’ [1996] 
New Zealand Law Review 254, 255. As regards the US public disclosure tort, it is difficult to find a struc-
tured discussion on this point. But see, eg, Kitt v Capitol Concerts Inc, 742 A 2d 856, 860 (1999) (the 
case was concerned with putting someone (here a concert clarinettist) into ‘false light’ claim; ‘[…] the 
offensiveness of such alleged tortious conduct is measured by an ‘ordinary, reasonable person’ standard, 
not that of a reasonable performing artist […]’). 
438 Kennedy makes a similar point by distinguishing between individualistic ‘rules’ and altruistic ‘stan-
dards’ - ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1975) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685, 1740. 
See also R M Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) 13.  
439 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 99. 
440 Megarry J, as he then was, argued that ‘if the circumstances are such that any reasonable man standing 
in the shoes of the recipient of the information would have realised that upon reasonable grounds the in-
formation was being given to him in confidence’ - Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1968] FSR 415, 
420-1.  
441 M Richardson, ‘Privacy and Precedent: The Court of Appeal’s Decision in Hosking v Runting’ (2005) 
11 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 82, 85. See also Anns v London Borough Council [1978] AC 
728, 758 per Lord Wilberforce (‘A reasonable man in the position of the inspector […]’). 
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The same pattern is valid for other tests or elements of the tort. The current US 
private facts test seems to be a strict category (1) liability rule inasmuch as an external 
actor merely observes the nature of the location regardless of the remaining facts of the 
case – the actor does not take part in the litigation as an internal actor would.442 That is 
perhaps not necessarily ‘just and reasonable.’ An internal actor would pay due regard to 
the motivation behind the act and would therefore not be content with its bare result. 
Those arguing in favour of a relaxation of the test consequently take an internal point of 
view. They ‘do not want predictions of the legal claims they will make but arguments 
about which of these claims is sound and why.’443 Consequently, they suggest consider-
ing, for example, the plaintiff’s own efforts of keeping things private even in public 
places as well as the defendant’s manner, method, motive and fixation (ie, filming et-
cetera) of the information obtained.444 In short, arguments are made particularly with 
regard to putative contexts of individual cases. Effectively, this leads to the application 
of a genuine category (2) duty, which we have associated with the law of New Zealand 
and the UK in the context of professional negligence.          
 
Lastly, Prosser’s publicity element is a category (1) strict liability rule because 
an external actor merely observes as to whether personal information has been dissemi-
nated to the public at large and nothing else. Again, the result of an act is decisive and 
not the motivation behind it. That is perhaps again not necessarily just and reasonable. 
Hence, the critic takes once more an ‘internal point of view’ and considers a relaxation 
of the strict rule accompanied by ‘an enumeration of all the particular factors in the 
situation mitigat[ing] the failure to avoid over- and underinclusion.’445 Disclosure to, 
say, even one person can be hurtful and ‘if the new tort is to be fully effective it should 
442 See also H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon 2nd ed, 1994) at p 143 (‘It is important to ob-
serve that if the game played were “scorer’s discretion” then the relationship between official and unoffi-
cial statements would necessarily be different: the player’s statement not only would be a prediction of 
the scorer’s rulings but could be nothing else” – emphasis his).   
443 R M Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) 13 (emphasis added). 
444 See R A Smolla, ‘Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News’ (1999) 67 George Wash-
ington Law Review 1097, 1124; see also N A Moreham, ‘Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 65(3) Cam-
bridge Law Journal 606, 620-32; A J McClurg, ‘Bringing Privacy Law Out of The Closet:  A Tort The-
ory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places’ (1995) 73 North Carolina Law Review 989, 1058.   
445 See D Kennedy ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1975) 89 Harvard Law Review 
1685, 1740. Both over- and underinclusion is an obvious disadvantage of strict liability rules - J Smillie, 
‘Formalism, Fairness and Efficiency: Civil Adjudication in New Zealand’ [1996] New Zealand Law Re-
view 254, 257. 
 
 
81 
                                                          
be able to extend to such a situation.’446 One would again consider the context of the 
individual case, would be concerned with the harm done to plaintiffs and look for ar-
guments in order to determine whose claim is sound and why. However, these argu-
ments are not what the original strict liability rule is all about because it is obvious that 
the allowance of arguments would be detrimental to the predictability of the law. To the 
present writer, the US tort is fully effective as long as the defendant’s permissible range 
of choices is predictable. Allowing arguments why a particular claim is sound would 
rather result in a genuine category (2) duty (owed to a plaintiff or at least a group of 
plaintiffs) in exchange for the Holmesian category (1) duty owed to the entire world.  
 
After all, it is fair to conclude that ‘fair und reasonable’ results require recognis-
ing the harm (whether in form of an invasion of a right or otherwise)447 done to the 
plaintiff as well as the relationship between the litigants under the circumstances. It may 
be true that all three legal systems involved in this analysis have replaced rights with 
duties, but particularly in New Zealand it may be worthwhile considering whether the 
matter has been taken a step further in American law. To my mind, there is a world of 
difference between a legal system that replaced rights with genuine duties (such as 
those based on the neighbour principle) and a system that seems to appreciate Holmes’ 
dissolution of ‘moral ideas and rights’ in ‘cynical acid.’448 The former takes us already 
a significant step towards a rights-based approach since a right is already operating be-
neath the surface.     
 
It sounds embarrassingly simple, but it is suggested that it should be first and 
foremost clear whether the tests of the new privacy action are to be examined from an 
‘internal’ or an ‘external point of view.’ The point at issue is whether the justice tradi-
tion should be continued or be partly replaced in the privacy context by an instrumental-
ist view as pursued in the USA. Moreover, I would like to suggest that one of these 
views should be maintained throughout the adjudication of the whole cause of action. 
446 J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005), para 18.5.04 at p 759-60 
(emphasis added); see also U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 252. 
447 The importance of this distinction was emphasised by M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Pri-
vacy’ NZLC MP19 para 23. 
448 P S Atiyah, ‘The Legacy of Holmes through English Eyes’ (1983) 63 Boston University Law Review 
341, 381. 
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As regards the ‘highly offensive’ test, there is certainly a preference for the internal 
view evolving – a good thing because that is just and reasonable. But if the ‘private 
facts’ or ‘publicity’ tests were examined from an external angle beforehand, cases 
would be dismissed without these considerations simply because the dissemination did 
not reach the public at large etcetera. The actual outcome would not necessarily be just 
and reasonable. The perspective of the actor, as it were, is not a question confined to a 
single test – it is a general commitment as to how the law is approached or examined.  
 
The joint judgment, for instance, conceded that they would allow liability in 
public places under ‘particular circumstances’ whereas liability is ‘generally’ to be de-
nied.449 This could of course signify the decision to develop the tort incrementally, but 
adopting our methodology it means that the actor should ‘generally’ take an ‘external 
point of view’ (inspired by US cases) and under ‘particular circumstances’ an internal 
angle (particularly influenced by decisions from the UK). It is fair to say that the law of 
the UK clearly follows the justice tradition. It is also fair to say that many New Zealand 
judges and scholars intuitively seem to prefer the ‘internal point view.’ It is, then, ques-
tionable why one would adopt - or maintain - these strict rules in the first place given 
that they are incompatible with the justice tradition.450 From my point of view, it is dif-
ficult to figure out how a principled development of the New Zealand tort could be pos-
sible under these auspices.451 Again, one may compare legal systems but individual 
cases may not necessarily be comparable. In a sense, mixing the approaches taken in the 
UK and USA would be as if one would say that the neighbour principle is ‘generally’ 
gibberish (Prosser’s view) and adopt an approach based on the neighbour principle un-
449 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 164. Their Honours had apparently an incremental development 
of the tort in mind.  
450 See also R S Summers, ‘How Law is Formal and Why it Matters’ (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review 
 1165, 1208-9 (‘And if form is not appropriate, if wrong choices are made as to form, and if these wrong 
choices are consequential, it follows that form matters practically and that it requires due attention’). 
451 I should point out that I presuppose a ‘principled approach’ due to my legal background - see E W 
Thomas, ‘A Return to Principle in Judicial Reasoning and an Acclamation of Judicial Autonomy’ (1993) 
23 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review Monograph 5 for further options. Although both terms 
describe different things to the present writer, ‘principled’ and ‘incremental’ development of the law are 
sometimes equated – eg, R Tobin, ‘Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Claus: the tort of invasion of privacy in 
New Zealand’ (2004) 12 Tort Law Journal 95, 101; M Waterfield, ‘Now You See It, Now You Don't: the 
Case for a Tort of Infringement of Privacy in New Zealand’ (2004) 10 Canterbury Law Review 182, 200-
01. 
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der ‘particular circumstances.’ A civil lawyer cannot be sure whether this is sound 
common law, but it seems peculiar with regard to a principled approach.      
 
Thus, it is suggested that the law should follow either an instrumentalist ap-
proach or the justice tradition – not both in a seemingly confused manner. After all, this 
might indicate that New Zealand is better off adopting the British framework and de-
veloping its own ‘rules.’ We will now consider further why an internal viewpoint might 
be preferable. As I attempt to show briefly, it is a necessary precondition of applying 
any advanced concept of privacy. 
Genuine duties as a necessary precondition for privacy concepts      
The application of any sophisticated theoretical concept of privacy seems to pre-
suppose an understanding of the tort’s purpose other than an instrumentalist view aimed 
at social engineering. Firstly, at least any non-reductionist theoretical conception is in 
some respect concerned with the individual demands of the plaintiff who has an interest 
in preserving her privacy (for instance an interest in secrecy, anonymity, identity, per-
sonhood/personality etc). Secondly, advanced concepts usually continue by attempting 
to characterise as to how another person may interfere with those interests; ie, they 
specify the type of the defendant’s actionable conduct (for example misusing her per-
sonal information by ‘accessing’ the information, gaining ‘control’ over its use etcet-
era).452 By applying such concepts, the relationship between plaintiff and defendant is 
becoming the leitmotiv. These concepts, thus, take the plaintiff’s concerns as well as the 
conduct of the defendant into account.453 In terms of tort theory, these issues involve 
considerations of ‘wrongdoing’ and ‘causation.’ As William Lucy points out, wrongful-
ness can be determined from two perspectives - that of the defendant and that of the 
452 Privacy is therefore regarded as something that pre-exists the interaction of the parties - L R Meyer, 
‘Unruly Rights’ (2000) 22 Cardozo Law Review 1, 8. 
453 See also E J Weinrib, ‘Understanding Tort Law’ (1989) 23 Valparaiso University Law Review 485, 
511 discussing what he calls ‘inherent ordering’ of tort law. According to this view, tort law is a coherent 
‘bipolar procedure’ between both litigants; ‘[t]he defendant’s injuring of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's 
recovery of damages from the defendant are mutually connected, so that the procedure is the […] appro-
priate response to what the defendant has done to the plaintiff.’ The procedure is presupposed by the 
‘causation’ of harm and the ‘procedure is not severable from the injury to which it responds.’ Weinrib's 
approach (as well as Coleman’s) utilises the ‘internal point of view’ - W N R Lucy, Philosophy of Private 
Law (2007) 274. 
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plaintiff454 or both, as I should add. In the context of a privacy tort, both perspectives 
are arguably relevant. Causation, on the other hand, links doer and sufferer of a particu-
lar form of harm.455  
    
Hence, it is suggested that one of the first steps in the discussion of a new cause 
of action outside the USA should be concerned with the function of this action.456 
Given that the application of a privacy concept shifts the perspective from the defen-
dant’s conduct to the relationship of the litigants involved in a particular legal claim, it 
follows as a corollary that it should be considered whether these relationships are rele-
vant in the first place - in a tort comprised of category (1) strict liability rules they are 
not in my respectful view. In the context of US law, it is only relevant what conduct of 
the defendant triggers liability.457 Consequently, only the defendant’s actions determine 
‘wrongdoing.’ Applying a particular concept of privacy, in contrast, only makes sense if 
the plaintiff’s interest (however defined) actually ‘matters.’ However, this is precisely 
what Prosser tried to avoid, for instance, when he argued that a relational approach to 
‘duties’ in negligence would direct attention to the plaintiff, the consequences of the 
defendant’s conduct and its individual rather than social blameworthiness. As a result, it 
is questionable whether the theoretical structure of the US tort allows the application of 
any advanced concept of privacy. As we will see later during the discussion of the ‘pub-
licity’ test, the recognition of the harm done to the plaintiff by a minor dissemination 
conflates, for instance, the ‘publicity’ and the ‘highly offensive’ test. It is therefore at 
least arguable that the strict liability rules have to be strictly kept separate – if it were 
otherwise, the structure of the tort gets cracks and fissures.           
2.3.2.4 Two versions of a reasonable expectation of privacy 
Thus far, we came quite a long way from the formalistic adjudication of the pri-
vate facts test to an underlying concept of torts. In the USA it has been observed that 
the ‘concept of right (Recht) shapes [for instance] German legal thought as reasonable-
ness directs common law reasoning;’ the reliance on reasonableness ‘facilitates [in the 
454 W N R Lucy, Philosophy of Private Law (2007) 206. 
455 E J Weinrib, ‘Causation and Wrongdoing’ (1987) 63 Chicago Kent Law Review 407, 410 
456 See also T Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (1999) 68-9. 
457 See also W N R Lucy, Philosophy of Private Law (2007) 206.  
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USA] flat legal thinking’ whereas a concept of right facilitates a ‘style of structured le-
gal discourse.’458 In what is now apparently seen as traditional common law the appli-
cation of reasonableness standards therefore replaces what is in other legal systems a 
concept of right.459 However, we have also seen that a duty in common law can be fash-
ioned in quite different ways. To my mind, a genuine category (2) duty that we have 
associated with New Zealand and the UK is still a duty and not a right, but it does not 
facilitate ‘flat legal thinking.’ A duty understood in terms of the justice tradition is not 
dissimilar to a properly understood concept of right.460 The difference would largely be 
one of structure rather than substance. The interpretation of duties in the USA, by con-
trast, allows liability merely because of commands issued by the courts.461 Particularly 
Prosser captured the notion of law as commands, I think, eloquently by asserting that 
the law is ’what we make it.’ As the Swedish scholar Hägerström pointed out, ‘the 
whole theory of subjective rights of private individuals [...] is incompatible with the im-
perative theory.’462 From a mainland European perspective, there is, in other words, 
nothing left beneath the surface which resembles the notion of rights.  
 
Nowadays, the command theory is thus widely rejected as crude and anachronis-
tic.463 This does not necessarily mean, however, that there is no kinship with contempo-
rary US law. This will be elucidated by pointing briefly to the two different meanings of 
a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ - one is concerned with criminal procedure focus-
458 G P Fletcher, ‘The Right and the Reasonable’ (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 949, 951-2; see also W 
Leebron, ’The Right to Privacy’s Place in the Intellectual History of Tort Law’ (1991) 41 Case Western 
Reserve Law Review 769, 808.  
459 See also J C Goldberg and B C Zipursky, ‘Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes 
and Hart on Legal Duties’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1563, 1565 arguing that in the days of Black-
stonian common law the directives of tort law were rooted in individual rights which placed particular 
obligations on defendants.  
460 N Jansen, ’Duties and Rights in Negligence: A Comparative and Historical Perspective on the Euro-
pean Law of Extracontractual Liability’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 443, 462-3. 
461 J C Goldberg and B C Zipursky, ‘Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart 
on Legal Duties’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1563, 1567.  
462 A Hägerström, Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals (K Olivecrona ed, 1953) 217 as cited in H 
L A Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593, 605; J 
L Coleman and J Kraus, ‘Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights’ (1986) 95 Yale Law Journal 1335, 
1340 (The authors argue that classical liberal rights are incompatible with liability rules). See also G Let-
sas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 705, 715. 
(‘[…] utilitarianism has been traditionally understood as the biggest enemy of rights, why in fact, liberal 
rights themselves emerged as an objection to utilitarianism’).  
463 G Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
705, 715. 
 
 
86 
                                                          
sing on people, the other with tort law stressing the importance of places.464 I should 
point out that this issue might be important because the phrase is used in all three legal 
systems compared here. The meaning of the test could be perceived quite differently 
however - it could either protect ‘places’ by command or ‘people’ by right or genuine 
duty.    
 
The test originated465 most likely from Katz v United States466 and this case will 
indicate the first possible meaning of the test concerned with the protection of people. 
The case was concerned with a telephone conversation conducted from a public tele-
phone booth. The FBI467 overheard these conversation using listening devices. The 
question arose whether a ‘constitutionally protected area’ could exist in such a public 
environment.468 The US Supreme Court found this contention misleading ‘for the 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.’469 According to Justice Harlan, the 
determination of a reasonable expectation required two distinct considerations: firstly, 
the plaintiff’s individual expectations against governmental search and seizure had to be 
investigated (akin to a subjective expectation of privacy); and secondly ‘that the expec-
tation be one that society is prepared to recogni[s]e as “reasonable”’ (akin to an objec-
tive expectation of privacy).470 This is perfectly consonant with a subjective right of a 
464 Tort law and Fourth Amendment are the two areas where the law operates with ‘reasonable expecta-
tions’ – S B Spencer, ‘Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy’ (2002) 39 San Diego Law 
Review 843, 847 (2002). In the tort context the test is predominantly applied in intrusion into solitude or 
seclusion cases - R A Smolla, ‘Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News’ (1999) 67 
George Washington Law Review 1097, 1118.
465 See H T Gómez-Arostegui, ‘Defining Private Life Under The European Convention on Human Rights 
by Referring to Reasonable Expectations’ (2005) 35 California Western International Law Journal 153, 
163. 
466 389 US 347 (1967). 
467 Acronym for: Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
468 Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 351 (1967). Until Katz, the test was indeed as to whether a physical 
intrusion in a ‘constitutionally protected area’ had occurred - S K Sandeen, ‘Relative Privacy: What Pri-
vacy Advocates Can Learn from Trade Secret Law’ [2006] Michigan State Law Review 667, 695.  
469 Ibid. The Fourth Amendment provides a ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, will not be violated […].’ The Court 
thereby rejected the ‘”trespass' doctrine”.’ The judgment has been described as ‘revolutionary’ because it 
changed centuries of common law thinking - Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 225 per Tipping J. 
470 Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 361 (1967); see also L R Meyer, ‘Unruly Rights’ (2000) 22 Car-
dozo Law Review 1, 34; S B Spencer, ‘Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy’ (2002) 39 
San Diego Law Review 843, 847. It should be noted, however, that Katz seems to be a rare exception. 
Generally speaking, the Fourth Amendment protects a person’s home and therefore grants little protection 
in public places - A J Lum, ‘Don’t Smile, Your Image Has Just Been Recorded On A Camera-Phone: The 
Need For Privacy In The Public Sphere ‘(2005) 27 University of Hawaii Law Review 377, 389; D J So-
love, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 477, 497; L E Roth-
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private person as opposed to an imperative command. The test, sensibly, protects an 
individual expectation that does not necessarily imply legal recognition of the expecta-
tion. 
 
We will now return to Shulman v Group W in order to determine the second 
meaning of a reasonable expectation of privacy concerned with places. In the author’s 
opinion, the reasonable expectation test (or rather phrase) is used in a completely differ-
ent fashion in the tort context. Given that the plaintiff would have been situated in a 
public telephone booth, as was the case in Katz, a court would simply hold that the 
plaintiff had no reasonable expectation qua public setting.471 In Shulman, as we recol-
lect, all that mattered was (1) ‘plaintiff at accident site’ equalled no reasonable expecta-
tion; and (2) ‘plaintiff in helicopter’ resulted in a reasonable expectation. In the context 
of the US tort, the test therefore seems to further what George Fletcher described as 
‘flat legal thinking.’ 
 
In this context, it is sometimes suggested that an appearance in a public place 
constitutes a ‘waiver’ of one’s right to privacy or a ‘consent’ which implies surrender-
ing reasonable expectations of privacy.472 That this is only remotely relevant as regards 
US tort law is quite obvious however. The paraplegic plaintiff in Shulman, by way of 
illustration, was wondering whether or not she was dreaming and feeling that she 
wanted to die whilst being extricated from the car and brought to the helicopter. It is 
fair to assume that she had no subjective expectation of privacy under these circum-
 
enberg, ‘Re-Thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and the Failure of Criminal Law to Rec-
ognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space’ (2000) 49 American University Law 
Review 1127, 1132; S K Sandeen, ‘Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn from Trade 
Secret Law’ [2006] Michigan State Law Review 667, 695.   
471 Particularly an analogy to trespass is still explicitly drawn in the context of the intrusion tort - see, eg, 
Alvarado v KOB-TV LLC, (2007) Westlaw 2019752 at p 4 (‘[…] intrusion is “distinct from but related to 
trespass,” and “involves an invasion of the plaintiff's ‘private’ space or solitude-eavesdropping on pri-
vate conversations or peeping through the bedroom window, for example”’ - emphasis added; internal 
citations omitted); see also Roe v Heap, (2004) Westlaw 1109849 para 81. 
472 K M Beasley, ‘Up-Skirt and other Dirt: Why Cell Phone Cameras and other Technologies Require a 
New Approach to Protecting Personal Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 31 Southern Illinois University 
Law Journal 69-70 who also notes that this has the advantage of a bright line test. However, since there is 
no threshold test identifiable as to what number of persons constitutes ‘the public at large’ the bright line 
test is no such bright line test – see L M Jennings, ‘Paying the Price for Privacy: Using the Private Facts 
Tort to Control Social Security Number Dissemination and the Risk of Identity Theft’ (2004) 43 
Washburn Law Journal 725, 759.  
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stances. To argue that her (hypothetical) subjective expectations may have changed 
from ‘unreasonable’ to ‘reasonable’ during her transfer to the helicopter would involve 
an assumption non sequitur. Furthermore, the plaintiff’s objective or normative expecta-
tions not to be filmed surreptitiously and have her health problems publicised were the 
same inside or outside the helicopter.473 Hence, the very idea that she consented, 
waived her soi-disant right to privacy or that she realised that she simply ‘could not 
have had a reasonable expectation of privacy’474 in such a situation is quite daring.475 
That the Court nonetheless came to different conclusions in this instructive case illus-
trates, as I would like to suggest, the difference between a privacy protection by ‘com-
mand’ whilst being in a public place (accident site) and a ‘permission’ to maintain pri-
vacy while being in a private place (helicopter as an analogy to a hospital room).476 The 
notion of law as commands is a general feature of American legal realism (or pragmatic 
institutionalism as Summers has labelled it)477, a matter to which we will return.   
 
McNamara v Freedom Newspapers seems to confirm this impression. The de-
fendant published a photograph depicting the plaintiff playing soccer; his genitals were 
accidentally exposed and the court held that he was ‘voluntarily participating in a spec-
tator sport at a public place.’478 To presuppose the plaintiff’s consent or waiver in such 
473 See Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 250 (1998) per Brown J (concurring and 
dissenting). I implicitly depart from E Paton-Simpson’s opinion here. The scholar (correctly in my view) 
characterises the ‘reasonable expectation’ test as an amalgam of descriptive and normative elements. She 
argues, ‘[n]ormatively, the position is taken [by the courts] that, to the extent public privacy exists, it is 
not worthy of legal protection’ - E Paton-Simpson, ‘Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection 
of Privacy in Public Places’ (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 321. This is not a norma-
tive consideration but an ‘imperative command’ according to my thesis. Instead, considerations are made 
in terms of external ‘social goals’ tort law ought to achieve. The ‘validity’ of these goals ‘is prior and 
independent’ of the facts of the case – see E J Weinrib, ‘Understanding Tort Law’ (1989) 23 Valparaiso 
University Law Review 485, 487. As regards privacy in public places all relevant normative considera-
tions have been made by Prosser, whose opinion hardened into the doctrine applied by the courts. 
474 Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 213 (1998).
475 See also D M Worley, ‘Shulman v Group W Productions: Invasion of Privacy by Publication of Pri-
vate Facts - Where Does California Draw the Line Between Newsworthy Information and Morbid Curi-
osity’ (1999-2000) 27 Western State University Law Review 535, 569. 
476 For a sensible discussion concerned with a waiver of a right see Pavesich v New England Life Ins Co, 
50 SE 68, 72 (1905); for a sensible discussion of the ‘reasonable expectation’ test in a tort context see 
Huskey v National Broadcasting Company Inc, 632 F Supp 1282, 1291 (1986). 
477 R S Summers, ‘On Identifying and Reconstructing a General Legal Theory – Some Thoughts 
Prompted by Professor Moore's Critique’ (1984) 69 Cornell Law Review 1014, 1019. 
478 McNamara v Freedom Newspapers Inc, 802 SW 2d 901, 905 (1991). 
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a situation seems again misconceived.479 Arguing by analogy one could claim that such 
reasoning rather reflects the essence of the ‘industrial accident’ rule formulated by nine-
teenth century British judges. According to this rule, factory workers were excluded 
from suing their employer for negligent injuries caused by another employee; the fac-
tory worker, as it were, ‘assume[d] the risk’ of being harmed due to the carelessness of 
‘fellow servants.’480 However, similar to the worker who does not assume or accept be-
ing negligently harmed just because he works in a factory with supposedly careless co-
workers, a soccer player does not consent to the - even less likely - public dissemination 
of a photograph showing his genitals just because he participates in a sport usually 
played in public places.481 Implied consent is surely an issue, but the curtailment of vo-
lenti non fit injuria as general defence in negligence law might provide useful hints for 
the law outside the USA. As Lord Denning MR explained: ‘[k]nowledge of risk is not 
enough. Nor is a willingness to take the risk of injury.’482
 
Moreover, a normative argumentation in a case such as McNamara especially if 
based on a right to privacy would again come to a different conclusion. It is perhaps 
true enough to say that one’s genitals are a ‘clearly private’ matter even though they 
only indirectly belong to one’s ‘sex life.’483 A normative consideration would therefore, 
for instance, consider that ‘[i]t is genital nudity that Americans find most bizarre: One’s 
genitalia are “privates” in the full sense of the word in America, and one does not ordi-
479 Compare also D J Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1147-8 
who advances the familiar suggestion that the Court in McNamara conceptualised privacy as secrecy, 
which was in his view an inappropriate concept.   
480 R M Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) 2. The rule was abandoned in England with the Law Reform 
(Personal Injuries) Act 1948 – ibid fn 3. See also generally P S Atiyah, ‘The Legacy of Holmes through 
English Eyes’ (1983) 63 Boston University Law Review 341, 359.  
481 In Daily Times Democrat v Graham, 162 So 2d 474, 478 (1964) - the Court argued, ‘[t]o hold that one 
who is involuntarily and instantaneously enmeshed in an embarrassing pose forfeits her right of privacy 
merely because she happened at the moment to be part of a public scene would be illogical, wrong, and 
unjust.’ Dworkin assumes, however, that the industrial accident rule ‘seemed less silly when Darwinian 
images of capitalism were more popular’ – Law’s Empire (1986) 2. Likewise, it could be argued that 
even contemporary judgments to this effect in the privacy context seem more appropriate when the Social 
Darwinian nature of First Amendment doctrine is taken into account.   
482 Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691, 701. See E Simpson-Paton,’ Privacy and the Reasonable Para-
noid: The Protection of Privacy in Public Places’ (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 332 
for further details regarding the privacy context. See also X v Unknown Persons [2007] EMLR 10 (QBD) 
paras 29 – 36 per Eady J.  
483 For a similar opinion see also K M. Beasley, ‘Up-Skirt and other Dirt: Why Cell Phone Cameras and 
other Technologies Require a New Approach to Protecting Personal Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 31 
Southern Illinois University Law Journal 69, 74. 
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narily expose them in public, and certainly not before the opposite sex.’484 Following 
the already familiar scheme, such considerations were of no concern in McNamara; 
what was decisive was that the ‘photograph accurately depict[ed] a public, newsworthy 
event.’485 This case also indicates the preference for an individualistic concept detached 
from responsibility. The plaintiff proffered that the newspaper could have used one of 
its numerous other photographs in order to depict the soccer match as a newsworthy 
event (without exposing the plaintiff’s genitals). The Court held, ‘[t]he mere existence 
of an alternative means of expression cannot by itself justify a restraint on some particu-
lar means that the speaker finds more effective.’486 In sum, given that the ‘reasonable 
expectation’ is used in the context of the public disclosure tort, it protects places by 
command.487 As already indicated, the viability of individual rights of private persons 
under these circumstances is impossible.488  
 
Considered in aggregation, it is suggested that there is no right of privacy whose 
infringement gives rise to a cause of action in the context of US law. What American 
scholars usually address as ‘right to privacy’ should be exclusively understood as a 
right to take action without an underlying right. Furthermore, a right to compensation is 
conferred by making out the action. In a nutshell, this is what might be described as pri-
vacy by permission as opposed to a right to privacy.489 When US scholars lament, by 
way of illustration, that the plaintiff’s privacy right has shrunk considerably over 
484 J Q Whitman ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty’ (2004) 113 Yale Law 
Journal 1151. See also L E Rothenberg, ‘Re-Thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and the 
Failure of Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space’ (2000) 
49 American University Law Review 1127, 1135. 
485 McNamara v Freedom Newspapers Inc, 802 SW 2d 901, 905 (1991). 
486 Ibid, at p 904. 
487 See also W J Chriss, ‘Personhood and the Right to Privacy in Texas’ (2007) 48 South Texas Law Re-
view 575, 595 who argues that the First Amendment provided an absolute privilege to the newspaper in 
McNamara. Compare Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 233.
488 See also J Rosen, ‘Continental Divide’ [2004] Legal Affairs 49, 53 who dimly senses that ‘[i]n the 
name of hono[u]r, Europeans are even willing to tolerate restrictions on freedom of the media, restrictions 
American courts would never accept.’ In the European context, it is irrelevant what ‘the courts would 
accept.’ Instead, courts have to consider whether or not an individual claim, based on a right to privacy, is 
justified in the light of the media’s right to free speech and the public’s right to know. 
489 A L Peikoff, for instance, mentions that ‘thanks to the right to privacy, Americans enjoy privacy not 
by right, but by permission’ - ‘The Right to Privacy: Contemporary Reductionists and their Critics 
‘(2006) 13 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law 474, 489. 
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time,490 it would consequently be more appropriate to understand this as indicating that 
the readiness of the courts to grant these permissions has shrunk. Notwithstanding, the 
notion of law as commands quite literally suits the top-down approach on privacy taken 
in that country.491 The difference of adopting an alternative rights-based approach will 
be shown next.  
2.3.3 Towards a right to a ‘right of privacy’ 
As the title of their law review article already suggests, Warren and Brandeis’ 
conceptual basis for their proposal was that of a ‘right.’492 In my opinion, this still the 
best way in the present context since extra-contractual liability is most easily imposed 
on the basis of the invasion of an individual right. It would also clarify the status of the 
interest pitted against freedom of speech. It has already been indicated and will receive 
detailed discussion later on that the New Zealand courts may recognise a right to pri-
vacy under the heading of s 28 NZBoRA.493 Moreover, the recent acknowledgment of 
an ‘intrusion into seclusion tort’ on a comparable basis by the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice also lends support to proceed in this manner.494 At least in the context of Eng-
lish law, however, it might be necessary to recognise an autonomous ‘right of privacy’ 
in common law. This would also suit the tort structure preferred here – there would be a 
private right whose infringement gives rise to a cause of action. 
 
490 Eg, A J McClurg, ‘Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions 
in Public Places’ (1995) 73 North Carolina Law Review 989, 995. 
491 See also C R Sunstein, ‘On Analogical Reasoning’ (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 741, 749. 
492 W Leebron, ‘The Right to Privacy’s Place in the Intellectual History of Tort Law’ (1991) 41 Case 
Western Reserve Law Review 769, 778 - Leebron points out that the language was deliberately chosen as 
the authors could have named the article ”The Legal Protection of Privacy, Invasion of Privacy” or simi-
larly. As already shown, Prosser very much dismantled Warren and Brandeis’ original intentions – see, 
eg, H Kalven, Jr, ‘Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?’ (1966) 31 Law and Contem-
porary Problems 326, 333 – Kalven discusses Bloustein’s effort to ground privacy on a single principle 
and observes ‘the deadening common sense of the Prosser approach [that] cuts the tort loose from the 
philosophic moorings Warren and Brandeis gave it, from, that is, the excitement of association with the 
grand norm of privacy’). 
493 This would represent a liberty-based normative foundation of the right – See J L Coleman and J 
Kraus, ‘Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights’ (1986) 95 Yale Law Journal 1335, 1340-1.   
494 Somwar v McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Ltd 263 DLR (4th) 752 paras 23-31; Shred-Tech Corp 
v Viveen [2006] OJ No 4893 para 30 - Gordon J was ‘of the view recognition of such a tort in law is the 
logical result of the acknowledgment of privacy rights. There must be a remedy available for the breach 
of any right’). 
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What would be the implication of granting a ‘right’ of privacy as distinct from 
the court’s ‘permission’ to retain privacy to a certain extent?495 Is the joint judgment’s 
assertion swiftly mentioned in Hosking true that in theory ‘a rights-based cause of ac-
tion would be made out by proof of breach of the right irrespective of the seriousness of 
the breach’?496 On the face of it, the simplicity of the argument is certainly stunning but 
which theory had their Honours’ in mind when they made this rigorous claim?497 What-
ever gave them that idea, does their assumption represent the only arguable concept of 
right?498 This large issue cannot be canvassed exhaustively here. However, we consider 
two different formulations.499 The chief purpose of the following exposition is to coun-
teract against the apparently widespread impression that a rights-based conflict (for in-
stance between privacy and freedom of speech) ‘virtually begs for an either/or solu-
tion’500 as indicated in Hosking. The following works towards a ‘bottom-up’ approach 
that I associate with a tort consistent with a human rights instrument. In such an ap-
proach, as Weinrib put it somewhat enigmatically, the ‘plaintiff and the defendant are 
locked in a reciprocal normative embrace.’501 This formulation nevertheless alludes to 
an uncompromising ‘corrective justice’ approach. It is, thus, advantageous to point out 
that our analysis proceeds on the premise that ‘[c]orrective justice specifies grounds, 
495 The advent of, for instance, an ‘age of rights’ could be observed quite regularly these days - see, eg, T 
Poole, ‘Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law Constitutionalism’ (2003) 23 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 435, 438. One may nonetheless have the impression that the implications of a 
right are like a red rag to a bull to some judges and scholars. Hence, a short discussion seems advanta-
geous – compare, eg, M Richardson, ‘Whither Breach of Confidence: A Right of Privacy for Australia?’ 
(2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 381, 392 where the author discusses Mill’s political phi-
losophy and remarks ‘[c]ertainly, Mill took rights seriously […]’ obviously paraphrasing Dworkin, with 
M Richardson and L Hitchens, ‘Celebrity privacy and benefits of simple history’ in M Richardson and A 
T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 250, 262 discussing Mill and sensing a ‘rich 
potential base of utilitarian support for privacy as a species of liberty.’ 
496 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 125 per Gault P and Blanchard J. For a similar suggestion see P 
A LeBel, ‘The Right to Privacy One Hundred Years Later: Rights-Talk and Torts-Talk’ (1991) 41 Case 
Western Reserve Law Review 811, 818.   
497 It could be a will-based theory of rights, which is said to ‘regard rights as spheres of liberty bounded 
by absolute rules’ – see L R Meyer, ‘Unruly Rights’ (2000) 22 Cardozo Law Review 1, 7; the statement 
also fits Dworkin’s ‘rights as trumps’ account – see M Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On 
the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 
574, 592.  
498 Particularly the notion of ‘rights as trumps’ was given ‘wide currency’ by Dworkin - J Raz, The Mo-
rality of Freedom (OUP, 1986) 186. 
499 A consensus about the proper conception of a ‘right’ indeed does not seem to exist - J Waldron, Lib-
eral Rights (1993) 203. 
500 P A LeBel, ‘The Right to Privacy One Hundred Years Later: Rights-Talk and Torts-Talk’ (1991) 41 
Case Western Reserve Law Review 811, 816. 
501 E J Weinrib, ‘Understanding Tort Law’ (1989) 23 Valparaiso University Law Review 485, 512; W N 
R Lucy, Philosophy of Private Law (2007) 379. 
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not modes, of rectification.’502 In Aristotle’s treatise ‘Justice and Injustice,’503 the fa-
mous distinction between ‘corrective justice’ and ‘distributive justice’ was first made. 
Although this is obviously another complex issue which cannot be dealt with exhaus-
tively in a comparative law analysis, a brief account on the distinction will be provided. 
We will see later that particularly the ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’ test con-
tains elements of distributive justice. For our purposes, corrective and distributive jus-
tice is therefore not incompatible, but may overlap and even co-exist.504   
2.3.3.1 Warren and Brandeis and the ‘inviolate personality’ 
In terms of Warren and Brandeis’ ‘inviolate personality,’505 for example, the an-
swer would have been quite simple.506 The two authors used this phrase particularly in 
order to clarify the distinctiveness of privacy in contrast to property interests.507 Before 
Prosser gradually cemented his quadripartite tort, Leon Green proposed to rephrase the 
cases developing under the privacy label as ‘appropriation of an interest in personal-
ity.’508 ‘Personality essentially involves the capacity for rights;’ on the most basic level, 
these abstract rights empower the individual ‘to be a person’ which necessarily corre-
sponds with the requirement ‘to respect others as persons.’509 This statement implies an 
interrelationship between right and obligation among citizens.510   
 
502 J L Coleman, ‘The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice’ (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 427, 432. 
503 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Five. In the following, references Aristote’s treatise stem from 
Selections from Nicomachean Ethics and Politics (The Collector’s Library of Essential Thinkers, 2004) 
pp 72 - 96.  
504 See W N R Lucy, Philosophy of Private Law (2007) 379. 
505 S D Warren and L D Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193, 205; see 
also J Q Whitman, ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty’ (2004) 113 Yale Law 
Journal 1151, 1180. 
506 Some courts have regarded privacy as the ‘right to be let alone’ as well as the ‘right to an inviolate 
personality’ – see Jaubert v Crowley Post-Signal Inc, 375 So 2d 1386, 1388 (1979).  
507 J Kahn, ‘Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance’ (2003) 33 Seton Hall Law Review 371, 
391. The characterisation of privacy as a property interest crops up regularly – see, eg, A Schreiber, 
‘Confidence Crisis, Privacy Phobia: Why Invasion of Privacy Should Independently recognised in Eng-
lish Law’ [2006] Intellectual Property Quarterly 160, 180. 
508 L Green, ‘The Right of Privacy’ (1932) 27 Illinois Law Review 237, 254. 
509 G W F Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (A W Wood ed; H B Nisbet trans, CUP 1991) § 36 
at p 69 (emphasis added). This definition of an abstract ‘right’ seems to be in tune with some contempo-
rary definitions of ‘dignity’ and ‘right’ - see J Kahn, ‘Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Mainte-
nance’ (2003) 33 Seton Hall Law Review 371, 382. 
510 At its core, the categorical right in a Kantian sense is ‘a right to expect civility from others’ - L R 
Meyer, ‘Unruly Rights’ (2000) 22 Cardozo Law Review 1, 12; see also C Fried, ’Privacy’ (1968) 77 Yale 
Law Journal  475, 478-9; G P Fletcher, ‘The Right and the Reasonable’(1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 
949, 966.  
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In German law, for example, the normative concept of personality entails, for 
instance, a right to a name or likeness that may be misappropriated as in Douglas v 
Hello! Ltd, a right to privacy which may have been breached in Shulman v Group W, or 
an earned reputation that may be defamed as in Lange v Atkinson.511 All cases are then 
treated alike inasmuch as the individuals involved have at least the abstract right to ‘be 
a person’ (for example, plaintiff) and the corresponding obligation to ‘respect others as 
persons’ (for example, defendant).512 On this note, Bloustein’s observation that the in-
violate personality posits ‘the individual's independence, dignity and integrity [and] de-
fine[s] man's essence as a unique and self-determining being’ was apparently quite 
close to Warren’s and Brandeis’ original intention.513 In a way, Bloustein tried to turn 
back the clock. 
 
Similarly, New Zealand, England and Wales have started with a protection of 
privacy and seem to press interests under this headline which are perhaps more appro-
priately put under the headline of personality or an interest in one’s personhood.514 In 
England and Wales, for instance, it seemed for a while as if privacy conceptualised as 
‘dissemination of personal information’ was becoming a surrogate for personality in the 
Douglas v Hello! Ltd litigation.515 The situation was clarified recently in the House of 
511 His Honour would certainly not like the idea, but for a quite ‘German’ reconciliation of the two inter-
ests see Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424, 473 (CA) per Tipping J. In a similar manner, Leon Green 
thought that privacy is only one of several aspects of personality - ‘The Right of Privacy’ (1932) 27 Illi-
nois Law Review 237, 239. 
512 See also E J Weinrib, ‘Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice’ 
(2001) 2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 107, 126 who argues that correlativity represents the interrelation 
of the parties while personality ‘represents the parties in their interrelation’ (emphasis added). 
513 E J Bloustein, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser’ (1964) 39 New 
York University Law Review 962, 971. 
514 It should be added that the ECtHR implies the ‘development of every human being’s personality’ 
while using the term ‘private life’ of art 8 ECHR - von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1 para 69; 
see also H T Gómez-Arostegui, ‘Defining Private Life Under The European Convention on Human 
Rights by Referring to Reasonable Expectations’ (2005) 35 California Western International Law Jour-
nal 153, 160. 
515 This is hardly a privacy case, but fits into the formulation of the US appropriation of name and like-
ness tort – R Wacks, ‘Why there will never be an English common law privacy tort’ in M Richardson and 
A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 154, 157. This tort, however, is widely re-
garded as not incorporating a privacy interest. For some further details see also S Bains, ‘Personality 
Rights: Should the UK Grant Celebrities a Proprietary Right in Their Personality?’ (2007) 18 Entertain-
ment Law Review 165; see also Note ‘In the Face of Danger: Facial Recognition and the Limits of Pri-
vacy Law’ (2007) 120 Harvard Law Review 1870, 1876. 
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Lords.516 Likewise, one New Zealand decision also seemed to show an interest in con-
flating personality interests under the privacy banner.517  
  
Notwithstanding, recognising at least a general ‘right to privacy’ under s 28 
NZBoRA in New Zealand could have the advantage of ensuring a limited and princi-
pled development of the current remedy affording protection solely against disclosure 
of personal information. This remedy would only protect an aspect of the right to pri-
vacy not privacy as a whole.518 Thus understood the cause of action would be less vul-
nerable to treat what is in fact a ‘placing someone in a false light claim’ as a disclosure 
case. A ‘false light’ claim may or may not be accepted as another actionable aspect of a 
right to privacy, but it is not encompassed by the current remedy. We will see later that 
an ‘indirect horizontal application’ of the NZBoRA does not require the courts to manu-
facture a new cause of action.519 A right to privacy would (indirectly applied) only 
grant protection in an already existing remedy. Whether or not such an additional ‘false 
light’ cause of action should be recognised is, in my view, left to the courts as a matter 
of common law.520 The exact relationship between common law rights and the rights 
enshrined in a human rights instrument are beyond the scope of this analysis. However, 
an indirectly applied quasi-constitutional right would arguably require an autonomous 
recognition of a right to privacy in the common law as well. As Laws LJ put it in the 
context of English law:521  
 
516 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2007] 2 WLR 920 (HL) paras 118 per Lord Hoffmann; para 255 per 
Lord Nicholls and para 285 per Lord Walker (dissenting). 
517 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 391 
predicts that aspects may be subsumed under ‘privacy’ that do not belong there. In Mafart v TVNZ Ltd 
[2006] 3 NZLR 534 (CA) para 61 per Hammond J - the Court of Appeal opined that ‘misinterpretation or 
misportrayals’ was an aspect of privacy. This interest is probably best subsumed under the ‘publicity 
which places the plaintiff in the false light in the public eye’ formulation of the US tort (see J F Burrows, 
‘Review: Media Law’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 769, 774), which is a branch of the quadripartite 
US tort also not protecting ‘privacy’ interests in a narrow sense. 
518 See particularly Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 15 per Lord Nicholls. 
519 Ibid, para 132 per Lady Hale. 
520 See generally Lord Irvine of Lairg, Hansard, HL Volume 583, 24 November 1997, col 785 (‘In my 
view, the courts may not act as legislators and grant new remedies for infringement of convention rights 
unless the common law itself enables them to develop new rights or remedies’ – emphasis supplied). See 
also M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 paras 184, 204. 
521 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] QB 728 
para 71 (emphasis supplied). 
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[t]he common law has come to recognize and endorse the notion of constitutional, or fundamen-
tal rights. These are broadly the rights given expression in the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, but their recognition in the common law is autono-
mous [...]. The Human Rights Act 1998 […] now provides a democratic underpinning to the 
common law's acceptance of constitutional rights, and important new procedural measures for 
their protection. 
 
A right to privacy recognised in the common law would therefore be a private 
right whose infringement might give rise to additional remedies. I perceive a right, thus, 
as an incentive to protect privacy meaningfully - not as a threat to freedom of speech. 
Moreover, it is, I think, difficult to distinguish ‘personality’ understood as a basic nor-
mative concept from the central idea embodied in Lord Atkin’s neighbour principle. 
However, rejecting the notion of an ‘inviolate personality’ as a viable concept is in the 
author’s view perfectly arguable due to its speculative basis. To argue, by way of illus-
tration, ‘the inherent difficulty with the Kantian approach, if applied rigorously (as the 
United States experience has shown) - that is, the risk of a worryingly narrow protection 
being accorded to privacy interests under the aegis of a strictly framed privacy right’522 
is another matter though. Only a remarkably fertile imagination would allow such an 
observation; the lack of similarities of the actual public dissemination tort with one of 
Warren and Brandeis’ original influences are rather obvious. The plaintiffs have, as al-
ready indicated, no ‘right’ in Holmesian tort theory particularly not in a Kantian sense. 
In Holmes tort theory, judges exclusively create obligations. Tort law could therefore 
‘not be described as reflecting or enforcing moral or conventionally-recognized duties 
owed by one citizen to another.’523  
 
The paraplegic plaintiff in Shulman, for instance, was not ‘a person’ with a con-
comitant right to privacy and she was not treated as such. She was treated as a means to 
a news item as an end, an object on which the function of some ‘claws of life’ and the 
522 M Richardson, ‘Whither Breach of Confidence: A Right of Privacy for Australia?’ (2002) 26 Mel-
bourne University Law Review 381, 394. The position probably has been readjusted – see M Richardson 
and L Hitchens in M Richardson and A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 250, 
262 fn 67. 
523 J C Goldberg and B C Zipursky, ‘The Moral of MacPherson’ (1998) 146 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1733, 1756. 
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daily goings about of ‘nurse Carnahan’ were to be shown.524 It is furthermore difficult 
to determine why the conduct of the media in cases such as Shulman should be treated 
differently from the often-condemned up-skirt photography.525 However, whether or 
not this is indeed a ‘civilized and humane society’526 is not for the author to decide but 
it might be in doubtful taste calling this a Kantian approach.527 In conclusion, there is 
effectively nothing left of Warren’s and Brandeis’ famous article – apart from the al-
ready mentioned disregard for the human dignity, the original intention of implement-
ing a ‘right to privacy’ has also not taken root in US law.528 Before I attempt to espouse 
an alternative view of the nature and structure of rights, the difference between correc-
tive and distributive justice will be sketched briefly.    
2.3.3.2 Corrective and distributive justice 
According to Aristotle, two particular forms of justice and the just in them can 
be distinguished – corrective and distributive justice.529 Corrective justice is agent spe-
cific and aims at ensuring equality between two particular agents in either voluntary 
transactions (such as contractual relationships) or involuntary transactions (such as tor-
tious wrongdoing). In the context of tort law, this form of justice is therefore concerned 
524 Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal  4th 200, 228-9 (1998) – the Court determined newswor-
thiness by way of emphasising the public interest in the rescue proceedings (the ‘claws of life’ were a 
special tool with which the plaintiffs were extricated) and the medical team with a particular focus on 
‘nurse Carnahan’). An interpretation of the means/end distinction could be found in J Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice (OUP, 1971) 179-83. See also J Kahn, ‘Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance’ 
(2003) 33 Seton Hall Law Review 371, 382; L E Rothenberg, ‘Re-Thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, 
Video Voyeurs, and the Failure of Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in 
the Public Space’ (2000) 49 American University Law Review 1127, 1137. 
525 Compare K M Beasley, ‘Up-Skirt and other Dirt: Why Cell Phone Cameras and other Technologies 
Require a New Approach to Protecting Personal Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 31 Southern Illinois 
University Law Journal 69, 82. 
526 Florida Star v BJF, 491 US 524, 547 (1989). According to A Margalit, The Decent Society (1996) 201 
- as cited by J Kahn, ‘Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance’ (2003) 33 Seton Hall Law 
Review 371, 398 - a civilised society ‘is one whose members do not humiliate one another, while a decent 
society is one in which the institutions do not humiliate people.’ 
527 But compare an earlier work of J Rosen, ‘The Purposes of Privacy: A Response’ (2001) 89 George-
town Law Journal  2117, 2128 who argues, ‘American law is better equipped to adjudicate serious of-
fen[c]es against dignity [as opposed to European law which allegedly focuses on the protection of ‘hon-
our’]‘ which is in Rosen’s opinion particularly evidenced by the fact that ‘the torts of intrusion and offen-
sive public disclosure of private facts ask whether the invasion “would be highly offensive to a reason-
able person”.’ 
528 See also P A LeBel, ‘The Right to Privacy One Hundred Years Later: Rights-Talk and Torts-Talk’ 
(1991) 41 Case Western Reserve Law Review 811. See also S K Sandeen, ‘Relative Privacy: What Pri-
vacy Advocates Can Learn from Trade Secret Law’ [2006] Michigan State Law Review 667, 668-9.  
529 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Five, at p 78. 
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with the bipolar relationship between plaintiff and defendant.530 If a person steals NZ$ 
50.00 from another person, equality is restored in this bipolar relationship by repaying 
the exact amount taken. In this context, the particular features of the two parties in-
volved in such an involuntary transaction are not relevant. It does not matter, for in-
stance, whether the money was stolen from a rich or a poor person. In other words, it is 
not determinative what the particular merits of each claim are. In terms of corrective 
justice, it is ‘wrong’ to steal the money in both cases.     
 
Distributive justice, in contrast, is agent general and concerned with the distribu-
tion of wealth or other things that are to be shared ‘among the members of the social 
community.’531 The principle of distributive justice is proportionality: that ‘which is to 
be distributed should be so distributed in proportion to the merit of the individuals 
among whom it is to be distributed.’532 The just (and therefore equal) in distributive jus-
tice is thus concerned with merit; it involves comparing the merits of the claims of po-
tential parties to the distribution in terms of a distributive criterion (such as proportion-
ality).533 In this respect, the relative merit of a poor person’s claim may be compared 
with the merits of a rich person’s claim. In brief, ‘the kind of equality to which correc-
tive justice restores the parties is thus an abstract one, as the parties are abstracted from 
their particular features that are relevant in claims of distributive justice.’534  
 
Unfortunately, the importance of the role of distributive justice within tort rules 
is not fully clarified yet; the reason is most likely that the relevant literature is pitched at 
a high level of abstraction.535 However, it would appear that both forms of justice are 
incompatible. As already indicated, we will nevertheless utilise Jule Coleman’s ‘mixed 
530 E J Weinrib, ‘Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice’ (2001) 2 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 107, 110; see too his ‘Corrective Justice’ (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 403, 
409. 
531 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Five, at p 78. 
532 N A Weston, ‘The Metaphysics of Modern Tort Theory’ (1994) 28 Valparaiso University Law Review 
919, 989; Aristotle, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Five, at p 81. 
533 See E J Weinrib, ‘Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice’ 
(2001) 2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 107, 117. 
534 N A Weston, ‘The Metaphysics of Modern Tort Theory’ (1994) 28 Valparaiso University Law Review 
919, 990. 
535 P Cane, ‘Distributive Justice and Tort Law’ [2001] New Zealand Law Review 401, 419. 
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conception of corrective justice.’ This approach implies that both forms of justice may 
at least co-exist.   
2.3.3.3 Right to privacy - a fresh start 
The meaning or theoretical basis of a common law ‘right’ can be manifold and 
we will consider a fairly recent formulation next. With Raz one could argue, ‘X has a 
“right” if and only if […] an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason 
for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.’536 The difference between the 
formulations seems to be that the individual does not have certain rights qua being 
(Hegel) but merely under particular circumstances if individual interests suffice to hold 
another person under an obligation or duty (Raz).537 However, an obvious conflict ex-
ists as to how an interest theory of rights could be reconciled with the claim that privacy 
is an interest grounded in human dignity.538 In a strict sense, interest theories of rights 
are independent of human agency, but a solution to this important issue is outside the 
scope of a comparative law analysis.539
 
These caveats notwithstanding, Raz’s formulation is best suited for our pur-
poses, because it presupposes that two rights (such as privacy and freedom of speech) 
can conflict and on occasion only prevail to a degree. This necessarily implies that they 
are not ‘absolutes.’540 It is therefore easily possible to associate this theory with the 
536 J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP, 1986) 166. It seems as if in the ‘rights-free’ common law 
sphere, automatic preference is often afforded to a ‘right’ over the corresponding ‘obligation’ which is 
not necessarily the case. In mainland European law, for example, a ‘right’ is simply ‘subjective law’ (eg, 
subjektives Recht or droit subjectif) as distinct from ‘objective law’ (eg, objektives Recht or droit objectif) 
- H Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (M Knight trans, University of California Press 1967) 125-6. It is only 
‘objective law’ if and only insofar as the so-called enjoyment of the ‘subjective law’ corresponds with the 
‘obligation’ of another individual to tolerate the enjoyment of the aforementioned right - at p 127.    
537 Raz posits a so-called ‘interest theory’ – see H Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (M Knight trans, Univer-
sity of California Press, 1967) 134 for a brief differentiation of a will power theory of ‘right’ (for example 
Hegel) and interest theories. Interest theories are not grounded in moral agency (like a Kantian will-
theory) but base rights claims in common interests we share as humans -  L R Meyer, ‘Unruly Rights’ 
(2000) 22 Cardozo Law Review 1, 7.     
538 For the importance of ‘agency’ to privacy see M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ 
NZLC MP19 para 144. 
539 Even from the specialised literature it is only ascertainable that, for instance, the German model  
would run both on advanced utilitarianism or core Kantian principles - M Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights 
as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 574, 590 fn 87. 
540 See J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP, 1986) 184; J Waldron, Liberal Rights (OUP, 1993) 203. 
Many US lawyers, by contrast, seem to presuppose that there could be at best only one right in play, a 
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possibility of balancing countervailing rights.541 For my money, this is also the best 
concept of rights to be combined with a proportionality test. Contrary to the belief of 
the joint judgment in Hosking, a rights-based action is on this basis not automatically 
made out by its breach. The seriousness of the infringement rather has an impact on the 
gravity of the plaintiff’s interest to hold the defendant under an obligation. First and 
foremost, it is therefore advantageous to distinguish between prima facie rights on one 
hand and rights on the other.542   
 
So what kind of change does a rights-based approach theoretically bring about? 
In the most basic sense, a prima facie right implies that an individual plaintiff (hereinaf-
ter Simpkins) may have an interest which might justify demanding something from the 
individual defendant (hereinafter Hargreaves).543 The individual interest is recognised 
by law as an actual right if and to the extent Simpkins can hold Hargreaves under an 
obligation to do or abstain from doing something. Simpkins could, for instance, demand 
from Hargreaves not to publicly broadcast and thereby disseminate personal informa-
tion to the extent that no conflicting considerations are of greater weight.544 Given that 
the incident underlying the broadcast occurred, by way of illustration, in a public place 
it is suggested that the obligation which Hargreaves may owe individually to Simpkins 
is neither obsolete per se because of third-party-onlookers nor because of anonymous 
drivers on a highway who could have watched the incident theoretically.545 The afore-
mentioned groups may or may not owe similar obligations to Simpkins, but do not at 
first blush interfere - let alone obliterate – Hargreaves’ individual obligations.546 In 
other words, rights tie the litigants together and make their obligations relational.547 The 
 
presupposition which facilitates flat legal thinking - G P Fletcher, ‘The Right and the Reasonable’ (1985) 
98 Harvard Law Review 949, 979.   
541 See L R Meyer, ‘Unruly Rights’ (2000) 22 Cardozo Law Review 1, 9. 
542 For brief discussion of ‘abstract’ or ‘prima facie rights’ see R M Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Belknap 
Harvard, 1986) 293, 295; J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP, 1986) 184; G P Fletcher, ‘The Right 
and the Reasonable’ (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 949, 978. 
543 See also J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP, 1986) 183; H Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (M Knight 
trans, University of California Press 1967) 132. 
544 Ibid, at p 172. 
545 See also Murray v Express Newspapers [2007] EMLR 583 (Ch) para 26 per Patten J (“Murray”). 
546 Some judges seem to acknowledge this consequence – see Shulman v Group W Productions Inc, 18 
Cal 4th 200, 246-7 (1998) per Kennard J (concurring). For a brief distinction between such a rights based 
model and certain utilitarian accounts see J Waldron, Liberal Rights (1993) 204. 
547 Eg, E J Weinrib, ‘Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice’ 
(2001) 2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 107, 117. 
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presence of third-party-onlookers may, however, play a part in determining whether 
Simpkins has ‘sufficient reason’ to hold Hargreaves under an obligation depending on 
the circumstances.548
 
In order to determine whether or not Simpkins has ‘sufficient reason’ to hold 
Hargreaves under the obligation not to disseminate personal information about her the 
particular remedy has to be fashioned in a certain way of course.549 Let us assume that a 
court employs a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test as its first prong.550 It is impor-
tant not to conflate the issues of determining the actionable nature of the personal in-
formation involved and the public interest in learning about this information - these are 
different matters.551 The reasonable expectation formula merely serves to demarcate a 
prima facie right to privacy.552 As such, the test necessarily would have to combine 
subjective and objective or better normative considerations in order to produce ‘reason-
able’ results.553 In my view, the basic structure of the test as originally proposed by 
Harlan J in Katz554 can be utilised for present purposes. We assume that Hargreaves in-
tends to disseminate Simpkins’ health problems against her will / without her consent to 
other people in two constellations.  
 
548 Eg, E Paton-Simpson, ‘Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in Public 
Places’ (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 321 (2000); A J McClurg, ‘Bringing Privacy 
Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places’ (1995) 73 North Caro-
lina Law Review 989, 1037. 
549 Even a value judgment ‘should be a principled, structured and transparent exercise’ - Brooker v Police 
[2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC) para 153 per Thomas J. 
550 The ECtHR mentioned the test in Halford v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 523 para 45; PG & JH  
v United Kingdom 2001-IX Eur Ct HR 546 para 57; Peck v UK (2003) 13 BHRC 669 para 58; von Han-
nover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1 per Mr Justice Zupančič (concurring) (‘The context of criminal pro-
cedure and the use of evidence obtained in violation of the reasonable expectation of privacy in Halford 
do not prevent us from employing the same test in cases such as the one before us’). 
551 See Associated Newspapers Ltd v His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales [2007] 3 WLR 222 (CA) 
para 112 per Blackburne J. This conflation, however, often seems to happen in applying the US law – see 
J B Mintz, ‘The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain’ (1996) 55 
Maryland Law Review 425, 441. 
552 For a practical example see Lord Browne of Madingley v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] 3 WLR 
289 (CA) para 22 per Clarke MR (“Browne”). 
553 See, eg, N A Moreham, ‘Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 65(3) Cambridge Law Journal 606, 617. For 
the importance of recognising both subjective and objective (in my view normative) considerations in the 
context of law relating to human dignity see also G Moon and A Allen ‘Dignity Discourse in Discrimina-
tion Law: A Better Route to Equality’ (2006) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 610, 645 and D 
Feldman, ‘Human Dignity as a Legal Value: Part 1’ [1999] Public Law 682, 686. 
554 Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 361 (1967). 
 
 
102 
                                                          
The first constellation is concerned with Simpkins having a cold, which is pretty 
obvious even in public places because of her constant sneezing and her runny nose. Her 
subjective expectations should be tested, inter alia, against social practices of talking 
about this issue, which would be a normative consideration. It considers whether the 
plaintiff ought to have a reasonable expectation.555 A court would most likely answer in 
the negative that this particular health problem (although regularly regarded as private) 
constitutes a ‘sufficient reason’ to hold Hargreaves under an obligation not to dissemi-
nate them. That would be one of the costs Simpkins has to pay for living in an organ-
ised and civilised society as they say.556 Decisive is already ‘the nature of informa-
tion.’557 The test, then, functions as first filter against wholly subjective individual ex-
pectations and delimits a prima facie right to privacy.558 As a result, the case is simply 
dismissed without any considerations concerned with free speech.559 However, in a 
rights-based approach there is hardly any room for a general rule saying that there is no 
protection for privacy interests in public places; it rather has to be tested in each case 
anew whether Simpkins can hold Hargreaves under an obligation or not.560  
 
For the second constellation, Simpkins was involved in a car accident. This time 
her health problems are critical injuries and she was barely conscious and therefore un-
aware of being surreptitiously filmed at the accident site by Hargreaves. She learns 
about these circumstances only through the broadcast itself. Here the second purpose of 
555 See M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 para 153. 
556 See, eg, Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 
226. This argument is often invoked but at a certain point it rings hollow and provides ‘a cost-free license 
for irresponsible behavio[u]r’ – See B Ackerman, ‘Tort Law and Communitarism: Where Rights Meet 
Responsibilities’ (1995) 30 Wake Forest Law Review 645, 658. A related argument is concerned with the 
‘hypersensitivity’ of certain plaintiffs - see, eg, R Gavison, ‘Too Early for a Requiem: Warren and 
Brandeis were Right on Privacy v Free Speech’ (1992) 43 South Carolina Law Review 437, 465. 
557 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 249 per Tipping J; see also McKennitt v Ash [2006] EMLR 178 
(QB) para 58 per Eady J (“McKennitt”). 
558 See Browne [2007] EMLR 19 (QB) para 42 per Eady J; [2007] 3 WLR 289 (CA) para 33 per Clarke 
MR. 
559 This would be a ‘popping out for a pint of milk’ case – see Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 
154 per Baroness Hale; John v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EMLR 27 (QB) paras 14 -15 per Eady 
J; Murray [2007] EMLR 583 (Ch) para 45 per Patten J. It is therefore not necessary to balance this kind 
of information against free speech interests – at para 68; see also McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) 
para 11 per Buxton LJ.  
560 Although the degree of analogy with cases in which a sufficient reason to hold the defendant under an 
obligation have been established is certainly important – for a similar consideration in professional negli-
gence see S Todd, ‘Twenty Years of Professional Negligence in New Zealand’ (2005) 21(4) Professional 
Negligence 257, 265. See also Browne [2007] 3 WLR 289 (CA) para 33 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR. 
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objective considerations in determining a ‘reasonable expectation’ becomes obvious. 
One may have the distinct impression that these considerations are exclusively regarded 
as a tool to constrain subjective expectations of the individual. This is not necessarily 
so in my respectful view. On occasion, objective considerations have to be made be-
cause subjective expectations are simply absent; objective considerations may also sup-
port an individual claim. This is, for instance, the case if the claimant is barely con-
scious as in Shulman or a small child without her or his own subjective expectation of 
privacy.561 The final determination as to whether there had been an unjustified interfer-
ence and thus a violation of either a right to privacy or free speech is subject to a dis-
tinct step, in which both rights are pitted against one another by means of applying a 
proportionality test.562
 
Given the historical scepticism of some English lawyers about rights-based rea-
soning,563 much therefore depends on how these ‘rights’ are conceptualised. In a consti-
tutionalised common law, it is important not to regard rights as ‘socially pre-existing 
monolithic preserves’ which constitute valid claims regardless of the context.564 They 
are ‘pre-existing’ or fundamental but not monolithic. Rights and obligations are rather 
primary to the contents of the right in question.565 The recognition of a right to privacy 
underlying the privacy cause of action is in my respectful view also not a matter favour-
ing the plaintiff rather than the defendant; it is a matter of perspective – either the tort is 
fashioned in a ‘bottom up’ manner (which is apparently regarded as automatically fa-
561 A similar view was taken by Patten J in Murray [2007] EMLR 583 (Ch) para 23. Furthermore influen-
tial institutions, such as television, may have a strong impact on one’s subjective expectations - S B 
Spencer, ‘Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy’ (2002) 39 San Diego Law Review 843, 
860 who provides an additional example of a merchant who regularly sells personal information – subjec-
tive expectations that personal information is not being sold will diminish over time. 
562 See, eg, HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2008] EMLR 66 (Ch) para 88 per 
Blackburne J; Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) paras 137, 140 per Baroness Hale; Murray [2007] 
EMLR 583 (Ch) para 22 per Patten J and Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2006] QB 125 para 82 per Lord 
Phillips MR. 
563 Lord Steyn, ‘Democracy through Law’ [2002] European Human Rights Law Review 723, 732. His 
Lordship mentions, however, that ‘there has been a decisive shift towards a rights based system’ over the 
last 20 years. 
564 See L R Meyer, ‘Unruly Rights’ (2000) 22 Cardozo Law Review 1, 39. 
565 See J L Coleman, ‘The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice’ (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 427, 
437. 
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vouring the plaintiff) or fashioned ‘top-down’ (which is supposed to favour the defen-
dant).566
 
Qualified rights should neither be understood as ‘trumps’ or ‘firewalls’ as 
Dworkin and Habermas would suggest, nor should rights have priority over the good 
(as Rawls argued).567 With Robert Alexy, we will instead proceed on the basis that 
‘rights’ operate as ‘principles.’568 In this context, the major difference between ‘princi-
ple’ and ‘rule’ is their different prima facie character. A rule is not set aside ‘because its 
background justification does not hold up in the context of a particular case’ whilst the 
weight of a principle depends on the context of the case; the principle carrying greater 
weight under the circumstances sets aside the conflicting principle.569 It is, of course, 
different as regards for example the right to a fair trial – these are categorical rule-like 
rights.570 Contrary to the assumption of the joint judgment, the fact that the rights 
holder is equipped with a prima facie right does not mean that she automatically pre-
vails.571 On the other hand, it does not mean that these rights do not have to be taken 
seriously by the court. They posit what Alexy calls an ‘ideal ought;’572 in essence this 
means that constitutional rights as principles ‘have [to] be reali[s]ed to the greatest ex-
tent possible, given the factual and legal possibilities’ in the light of the principle of 
proportionality.573 As we will see later, this may require the courts to distinguish certain 
sets of facts disseminated by the defendant depending on the circumstances of the case. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that rights, as principles, do not take precedence 
566 Compare R Tobin, ‘Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Claus: the tort of invasion of privacy in New Zea-
land’ (2004) 12 Tort Law Journal 95, 106 who argues that Tipping J’s approach may favour the plaintiff 
rather than the media defendant when contrasted to the joint judgment’s proposition. 
567 See M Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional 
Justice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, 590. 
568 R Alexy, ‘Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation’ (2005) 3 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 572, 573.  
569 M Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Jus-
tice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, 578. 
570 M Kumm, ‘What Do You Have in Virtue of Having a Constitutional Right? On the Place and Limits 
of the Proportionality Requirement’ at pp 3-4 <http://www.lsr.nelco.org/nyu/plltwp/papers/46 at 08 Feb-
ruary 2008>. 
571 See, eg, J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP, 1986) 184 (‘A general right is, therefore only a prima 
facie ground for the particular right in the circumstances to which it applies’). 
572 R Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (J Rivers trans, OUP, 2002) 60 as cited by M Kumm, 
‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice’ (2004) 2 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, 577. 
573 R Alexy, ‘Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation’ (2005) 3 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 572, 572-3. 
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over one another; they do not even take priority ‘over countervailing considerations of 
policy.’574  
 
Translating this into tort theory, it means that we are not dealing with a pure cor-
rective justice approach. Uncompromising conceptions of corrective justice reject ‘one-
sided considerations’ (such as policy) affecting only one of the two parties.575 With re-
gard to a ‘constitutionalised common law tort,’ it seems reasonable to suggest that we 
are confronted with a mixed conception of corrective and distributive justice. 
 
An interference with a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ marks the infringe-
ment of a right to privacy. In terms of tort law, this would represent a civil wrong. 
However, this infringement or wrong does not constitute the content of the right and 
therefore not the content of the defendant’s obligation.576 The subsequently applied 
proportionality test rather defines whether this interference constitutes an actual viola-
tion of the right in question. Such a definitive violation occurs insofar as an interference 
with the prima facie right is not fully justified in the light of the countervailing principle 
or policy considerations.577 Borrowing Coleman’s phrase from tort theory, this second 
step determines whether the plaintiff suffers a ‘wrongful loss’ of privacy.578
 
With regard to freedom of speech, it is important to stress that it does not oper-
ate primarily as a systemic value as is the case in the USA. It is an important right in a 
framework of rights. The right of, for instance, the media to disseminate information is 
coupled with the ‘right’ of the public to impart information – even though they may be 
personal in nature. To be pitted against these interests in freedom of speech is an indi-
574 M Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Jus-
tice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, 582. Compare R M Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1978) 194 (‘In order to save [rights], we must recognize as competing 
rights only the rights of other members of society as individuals’).    
575 E J Weinrib, ‘Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice’ (2001) 2 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 107, 130. 
576 See J L Coleman, ‘The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice’ (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 427, 
444; see also his ‘Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice’ (1992) 67 Indiana Law Review 349, 
369-70. 
577 M Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Jus-
tice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, 579. 
578 See J L Coleman, ‘The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice’ (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 427, 
434. 
 
 
106 
                                                          
vidual interest to keeping personal information away from the public gaze – even 
though there might be a ‘public interest’ of some kind in learning about these matters. 
An interference with a prima facie right to freedom of speech, like an interference with 
most constitutional rights, simply leads to an assessment as to whether the interference 
is justified.579 Particularly the application of a proportionality test requires determining 
when and to which extent (not if at all) one of the interests involved overrides the 
other.580 The systemic value of freedom of speech for a democratic society is embodied 
in the fact that it is, for instance, more difficult to justify limitations on political speech 
than on commercial speech. We will return to these matters during the discussion of the 
law of the UK law and New Zealand’s tort.  
2.3.4 Conclusion 
The 1990s saw a revived interest in both constitutional and tort theory.581 In 
New Zealand and England, new privacy remedies have been added to common law and 
equity recently. Furthermore, each remedy is supposed to be consistent with quasi-
constitutional human rights instruments. Both strands of theory are therefore relevant in 
this context.  
 
It seems, however, as if only the development of theoretical privacy concepts 
has received a considerable amount of scholarly attention. Our analysis is much nar-
rower in focus and in the preceding section, we have paid closer attention to the detail 
that we are also dealing with a ‘privacy tort.’ To my mind, the implications of this fact 
are equally important and deserving of attention but are usually neglected. The fixation 
on privacy may lead to peculiar results. It sometimes seems as if every problem occur-
ring in this context is associated with the newly protected privacy interest and its inter-
pretation. A good example is the protection of privacy interests in public places, which, 
as I have attempted to show, does not have necessarily anything to do with a particular 
concept of privacy. 
579 It should be reiterated that, for instance, the right to life or a fair trial are not at issue here. 
580 See M Kumm, ‘What Do You Have in Virtue of Having a Constitutional Right? On the Place and 
Limits of the Proportionality Requirement’ at p 5 <http://www.lsr.nelco.org/nyu/plltwp/papers/46 at 08 
February 2008>. 
581 For the revived interest in constitutional theory see generally M Laughlin, ‘Constitutional Theory: A 
25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 183. 
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At the outset, we have noted that there are two relevant ways of determining tort 
liability. The first is represented by American tort law and vests plaintiffs with a right to 
take action while a right to compensation is conferred by making out the action. There 
is no individual right to privacy in common law. Recovery is determined by command 
with regard to social goals lying outside tort law itself. This means, inter alia, that the 
courts do not permit liability given that ‘clearly private’ personal information about the 
plaintiff had been gathered in a public place. This phenomenon, for example, has in my 
respectful view nothing to do with any particular concept of privacy. It is rather part of 
a general conception of tort law emphasising the liberty interests of the defendant. 
 
We have attempted to contrast this approach with an alternative based on an in-
dividual right to privacy. In this second model of determining tort liability, the defen-
dant infringes an individual right of the plaintiff which in turn gives rise to a cause of 
action. The notion of rights certainly puts some common lawyers off, but it is important 
to note that most tort theorists following the justice tradition develop their conceptions 
around the dichotomy of right and correlative duty or obligation. In other words, there 
is an emerging consensus to the effect that corrective justice has an important role to 
play in modern tort theory.582 The joint judgment in Hosking arguably assumed that 
such an approach would lead to successful privacy claims regardless of the seriousness 
of the interference.583 We have tried to contrast this view particularly by help of 
‘Simpkins and Hargreaves.’ Such a concept constrains the ambit of individual rights 
particularly by acknowledging that two rights may conflict.584 An approach initially 
based on corrective justice has in turn important implications for the protection of pri-
vacy interests in public places, which could be regarded as the litmus test of a rights-
based approach. Rights make obligations relational. Contrary to the situation in the 
USA, the tort law wrong is not against the world at large but against the injured plain-
582 See E J Weinrib, ‘Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice’ 
(2001) 2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 107, 109. 
583 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 125. 
584 See also N Jansen, ’Duties and Rights in Negligence: A Comparative and Historical Perspective on the 
European Law of Extracontractual Liability’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 443, 461; G P 
Fletcher, ‘The Right and the Reasonable’ (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 949, 966. 
 
 
108 
                                                          
tiff.585 The categorical question as to whether or not individuals may restrict further dis-
semination of personal information gathered in public places does not occur. Instead, it 
is, for instance according to Raz’s concept of rights, more appropriate to ask whether 
the plaintiff’s interest justifies holding the defendant under the obligation not to dis-
seminate (or further disseminate) the disputed information in the particular circum-
stances. Recognising the correlation of right and obligation may in turn also open up the 
opportunity to implement a concept of privacy.  
 
A tort based on corrective justice alone is impractical though. I suggest that 
‘corrective justice specifies grounds, not modes, of rectification.’586 A realistic account 
would also contain elements of distributive justice, which may be provided by a (quasi-) 
constitutional framework. As we have noted, the principle of distributive justice is pro-
portionality. Tort theory is pitched at a regrettably high level of abstraction, but a 
‘mixed conception of corrective justice’ distinguishing between ‘wrong’ and ‘wrongful 
loss’ seems to accord with the distinction between ‘infringement’ and ‘violation’ of 
constitutional rights. As I understand it, particularly the law of England and Wales 
could easily develop into such an approach.587 This approach would be consistent with 
a modern human rights instrument and would incidentally represent a very modern ap-
proach to the law of torts.      
2.4 Publicity and the impact of ‘special relationships’  
We will now return to the US tort. The next prerequisite requires the plaintiff to 
show that the defendant gave ‘publicity’ to the personal information in dispute.588 The 
purpose of this requirement still seems unclear.589 It is most likely for this reason that 
585 See E J Weinrib, ‘Understanding Tort Law’ (1989) 23 Valparaiso University Law Review 485, 513. 
586 J L Coleman, ‘The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice’ (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 427, 432. 
587 See Browne [2007] EMLR 19 (QB) para 40 per Eady J. 
588 This issue is often the crux of this branch of the privacy tort – L M Jennings, ‘Paying the Price for 
Privacy: Using the Private Facts Tort to Control Social Security Number Dissemination and the Risk of 
Identity Theft’ (2004) 43 Washburn Law Journal 725, 733. 
589 Prosser opined that the ‘publicity’ element was ‘fairly marked out’ (W L Prosser, The Law of Torts 
(4th ed, 1971) 810) but does not offer an analytical explanation why this is the case. Compare W L 
Prosser and W P Keeton (ed), Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed, 1984) 857 (‘[t]here is considerable 
doubt about the necessity for a public disclosure’).       
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the courts have been unsure as to whether they should follow the Restatement by en-
forcing a strict publicity requirement.590  
 
‘Publicity’ has to be distinguished from ‘publication’, which is a prerequisite of 
defamation.591 Whereas ‘publication’ denotes communicating facts to at least one other 
person, ‘publicity’ requires the dissemination of facts to a group of people; the differ-
ence could be described as one between private and public communication.592 Publicity 
or public communication in the strict sense ‘means that the matter is made public, by 
communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be 
regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge’; it does not nor-
mally constitute an actionable invasion of privacy if the defendant ‘communicate[s] a 
fact concerning the plaintiff's private life to a single person or even to a small group of 
persons.’593 Hence, some suggest that privacy in the context of the public disclosure tort 
can only exist as opposed to knowledge of society.594  
 
To put it more intelligibly, however, it might be easier to think of the publicity 
test as an externally observed strict ‘liability rule’ which has to be satisfied regardless of 
other facts of the case such as the harm done to plaintiff. The courts generally follow 
590 R C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 
77 California Law Review 957, 987. See also Fernandez Wells v Beauvais, 983 P 2d 1006, 1009 (1999) –
the court observed that ‘the extent of the required publicity to support a claim of public disclosure of pri-
vate facts varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.’ 
591 The same distinction is made in New Zealand – see J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in 
New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.5.04 at p 759. 
592 Virgil v Time Inc, 527 F 2d 1122, 1126 (1975); Doe v Methodist Hospital, 690 NE 2d 681, 692 (1997); 
Bodah v Lakeville Motor Express Inc, 663 NW 2d 550, 554 (2003); D A Elder, ‘Rhode Island Privacy 
Law - An Overview and some Important Recent Developments’ (1998) 31 Suffolk University Law Review 
837, 848.   
593 § 652 D Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) comment (a); however, the Restatement also states: 
‘While the cases to date allowing recovery for the type of invasion of privacy covered by this Section 
have been confined to the giving of publicity to the private matter, the courts may decide to extend the 
coverage to a simple disclosure.’ Compare also Beaumont v Brown, 257 NW 2d 522, 531 (1977). In Ozer 
v Borquez, 940 P 2d 371, 378 (1997), the Court conceded that ‘there is no threshold number which con-
stitutes “a large number” of persons.’ See also R C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community 
and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 77 California Law Review 957, 993. 
594 J B Mintz, ‘The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain’ (1996) 
55 Maryland Law Review 425, 437. The reason for this requirement is probably that Warren and 
Brandeis’ article was predominantly aimed at the mass media whose involvement routinely leads to pub-
licity in this sense - B Moretti, ‘Outing: Justifiable or Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy? The Private 
Facts Tort as a Remedy for Disclosures of Sexual Orientation’ (1993) 11 Cardozo Arts and Entertain-
ment Law Journal 857, 867; a similar argument for insisting on the strict publicity requirement was ex-
pressed in Bodah v Lakeville Motor Express Inc, 663 NW 2d 550, 557 (2003). 
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the formulation of the Restatement595 which resembles either ‘slot machine’ adjudica-
tion or the application of a ‘command’ determining liability. Elder has observed that the 
usual application of the Restatement’s formulation has spawned a vast body of ‘knee-
jerk and reflexive jurisprudence’; he continues by mentioning, ‘the non-liability rule in 
cases of limited publication [provides] an irrebuttable presumption that all such disclo-
sures are not entitled to redress - no matter how offensive the communication and de-
spite the absence of any justification for publication thereof to the recipient.’596 To this 
writer, this indicates the absence of a ‘right to privacy.’597  
 
In certain areas, predominantly where the media is not involved,598 some deci-
sions do consider social consequences of limited dissemination however. These deci-
sions therefore might provide a useful source for other common law jurisdictions. In 
these cases, plaintiffs have established an action based on publicity to a small number 
of people with whom they shared a ‘special relationship.’599 Such a relationship exists 
if ‘communication was made to a particular public such as employees, club members, 
church members, family, or neighbo[u]rs.’ The rationale behind the deviation is that 
even a limited dissemination may ‘be just as devastating as disclosure to the general 
595 P J McNulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 
Drake Law Review 93, 99-100. See also Doe v State of Washington, (2007) Westlaw 1476341 at p 11; 
Munsell v Hambright, 776 NE 2d 1272, 1282 (2002); Dietz v Finley Fine Jewellery Corp, 754 NE 2d 
958, 966 (2001); Swinton Creek Nursery v Edisto Farm Credit ACA, 483 SE 2d 789, 794 (1998); Bodah v 
Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 NW 2d 550, 554-55 (2003); Virgil v Time Inc, 527 F 2d 1122, 1126 
(1975); Fernandez Wells v Beauvais, 983 P 2d 1006, 1008-9 (1999). Some courts require the communica-
tion ‘to a large number of persons, as distinguished from one individual or a few’ - Ozer v Borquez, 940 P 
2d 371, 377 (1997).  
596 D A Elder, ‘Rhode Island Privacy Law - An Overview and some Important Recent Developments’ 
(1998) 31 Suffolk University Law Review 837, 849. 
597 See also Bodah v Lakeville Motor Express Inc, 663 NW 2d 550, 557 (2003); L M Jennings, ‘Paying 
the Price for Privacy: Using the Private Facts Tort to Control Social Security Number Dissemination and 
the Risk of Identity Theft’ (2004) 43 Washburn Law Journal 725, 748. 
598 B C Murchison, ‘Revisiting the American action for public disclosure of private facts’ in M Richard-
son and A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 32, 53. The cases mostly involve 
workplace or health problem related privacy interests. 
599 Mc Surely v McClellan, 753 F 2d 88, 112 (1985); Duncan v Peterson, 835 NE 2d 411, 423 (2005); 
Wynne v Loyola University of Chicago, 741 NE 2d 669, 677 (2000); Olson v Red Cedar Clinic, 681 NW 
2d 306, 309 (2004); P J McNulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida 
Star’ (2001) 50 Drake Law Review 93, 100. The courts applying the more liberal standard represent the 
minority - L M Jennings, ‘Paying the Price for Privacy: Using the Private Facts Tort to Control Social 
Security Number Dissemination and the Risk of Identity Theft’ (2004) 43 Washburn Law Journal 725, 
734; R C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ 
(1989) 77 California Law Review 957, 987. 
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public.’600 On occasion, even dissemination to one person was held to satisfy the ‘pub-
licity’ requirement.601 This would, of course, obliterate the initial distinction between 
‘publication’ and ‘publicity.’ Given that the recipients have ‘natural and proper interest’ 
in the disclosure of the plaintiff’s information, however, even a special relationship 
does not assist the plaintiff’s claim.602  
 
‘[I]n assessing whether the publicity element of an invasion of privacy claim 
was satisfied’ the courts then examine ‘the particular facts of the case together with the 
nature of the disclosure and the relationships of the individuals involved.’603 Hence, by 
focusing on these ‘special relationships’ (rather than the bright line test of the Restate-
ment) the courts examine the context of the case and the sometimes egregious con-
duct604 of the defendants. However, courts that apply the publicity test allegedly more 
flexibly are in fact ignoring the test of the Restatement since they are ‘focusing not on 
the amount or extent of publicity, but instead on whether the disclosure is unnecessary 
or unreasonable.’605 Other courts have pointed out that reasonableness is not part of the 
publicity analysis and consequently reaffirmed the strict publicity element of the Re-
statement.606  
 
This is a very significant conflict. Most courts apply what we have addressed as 
a category (1) strict liability rule and therefore only focus on whether the dissemination 
600 Duncan v Peterson, 835 NE 2d 411, 424 (2005) (emphasis added; internal citations omitted); see also 
Miller v Motorola Inc, 560 NE 2d 900, 903 (1990); Johnson v K Mart Corp, 723 NE 2d 1192, 1197 
(2000); Kuczaba v Pollock, 742 NE 2d 425, 435 (2000); Munsell v Hambright, 776 NE 2d 1272, 1282-3 
(2002); Pachowitz v LeDoux, 666 NW 2d 88, 95 (2003); Cordts v Chicago Tribune Comp, 860 NE 2d 
444, 450 (2006); Wynne v Loyola University of Chicago, 741 NE 2d 669, 677 (2000). 
601 Johnson v K Mart Corp, 723 NE 2d 1192, 1197 (2000); Beaumont v Brown, 257 NW 2d 522, 529 
(1977); Mc Surely v McClellan, 753 F 2d 88, 112 (1985). 
602 Cordts v Chicago Tribune Comp, 860 NE 2d 444, 451 (2006). Some courts are aware of the possible 
circularity that people who share a ‘special relationship’ are also likely to have a ‘natural and proper in-
terest’ in the disclosed personal information. Spouses, by way of illustration have such a relationship, but 
a wife has a proper interest in knowing her husband’s credit cards debt - at pp 451-2. See also Roehrborn 
v Lambert, 660 NE 2d 180, 183 (1995).  
603 Pachowitz v LeDoux, 666 NW 2d 88, 95 (2003) (emphasis added); compare Olson v Red Cedar 
Clinic, 681 NW 2d 306, 309 (2004); Roehrborn v Lambert, 660 NE 2d 180, 182 (1995); Shattuck-Owen v 
Snowbird Corp, 16 P 3d 555, 559 (2000); Ozer v Borquez, 940 P 2d 371, 378 (1997).   
604 Ozer v Borquez, 923 P 2d 166, 173 (1995). 
605 P J McNulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 
Drake Law Review 93, 101; Ozer v Borquez, 923 P 2d 166, 174 (1995). 
606 Bodah v Lakeville Motor Express Inc, 663 NW 2d 550, 556 (2003). 
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reached the public at large and nothing else.607 The minority, in contrast, concentrates 
on whether the dissemination was ‘unreasonable’ in the circumstances and thereby 
turns the strict liability rule into a genuine category (2) duty or standard.608 As we rec-
ollect, this also involves a shift of perspective: the focus lies no longer on the conduct 
of the defendant evaluated from an ‘external point of view.’ Instead, the courts take part 
in the litigation and consider the ‘harm’ done to the plaintiff by means of some form of 
dissemination. We have associated this approach with the ‘internal point of view.’ In 
terms of doctrine, this also seems to add a ‘causation’ element to the remedy because 
the fact that the defendant’s conduct caused harm to the plaintiff is otherwise irrelevant. 
This would also be in line with the observation that modern American legal thought 
seems to be conspicuous for its ‘causal minimalism.’609   
 
What may be the implications of the minority opinion? Basically, the extended 
examination of the context blurs at least the line between the ‘publicity’ requisite and 
the ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’ test.610 Robert Post, however, was already 
able to observe that the recognition of special relationships ‘collapses the publicity test 
into the “private” facts and “offensiveness” requirements.’611 In other words, given that 
the courts acknowledge the relevance of relationships in this context, the same full cir-
cumstances of the case would have to be evaluated under three different headlines. This 
in turn seems to prove Weinrib’s thesis that once the plaintiff’s suffering is inseparably 
linked to the conduct of the defendant, ‘the procedure [the cause of action] is not inter-
nally divisible into independent components;’ various aspects of the remedy rather con-
607 See above Chapter Two, 2.3.2.3. 
608 See also J Smillie, ‘Formalism, Fairness and Efficiency: Civil Adjudication in New Zealand’ [1996] 
New Zealand Law Review 254, 257 (‘Judges are often tempted to accommodate […] a deserving case by 
recognising an exception to a governing rule, or extending the range of application of a rule, or abandon a 
rule entirely in favour of a more abstract and uncertain norm which leaves the court more discretion at the 
point of application’).  
609 W N R Lucy, Philosophy of Private Law (2007) 164; refer to E J Weinrib, ‘Causation and Wrongdo-
ing’ (1987) 63 Chicago Kent Law Review 407, 410 for further details. See also A Ripstein, Equality, Re-
sponsibility, and the Law (1999) 32-35. 
610 In Bodah v Lakeville Motor Express Inc, 663 NW 2d 550, 556 (2003) such an argumentation was 
adopted to justify the application of the strict publicity requirement of the Restatement; see also P J 
McNulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 Drake Law 
Review 93, 101.  
611 R C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 
77 California Law Review 957, 988. 
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stitute a single whole.612 By sticking to the strict publicity requirement of the Restate-
ment, most courts keep tests of the tort remedy separate which would otherwise not be 
clearly separable. To turn the argument on its head, it means that the harm done to the 
plaintiff is of no concern, which resembles what Weinrib has called ‘ordinary ordering’ 
of tort law. Ordinary ordering presupposes an assortment of independent tests, which 
have to be satisfied in order to serve social goals unrelated to tort law and thus an indi-
vidual case itself.613 Moreover, this confirms Duncan Kennedy’s general observation 
that the ‘wrong’ involved is not the infliction of harm or damage, but the failure to 
compensate the plaintiff for narrowly confined actions of the defendant.614
 
As a result, it is suggested that the US tort, comprised of independent strict li-
ability rules, only functions properly if each of them concentrates on a tightly confined 
aspect of the whole circumstances of a particular case. This also means that connecting 
the defendant’s conduct to the harm done to the plaintiff is not feasible in this context.  
 
The recognition of the relationship between plaintiff and certain parts of the au-
dience to which disputed personal facts are disseminated may nonetheless be subject to 
generalisation.615 We may distil the minority courts’ observation that the dissemination 
to a small number of persons can be as devastating for the plaintiff as a ‘public dissemi-
nation.’ To require the plaintiff to show a more widespread publicity under these cir-
cumstances seems arbitrary.616 Outside the USA, there seems to be no persuasive rea-
son why this observation should be restricted to ‘non-media’ cases. It might rather have 
an impact, for instance, on the ‘identification’ of the plaintiff by others.617 In this re-
612 E J Weinrib, ‘Understanding Tort Law’ (1989) 23 Valparaiso University Law Review 485, 511; see 
also his ‘Causation and Wrongdoing’ (1987) 63 Chicago Kent Law Review 407, 410 and C R Sunstein, 
‘On Analogical Reasoning’ (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 741, 789. 
613 E J Weinrib, ‘Understanding Tort Law’ (1989) 23 Valparaiso University Law Review 485, 495. 
614 D Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1975) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685, 
1694. 
615 US trade secret law for instance analyses the ‘relationships that exist between the trade secret owner 
and the persons to whom information is disclosed’ - S K Sandeen, ‘Relative Privacy: What Privacy Ad-
vocates Can Learn From Trade Secret Law’ [2006] Michigan State Law Review 667, 698. 
616 D A Elder, ‘Rhode Island Privacy Law - An Overview and some Important Recent Developments’ 
(1998) 31 Suffolk University Law Review 837, 848. Similar criticisms have been made in New Zealand - 
U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 252; see also J F Burrows in S 
Todd (gen ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.5.04 at p 759-60. 
617 See, eg, E Volokh, ‘Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a 
Right to Stop People From Speaking about You’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1049, 1092 - Volokh 
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spect, the concept of a ‘special relationship’ is apparently not fully appreciated. In the 
academic discussion of negligence theory, it seems to be a product of considering as 
theory, for example, the coherent Rawlsian concept of the rational individual and thus 
represents the antithesis to the contemporary concept of economic rationality. A ‘spe-
cial relationship’ just seems to paraphrase the dichotomy of right and obligation.618 
However ‘Rawlsian coherentism’619 would not be called coherentism if the notion of 
‘special relationships’ could not be utilised for the purposes of the public disclosure 
tort.620 To my mind, it simply means in its broadest sense that individuals and their rela-
tionship with others (as distinct from a faceless cost/benefit relation) move into the cen-
tre of litigation.621 This may also change the face of litigation itself. For New Zealand, 
this might after all indicate that the whole context of a particular case is better evaluated 
in a more streamlined cause of action.   
2.5 The ‘highly offensive’ test – a recipe for confusion?  
We will now turn to the ‘highly offensive to the reasonable person’ test. The 
reasonable person is an often-invoked concept in common law. In trying to explain its 
 
interprets Briscoe v Reader's Digest Association Inc, 93 Cal Rptr 866 (1971) as saying that Briscoe’s in-
terest in social rehabilitation as follows: ‘people who know Briscoe, [were] the very same group whose 
ignorance Briscoe seemed most concerned about preserving’ – emphasis added). See also R C Post, ‘The 
Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 77 California Law 
Review 957, 990; Borquez v Ozer, 923 P 2d 166, 174 (Colo App 1995).  
618 B C Zipursky, ‘Rawls in Tort Theory: Themes and Counter-Themes’ (2004) 72 Fordham Law Review 
1923, 1927-8 (2004) (‘We are now beginning to ask whether ‘duty’ really does mean something, and if 
so, what: whether concepts of reasonableness in tort really reduce to economic rationality; whether the 
concept of a special relationship generating a duty of care is merely shorthand for the idea that liability 
within certain pockets would be efficacious, or whether it really means what it says; and so on for a vari-
ety of concerns relating to reputation, bodily integrity, dignity, deception, and a variety of other interests 
and obligations’); for an emphasis on human ‘relations’ see also C Fried, ’Privacy’ (1968) 77 Yale Law 
Journal 475, 481. 
619 Ibid. 
620 Invoking parts of Rawls’ work in the context of a ‘constitutionalised’ privacy tort seems appropriate. 
Rawls attempts to carry ‘to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as 
found, say, in Locke, Rousseau and Kant’ – J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (OUP, 1971) 11. On the most 
basic level, a constitutionalised private law means that relationships between private citizens will be 
treated similarly to the relationship between citizen and state – see also Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 
91 (SC) paras 171- 173 per Thomas J.  
621 See B C Zipursky, ‘Rawls in Tort Theory: Themes and Counter-Themes’ (2004) 72 Fordham Law 
Review 1923, 1927. See also E J Weinrib, ‘Understanding Tort Law’ (1989) 23 Valparaiso University 
Law Review 485, 491 (‘The practical relevance of theory is to point to what the positive law of torts 
ought to be by exhibiting the implications of what tort law already is’). 
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functioning in the present context, I adopt Arthur Ripstein’s account622 because it fits 
structure and main contours of the reasonable person in tort law generally.623 In abstract 
terms, reasonable persons can thus be understood as devices playing an enabling role in 
balancing one person’s interest in ‘security’ against another’s interest in ‘liberty’ from 
being held liable.624 In the context of the disclosure tort, this general statement trans-
lates into a need of balancing conflicting interests of ‘self’ and ‘society’ because a line 
has to be drawn between ‘individual’ and ‘collective.’625 Daniel Solove quotes the soci-
ologist Barrington Moore who pointed out that ‘the need for privacy is a socially cre-
ated need;’ ‘[w]ithout society there would be no need for privacy.’626   
 
Bearing this in mind, the premise of US law contending that a hermit enjoys 
‘complete privacy’627 could be regarded as invoking a decoy-target. A hermit’s interest 
in ‘security’ does not depend upon an exercise balancing his interest in keeping certain 
personal information private against the ‘liberty’ of press and society to discuss these 
aspects. His security interests are ensured by avoiding society altogether. The conflict 
and therefore the need of balancing interests only occurs if society starts interacting 
with the hermit and thereby embraces him or her as part of society itself. At the outset, 
it should thus be noted that what has been addressed as ‘complete privacy’ is, to this 
622 A Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (1999). This account is based on the assumption that 
‘rights and remedies must be defined together’ - at p 49 – which accords with both the approach taken by 
the joint judgment in Hosking and the USA. 
623 W N R Lucy, Philosophy of Private Law (2007) 407. 
624 A Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (1999) 6. A similar balancing of interests occurs, eg, 
in negligence law - see S Todd, ‘Twenty Years of Professional Negligence in New Zealand’ (2005) 
21(4) Professional Negligence 257, 265. 
625 See M Schadrack, ‘Privacy and the Press: A Necessary Tension’ (1985) 18 Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review 949, 953. 
626 D J Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 477, 484 
and his ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1104; for a conclusion to the 
same effect see also J B Mintz, ‘The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private 
Domain’ (1996) 55 Maryland Law Review 425, 428 and L R Meyer, ‘Unruly Rights’ (2000) 22 Cardozo 
Law Review 1, 31. 
627 § 652D comment c Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) cited, for instance in White v Township of 
Winthrop, 116 P 3d 1034 (2005); see also W L Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, 
396 - in this famous treatise, it is an ‘eremite’ in the desert who enjoys ‘complete privacy;’ Green v Chi-
cago Tribune Comp, 675 NE 2d 249, 254 (1996). For a recent repetition see N A Moreham, ’Privacy in 
the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 65 Law Quarterly Review 628, 639. 
However, it has to be noted that loneliness turns, according to Moreham, into privacy if it is desired – at p 
637.   
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writer, beside the point.628 The premise therefore fails to make any headway towards 
solving the conflict at hand.  
 
However, the test constitutes a twin element of the tort together with the private 
facts test629 in order to ensure that only the dissemination of highly personal details 
about one’s life is actionable.630 The test has therefore been described as a major limita-
tion on the privacy action.631
2.5.1 Character and institutional context of the test   
The Restatement addresses the aforementioned conflict of interests as follows: 
‘[t]he protection afforded to the plaintiff’s interest in his privacy must be relative to the 
customs of the time and place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his 
neighbo[u]rs and fellow citizens.’632 This element of the tort focuses, according to 
Prosser, ‘on something in the nature of a “mores” test.’633 The test incorporates soci-
ety’s expectations as to what should be protected as private; hence, the plaintiff’s indi-
vidual sensibilities are not determinative.634 As this writer understands them, these sug-
gestions circumscribe that interests in security and liberty are weighed within a repre-
sentative reasonable person in order to avoid allowing ‘the particularities of one person 
to set the limits of another’s liberty.’635 Particularly the offensiveness element may 
628 The author agrees with C Fried, ’Privacy’ (1968) 77 Yale Law Journal 475, 482 who argues that in-
voking this metaphor means to ‘engage in irony.’ For a preferable view see also Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 
1 (CA) para 264 per Anderson J; M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 para 74. 
629 P J McNulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 
Drake Law Review 93, 102. 
630 A Taslitz, ‘The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy and Human 
Emotions’ (2002) 65 Law and Contemporary Problems 125,176. 
631 A B Vickery, ‘Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort’ (1982) 82 Columbia Law Review 1426, 
1441. 
632 § 652D comment c Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) (emphasis added).   
633 W L Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed, 1971) 812 and his ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California 
Law Review 383, 397. See also L R Meyer, ‘Unruly Rights’ 22 (2000) Cardozo Law Review 1, 32 who 
argues that what is regarded as ‘highly offensive’ largely depends upon ‘social conventions and expecta-
tions’; S B Spencer, ‘Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy’ (2002) 39 San Diego Law 
Review 843, 853 and P J McNulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida 
Star’ (2001) 50 Drake Law Review 93, 105. 
634 S B Spencer, ‘Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy’ (2002) 39 San Diego Law Review 
843, 853. 
635 A Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (1999) 56.  
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thereby create a sense of ‘fault,’636 but an actual fault standard cannot be inferred from 
this test.637 Instead, one could argue that it contains elements of distributive justice.638 
‘Fault,’ in this context, should rather be understood as an ‘expression of fair terms of 
interaction in a world of risks.’639 The plaintiff has to discharge the burden of proof, 
which may be difficult with regard to mental states.640
 
An important point regarding the institutional context is that this element usu-
ally has to be determined by means of a jury verdict;641 the jury trial in common law 
suits is constitutionally protected in the USA.642 The function of this protection is to 
delimit governmental oppression through the judicial process.643 Both the ‘highly of-
fensive’ test as well as the newsworthiness element (as outlined in the Restatement) is 
perhaps better understood with this precondition in mind.644 As for US negligence law, 
it has been observed that the reasonable person ‘gets its content in substantial part from 
its role in framing a jury consideration of community norms.’645 The same is, in the au-
thor’s eyes, also valid for the public disclosure tort.646 The power of the jury, however, 
was also a major factor behind the extension of First Amendment protection in the wake 
636 R A Smolla, ‘Accounting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law’ (2002) 27 Nova Law Re-
view 289, 303. 
637 D A Elder, ‘Rhode Island Privacy Law - An Overview and some Important Recent Developments’ 
(1998) 31 Suffolk University Law Review 837, 848.  
638 Ripstein’s suggestions imply a mixed account of corrective and distributive justice - W N R Lucy, 
Philosophy of Private Law (2007) 407; see generally G C Keating, ‘Reasonableness and Rationality in 
Negligence Theory’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 311, 319. 
639 A Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (1999) 58. 
640 See, eg, Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 248 (1998) per Chin J (concurring and 
dissenting); Doe v State of Washington, (2007) Westlaw 1476341 at p 11.  
641 Vassiliades v Garfinkel’s Brooks Bros Inc, 492 A 2d 580, 588. For New Zealand see also Andrews v 
TVNZ Ltd High Court Auckland CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) para 68. 
642 The Seventh Amendment reads: ‘In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy will exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury will be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, will be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.’ 
643 W C Heffernan, ‘Privacy Rights’ (1995) 29 Suffolk University Law Review 737, 753. 
644 It is difficult to elaborate on the ‘highly offensive’ test. US courts predominantly concentrate on the 
‘private fact’ test and the ‘newsworthiness’ element, because they are mostly affected by exceptions 
mandated by the First Amendment - J Elford, ‘Trafficking in Stolen Information: A "Hierarchy of 
Rights" Approach to the Private Facts Tort’ (1995) 105 Yale Law Journal 727, 730. 
645 B C Zipursky, ‘Rawls in Tort Theory: Themes and Counter-Themes’ (2004) 72 Fordham Law Review 
1923, 1938.  
646 See H Kalven, Jr, ‘Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?’ (1966) 31 Law and Con-
temporary Problems 326, 334 (‘Whatever the success of the reasonable-man standard in negligence 
cases, in this context it can only mean that the jury will know better than the court what the sensivities of 
the day are’). 
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of New York Times v Sullivan.647 The underlying concern was that juries might punish 
certain types (or contents) of speech, a matter to which we return during the discussion 
of the newsworthiness element. Nowadays, it is more appropriate to say that the jury 
has to resolve all doubtful cases whilst the test is usually applied by the fact-finder.648 
As a result, jury-trials are often bypassed with either summary judgments or motions to 
dismiss.649 Most cases therefore never reach a jury in order to avoid a chilling effect on 
the First Amendment.650 One might summarise this development by suggesting that the 
‘security’ interests of plaintiffs posed a threat to the ‘liberty’ interests of others - the 
overall balance therefore had to be recalibrated.651  
 
However, in order to determine a prima facie case, it is said that a court should 
consider a wide range of factors such as ‘the degree of the intrusion, the context, con-
duct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion as well as intruder’s motives and ob-
jectives, the setting into which he intrudes and the expectations of those whose privacy 
is invaded.’652 Thus understood, the prerequisite would constitute a ‘hybrid test’ bridg-
ing the actions of the plaintiff with the defendant’s conduct.653 Here, for once, the rela-
tionship between both litigants has to be examined. Furthermore, it is obvious that the 
647 D A Logan, ‘Masked Media: Judges, Juries, and the Law of Surreptitious Newsgathering’ (1997) 83 
Iowa Law Review 161, 165. See also Haynes v Alfred A Knopf Inc, 8 F 3d 1222, 1234 (1993). 
648 A J McClurg, ‘Bringing Privacy out of the Closet: A Tort Theory for Intrusions in Public Places’ 
(1995) 73 North Carolina Law Review 989, 1005. This resembles the application of the defamation Tort 
in New Zealand - see D R Knight, ‘“I'm Not Gay - Not That There's Anything Wrong with That!”: Are 
Unwanted Imputations of Gayness Defamatory?’ (2006) 37 Victoria University of Wellington Law Re-
view 249, 257. 
649 See, eg, Baugh v CBS Inc, 828 F Supp 745, 752 (1993) for further details.     
650 Ibid, at p 754 – the Court observed that summary disposition ‘has become an approved method of re-
solving privacy cases, since protracted litigation would have a chilling effect on the exercise of free 
speech in the public forum’ (internal citation omitted). A related concern is that the jury would be con-
fronted with torts without ‘legal profile’ - A J McClurg, ‘Bringing Privacy out of the Closet: A Tort The-
ory for Intrusions in Public Places’ (1995) 73 North Carolina Law Review 989, 1005.  
651 See also D A Logan, ‘Masked Media: Judges, Juries, and the Law of Surreptitious Newsgathering’ 
(1997) 83 Iowa Law Review 161, 167-8; Logan observes that defamation law was relatively stable by the 
mid-1980s. ‘Stability’ meant, however, that the decisions were predictable, which implied that libel 
claims were rarely successful – at p 168.   
652 L R Meyer, ‘Unruly Rights’ (2000) 22 Cardozo Law Review 1, 32. But see P J McNulty, ‘The Public 
Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 Drake Law Review 93, 105 who 
argues that this is often overlooked by the courts which instead focus on the offensiveness of the dissemi-
nated material alone. However, numerous courts indeed engage in evaluating the whole context in the 
aforementioned sense – see, eg, Stien v Marriot Ownership Resorts Inc, 944 P 2d 374, 379 (1997); Shul-
man v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 236 (1998) (in the context of the intrusion branch). 
653 R A Smolla, ‘Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News’ (1999) 67 George Washington 
Law Review 1097, 1124-5. Smolla’s statement is concerned with the intrusion branch of the tort, but ap-
plies, in my view, also to the disclosure tort. 
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test constitutes a balancing of security and liberty interests. Given that the court has 
identified a doubtful case, a statement may read as follows: ‘[b]ecause reasonable peo-
ple could differ as to these facts, we believe a jury could find the […] publication 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.’654 The reasonable person test might therefore 
not be that useful if transplanted into New Zealand’s legal system. This question has not 
been addressed so far, but in the English context, the role of the jury extends only to 
defamation cases.655    
 
Mindful of the fact that the test receives further attention during the discussion 
of New Zealand’s law, this first impression will be illustrated by sketching two broad 
problems: (1) the determination of actionable personal information by means of apply-
ing an additional ‘highly offensive’ test (as a twin-element) may result in conflicts with 
equality concerns; and (2) the inherently subjective nature of the privacy interest at 
stake might lead to unevenness between the claimant’s individual experience and that of 
an objective reasonable person.     
2.5.1.1 Equality concerns  
The concept of reasonableness generally and the reasonable person in particular 
express an idea of equality.656 The presupposition is that ‘all have the same interest in 
both liberty and security.’657 However, this very assumption seems to be questionable 
in the context of the privacy tort. An illustrative example regarding the first aforemen-
tioned problem postulates that exposure to HIV658 constitutes a ‘clearly private mat-
ter.’659 Additionally, personal information of this kind has to surpass the ‘highly offen-
sive’ test. Being confronted with such a case, one US court held that ‘[t]he disclosure 
[concerned with an HIV infection of a homosexual plaintiff] would be highly objection-
654 Green v Chicago Tribune Comp, 675 NE 2d 249, 255 (1996); see also Johnson v K Mart Corp, 723 
NE 2d 1192, 1197 (2000). 
655 A T Kenyon and M Richardson, ‘New dimensions in privacy: Communications technologies, media 
practises in law’ in A T Kenyon and M Richardson (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 1, 5 fn 
22.  
656 A Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (1999) 6-7. The negligence standard, interpreted in a 
non-instrumentalist way, likewise embodies an idea of formal equality - E J Weinrib, ‘Causation and 
Wrongdoing’ (1987) 63 Chicago Kent Law Review 407, 428. 
657 Ibid, at p 7.  
658 Acronym for: Human Immunodefiency Virus. 
659 Ozer v Borquez, 923 P 2d 166, 172 (1997) with further references. 
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able to a reasonable person because a strong stigma still attaches to both homosexuality 
and AIDS.’660 Another court stated in a similar context, ‘[i]t ought not to be, but [an 
HIV positive status] quite commonly is, viewed with mistrust or opprobrium’661 and 
was therefore regarded as both ‘clearly private’ and (prima facie) ‘highly offensive.’ 
However, it should be reiterated that the information cannot be private as a matter of 
law given that someone is involved, for example, in a custody battle and admits being 
gay and HIV positive in court.662 Consequences of a more widespread dissemination 
are irrelevant in that case. 
 
Taken at face value, the arguments brought to bear by the courts are neverthe-
less persuasive. Some regard AIDS as a curse or even construe it as evidence for the 
wrath of god directed against homosexual conduct.663 If I am not entirely convinced, it 
is for one reason. These efforts try to explain why the dissemination of ‘clearly private’ 
personal information such as ‘Wilde is homosexual’ is highly offensive to a reasonable 
person whereas information such as ‘Wilde is heterosexual’ would be regarded as ano-
dyne. 
 
What might be the implication for the ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’ 
test? To my mind, there is no such thing as an equal interest of all in the security of in-
formation relating to one’s sexual orientation. For the sake of brevity, a homosexual 
may have a heightened interest in the security of information relating to his or her sexu-
ality because such a person might otherwise be viewed with ‘mistrust or opprobrium.’ 
A heterosexual has a lower security interest with regard to this kind of information, be-
cause it constitutes the societal norm. On the other hand, one’s gaze should not be 
660 Acronym for: Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. Ozer v Borquez, 923 P 2d 166, 173 (1997) for 
further references; see also K Hilzendeger, ‘Unreasonable Publicity: How Well Does Tort Law Protect 
the Unwarranted Disclosure of a Person’s HIV-Positive State?’ (2003) 35 Arizona State University Law 
Journal 187, 189. 
661 Urbaniak v Newton, 226 Cal App 3d 1128, 1140 (1991) (emphasis added); see also B Moretti, ‘Out-
ing:  Justifiable or Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy? The Private Facts Tort as a Remedy for Disclosures 
of Sexual Orientation’ (1993) 11 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 857, 872, who considers 
such a disclosure as offensive to a reasonable person, because it ‘exposes the individual to hatred, preju-
dice, and discrimination.’ 
662 Cumrine v Harte-Hanks Television, 37 SW 3d 124, 127 (2001). 
663 See, eg, B Moretti, ‘Outing:  Justifiable or Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy? The Private Facts Tort as 
a Remedy for Disclosures of Sexual Orientation’ (1993) 11 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 
857, 897; K Hilzendeger, ‘Unreasonable Publicity: How Well Does Tort Law Protect the Unwarranted 
Disclosure of a Person’s HIV-Positive State?’ (2003) 35 Arizona State University Law Journal 187, 188.  
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averted from the fact that a stigma may be attached to homosexuality, but some suggest 
that this ought not to be the case. Consequently, educative and legal efforts are made to 
normalise the situation.664 The relevant thrust of these efforts is, in my view, to ensure 
that a homosexual has the same (low) interest in securing information regarding his or 
her sexual orientation as a heterosexual.665  
 
Those who nonetheless insist on the ‘reasonable person’ usually contend that 
this form of equality is not the reality yet. However, as long as the security interests are 
not equal, the application of the test itself seems dubious because equality of interests as 
its very premise is not met. It is, then, rather a ‘particularity’ of the plaintiff or at least 
of a minority group that requires different treatment; these ‘particularities’ are in theory 
nevertheless not supposed to place limits on someone else’s liberty.666  
 
In the same vein, Nicholson J indicated in his able judgment in P v D667 that 
publicity given to a mental illness should not be regarded as reason for exclusion, scorn 
or embarrassment in contemporary society. Within the confines of the adopted Ameri-
can framework of the tort, his Honour nevertheless found the issue to be highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person because a strict application of the test was supposed to be 
unrealistic.668 In other words, the Judge recognised a security interest of the plaintiff in 
personal information that was particular to him or her.  
 
The basic problem, to my eyes, is in both aforementioned constellations a con-
flict with the liberal imperative of equal concern and respect.669 In a nutshell, if privacy 
is an interest worth protecting in its own name, for example, one’s sexuality is com-
monly regarded as such a private matter; given that the law distinguishes further be-
664 See particularly s 19 NZBoRA; s 21(1)(m) Human Rights Act 1993. Keith J also mentioned the Ho-
mosexual Reform Act 1986 – Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 182.  
665 See also D R Knight, ‘“I'm Not Gay - Not That There's Anything Wrong with That!”: Are Unwanted 
Imputations of Gayness Defamatory?’ (2006) 37 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 249, 278. 
666 See A Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (1999) 56. 
667 [2000] 2 NZLR 591 para 37. 
668 Ibid. 
669 See R M Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) 296; see also his Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1978) 
182; M Moran, ‘Rethinking the Reasonable Person - An Egalitarian Reconstruction of the Objective 
Standard’ (2003) 168-71 [hereinafter M Moran, ‘Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003)] for further 
details. 
 
 
122 
                                                          
tween several sexual orientations, an equality issue may arise. The reason why this may 
cause problems in jurisdictions outside the USA may be found in significantly diverg-
ing concepts of equality.670  
 
An instructive Canadian suggestion, by way of illustration, seeks to avoid  
 
the violation of essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, 
stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society in which all persons enjoy 
equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable 
and equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.671   
 
In the USA, by contrast, such an approach lacks a ‘doctrinal peg.’672 In other ju-
risdictions adopting a public disclosure tort, the question may thus not be as to how 
homosexuality could be distinguished from heterosexuality while emulating a ‘highly 
offensive’ test. Instead, the problem could be summarised as follows: given that one 
could indeed elaborate a compelling difference, are judgments continually holding mat-
ters such as ‘Wilde is homosexual’ or ‘P has a mental illness’ as being highly offensive 
to a hypothetical model person of society such a neat idea in the first place?673 Since 
this ought actually not to be the case, the law would endorse and perpetuate prejudices 
(ie the ‘reality’) as a basis for affording a legal remedy.674 Furthermore, the practical 
difficulties of such a distinction based on ‘community mores’ would perhaps become 
670 See, eg, C L'Heureux-Dubé, ‘Realizing Equality in the Twentieth Century: The Role of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Comparative Perspective’ (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 35, 
52 for a brief comparative discussion of Canadian and US authorities. 
671 Law v Canada [1999] 1 SCR 497 para 51 per Iacobucci J. For a similar suggestion see also Brooker v 
Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC) paras 171, 180 per Thomas J; M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to 
Privacy’ NZLC MP19 paras 72, 77. For the historical development of the interrelationship of ‘human 
dignity’ and ‘equality’ see E Grant, ‘Dignity and Equality’ (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 299, 304-
5. See also G Moon and A Allen ‘Dignity Discourse in Discrimination Law: A Better Route to Equality’ 
(2006) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 610, 611, 623. 
672 J Rosen, ‘Continental Divide’ [2004] Legal Affairs 49, 52 discussing Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558 
(2003). Justice Kennedy, however, invoked a similar rationale in that case, but on the contested use of 
comparative law. Similar to the interpretation of freedom of speech, different judges seem to have differ-
ent predilections as opposed to a single and systematic approach as in Canada or Europe. 
673 See also D R Knight, ‘“I'm Not Gay - Not That There's Anything Wrong with That!”: Are Unwanted 
Imputations of Gayness Defamatory?’ (2006) 37 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 249, 272. 
674 See also the Australian provocation case Green v Re (1996-97) 191 CLR 334, 407 per Kirby J. With 
regard to the parallel problem in defamation law see D R Knight, ‘“I'm Not Gay - Not That There's Any-
thing Wrong with That!”: Are Unwanted Imputations of Gayness Defamatory?’ (2006) 37 Victoria Uni-
versity of Wellington Law Review 249, 268-70. 
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more obvious if one would assume that ‘Wilde is bisexual.’ Wilde takes all sorts I sup-
pose, but it is already difficult to comprehend and argue whether such a disclosure 
would be as highly offensive as ‘Wilde is homosexual’ or as anodyne as ‘Wilde is het-
erosexual.’  
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the provocation defence in criminal law may provide 
useful hints for present purposes. Consider, for instance, that Australian courts have 
questioned whether an ‘ordinary person’ should lose an objectively required level of 
self-control when homosexual men encounter heterosexuals proposing intercourse 
without more. Kirby J rejected the notion of reducing murder to manslaughter on this 
basis, because it ‘would sit ill with contemporary legal, educative, and policing efforts 
designed to remove such violent responses from society, grounded as they are in irra-
tional hatred and fear.’675 Dissemination of personal information, of course will not be 
likened to committing murder. However, similar arguments may be mounted in the pri-
vacy context given that a homosexual or mentally ill plaintiff obtains an injunction or 
retrieves damages on a comparable basis.676 Since one’s sexuality and health are rou-
tinely regarded as lying at the settled core of personal information protected by the tort, 
equality issues should not be taken too lightly. Whilst an individual plaintiff receives an 
advantage (by means of retrieving damages or obtaining an injunction), it is suggested 
that the systematic unequal treatment of these types of information might have negative 
implications for the rule of law.677
2.5.1.2 Questionable inherent logic of the test 
As we will see later, the inherently subjective nature of the privacy interest leads 
to the assumption that ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’ test fuses subjective 
and objective elements. The resulting second problem is concerned with what Thomas J 
675 Ibid, at p 408; see also K Hilzendeger, ‘Unreasonable Publicity: How Well Does Tort Law Protect the 
Unwarranted Disclosure of a Person’s HIV-Positive State?’ (2003) 35 Arizona State University Law 
Journal 187, 191.  
676 See also the convincing arguments raised by D R Knight, ‘“I'm Not Gay - Not That There's Anything 
Wrong with That!”: Are Unwanted Imputations of Gayness Defamatory?’ (2006) 37 Victoria University 
of Wellington Law Review 249, 278-79. 
677 M Moran describes the corrosive effect of bias and prejudice on justice. She points out that ‘system-
atic mistakes’ (as opposed to ad hoc mistakes) are likely to undermine the rule of law - Rethinking the 
Reasonable Person (2003) 179-80.   
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has identified in the context of the provocation defence as a lack of inherent logic.678 
Burrows679 has made the observation that judges may often give scarce reasons for their 
decision and this seems to hold true for the situation in the USA.680 In an illustrative 
example, the ‘plaintiffs had been held hostage in their own home by escaped criminals 
three years prior to publication of [an] article in Life magazine.’681 The US Supreme 
Court implied that ‘most people would not consider their former momentary status as a 
hostage of escaped criminals to be so offensive or discreditable as to render the disclo-
sure of this fact outrageous.’682  
 
Inherent in this example is the ambiguity as to whether the disclosed facts or the 
disclosure in all the circumstances has to be deemed offensive.683 Assuming arguendo 
that the circumstances of the disclosure are themselves determinative, the second prob-
lem crystallises. The reasoning of the court suddenly appears vapid to this writer. Lest it 
be thought that this problem is peculiar to American jurisdictions, it should be stressed 
that similar problems occur in other countries where reasonable persons or right-
thinking members of the community are invoked as objective standards.684 The same 
problem resurfaces regularly (and is most pressing) when mental processes are at issue. 
The problem is, then, always as to whether the reasonable person standard is ‘objective’ 
or whether ‘infirmities of human nature’ should be taken into account.685    
678 R v Rongonui [2000] 1 NZLR 385 (CA) para 177. 
679 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 391, 395.  
680 See, eg, the reasoning in Alvarado v KOB-TV LLC, (2007) Westlaw 2019752 at p 6. 
681 Time Inc v Hill, 385 US 374 (1967) as summarised in Briscoe v Reader's Digest Association Inc, 93 
Cal Rptr 866, 873 (1971).   
682 Ibid, fn 13. It should be noted that the author cannot ascertain this implication from the judgment in 
Hill. 
683 See Vassiliades v Garfinkel’s Brooks Bros Inc, 492 A 2d 580, 588; see also Shulman v Group W Pro-
duction Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 248 (1998) per Chin J (concurring and dissenting) (‘[Shulman’s] expecta-
tions notwithstanding, I do not believe that a reasonable trier of fact could find that defendants' conduct 
in this case was “highly offensive to a reasonable person” […]’) - emphasis provided. 
684 See, eg, Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC) para 112 per McGrath J. For the parallel problem 
occurring in the context of the defamation tort see D R Knight, ‘“I'm Not Gay - Not That There's Any-
thing Wrong with That!”: Are Unwanted Imputations of Gayness Defamatory?’ (2006) 37 Victoria Uni-
versity of Wellington Law Review 249, 253. 
685 Due to the focus on external standards this is of no concern in US law, but for an example provided by 
an English court refer to the ‘remoteness of damage’ considerations in Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 
57 per Wright J (‘Whether, as the majority of the House of Lords thought in Lynch v Knight [(1861) 9 
HLC 577, 592, 596 ], the criterion is in asking what would be the natural effect on reasonable persons, or 
whether, as Lord Wensleydale thought [at p 600], the possible infirmities of human nature ought to be 
recognised’ - emphasis provided) and Green v Re (1996-97) 191 CLR 334, 409 per Kirby J for a provoca-
tion case. 
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As for the aforementioned example, most people fortunately have never been 
held hostage in their own home by escaped criminals. It is, thus, not self-evident what 
might embolden a judge to believe that an objective reasonable person standing in the 
shoes of the claimant would or would not be highly offended in the circumstances of 
the case. Strange though it may seem, the test to be applied is then one of a ‘reasonable 
person taken hostage in her own home by escaped criminals.’ However, there does not 
seem to be an objectively ascertainable ‘experience’ on which such a judgment could be 
based. To this writer, privacy is an individual concern, which has to be reconciled with 
societal life.686 Thus understood, the concept is not subject to empirical evaluation.687 
Jury decisions aside, the resulting reasoning occurs to me as being just a hunch appar-
elled in important-sounding legal terms.688 In brief, a tension between ‘individual’ and 
‘objectively reasonable’ experience may exist.  
2.5.1.3 Conclusion 
It is suggested that the two aforementioned problematic areas point to a theoreti-
cal infirmity of the test if applied in the context of a privacy tort. This is undoubtedly an 
intricate area and a ‘right’ answer is and will be difficult to ascertain. The observation 
that the ‘highly offensive’ prerequisite embodies ‘something in the nature of a “mores” 
test’689 orchestrated by allusions to hermits should nevertheless only be understood as a 
useful reminder of the difficulties of striking the balance between ‘security’ and ‘lib-
erty’ in this context. As regards US law, it is clear that the test has indeed no legal pro-
file. During the discussion of the New Zealand law, I will thus attempt to (re-)structure 
the test particularly by means of drawing an analogy to the already mentioned provoca-
tion defence in criminal law. This will pay tribute to the more practical orientation of 
the law in this country. In theory, as I have sought to show, the test fails to meet its ba-
sic premise, because the interests of all citizens in their security and liberty are not 
686 See also M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 para 62.1; R Wacks in R 
Wacks (ed), Privacy Volume I (International Library of Essays in Law & Legal Theory) (1993), xi – In-
troduction. 
687 S Ingber, ‘Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 772, 
850. 
688 Most members of juries were presumably also never held hostage, but the verdict would at least repre-
sent an inter-subjective share of ‘community mores’ as opposed to a subjective result found by a judge.  
689 W L Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th Ed, 1971) 812. 
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equal. Notwithstanding, the sole purpose of restructuring the test later on is to make it 
altogether superfluous. An approach protecting, inter alia, information regarding one’s 
sexuality for its own sake is in my view preferable. Coincidentally, English law to 
which we will turn now has achieved this.690 The following discussion will also provide 
a first impression as to why the test should be rejected in the context of a constitutional-
ised tort.     
2.5.2 The ‘highly offensive’ test in English law 
In English law, having an initial ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ is develop-
ing as the touchstone of private life.691 Independently of this test, some statements of 
the courts suggest an embryonic second test, broadly akin to a fault standard. Baroness 
Hale pointed out in Campbell that a court should ascertain - prior to the proportionality 
balancing exercise - whether ‘the person publishing the information knows or ought to 
know that there is a reasonable expectation that the information in question will be kept 
confidential.’692 This element stems most likely from the guidelines laid out by Lord 
Woolf CJ in A v B Plc.693 Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to contend that the ele-
ment adds nothing to the examination as to whether the claimant’s expectation of pri-
vacy was reasonable in the first place, if the defendant knew or ought to have known 
that the claimant had such an expectation. This may be contrasted to traditional breach 
of confidence where the knowledge (or purported knowledge) of the recipient that the 
information was imparted in confidence gives rise to an ‘obligation of confidence.’694 
The defendant’s knowledge is therefore a reason to impose a duty. As is well known, 
however, there is no necessity for an obligation of confidence in the privacy context. In 
other words, the defendant’s knowledge is not conclusive for the claimant’s ‘reasonable 
690 It goes without saying that the same is essentially true for Tipping J’s approach in Hosking. 
691 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 21 per Lord Nicholls; para 137 per Baroness Hale; McKen-
nitt [2006] EMLR 178 (QB) para 50 per Eady J; [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 11 per Buxton LJ; His 
Royal Highness the Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2008] EMLR 66 (Ch) para 88 per 
Blackburne J; [2007] 3 WLR 222 (CA) para 88 per Blackburne J; Browne [2007] 3 WLR 289 (CA) para 
24 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR and Murray [2007] EMLR 583 (Ch) para 26 per Patten J.  
692 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 134; see too Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No3) [2006] QB 125 
para 81 per Lord Phillips MR and HRH the Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] 3 WLR 
222 (CA) para 91 per Blackburne J. But compare N A Moreham, ’Privacy in the Common Law: A Doc-
trinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 628, 643 who seems to interpret this 
statement as an objective check on the claimants subjective expectations of privacy. Moreham’s view 
seems to be reflected in Browne [2007] 3 WLR 289 (CA) para 31 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR.  
693 [2002] 2 All ER 545 para 11 guideline (ix). 
694 Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1968] FSR 415, 420-1 per Megarry J. 
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expectation’ itself. The function of this element, it seems reasonable to suggest, there-
fore differs from traditional confidence doctrine. However, a fault standard, of course, 
would not be incompatible with a rights-based approach. Instead of being a reason for 
imposing a duty, a fault standard restricts what would otherwise be strict liability.695 
This element of the remedy would be optional. It might be argued that it depends on the 
particular account of personal responsibility whether such an element should be 
adopted. In abstract terms, it is said that corrective justice demands ‘compensation only 
when the injurer's wrongful actions cause the victim's wrongful losses.’696 An optional 
fault standand, in contrast, would imply a ‘thicker’ notion of personal responsibility; 
that is to say that ‘fault in the action’ needs to be accompanied by ‘fault in the actor.’697  
 
Be that as it may, the ‘highly offensive’ test has not been well received.698 
These two tests had been considered in the House of Lords decision in Campbell along 
with an ‘obviously private facts’699 test in order to delimit the claimant’s privacy inter-
est.700 The joint judgment in Hosking,701 by contrast, linked the ‘highly offensive’ test 
to the publicity element and made it clear that the test was not part of the test as to 
whether information is private. The concomitant assertion saying that English courts 
likewise employ an additional highly offensive test later turned out to be insubstan-
695 N Jansen, ’Duties and Rights in Negligence: A Comparative and Historical Perspective on the Euro-
pean Law of Extracontractual Liability’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 443, 467. 
696 G J Postema, ‘Risks, Wrongs and Responsibility – Coleman’s Liberal Theory of Commutative Justice’ 
(1993) 103 Yale Law Journal 861, 879 (emphasis added). 
697 Ibid, at p 879-80. 
698 See Browne [2007] 3 WLR 289 (CA) para 24 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR; [2007] EWHC 202 (QB) 
para 42 per Eady J. It should be noted, however, that the test was taken into consideration in Murray 
[2007] EMLR 583 (Ch) para 26 per Patten J. 
699 There is no need for an initial test if the information is ‘obviously private’ - Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 
995 (HL) para 96 per Lord Hope; Associated Newspapers Ltd v His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales 
[2007] 3 WLR 222 (CA) para 35 per Blackburne J. 
700 N A Moreham, ’Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 121 Law 
Quarterly Review 628, 630; T Aplin, ‘The Development of the Action for Breach of Confidence in a 
Post-HRA Era’ [2007] Intellectual Property Quarterly 19, 25. 
701 [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 127; see also Andrews v TVNZ Ltd High Court Auckland CIV 2004-404-
3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) para 25; TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 
68 per Panckhurst and O’Regan JJ. 
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tial.702 The threshold test for personal or private information in New Zealand, like the 
USA and unlike the UK, is hence the highly offensive test.703
 
Despite all its advantages, perhaps no case other than Browne v Associated 
Newspapers Ltd704 pinpoints the difficulties of the English approach more vividly. The 
claimant had intended to keep both his ‘homosexuality’705 as well as business informa-
tion which he had entrusted to his partner during a ‘homosexual relationship’ out of the 
press. To compound matters, it was to some degree also not clear whether the disputed 
information was true or false.706 The major problem is the unclear distinction between 
traditional and extended breach of confidence.707 It is difficult to improve on Tipping 
J’s formulation who considered ‘it legally preferable and better for society’s under-
standing of what the Courts are doing to achieve the appropriate substantive outcome 
under a self-contained and stand-alone common law cause of action.’ 708
 
However, it seems settled that the nature of the claimant’s sexual orientation 
plays no decisive role under both heads.709 We are nonetheless only concerned with the 
claimant’s homosexuality. In this respect, the courts determine first whether the claim-
ant’s privacy interests had been engaged. The claimant’s subjective expectation of pri-
vacy in Browne had to be tested against a normative reasonableness standard.710 In 
702 Eg, Rogers v TVNZ Ltd [2007] NZSC 91 para 25 per Elias CJ. But compare Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 
(CA) para 42 Per Gault P and Blanchard J; Andrews v TVNZ Ltd High Court Auckland CIV 2004-404-
3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) para 37. 
703 See also Brown v Attorney-General [2006] DCR 630 para 78 per Spear J. 
704 [2007] EWHC 202 (QB) per Eady J; [2007] 3 WLR 289 (CA) para 24 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR. 
705 Browne [2007] EMLR 19 (QB) para 55 per Eady J. One’s sexual orientation is encompassed by the 
scope of art 8 ECHR - Peck v UK (2003) 13 BHRC 669 para 57. 
706 Defamation was not pleaded and this issue was, according to Eady J, not critical to the determination 
on the facts of the case - ibid, para 30.  
707 For discussions of the differences see, eg, Murray [2007] EMLR 583 (Ch) para 20 per Patten J; T Ap-
lin, ‘The Development of the Action for Breach of Confidence in a Post-HRA Era’ [2007] Intellectual 
Property Quarterly 19, 21. There is, however, an occasional overlap between the two remedies – see, eg, 
Rogers v TVNZ Ltd [2007] NZSC 91 para 24 per Elias CJ. It had been emphasised recently, however, that 
both forms have to be kept separate - Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2007] 2 WLR 920 (HL) para 118 per 
Lord Hoffmann; para 255 per Lord Nicholls. 
708 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 246; see also para 45 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
709 Eady J reiterated that both heterosexual and homosexual relationships had been protected in traditional 
breach of confidence actions - Browne [2007] EMLR 19 (QB) para 11; see also [2007] 3 WLR 289 (CA) 
para 85 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR.  
710 Ibid, para 55 (‘I understand that the claimant prefers to keep his relationships, and sexual orientation, 
out of the media and that he has made strenuous efforts in the past to avoid it being mentioned, but that is 
a different matter from having a reasonable expectation of privacy’). 
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other words, at issue was whether the claimant ought to have a reasonable expectation 
under the circumstances.711 In this respect, arguments have to be made and considered: 
on one hand, the claimant has made strenuous efforts to keep his homosexuality out of 
the press; on the other hand, the claimant attended ‘various social events […] including 
events connected with the claimant’s business activities’ together with his partner.712 
Based on the merits of the case, the question arose as to whether his expectation of pri-
vacy was still reasonable. An important aspect of those meetings may have been that 
they took place in the claimant’s house and that only friends and acquaintances were 
involved. Privacy, in the context of English law, also has a social dimension in order to 
foster relationships.713 These relationships are nevertheless not necessarily to be 
equated with the relationship of confidence of the traditional equitable remedy.714  
 
Against this backdrop, Eady J held that the expectation was no longer reason-
able. The privacy right of the claimant had consequently not been engaged.715 The 
Court of Appeal, on the other hand, cautioned by mentioning that there may be ‘poten-
tially an important distinction between information which is made available to a per-
son's circle of friends or work colleagues and information which is widely published in 
a newspaper.’716 However, whether the homosexual claimant would have faced, for ex-
ample, ‘mistrust or opprobrium’ once the information is published is irrelevant to each 
conclusion.717 This is not to suggest that discrimination does not exist in reality. The 
point to be made is simply that the law should not embrace these views; there should be 
no ratio decidendi on this point if possible. In short, personal information regarding 
one’s sexuality is treated as being of equal concern and respect in English law regard-
less of any particular sexual orientation.     
711 See also M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 para 160. 
712  Browne [2007] EMLR 19 (QB) paras 4, 55 per Eady J. 
713 Ibid, para 33; Peck v UK (2003) 13 BHRC 669 para 57 (The ECtHR added that this social dimension 
‘may include activities of a professional or business nature,’ which was apparently overlooked by the 
English courts). See also M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 paras 81, 145 
for further details. 
714 Browne [2007] 3 WLR 289 (CA) para 26 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR (‘[…] in answering the question 
whether in respect of the disclosed facts the claimant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the par-
ticular circumstances of the case the nature of any relationship between the relevant persons or parties is 
of considerable potential importance’ – emphasis provided) 
715 Browne [2007] EMLR 19 (QB) para 55 per Eady J. 
716 Browne [2007] 3 WLR 289 (CA) para 61 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR. 
717 Compare, eg, Urbaniak v Newton, 226 Cal App 3d 1128, 1140 (1991). 
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Why is the highly offensive test superfluous in English law? An important factor 
is surely that privacy is protected in its own name. Moreover, a highly offensive test 
was never part of the traditional breach of confidence action. These factors notwith-
standing, the civil ‘wrong’ in England is effectively to be found in an infringement of a 
right to privacy.718 This should be distinguished from the ‘harm’ of being ‘truly humili-
ated’ that we find in the torts as outlined by the joint judgment in New Zealand and in 
the USA.719 Even more important in this respect is the horizontal application of arts 8 
and 10 ECHR and their reconciliation by means of a proportionality test. Barak has 
pointed out that the proportionality test ‘lies at the foundation of the reasonableness 
standard, which is merely a proper balancing between conflicting principles.’720 More-
over, by connecting the cause of action closer to human rights instruments, fundamental 
requirements of distributive justice are provided.721
 
We have already noted that the ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’ test 
also requires a balancing of interests and incorporates an element of distributive justice. 
According to Ripstein, the reasonable person is to be understood ‘as the expression of 
an idea of fair terms of social cooperation;’ as such, the test signifies John Rawls’ dis-
tinction between the rational (acting to promote one’s ends effectively) and the reason-
able (cooperating with others as free and equal on terms all can accept).722 According to 
Rawls, the distinction between the reasonable and the rational goes back to Immanuel 
Kant.723 Without going into too much detail at this point,724 Rawls uses the reasonable 
‘as an element of the idea of society as a system of fair cooperation and that its fair 
718 See, eg, Associated Newspapers Ltd v His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales [2007] 3 WLR 222 
(CA) para 122 per Blackburne J. 
719 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 126 per Gault P and Blanchard J. The importance of this distinc-
tion was emphasised by M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 para 23. 
720 A Barak, ‘Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience’ (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 
369, 381-2 (emphasis supplied). 
721 See R Mullender, ‘The Reasonable Person, the Pursuit of Justice, and the Negligence Law’ (2005) 
68(4) Modern Law Review 681, 686. 
722 A Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (1999) 7; see generally J Rawls, Political Liberalism 
(1993) 48-54; G C Keating, ‘Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory’ (1996) 48 Stanford 
Law Review 311, 311-2. 
723 J Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993) 48 fn 1. 
724 Later on during the discussion of the New Zealand law, I will try to provide a slightly fuller accout of 
the  difference between the rational and the reasonable during the discussion of the ‘image of the person’ 
in the context of human rights instruments. See below Chapter Four, 2.2.     
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terms be reasonable for all to accept is part of its idea of reciprocity.’725 This helps to 
say that rational agents have to engage in fair social cooperation. Effectively, I suggest, 
the distinction between the rational and the reasonable aims at solving the tension be-
tween ‘individual’ and ‘society.’ This fundamental issue, as I have sought to show, 
needs to be addressed in the privacy context as well. Likewise, mediating between what 
is ‘rational’ and what is ‘reasonable’ lies at the heart of the proportionality test, as we 
will see later in further detail. Suffice it to say at this point that human rights instru-
ments nevertheless presuppose a rational human being. Individuals are not, as Prosser 
would have it, ‘congenital fools.’726 The individual liberty of those rational agents is to 
be restricted no more than necessary or reasonable on terms all can accept in a democ-
ratic society. This is because distributive justice is agent-general as opposed to correc-
tive justice, which is agent-specific.727 In brief, the reasonable person and proportional-
ity tests serve essentially the same legal purpose.  
 
It is suggested, in conclusion, that employing both tests in a single cause of ac-
tion (as the joint judgment proposed in Hosking728) is imperfect. The Court was rather 
confronted with an either/or situation. Given that the reasonable person test is preferred 
in New Zealand, why rock the boat with an additional proportionality test? To my eyes, 
‘a recipe for confusion’729 could once more be found in the fact that English and US 
American influences are mixed with one another without adequate reflection.     
 
As for English law, Lord Nicholls’ words are therefore very true: ‘in deciding 
what was the ambit of an individual's 'private life' in particular […] courts need to be on 
guard against using as a touchstone a test which brings into account considerations 
which should more properly be considered at the later stage of proportionality;’730 ‘the 
“highly offensive” formulation can all too easily bring into account, when deciding 
725 J Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993) 49-50. 
726 W L Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed, 1971) 152. 
727 W N R Lucy, Philosophy of Private Law (2007) 318. 
728 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) paras 125, 126 (employing a reasonable person test) and para 132 
(referring to proportionality); see also TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 156 (CA) para 86 per Panck-
hurst and O’Regan JJ.  
729 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 22 per Lord Nicholls. 
730 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 21; see also McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 11 per 
Buxton LJ.   
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whether the disclosed information was private, considerations which go more properly 
to issues of proportionality, for instance, the degree of intrusion into private life.’731 
The same holds true, for example, for the matter as to whether the claimant is a ‘public 
figure.’732 Subjects to the law should be treated with equal concern and respect.733 This 
rather Kantian notion is also in line with an approach initially based on corrective jus-
tice. As Aristotle pointed out:734
 
it makes no difference, for instance, whether a robbery is committed by a good man on a bad or 
by a bad man on a good […]: the law looks only to the difference created by the injury and 
treats the men as previously equal, where the one does an the other suffers injury, or the one has 
done and the other suffered harm. 
    
In brief, whether the claimant has a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ should 
be determined by an approach implementing corrective justice concerns. The particular 
features of the two parties involved and the respective merit of their claims are of no 
importance in this context.735 Whatever the case may be, it is ‘wrong’ to disseminate 
personal or private information if there has been a ‘reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.’736   
 
The fact that the public’s interest in learning about personal information of ‘pub-
lic figures’ undoubtedly may be higher is another matter.737 Hence, it is suggested that 
these issues should preferably be dealt with separately, viz, in the context of justifying a 
limit on freedom of speech. At this stage, the merit of the public figure’s claim is evalu-
ated, for instance, in comparison to the claim of a private person. By means of employ-
ing a proportionality test, the second stage therefore seeks to clarify if the ‘wrong’ 
731 Ibid, para 22.  
732 Eg, Associated Newspapers Ltd v His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales [2007] 3 WLR 222 (CA) 
paras 44, 45, 106, 110 per Blackburne J; McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 56 per Buxton LJ. 
Compare Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 121 per Gault P and Blanchard J; R Tobin, ‘Privacy: One 
step forward, two steps back’ [2003] New Zealand Law Journal 256, 257. 
733 See also Lord Steyn, ‘Democracy through Law’ [2002] European Human Rights Law Review 723, 
731-2. 
734 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Five, at p 81. 
735 See above Chapter Two, 2.3.3.2.  
736 See also R Mullender, ‘Tort, Human Rights, and Common Law Culture’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 301, 308-9. 
737 See Associated Newspapers Ltd v His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales [2006] EWCA Civ 1776 
para 70 per Lord Phillips CJ.  
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amounts to a ‘wrongful loss’ of privacy. It constitutes a ‘wrong’ insofar as the right to 
privacy is invaded, but it is a justified wrong to the extent the countervailing right to 
freedom of speech bears greater weight on the facts of the case.738 An unjustified in-
fringement of the right of privacy, on the other hand, amounts to an actionable violation 
of the right. As a result, it may be wrong to disseminate information about a public per-
son’s private life, but this does not necessarily mean that the dissemination amounts to a 
wrongful loss of privacy. At least if one favours a liberal approach, I suggest, English 
law thereby achieves much more with less if compared to New Zealand and US law.739 
That it is nonetheless treated as being essentially the same is insubstantial to my eyes. 
 
In order to portray another major difference between English and US law, one 
should refrain from regarding ‘formalism’ as a pejorative term.740 Black-and-white 
views, as already suggested, should be avoided; the question is rather what the appro-
priate form of law is in a particular context. Formalism generally ensures a certain de-
gree of predictability, which is a rightfully cherished value in law.741 Predictability it-
self is perhaps not the sovereign virtue in law however. English law, as I understand it, 
employs a formal framework, in a layperson’s view not dissimilar to Lord Wilber-
force’s two-step approach to negligence law as outlined in Anns.742 But where a prima 
facie duty may seem odd, a prima facie right may not. As an analytical framework, it 
allows recognition of the full context of the case on a principled basis and in an inher-
ently coherent manner.743 Moreover, it is a forward-looking approach requiring induc-
738 See also G J Postema, ‘Risks, Wrongs and Responsibility – Coleman’s Liberal Theory of Commuta-
tive Justice’ (1993) 103 Yale Law Journal 861, 876-7.  
739 It should be noted that the additional ‘highly offensive’ test has been called into question recently - 
Rogers v TVNZ Ltd [2007] NZSC 91 (SC) para 25 per Elias CJ. 
740 See generally R S Summers, ‘How Law is Formal and Why it Matters’ (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review 
 1165. 
741 See also the discussion in S Todd, ‘Negligence and Policy’ in P Rishworth (ed), The struggle for sim-
plicity in the law (1997) 105, 110. 
742 Anns v London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 741; McLaughlin v O’Brian [1982] 1 AC 410, 420-
1. See also Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 259 per Tipping J. 
743 English judges are very alert to avoid turning what is in fact a ‘principle’ into a mechanically applied 
‘rule’ or similar form of generalisation - Browne [2007] EMLR 19 (QB) para 41 per Eady J citing W 
(Children) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication), Re [2005] EWHC 1564 (Fam) para 53 per Sir 
Mark Potter P; CC v AB [2007] EMLR 11 (QBD) para 13 per Eady J. See also Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v 
Home Office [1970] 2 All ER 294, 297 per Lord Reid (‘[…] there has been a steady trend towards regard-
ing the law of negligence as depending on principle so that, when a new point emerges, one should ask 
not whether it is covered by authority but whether recognised principles apply to it’ – emphasis pro-
vided).  
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tive normative reasoning.744 This approach will never (and cannot possibly) achieve the 
degree of predictability of US law. US law seems to achieve these high levels of pre-
dictability and certainty by collapsing ‘form’ into ‘substance’ of the law.745 It has the 
virtues and vices of a ‘checklist;’ this writer cannot confirm an actual development of 
the disclosure tort over the last four decades. The joint judgment in Hosking, in con-
trast, seems to fuse both approaches in order to develop the privacy tort incrementally 
(ie, backward-looking to authority, including authority provided by both of the afore-
mentioned jurisdictions).746 It is suggested that this might also be an ingredient of a rec-
ipe for confusion. English and American law are, as we have seen, quite different and it 
is not easy to see how they can be combined meaningfully.   
2.6 The newsworthiness element  
We will now turn to the newsworthiness element of the US tort and therefore to 
the speech side of the equation. As already elaborated, the US Supreme Court refused to 
answer the crucial question as to whether restrictions on publishing true information are 
compatible with the First Amendment.747 It is, thus, up to the Supreme Courts of each 
state to decide whether the public disclosure branch of the tort is compatible with the 
First Amendment and should form part of the common law. The following exposition 
will predominantly show the determination of ‘newsworthy’ private information and the 
impact of First Amendment jurisprudence on this process. 
2.6.1 The rejection of the tort in North Carolina 
The case of Hall v Post748 provides an illustrative example of the existing uncer-
tainty left behind by the Federal Supreme Court.749 Although a ‘right’ of privacy had 
744 Tipping J seems to have embraced this forward-looking way of approaching the law - Hosking [2005] 
1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 256. 
745 See generally R S Summers, ‘How Law is Formal and Why it Matters’ (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review 
1165, 1209. 
746 Consider Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 117 per Gault P and Blanchard J. See also Hosking 
[2003] 3 NZLR 385 (HC) paras 119, 140 per Randerson J. See S Todd, ‘Negligence and Policy’ in P 
Rishworth (ed), The struggle for simplicity in the law (1997) 105, 110 and E W Thomas, ‘A Return to 
Principle in Judicial Reasoning and an Acclamation of judicial Autonomy’ (1993) 23 Victoria University 
of Wellington Law Review Monograph 5, pp 59-62 for further details. 
747 Cox Broadcasting Corp v Cohn, 420 US 469, 491 (1975); Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514, 529 
(2001). 
748 372 SE 2d 711 (1988). 
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been acknowledged as a part of North Carolina’s tort law, the Supreme Court refused to 
recognise the public disclosure branch. The main reason for this judgment was the fa-
miliar argument asserting that this branch most directly affected the First Amendment. 
Justice Mitchell stated for the majority that the privacy interest involved was not consti-
tutionally protected.750 With reference to Cox Broadcasting Corp v Cohn751 the major-
ity emphasised the already existing tension between tort law and the First Amendment, 
to which the recognition of the disclosure branch would further contribute.752 However, 
Justice Frye753 concurred with the outcome but dissented from the categorical rejection 
of this branch of the tort. The learned Judge argued: 754
 
I do not accept the notion that the tension already existing between the First Amendment and the 
law of torts requires the non-recognition of a legitimate claim […] against a media defendant 
for wrongfully publishing highly offensive private facts which are not of legitimate concern to 
the public. […] I do not believe that the media should be given a licence to pry into the private 
lives of ordinary citizens and spread before the public highly offensive but very private facts, 
without any degree of accountability. Such is not required by either the federal or state constitu-
tions. 
 
Frye J agreed with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that both interests could be 
reconciled by applying a ‘newsworthiness’ or ‘public interest’ test in order to determine 
what publications are constitutionally privileged and what publications are action-
able.755 These tests were supposed to give credence to the viewpoint that neither the so-
called right of privacy nor freedom of the press was absolute.756 In the Judge’s opinion, 
the chilling effect that this tort may have on freedom of the press would be minimised if 
the question of whether the material is of legitimate public concern were initially a 
question of law.757  
 
749 G L Bostwick, ‘The Newsworthiness Element: Shulman v Group W Prods., Inc. Muddies the Waters’ 
(1999)19 Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review 225, 238. 
750 Hall v Post, (1988) 372 SE 2d 711, 717. 
751 420 US 469 (1975). 
752  Hall v Post, 372 SE 2d 711, 717 (1988). 
753 Meyer J joined his opinion. 
754 Ibid. 
755 Ibid, at p 719 (‘[t]he first amendment encourages a robust debate and the gravamen of the first 
amendment, as recently stated by the Supreme Court is the “recognition of the fundamental importance of 
the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern”’). 
756 Ibid, at p 720. 
757 Ibid. 
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The case reveals two distinct ways of approaching limitations on freedom of 
speech, both of which were also displayed in Hosking. The majority in Hall regarded 
the abstract privacy value related to the cause of action itself as an unnecessary interfer-
ence with free speech interests. The minority, by contrast, emphasised the limited im-
portance of abstract considerations; determinative was whether personal information in 
a concrete case results in a legitimate claim and therefore a justified interference with 
freedom of speech. As we will see later in further detail, the minority in Hosking also 
regarded privacy predominantly as an abstract interest that posed an unjustified limit on 
free speech interests. Particularly Keith J argued that the US experience told strongly 
against a social need for a privacy action.758 The majority, on the other hand, stressed 
that the common law may develop side-by side with the statutory protection of privacy 
interests;759 their Honours, then, tried to outline what they perceived as a legitimate 
claim based on the facts of individual cases.760 The ‘keeping the floodgates shut’ argu-
ment that seems to underlie particularly the minority opinions in Hosking is certainly 
valid. However, it could be raised against every development of the law and is not a 
persuasive argument as long as the litigation is legitimate.761     
2.6.2 The newsworthy element in Californian law 
Most states have nonetheless acknowledged the public disclosure branch of the 
tort. This is in line with its theoretical constitutional viability given that appropriate at-
tention to free speech concerns is ensured. Once an element such as ‘newsworthiness’ 
or ‘public concern’ is established, the focus shifts to the viability of the tort for practi-
cal purposes.762 The necessary presupposition, as we recollect, would be to determine a 
‘public concern’ without swallowing the tort altogether.763 In this respect, it is conven-
ient to consider predominantly Californian authorities, which have been particularly in-
fluential in New Zealand.  
758 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) paras 210-220 per Keith J; Anderson J’s judgment is admittedly am-
biguous - at paras 267, 268.  
759 Ibid, para 108 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
760 Ibid, paras 110, 115. 
761 This point was made by G Ragland, ‘The Right of Privacy’ (1929) 17 Kentucky Law Journal 85, 94. 
762 See, eg, Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal.4th 200, 215-6 (1998). 
763 See above Chapter Two, 2.6. 
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2.6.2.1 The pre-Shulman era 
In Melvin v Reid764, the Supreme Court of California determined first a ‘founda-
tion for a [privacy] action in tort’ and found such a basis in the Californian constitu-
tion.765 This might be seen as a variation of ubi jus ibi remedium, because the basis was 
not the classic common law right to personal security but a constitutional provision.766 
Prosser opined that this constituted a dubious foundation,767 but more interesting is per-
haps that the recognition of the tort implied what would today be called horizontal ap-
plication of higher order law. The basis of the privacy tort, section 1 of article 1 of the 
Californian Constitution,768 had heretofore never been interpreted as restricting the ac-
tivities among private individuals; the sole purpose of the state constitution was rather 
confined to negative obligations of the state and its institutions.769      
 
The reconciliation of privacy and free speech interests received detailed consid-
eration in Briscoe v Reader's Digest Association Inc770. Broadly speaking, the ‘news-
worthiness’ element presents two major problems:  
 
• the determination of the substance of a ‘newsworthy’ matter; and 
• whether its application constitutes a ‘matter of law’ determined by 
judges or ‘a matter of fact,’ which should be left for a jury.    
 
The plaintiff in Briscoe had been involved in a hijacking case; the defendant 
published details of this incident eleven years after his criminal conviction. As to the 
first problem, the court ruled that the public’s interest in past crimes might be as strong 
764 112 Cal App 285 (1931). The case highlighted and gave ‘dramatic impetus’ to the public disclosure 
tort - G E White, Tort Law in America: An intellectual History (expanded ed, 2003) 175. 
765 Ibid, at p 291.  
766 See above Chapter Two, 2.3.2.2. 
767 W L Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, 392-3. 
768 Section 1 of article I of the Constitution of California read at that time as follows: ‘All men are by 
nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and 
defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining 
safety and happiness.’ This provision was amended in 1972 and includes now a self-executing right to 
privacy - Urbaniak v Newton, 226 Cal App 3d 1128, 1136 (1991). The provision applies both to private 
and government entities - Four Navy Seals v Associated Press, 413 F Supp 2d 1136, 1143 (2005). 
769 G Dickler, ‘The Right of Privacy – A Proposed Redefinition’ (1936) 70 United States Law Review 
435, 447. 
770 93 Cal Rptr 866 (1971). 
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as it is in present offences; the defendant therefore had the ‘right’ to publish information 
about the incident itself.771 Nonetheless, this ‘right’ did not amount to a lawful identifi-
cation of the offender; rather the goals sought by each interest had to be furthered with 
minimum intrusion upon the other.772 The Supreme Court of California, thus, entered 
into a weighing process. As an offender who had reverted to a lawful life, the plaintiff 
no longer needed to satisfy the curiosity of the public.773 Together with the state’s pol-
icy interest in the integrity of the rehabilitation process, the individual’s privacy interest 
outweighed the defendant’s interest in disseminating these facts.774 The Court was nev-
ertheless mindful of the fact that the balance always had to be weighed in favour of free 
speech in order to avoid a chilling effect on First Amendment freedoms through uncer-
tainty.775  
 
In order to determine the substance of the newsworthiness element the Court 
considered: (1) the social value of the facts published, (2) the depth of the intrusion into 
ostensibly private affairs, and (3) the extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to a 
position of public notoriety.776 Additional queries notwithstanding, it should be noted at 
the outset that the ‘depth of intrusion’ subtest conflates a part of the ‘highly offensive’ 
(balancing) test into the newsworthiness (balancing) element. We are therefore again 
confronted with the already familiar problem of keeping separate tests of the tort action 
apart.777  
 
As to the second aforementioned problem, the determination of the newsworthi-
ness element was regarded as largely being a matter of fact, which ‘a jury is uniquely 
well-suited to decide.’778 Particularly the ‘social value’ of the disseminated information 
771 Briscoe v Reader’s Digest Association Inc, 93 Cal Rptr 866, 872 (1971). 
772 Ibid, at p 874; see also Forsher v Bugliosi, 163 Cal Rptr 628, 638 (1980). 
773 Ibid. 
774 Ibid, at p 875. 
775 Ibid. 
776 Ibid; Forsher v Bugliosi, 163 Cal Rptr 628, 638 (1980); Diaz v Oakland Tribune Inc, 139 Cal App 3d 
128, 130 (1983) and Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 250 (1998) per Brown J (con-
curring and dissenting). This three-prong-test represents a normative approach – L N Woito and P 
McNulty, ‘The Privacy Disclosure Tort and the First Amendment: Should the Community decide News-
worthiness?’ (1979) 64 Iowa Law Review 185, 197.  
777 See above Chapter Two, 2.4. 
778 Diaz v Oakland Tribune Inc 139 Cal App 3d 128, 133 (1983). 
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alludes to the relevance of community mores and standards of decency.779 However, 
this is arguably not the ‘community mores’ test of the Restatement but a unique ap-
proach.780 In brief, the importance of freedom of speech had been emphasised, but the 
plaintiff was still provided with a fair chance of prevailing.  
 
This balancing approach became increasingly problematic in the wake of Cox 
Broadcasting Corp v Cohn781. Mr Briscoe’s name was, of course, a matter of public 
record as were the facts of the crime he committed. Likewise, in Melvin v Reid782, Ms 
Melvin’s name was a matter of public record as were the details of her murder trial. The 
absolute protection of these records did not allow differentiation of any kind. In 2003, 
the Supreme Court of California finally put the record straight by holding that Cox pre-
cluded the approach adopted in Briscoe and overruled the case.783 The ‘paradoxon’ in-
herent in the decisions of Briscoe and Melvin was known for almost 70 years how-
ever.784 As a result, even the ‘narrow exception’785 for criminals and past crimes was 
finally identified as unconstitutional. The policy interests in the rehabilitation of con-
victed offenders (which were ‘most important’ to the decision in Briscoe)786 were there-
fore of no concern anymore. It should be noted that particularly the lower courts in the 
USA cannot agree ‘on how to deal with factors other than speech.’787 Particularly the 
779 Ibid; see also P Gielniak, ‘Tipping the Scales: Courts Struggle to Strike a Balance Between the Public 
Disclosure of Private Facts Tort and the First Amendment’ (1999) 39 Santa Clara Law Review 1217, 
1235; D M Worley, ‘Shulman v Group W Productions: Invasion of Privacy by Publication of Private 
Facts - Where Does California Draw the Line Between Newsworthy Information and Morbid Curiosity’ 
(1999-2000) 27 Western State University Law Review 535, 567-8. 
780 J A Jurata, ‘The Tort That Refuses To Go Away: The Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure of 
Private Facts’ (1999) 36 San Diego Law Review 489, 506. 
781 420 US 469 (1975). 
782 112 Cal App 285, 290-1 (1931). 
783 Gates v Discovery Communications Inc, 131 Cal Rptr 2d 534, 545 (2003); 106 Cal App 4th 677 
(2003). 
784 Consider G Dickler, ‘The Right of Privacy – A Proposed Redefinition’ (1936) 70 United States Law 
Review 435, 446-7. 
785 The general rule states that once someone became a public figure, he or she may be subject to public 
interest to the end of the person’s days - Shulman v Group W Productions Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 222 
(1998). 
786 Forsher v Bugliosi, 163 Cal Rptr 628, 638 (1980), see also Gates v Discovery Communications Inc, 
131 Cal Rptr 2d 534, 545 (2003). 
787 J Elford, ‘Trafficking in Stolen Information: A "Hierarchy of Rights" Approach to the Private Facts 
Tort’ (1995) 105 Yale Law Journal 727, 733 (emphasis added). 
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implementation of policy considerations seems generally problematic in the First 
Amendment context.788  
2.6.2.2 Newsworthiness according to Shulman v Group W 
Shulman marked a new era in reconciling speech and privacy interests in Cali-
fornia.789 It had been observed in the aftermath that public disclosure cases were 
unlikely to survive summary judgments and would never reach a jury.790 As we recol-
lect, however, jury decisions were increasingly perceived as a threat to the First 
Amendment anyway. Thus, some courts had already concluded beforehand that ‘news-
worthiness’ was not necessarily a jury issue.791 The problem, as already sketched dur-
ing the discussion of the constitutional framework,792 is usually to justify why a news 
item may be generally of public concern whereas sensitive personal information is 
not.793 How can this task be carried out without resorting to a more fact-sensitive ap-
proach as taken, for example, in Briscoe?  
 
As will presently appear, the courts gradually replaced newsworthiness tests 
based on community norms with bright-line ‘logical nexus’ tests. The courts usually 
assert at the outset of their analysis that a legitimate public concern in the general sub-
ject matter of a publication does not render all information given in an account news-
worthy.794 The Californian Supreme Court, by way of illustration, conceded in Shulman 
that ‘a certain amount of interest-balancing does occur in deciding whether material is 
788 See P Gielniak, ‘Tipping the Scales: Courts Struggle to Strike a Balance Between the Public Disclo-
sure of Private Facts Tort and the First Amendment’ (1999) 39 Santa Clara Law Review 1217, 1234. 
789 The decision was described as ‘clearly the most comprehensive state judicial decision concerning the 
principle of newsworthiness’ - R P Bezanson, ‘The Developing Law of Editorial Judgment’ (1999) 78 
Nebraska  Law  Review 754, 778. 
790 D M Worley, ‘Shulman v Group W Productions: Invasion of Privacy by Publication of Private Facts - 
Where Does California Draw the Line between Newsworthy Information and Morbid Curiosity’ (1999-
2000) 27 Western State University Law Review 535, 565. 
791 Baugh v CBS Inc, 828 F Supp 745, 754 (1993); Winstead v Sweeney, 517 NW 2d 874, 877 (1994) - 
The Court of Appeals of Michigan held that the newsworthiness element was a mixed question of law 
and fact; ‘in certain rare cases, it is necessary to defer to the fact-finding process to gain a result that is 
fair and representative of the attitudes of the community’ – emphasis supplied. See also J Elford, ‘Traf-
ficking in Stolen Information: A "Hierarchy of Rights" Approach to the Private Facts Tort’ (1995) 105 
Yale Law Journal 727, 733. 
792 See above Chapter Two, 1.2.4. 
793 See, eg, Winstead v Sweeney, 517 NW 2d 874, 877 (1994), Star-Telegram Inc, v Doe, 915 SW 2d 471, 
474 (1995). 
794 Eg, Star-Telegram Inc v Doe, 915 SW 2d 471, 474 (1995). 
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of legitimate public concern.’795 Based on the facts of the case, this limited amount of 
balancing was encapsulated in the formula asking whether the disclosed facts ‘bear a 
logical relationship to the newsworthy subject of the broadcast and are not intrusive in 
great disproportion to their relevance.’796 This approach supposedly enables courts to 
decide cases involving persons in events of public interest without balancing interests in 
an ad hoc fashion in each case.797 It is therefore not to be mixed up with the proportion-
ality test as employed in England. At least in California, this was a new test,798 but 
speech related interests were henceforth generally assessed by reference to this 
method.799 According to one commentator, ‘the fastest growing approach to defining 
newsworthiness is the “logical nexus” approach.’800
 
This test was fist enunciated by the United States Court of Appeals in 1980. In 
Campbell v Seabury Press801, the defendant published an autobiography concerning the 
life of a religious and civil rights leader. The plaintiff argued that ‘the defendants tor-
tiously invaded her privacy by including in the autobiography private facts relating to 
her homelife and marriage with the author’s’ influential older brother.802 The Court 
held that 
 
795 Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 227 (1998); see also M G v Time Inc, 107 Cal 
Rptr 2d 504, 511 (2001) and Gates v Discovery Communications Inc, 131 Cal Rptr 2d 534, 538 (2003). 
796 Shulman v Group W Productions Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 215 (1998); see also M G v Time Inc, 107 Cal 
Rptr 2d 504, 513 (2001); Taus v Loftus, 40 Cal 4th 683, 718 (2007). For non-Californian authorities see 
also Ross v Midwest Communications Inc, 870 F 2d 271, 274 (1989); Wilson v Grant 687 A 2d 1009, 
1015; Gilbert v Medical Econs Co, 665 F 2d 305, 308 (1981); Campbell v Seabury Press, 614 F 2d 395, 
397 (1980). 
797 Shulman v Group W Productions Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 225-26 (1998); see also K W Bacon, ‘Florida 
Star v BJF: The Right of Privacy Collides with the First Amendment’ (1990) 76 Iowa Law Review 139, 
162 (1990). Compare G L Bostwick, ‘The Newsworthiness Element: Shulman v Group W Prods., Inc. 
Muddies the Waters’ (1999) 19 Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review 225, 241 who notes 
that many regard the element of ‘disproportionality’ as inviting a form of ad hoc balancing. 
798 Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 251 (1998) per Brown J (concurring and dissent-
ing); D M Worley, ‘Shulman v Group W Productions: Invasion of Privacy by Publication of Private Facts 
- Where Does California Draw the Line Between Newsworthy Information and Morbid Curiosity’ (1999-
2000) 27 Western State University Law Review 535, 565; G L Bostwick, ‘The Newsworthiness Element: 
Shulman v Group W Prods., Inc. Muddies the Waters’ (1999) 19 Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment 
Law Review 225, 240. 
799 Taus v Loftus, 40 Cal 4th 683, 718 (2007). 
800 J A Jurata, ‘The Tort That Refuses To Go Away: The Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure of 
Private Facts’ (1999) 36 San Diego Law Review 489, 507. 
801 614 F 2d 395 (1980) (5th Circuit). 
802 Campbell v Seabury Press, 614 F 2d 395, 397 (1980). 
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[a] review of the record in this action clearly shows the requisite logical nexus. An account of 
the author's close association with his older brother certainly is appropriate in the autobiogra-
phy. Likewise, accounts of his brother's marriage as they impacted on the author have the requi-
site logical nexus to fall within the ambit of constitutional protection.803
 
In the case of Gilbert v Medical Economics Company804, the United States 
Court of Appeals made another effort to explain how the ‘logical nexus’ test is applied 
in practice.805 The defendant published an article discussing the personal and profes-
sional problems of a physician involved in two incidents of alleged medical malprac-
tice. The Court held that the public dissemination of a ‘physician’s photograph, name, 
and private facts about her psychiatric history and marital life was substantially relevant 
to newsworthy topic of policing failures in medical profession and thus was privileged 
under the First Amendment.’806 The Court’s reasoning, insofar as is relevant, reads:807
 
With respect to the publication of plaintiff's photograph and name, we find that these truthful 
representations are substantially relevant to a newsworthy topic because they strengthen the im-
pact and credibility of the article. They obviate any impression that the problems raised in the 
article are remote or hypothetical, thus providing an aura of immediacy and even urgency that 
might not exist had plaintiff's name and photograph been suppressed. Similarly, we find the 
publication of plaintiff's psychiatric and marital problems to be substantially relevant to the 
newsworthy topic. While it is true that these subjects would fall outside the first amendment 
privilege in the absence of either independent newsworthiness or any substantial nexus with a 
newsworthy topic, here they are connected to the newsworthy topic by the rational inference 
that plaintiff's personal problems were the underlying cause of the acts of alleged malpractice. 
 
In brief, the newsworthiness element (as outlined in the Restatement) was 
gradually replaced with tests focussing on a ‘logical nexus’ between private information 
and the newsworthy subject. This development is in line with the observations made in 
other states that a community mores standard of newsworthiness had to be rejected 
categorically. As the Supreme Court of Oregon put it: ‘[t]he editorial judgment of what 
803 Ibid. 
804 665 F 2d 305 (1981) (10th Circuit). 
805 Note that Court defined ‘nexus’ as a ‘substantial relevance’ in that case - G Dendy, ‘The Newsworthi-
ness Defense to the Public Disclosure Tort’ (1997) 85 Kentucky Law Journal 147, 163. 
806 Gilbert v Medical Economics Company, 665 F 2d 305 (1981). 
807 Ibid, at p 308-9 (emphasis added). 
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is “newsworthy” is not so readily submitted to the ad hoc review of a jury as the Court 
of Appeals believed. It is not properly a community standard.’808  
 
As we remember, particularly in the wake of Bartnicki v Vopper809 scholars 
have argued that the tort’s viability depends on a balancing exercise by judges and ju-
ries based on community mores.810 However, the determination of speech related inter-
ests by means of utilising a newsworthiness standard based on those norms became in-
creasingly problematic.811 Particularly, the notion of ‘redeeming social value’ of speech 
is suspicious in the First Amendment context.812 Thus, it is fair to say that such a test 
cannot be problem and solution to the problem at the same time. One scholar has prog-
nosticated that the ‘logical nexus’ requirement would render, for instance, the former 
three-prong test as employed by Californian courts in the pre-Shulman era extinct.813 
This seems to be correct.   
 
Shulman was criticised, because the balancing test applied was said to be in fact 
a ‘bright line “logical relationship test”;’ this test, however, ‘fail[ed] to take adequate 
account [of] individual privacy rights and [was] overly deferential to the press.’814 The 
fact that there are no individual privacy rights in the first place is a different matter of 
course. One commentator argues that the new test is ‘even more amorphous and un-
workable than the use of ad hoc balancing,’ because there is no indication what criteria 
determines a ‘logical relationship.’815 Critics hence suggested that the Californian 
Courts should not abandon what has been described as ad hoc balancing in favour of 
this bright line test. The rationale behind this suggestion is that generalisation, as pre-
808 Anderson v Fisher Broadcasting Companies Inc, 712 P 2d 803, 809 (1986). 
809 532 US 514 (2001). 
810 R A Smolla, ‘Information as a Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in 
Speech’ (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1099, 1110 
811 See particularly Shulman v Group W Productions Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 246 (1998) per Kennard J (con-
curring) 
812 S Ingber, ‘The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth’ [1984] Duke Law Journal 1, 22; see also J 
Rubenfeld, ‘The First Amendment’s Purpose’ (2001) 53 Stanford Law Review 767, 824. 
813 J A Jurata, ‘The Tort That Refuses To Go Away: The Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure of 
Private Facts’ (1999) 36 San Diego Law Review 489, 506. 
814 P Gielniak, ‘Tipping the Scales: Courts Struggle to Strike a Balance Between the Public Disclosure of 
Private Facts Tort and the First Amendment’ (1999) 39 Santa Clara Law Review 1217, 1263. 
815 Ibid, at p1259; see also D M Worley, ‘Shulman v Group W Productions: Invasion of Privacy by Publi-
cation of Private Facts - Where Does California Draw the Line Between Newsworthy Information and 
Morbid Curiosity’ (1999-2000) 27 Western State University Law Review 535, 564.  
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supposed by such a bright line test, ‘is simply impossible.’816 Shulman was thus inter-
preted as saying that it ‘will completely strip the publication of private facts tort of what 
little protection it provide[d] to private citizens in California.’817
 
To this writer, the critique is persuasive but the critics nevertheless seem to bark 
up the wrong tree. The Supreme Court of California is not to blame, because the ‘logi-
cal nexus’ test is perhaps the only determination of ‘newsworthiness’ compatible with 
current First Amendment doctrine. Consider Kennard J’s concurring opinion in Shul-
man: 
 
I do not doubt the need to protect individual privacy against the ever-increasing intrusions upon 
it. I do question whether the publication of private facts can be prohibited on the basis of the 
perceived newsworthiness of the facts without creating a conflict with current First Amendment 
doctrine.818  
 
In the USA, it is hence a consequent move in light of general hesitation towards 
contents-based speech restrictions.819 Nevertheless, ‘relevance’ or a ‘logical nexus’ as 
determinant effectively defers the decision as to which personal information is of public 
concern to the press.820 Such a relationship to a matter of public concern can always be 
construed.821 In other words, it is another form of Zimmerman’s famous ‘leave it to the 
press’ model.822 In that case, it might indeed be better writing the tort out of the law.        
816 G L Bostwick, ‘The Newsworthiness Element: Shulman v Group W Prods., Inc. Muddies the Waters’ 
(1999) 19 Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review 225, 251. 
817 D M Worley, ‘Shulman v Group W Productions: Invasion of Privacy by Publication of Private Facts - 
Where Does California Draw the Line Between Newsworthy Information and Morbid Curiosity’ (1999-
2000) 27 Western State University Law Review 535, 565; but compare J H Fuson, ‘Protecting the Press 
From Privacy’ (1999) 148 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 629, 652. 
818 Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 246 (1998) per Kennard J (concurring) 
819 See ibid, pp 244-6. 
820 See R P Bezanson, ‘The Developing Law of Editorial Judgment’ (1999) 78 Nebraska Law Review 
754, 785; B C Murchison, ‘Revisiting the American action for public disclosure of private facts’ in M 
Richardson and A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 32, 55. 
821 E Tison, ‘Straddling the Fence: Justice Breyer's concurrence in Bartnicki v Vopper gives Protection of 
Privacy and still Manages to Protect the Press: Bartnicki v Vopper,  532 US 514 (2001)’ (2003) 27 
Southern Illinois University Law Journal 661, 683; P Gewirtz, ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme 
Court Review 139, 174; D M Worley, ‘Shulman v Group W Productions: Invasion of Privacy by Publica-
tion of Private Facts - Where Does California Draw the Line Between Newsworthy Information and 
Morbid Curiosity’ (1999-2000) 27 Western State University Law Review 535, 569-70. 
822 See D L Zimmerman, ‘Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’ (1983) 68 
Cornell Law Review 291, 353 for further details. 
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3   Conclusion on the American Law  
The examination of the cause of action in US law has been a genuinely interest-
ing experience. The law, admittedly, seemed quite unfamiliar at first sight. Once it had 
been understood, however, that it is supposed to serve quite distinct goals vis-à-vis this 
writer’s expectations it makes sound sense.  
 
The primary function of the tort is not to provide fair compensation to individual 
plaintiffs. There is no right to privacy in common law or otherwise. A right to compen-
sation (conferred by making out the action) is narrowly defined and only available un-
der exceptional circumstances. American law thereby meets its primary objectives. It 
achieves a high degree of predictability by focusing on the liberty interests of defen-
dants, which are tested against rigid rules rigidly applied. Liability is strict unless a fault 
standard is supplemented by state courts.823 The security interests of individual plain-
tiffs in their personal information, in contrast, are largely neglected. This arguably gen-
eral trait of US tort law is unquestionably exacerbated in the present context. Besides a 
focus on almost uninhibited private choices generally, the defendant’s main counter-
vailing interest in freedom of speech is of primary importance. As a result the tort is, at 
least for practical purposes, defunct. This is not to say that the public disclosure tort is 
not pleaded anymore, but the intrusion into seclusion or solitude branch now seems to 
promise greater protection to plaintiffs.824 One commentator hits the nail on the head 
when he observes that the USA does not ‘have the systemic capability coherently and 
consistently to set the boundaries for the cause of action, to determine the limits of per-
missible invasion of human dignity by the publication of truthful matters.’825 Within the 
confines of the US framework, it is very arguably impossible to protect more than one 
interest at a time.  
 
Nevertheless, one would have been led astray given that the situation in the 
USA is turned against the usefulness of a tort protecting against the disclosure of per-
sonal information generally. A good example is Keith J’s dissenting judgment in Hosk-
823 Eg, Ozer v Borquez, 940 P 2d 371, 377 (1997) 
824 See, eg, Turnbull v American Broadcasting Companies Inc, (2004) 32 Media Law Reporter 2442. 
825 S W Halpern, ‘Rethinking the Right of Privacy: Dignity, Decency, and the Law’s Limitations’ (1991) 
43 Rutgers Law Review 539, 549. 
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ing. His Honour pointed predominantly to two influential scholarly articles written by 
Harry Kalven and Diane Zimmerman in order to illustrate the defects of the American 
cause of action.826 This choice has been met with scepticism in New Zealand, appar-
ently on the ground that the articles are regarded as dated (Kalven’s article dates back to 
1966, Zimmerman’s to 1983). This, however, seems inappropriate principally because it 
presupposes an intention to alter things for the better. To my eyes, Kalven was re-
markably far-sighted in predicting that Prosser’s fourfold formulation of the privacy tort 
would dominate the legal landscape in the USA.827 Almost 20 years later, Zimmerman 
was right in observing that particularly the implemented community mores standards of 
the common law were too vague in the First Amendment context and irreconcilable 
with the general aim of maintaining content neutrality and predictability in order to 
avoid ‘chilling effects.’ Therefore, it does not seem unreasonable to assert that the First 
Amendment has indeed swallowed the tort as Kalven has predicted it. While Keith J’s 
circumspection in this respect is hence to be applauded, the conclusions his Honour has 
drawn from those observations are open to criticism. As we will see later in further de-
tail, the Judge inferred from them support for his view that no established societal need 
for such a privacy tort exists in New Zealand. This conclusion is multiply puzzling. 
 
It is obvious that a systemic incapability to respond to a possible societal need 
should not be mixed-up with its non-existence. One commentator has summarised this 
notion by observing that the decline of this tort leaves ‘a large gap in privacy protection 
for victims of offensive disclosures of private information.’828 For one thing the US Su-
preme Court has repeatedly refused to decide the question whether somebody might be 
held liable for the publication of truthful information facts although it had the opportu-
nity to do so. The limited practical importance of the tort at present is therefore hardly 
surprising. In the absence of a clear statement from the Court, the lower courts must re-
gard the tort with suspicion. Judges do not question the need to protect privacy against 
intrusion; they question the compatibility of the newsworthiness element with current 
826 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) paras 211-217. 
827 H Kalven, ‘Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?’ (1966) 31 Law and Contempo-
rary Problems 326, 332. 
828 A J McClurg, ‘Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy through Implied Contracts of 
Confidentiality’ (2006) 74 University of Cincinnati Law Review 887, 888. 
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First Amendment doctrine.829 Meanwhile the tort’s fortune remains pending between 
theoretical existence and practical non-existence much as one would expect under the 
circumstances.830 Another puzzle is that some state jurisdictions have indeed adopted 
the tort no earlier than the late 1990s - despite its blatantly obvious tensions with First 
Amendment prerogatives. The Supreme Court of Minnesota (acknowledging three 
branches of the privacy torts at a time) stated, ‘[a]s society changes over time, the 
common law must also evolve: It must be remembered that the common law is the re-
sult of growth, and that its development has been determined by the social needs of the 
community which it governs.’831  
 
In the perception of a mainland European, echoed in the aforementioned state-
ment, the common law is the work of many minds over centuries. The response to this 
societal need in the USA is naturally the adoption of the formulation laid down in the 
Restatement however. This formulation, on the other hand, is almost exclusively 
Prosser’s brainchild and an actual development cannot be confirmed. At first glance, it 
might be argued that the ‘publicity’ element has been ‘developed’ by a minority of 
courts. However, we have also seen that the transformation of the strict liability rule 
into a standard collapses the element both into the ‘private facts’ and ‘highly offensive 
to a reasonable person’ prerequisite. As a result it is, I think, highly debatable whether 
this particular formulation of the tort constitutes or can be modified into an appropriate 
response to such a concern in any society. This holds true quite apart from First 
Amendment considerations. 
 
To my mind, the true brilliance of the two articles by Kalven and Zimmerman is 
that they correctly predicted the impact of the horizontally applied First Amendment on 
communicative torts (such as defamation and the public dissemination branch of the 
privacy tort). The fact that it took the courts quite a while to translate the implications 
for common law actions is another matter. We have discussed those implications under 
the label ‘constitutionalisation of private law.’ Freedom of speech has always been of 
high importance in US law, but the key event leading to further decline of the public 
829 Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 246 (1998) per Kennard J (concurring). 
830 Ibid, fn 8. 
831 Lake v Wal-Mart Stores Inc, 582 NW 2d 231, 234 (1998). 
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disclosure tort was Sullivan v New York Times832. The implications of that decision fi-
nally led to the transformation of community mores tests into, for instance, a bright-line 
‘logical nexus’ test in order to determine newsworthiness. At least in California, this 
development apparently effaced even the small degree of protection offered by the tort. 
 
It is intriguing to observe that the process of constitutionalising the private law – 
be it in New Zealand, England or the USA – is always triggered off by media law cases 
involving freedom of speech issues.833 This development, however, can have grave im-
plications for the development of the law generally. In the perhaps most abstract sense, 
a constitution is a ‘formal framework of fundamental law that establishes and regulates 
the activity of governing a state.’834 It might sound pretentious, but in the widest sense 
such a framework also extends a particular understanding of liberty to the private law 
sphere. Crudely put, individualism may be (further) emphasised as was the case in the 
USA or such a framework may seek to reconcile individualism with community needs 
by demanding a responsible exercise of individual rights. It is therefore of the utmost 
importance to have a firm grip on the implications of the respective constitutional 
framework before it should, if at all, govern relationships of purely private actors to 
some extent. 
 
In this respect, the situation in the USA can be contrasted usefully to the devel-
opments in England. Problems do exist and are real, but this writer respectfully shares 
Richard Mullender’s view that the impact of human rights norms on English law is 
sometimes overstated. English law should not face severe difficulties as long as vener-
able traditions, identified by Mullender as ‘qualified deontology,’ are taken into ac-
count.835 That is why we have discussed the implications of the ‘neighbour’ principle 
for present purposes. Similarly, proportionality as a crucial concept of reconciling pri-
vacy and freedom speech is originally a retributive concept and means reduced to its 
832 376 US 254 (1964). 
833 The same holds true for the situation in Germany – see BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958) (“Lüth”). 
834 M Laughlin, ‘Constitutional Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 183, 184. 
835 R Mullender, ‘Tort, Human Rights, and Common Law Culture’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 301, 308. 
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core nothing more than tit-for-tat. With regard to the reconciliation of individual and 
communal interests, Mullender has noted that 
 
[h]istorically, the common law has been strongly associated with the concept of community. In 
classical common law theory, the common law was identified as, inter alia, giving institutional 
expression to a strongly consensual (Gemeinschaftlich) view of community (Lex Communis 
Angliae).836
 
In the light of qualified constitutional rights, a reinterpretation of this tradition 
seems necessary but Mullender sees an intersection between tort law and the ECHR in 
classic common law.837 However, English law could also be interpreted in terms of tort 
theory as incorporating a ‘mixed conception of corrective justice’ and that would be a 
very competitive and modern conception. Be that as it may, we have already seen that 
English law thereby reconciles individual and communal interests in a more nuanced 
manner. 
 
As for New Zealand’s tort, the American position seems to be favoured to a 
large extent. At least from this writer’s perspective, it nonetheless seems as if New Zea-
land’s law is rudderless and adrift between the positions taken in the UK and the USA 
respectively. However, it is difficult to see how the two quite different approaches can 
be combined to one compelling approach. This is evidenced, for instance, by the im-
plementation of a proportionality balancing exercise alongside a ‘highly offensive to a 
reasonable person’ test. As for ‘qualified deontology’ we have discussed in epic length 
that the implications of the neighbour principle were of little, if any, concern to Prosser. 
In sum, one may harbour doubts that it would be possible for New Zealand judges to 
carry Prosser’s guttering torch while simultaneously proclaiming outcome-consistency 
of the case with the NZBoRA. In comparison to the situation in the UK, there is cer-
tainly greater hesitation in New Zealand to accept the implications of a (quasi-
)constitutional framework. Before we turn to New Zealand’s law itself, however, the 
impact of the constitutional framework on the English cause of action will be further 
elucidated.  
836 Ibid, at p 312. 
837 Ibid, at p 309. 
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CHAPTER THREE - THE RIGHTS-FRAMEWORK OF THE UK 
 
 
 
 
English courts have so far refrained from acknowledging a freestanding privacy 
tort. This had been made clear by the decisions of the House of Lords in Wainwright838 
and later in Campbell.839 The courts have nevertheless felt the need to protect 
individual privacy interests particularly after the advent of the Human Rights Act 
1998840. They did so by utilising the equitable remedy of breach of confidence. This is 
not to say that the centrally important arts 8 and 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights 1950841 were of no importance beforehand. Nevertheless, Britain takes a 
dualist approach to international law which required formal recognition of those rights 
by statute to become applicable domestic law. 
 
Early decisions, however, already indicated an unease of the courts to ‘shoe-
horn’ privacy under the heading of an action traditionally requiring an obligation of 
confidence.842 It soon became fairly obvious that it would not be possible to extend the 
reach of the remedy for present purposes without distortion of its traditional features. 
The conceptual and doctrinal differences between private and confidential information 
have been discussed elsewhere by more able writers;843 they are not rehearsed here. It is 
nevertheless important to note that what has often been described as a ‘development’ of 
existing law soon turned out to be an evolving new cause of action.844 Indeed, Lord 
Nicholls recently seems to have lent credence from the bench to those concerns and 
838 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] 4 All ER 969 (HL). 
839 McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 8 per Buxton LJ; Browne [2007] 3 WLR 289 (CA) para 21 
per Sir Anthony Clarke MR. 
840 Hereinafter HRA or the Act 
841 Hereinafter ECHR or Convention. 
842 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) paras 13, 14 per Lord Nicholls; McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 
(CA) para 8 per Buxton LJ; Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2006] QB 125 para 53 per Lord Phillips MR. 
843 See particularly A Sims, ‘”A Shift in the Gravity Centre”: The dangers of Protecting Privacy through 
Breach of Confidence’ [2005] Intellectual Property Quarterly 27. 
844 R Bagshaw, ‘Unauthorised Wedding Photographs’ (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 550, 551; see 
also N A Moreham, ’Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 121 
Law Quarterly Review 628, 629. 
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there are now arguably two separate actions for breach of confidence.845 During the dis-
cussion of the American tort, we have already discussed a possible interpretation of the 
basic functioning of this action. For the sake of convenience, the elements of this 
distinct second action may be summarised as follows: 
 
• the claimant must have a reasonable expectation of privacy (his or her right con-
ferred by article 8 ECHR must be engaged); 
• (optionally) the defendant must have known or ought to have known that the 
claimant had such a reasonable expectation; 
• the claimant’s right of privacy must be balanced, for example, against the de-
fendant's right to freedom of speech conferred by art 10 ECHR (the proportion-
ality balancing exercise). 
   
It is fair to say that this approach goes further as envisaged particularly in A v B 
Plc846 where basic guidelines for the protection of private information have been laid 
down. The following exposition will therefore concentrate on a brief analysis of the ef-
fect given to arts 8 and 10 ECHR in the common law sphere. Hence, the analysis will 
provide suggestions (1) as to whether those rights are applicable in the private law 
sphere, ie between private litigants; (2) whether their possible application includes the 
necessity to afford a remedy against intrusion of private life by private actors; and (3) 
whether the influence exerted by those rights amounts to a duty to render decisions fully 
compatible with them or is of mere suggestive character.  
 
This discussion will be important with regard to New Zealand’s tort because the 
English experience shows how horizontally applied human rights norms can provide an 
analytical framework as an alternative particularly to legislation. Horizontally applied 
rights, then, serve as a formal framework for a constitutionalised common law tort. The 
common law, as will be suggested, is nevertheless an autonomous source of law. There-
fore, I attempt to rebut suggestions to the effect that a horizontal application of human 
rights has led to a relegation of the common law in the UK.  
845 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2007] 2 WLR 920 (HL) para 255.  
846 [2002] 2 All ER 545. 
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1   Positive obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights 
Of some importance in this context is the sometimes neglected distinction be-
tween ‘positive obligations’ and ‘horizontal effect’ of human rights. Article 1 ECHR 
requires signatory countries to secure the rights and freedoms of everyone within their 
jurisdiction.847 It is well known that Convention rights protect individuals primarily 
against state action.848 Art 8 ECHR, by way of illustration, therefore places negative 
obligations on signatory countries to the ECHR, viz, obligations not to interfere with 
the rights and freedoms of private persons in an arbitrary manner.849 A question long 
left unanswered by the European Court of Human Rights,850 however, was as to 
whether at least selected Convention rights may also place ‘positive obligations’ on a 
signatory state. A positive obligation may require, for instance, the UK to provide an 
effective remedy to private persons against interferences of their privacy interests by 
private people in order to secure respect for private life as protected by art 8 ECHR.851  
 
Whilst errors in this intricate area are easily understandable, it is important not 
to confound these ‘positive obligations’ with a ‘direct horizontal effect’ of Convention 
rights.852 State entities like the UK may be subject to ‘positive obligations’ as signato-
ries of a supra-national treaty such as the ECHR.853 However, the ECHR itself has no 
horizontal effect.854 A ‘direct horizontal effect’, in contrast, poses constitutional duties 
on private persons on a national level to act compatibly with Convention rights such as 
arts 8 and 10.855 This would enable a private actor to compel, for example, English 
847 For New Zealand see also art 2 ICCPR. 
848 [2001] 2 All ER 289 para 130 per Sedley LJ. 
849 Eg, von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1 para 57. 
850 Hereinafter ECtHR.  
851 See R S Kay, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and the Control of Privacy Law’ [2005] 
European Human Rights Law Review 466, 475.  
852 Compare N A Moreham, ‘Privacy and Horizontality: Relegating the Common Law’ (2007) 123 Law 
Quarterly Review 373-378. 
853 R Buxton, ‘The Human Rights Act and Private Law’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 48, 53 
(‘Therefore the [positive] obligation remains that of the state, to legislate or act to provide subjects with 
protection within the national legal order against the acts of other subjects. That cannot be translated into 
a direct right held by the applicant against those other subjects’ – emphasis supplied). 
854 R Singh, ‘Privacy and the Media: The Impact of the Human Rights Bill’ in B S Markesinis (ed), Pro-
tecting Privacy (1999) 169, 174. 
855 R Buxton, ‘The Human Rights Act and Private Law’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 48, 54; see 
also S Gardbaum, ‘Where the (State) Action is’ (2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 
760, 768.  
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courts to provide a remedy against other private persons.856 Lord Phillips MR has use-
fully summarised these distinct issues as follows:857
 
(1) What obligation does the Convention impose on the United Kingdom in relation to the pro-
tection of privacy?  
(2) What obligation is placed on the courts in respect of the protection of privacy?  
 
The first issue was finally resolved in von Hannover v Germany858 in favour of 
a positive obligation posed by art 8 ECHR on the state.859 Heretofore, the ECtHR of-
fered no definitive answer although Earl Spencer v United Kingdom860 had already 
foreshadowed this outcome.861 However, until von Hannover the position of the Stras-
bourg Court had been interpreted as saying that a privacy remedy available in purely 
private legal disputes would be compatible with art 10 ECHR; the Convention would 
therefore permit but not require such a remedy on a national level.862 Gavin Phillipson 
suggested, sensibly, that the Court of Appeal in Douglas (No 1) merely assumed the 
applicability of art 8 ECHR to disputes between private litigants and did not decide the 
matter in one way or the other.863 Given that breach of confidence protects confidential 
relationships – and not privacy – it is difficult see why this cause of action even had to 
be interpreted in the light art 8 ECHR. Von Hannover has been interpreted as clarifying 
that the UK, as a state entity, was henceforth arguably obliged to provide a remedy in 
order to discharge its positive obligations to secure respect for private life. Given that 
856 A L Young, ‘Remedial and Substantive Horizontality: The Common Law and Douglas v Hello! Ltd’ 
[2002] Public Law 232, 235. For such a view see, eg, Sir H W R Wade, ‘Horizons of Horizontality’ 
(2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 217.  
857 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No3) [2006] QB 125 para 46 per Lord Phillips MR (emphasis added). 
858 (2005) 40 EHRR 1 para 57 (‘[t]he Court reiterates that, although the object of Article 8 is essentially 
that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely 
compel the states to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, 
there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private and family. These obliga-
tions may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere 
of the relations of individuals between themselves. […] That also applies to the protection of a person's 
picture against abuse by others’). 
859 See also McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 9 per Buxton LJ. 
860 (1998) 25 EHRR CD 105. 
861 G Phillipson, ‘Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under 
the Human Rights Act’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 726, 729. 
862 Ibid, fn 26; see also Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No3) [2006] QB 125 para 47 per Lord Phillips MR.  
863 Ibid. 
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this obligation would be ignored, an individual could complain against the state in 
Strasbourg after having exhausted recourse to national courts or tribunals.864  
 
This leads us to the question as to how this positive obligation has been dis-
charged. English courts, as already indicated, already assumed a necessity to take arts 8, 
10 ECHR into account.865 At that point, however, no English public authority was 
obliged to provide a freestanding remedy fully compatible with convention rights.866 
Lord Hoffmann, for instance, stated in Wainwright v Home Office867 that the invention 
of a general tort of privacy would pre-empt the controversy about the ‘extent, if any, to 
which the convention requires the state to provide remedies for invasions of privacy by 
persons who are not public authorities.’  
 
The guidelines laid down by Lord Woolf CJ in A v B Plc (based on the assump-
tion to pay heed to arts 8, 10 ECHR), however, did not deal exhaustively with the com-
plexities raised by subjecting the common law to human rights norms.868 At that time, 
the courts saw privacy primarily as a limit on freedom of speech and not as an interest 
that also had to be protected actively against the exercise of this freedom; the resulting 
balancing of the two interests consequently favoured the freedoms conferred by art 10 
ECHR.869 In the wake of von Hannover, it had therefore been argued that A v B Plc was 
no longer good law. Lord Justice Sedley, speaking extra-judicially, pointed out that the 
implications of von Hannover made ‘it extremely doubtful whether the Flitcroft case 
[the claimant in A v B Plc was, as Sedley LJ put it, Gary Who? Flitcroft] could now be 
decided as it was;’ his Lordship went on to state, the implications of von Hannover 
‘suggest that the use of article 8 simply to plug gaps in the law of confidence, in the 
864 McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 9 per Buxton LJ; see also R Buxton, ‘The Human Rights Act 
and Private Law’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 48, 49. 
865 See particularly A v B Plc [2002] 2 All ER 545 para 4 per Lord Woolf CJ   
866 See also Ibid; McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 10 per Buxton LJ. 
867 [2003] 4 All ER 969 para 34 (emphasis supplied); see also Douglas v Hello! (No 1) [2001] 2 All ER 
289 para 166 per Keene LJ. 
868 G Phillipson, ‘Judicial Reasoning in Breach of Confidence Cases under the Human Rights Act: Not 
Taking Privacy Seriously’ (2003) European Human Rights Law Review Supp (Special Edition) 54, 55. 
869 G Phillipson, ‘The ‘right’ of privacy in England and Strasbourg compared’ in M Richardson and A T 
Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 184, 213-4. See also McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 
194 (CA) para 53 per Buxton LJ. 
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way proposed in the Wainwright case, will not do’ anymore.870 It became increasingly 
clear that English law was defective without an effective privacy remedy of some 
kind.871 Hence, it is fair to suggest that criticising the decisions beginning with McKen-
nitt on the ground that they departed significantly from the guidelines as set out in A v B 
Plc is of diminished value.872 Although particularly Campbell directed the law already 
into the very same direction, it is suggested to regard von Hannover as a caesura in the 
development of protecting private information in England and Wales.873  
 
It is plain that the English judiciary would have left the development of a free-
standing privacy remedy preferably to Parliament. Government nevertheless signalled 
that no legislation would be introduced in this area, ‘but anticipates that the judges will 
develop the law appropriately, having regard to the requirements of the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.’874 Likewise, the courts 
repeatedly asserted that a new cause of action would (or could) not be invented.875 That 
seems to have resulted in a bit of a quagmire. Without elaborating this point in greater 
depth, I should like to venture that it seems advantageous distinguishing between what a 
common law court is required to do under the impact of human rights and what a com-
mon law court is allowed to do in its capacity as a common law court.876 It might be 
argued that the latter is rather a ‘Dicean problem’ inasmuch as it is concerned with the 
unwritten Constitution. At the end of the day, that problem is concerned with the sepa-
ration of power. Raymond Wacks has observed that recent judgments of the English 
870 Sir S Sedley, ‘Sex, Libels and Video-surveillance’ (The Blackstone Lecture 2006) available at 
www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications_media/speeches/2006/sp130506; last accessed on 16 January 2008. 
871 See J Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ [2007] Public Law 720, 741 discussing Wain-
wright v the UK (App. No. 12350/04), judgment of 26 September 2006. 
872 Compare N A Moreham, ‘Privacy and Horizontality: Relegating the Common Law’ (2007) 123 Law 
Quarterly Review 373, 374-5. 
873 Gavin Phillipson notes, for example, that the Court of Appeal in Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No3) [2005] 
EWCA Civ 595 ‘emphasised the more transformative aspects of the Campbell decision’ whereas the 
‘more conservative dicta’ of their Lordships were not cited - ‘The ‘right’ of privacy in England and 
Strasbourg compared’ in M Richardson and A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 
184, 200. 
874 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No3) [2006] QB 125 para 46 per Lord Phillips MR. See also Sir S Sedley, ‘Sex, 
Libels and Video-surveillance’ (The Blackstone Lecture 2006) available at 
www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications_media/speeches/2006/sp130506.htm on 16 January 2008.  
875 Eg, ibid, para 52 citing Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 134 per Lady Hale. 
876 See Sir S Sedley, ‘Sex, Libels and Video-surveillance’ (The Blackstone Lecture 2006) available at 
www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications_media/speeches/2006/sp130506; last accessed on 16 January 2008 
(‘There are well-recognised constitutional objections to the creation by the courts of new torts’). 
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courts had shown ‘the willingness to allow article 8 to thwart the conception of a full-
blown privacy tort.’877 This argument, if I may say so, is certainly convenient for com-
mon lawyers. However, given that Government has signalled ‘we are not going to do 
anything’ and the courts went ‘we cannot do more than develop existing remedies in 
our capacity as common law courts,’ this very arguably cannot be correct. It is, then, 
rather the common law or constitutional restrictions on judges ‘to make the law’ that let 
Wacks down.878 The HRA does not prevent the courts from creating new causes of ac-
tion in private law, but the Act also does not authorise them to do so.879 The Act does 
not (and very arguably should not) create new private rights. In brief, the common law 
is an autonomous source of law. 
 
To my mind, the subsequent developments in English law - if development is 
the word - have to be seen in the light of these parameters. Assuming that this is correct, 
the courts have nevertheless made the necessary adjustments. Cutting a long story short, 
the courts have decided that arts 8 and 10 ECHR were no longer of persuasive or paral-
lel effect but are ‘now the very content of the domestic tort.’880 Effectively, this ‘devel-
opment’ has tacitly led to the development of a tort against the dissemination of per-
sonal information ‘in all but name.’881 This holds true regardless of the fact that the 
courts were presumably inhibited to do so in their capacity as common law courts.  
 
It should be reiterated that a freestanding tort of privacy protecting against the 
dissemination of personal information would most likely require an autonomous recog-
nition of a common law right to privacy.882 However, Lord Hoffmann was only pre-
pared to accept that the traditional breach of confidence action and an action involving 
877 R Wacks, ‘Why there will never be an English common law privacy tort’ in M Richardson and A T 
Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 154, 169. 
878 Wacks is, of course, aware of the preference of the courts for legislation - ibid, at p 181. 
879 D Pannick and A Lester, ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act on Private Law: The Knight's Move’ 
(2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 380, 384. 
880 McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 11 per Buxton LJ. 
881 G Phillipson, ‘The ‘right’ of privacy in England and Strasbourg compared’ in M Richardson and A T 
Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 184, 185; S Todd, ‘Review: Tort’ [2004] New 
Zealand Law Review 585, 607; J Morgan, ‘Hello! Again: Privacy and Breach of Confidence’ (2005) 
Cambridge Law Journal 549, 550; see also Sir S Sedley, ‘Sex, Libels and Video-surveillance’ (The 
Blackstone Lecture 2006) available at 
www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications_media/speeches/2006/sp130506; last accessed on 16 January 2008. 
882 See generally International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2003] QB 728 para 71 per Laws LJ. 
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private information should be kept separate; the ‘development’ as regards the protection 
of private information ‘has been mediated by the analogy of the right to privacy’ con-
ferred by art 8 ECHR.883 Lord Nicholls went further and asserted that breach of confi-
dence ‘now covers two distinct causes of action, protecting two different interests: pri-
vacy, and secret (“confidential”) information.’884 At this point, Lord Justice Sedley’s 
words are apposite: ‘the distinction between development and innovation [is reduced] to 
an abstraction.’885 That is, of course, old hat in New Zealand and validated the joint 
judgment’s suggestion in Hosking.886 Notwithstanding, to provide a private right by 
analogy to a constitutional right does not seem very convincing. In my respectful view, 
a common law right to privacy has not been acknowledged so far.887  
 
It should be noted, in conclusion, that these ‘developments’ were predominantly 
the result of discharging a positive obligation of the UK to provide an effective remedy 
against the dissemination of personal information (including photographs)888 by private 
litigants. A public authority of some kind had to provide such a remedy after all.889 In 
this writer’s respectful view, this should not be confused with a horizontal effect of 
Convention rights, a matter to which we will turn next.     
 
2   The horizontal effect of the Human Rights Act 
It follows from the previous elaboration that we may deal briefly with the dis-
tinct issue concerned with the appropriate effect to be given to the HRA. We will never-
883 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2007] 2 WLR 920 (HL) para 118 per Lord Hoffmann (emphasis sup-
plied). 
884 Ibid, para 255. 
885 Sir S Sedley, ‘Sex, Libels and Video-surveillance’ (The Blackstone Lecture 2006) available at 
www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications_media/speeches/2006/sp130506; last accessed on 16 January 2008. 
Commentators have recognised early on that the privacy tort would require more than an ‘incremental’ 
development - J Morgan, ‘Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: “Hello” Trouble’ (2003) 62(2) 
Cambridge Law Journal 444, 469. 
886 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 42 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
887 But see N A Moreham, ‘Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 65(3) Cambridge Law Review 606, 606, 610; 
compare also her ‘Recognising Privacy in England and New Zealand’ (2004) 63(3) Cambridge Law 
Journal 555. 
888 In von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1 para 72, the ECtHR stated that Germany had to com-
ply with ‘its positive obligation under the Convention to protect private life and the right to control the 
use of one’s image.’ 
889 See also Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 5) [2003] 3 All ER 996 (Ch) para 229 per Lindsay J. 
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theless discuss this matter, because the aforementioned transformation of the English 
law has been described as being brought about by a ‘direct horizontal effect’ of the 
Act.890 That, however, is imprecise. It is nevertheless apt to observe that arts 8 and 10 
ECHR now provide the framework to what Lord Nicholls has referred to as the tort of 
‘misuse of private information.’891 As will presently appear, the English courts have 
given ‘strong indirect effect’ to arts 8 and 10 ECHR. 
 
In order to comprehend the, in my view, correct impact, we will initially clarify 
the relationship of the HRA and ECHR. Section 1 (1)(a) HRA sets out that arts 2 to 12 
and 14 ECHR – therefore including privacy protected under art 8 of the Convention as 
well as freedom of speech (art 10) - are to have effect as Convention rights for the pur-
poses of the Act. The Act therefore does not ‘incorporate’ Convention rights into Eng-
lish law but gives ‘further effect’ to them.892 According to s 2 (1)(a) HRA, the English 
courts have to take the case law of the ECtHR into account when interpreting the do-
mestic HRA.893 Whilst the UK is bound by Strasbourg jurisprudence by way of art 46 
(1) ECHR the English courts are not.894 Section 6 (1) HRA, however, reinforces the ob-
ligation to take the European jurisprudence into account. Section 6 (3)(a) HRA attrib-
utes the status of a ‘public authority’ to the courts and imposes a duty of acting com-
patibly with Convention rights. This also holds true even in disputes between private 
litigants governed by the common law.895 At least for the purposes of this analysis it is 
fair to say that the HRA is largely parasitic on the Convention.896  
 
Notwithstanding, the wording of s 6 (1) HRA makes it immediately clear that a 
direct horizontal effect erga omnes was not intended.897 The HRA places no duties on 
890 N A Moreham, ‘Privacy and Horizontality: Relegating the Common Law’ (2007) 123 Law Quarterly 
Review 373, 375. 
891 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 14. 
892 J Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ [2007] Public Law 720, 724. 
893 See also Venables and another v News Group Newspapers and others [2001] 1 All ER 908, 917 per 
Dame Butler-Sloss P.  
894 J Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ [2007] Public Law 720, 729; F Klug, ‘A Bill of 
Rights: Do we need one or do we already have one’ [2007] Public Law 701, 706. 
895 M Hunt, ‘The “Horizontal Effect” of the Human Rights Act’ [1998] Public Law 423, 440. 
896G Phillipson, ‘Judicial Reasoning in Breach of Confidence Cases under the Human Rights Act: Not 
Taking Privacy Seriously’ (2003) European Human Rights Law Review Supp (Special Edition) 54, 56. 
897 M Hunt, ‘The “Horizontal Effect” of the Human Rights Act’ [1998] Public Law 423, 438; D Pannick 
and A Lester, ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act on Private Law: The Knight's Move’ (2000) 116 
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purely private actors.898 Hargreaves, a private person, does for example not owe 
Simpkins a duty to respect and uphold her freedom of speech.899 Hargreaves may there-
fore not claim for an unwarranted interference with this right directly under art 10 
ECHR. Instead, she has to rely on existing private law already regulating her relation-
ship with Simpkins in some way. Nowadays, it is trite law that the HRA precludes such 
a ‘direct horizontal effect.’900  
 
This, of course, does not preclude an indirect horizontal effect and the vexed 
question is rather if and to which extent the Act should impact upon existing remedies 
in common law disputes between private litigants. For the sake of brevity it is fair to 
say that s 6 HRA is generally regarded as obliging the courts to give effect to conven-
tion rights.901 As for freedom of speech, this result is fortified by s 12 HRA.902 Section 
12 (4) HRA provides that the court must have particular regard to the importance of 
freedom of expression in any decision where granting relief might affect art 10 ECHR. 
Moreover, judges are also obliged by s 12 (4)(b) HRA to have particular regard to any 
relevant privacy code.903 According to Sedley LJ, sub-s (4) therefore puts ‘beyond 
question the direct applicability of at least one article of the convention as between one 
private party to litigation and another - in the jargon, its horizontal effect.’904 The fol-
lowing reasoning of the Judge already suggests, however, that his reference to a ‘direct 
application’ was not intended to imply a direct horizontal effect of art 10 ECHR.905 
 
Law Quarterly Review 380, 383; R Singh, ‘Privacy and the Media: The Impact of the Human Rights Bill’ 
in B S Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) 169, 186. 
898 Eg, A L Young, ‘Remedial and Substantive Horizontality: The Common Law and Douglas v Hello! 
Ltd’ [2002] Public Law 232, 234. 
899 See J Coppel, The Human Rights Act 1998 (2000) para 2.37 at p 28. 
900 Eg, Venables and another v News Group Newspapers and others [2001] 1 All ER 908, 918 per Dame 
Butler-Sloss P; Lord Steyn, ‘Democracy through Law’ [2002] European Human Rights Law Review 723, 
733. But see Douglas v Hello! (No 1) [2001] 2 All ER 289 para 133 per Sedley LJ. 
901 Eg, Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 114 per Lord Hope; Douglas v Hello! (No 1) [2001] 2 
All ER 289 para 166 per Keene LJ; Murray [2007] EMLR 583 (Ch) para 18 per Patten J. Compare R 
Buxton, ‘The Human Rights Act and Private Law’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 48 who argues that 
Convention rights have no indirect effect. 
902 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 114 per Lord Hope 
903 Ibid, para 159. 
904 Douglas v Hello! (No 1) [2001] 2 All ER 289 para 133. 
905 Ibid, para 139 (‘Article 8 of the convention, whether introduced indirectly through s 12 or directly by 
virtue of s 6 of the Human Rights Act, will of course require the court to consider ‘the rights and free-
doms of others’, including the art 10(1) right of Hello!. And art 10, by virtue of ss 6 and 12, will require 
the court, if the common law did not already do so, to have full regard to Hello!'s right to freedom of ex-
pression’). 
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Most importantly, the courts later held that s 12 (4) HRA does not give the art 10(1) 
right of free expression a presumptive priority over other rights.906   
 
However, scholars divide the ‘indirect effect’ further into the ‘strong indirect ef-
fect’ and a ‘weak indirect effect.’907 The ‘strong indirect effect’ describes a duty of the 
courts under s 6 (1) HRA to render the common law compatible with Convention rights; 
a weaker indirect impact would just require the courts to consider Convention princi-
ples.908 In other words one may ask whether the courts’ obligations under s 6 (1) HRA 
are already satisfied by taking the relevant Convention rights into account or whether 
the impact of the human rights instrument overrides existing common law principles.909  
 
Sedley LJ, for instance, opined in Douglas (No 1)910 that the courts must them-
selves act compatibly with relevant Convention rights. His Lordship therefore advo-
cated a ‘strong indirect effect.’911 Keene LJ, on the other hand, suggested that the Eng-
lish Courts may have an obligation to ‘take account of the right to respect for private 
and family life.’912 His Lordship thereby paraphrased a weaker impact of Convention 
rights on the common law.913 
 
Statements of the courts in the wake of von Hannover indicate a settlement on a 
strong indirect impact in this particular context. There was, however, already a ten-
dency to this effect in Campbell; Lord Hoffmann has summarised the underlying ra-
tionale by stating that his Lordship could ‘see no logical ground for saying that a person 
906 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 111 per Lord Hope 
907 G Phillipson, ‘Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under 
the Human Rights Act’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 726, 730. 
908 Ibid. 
909 G Phillipson, ‘Judicial Reasoning in Breach of Confidence Cases Under the Human Rights Act: Not 
Taking Privacy Seriously’ (2003) Supp (Special Edition) European Human Rights Law Review 54, 59-
60; see also Douglas v Hello! (No 1) [2001] 2 All ER 289 para 128 per Sedley LJ. 
910 Douglas v Hello! (No 1) [2001] 2 All ER 289 para 111. 
911 G Phillipson, ‘Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under 
the Human Rights Act’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 726, 730; this also seems to be the opinion of J 
Morgan, ‘Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: “Hello” Trouble’ (2003) 62(2) Cambridge Law 
Journal 444, 467. 
912 Douglas v Hello (No 1) [2001] 2 All ER 289 para 167. 
913 For a more comprehensive discussion of indirect horizontal effect in earlier decisions see generally G 
Phillipson, ‘Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under the 
Human Rights Act’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 726, 730-2. 
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should have less protection against a private individual than he would have against the 
state for the publication of personal information for which there is no justification.’914 
In abstract terms, his Lordship describes a symmetrical nature of state intervention. 
‘Symmetrical’ means that the responsibility individual agents owe each other is essen-
tially the same form of responsibility that public agents (state/government) owe to an 
individual.915 A private individual may nevertheless proffer justifications for her actions 
that are not available to the state.916 In other words, the autonomy interests of private 
actors have to be taken into account when limits on particular rights are determined.917  
 
Emblematic of the post-von Hannover law is Buxton LJ’s statement in McKen-
nitt: ‘in order to find the rules of the English law of breach of confidence we now have 
to look in the jurisprudence of Arts 8 and 10.’918 However, ‘breach of confidence’ 
should be understood in the light of Lord Nicholls’ subsequent suggestion in Doug-
las919 as referring to the distinct second action protecting private information. Strong 
indirect effect means, indeed, that the common law rules or guidelines as elaborated for 
instance in A v B Plc were henceforth rendered nugatory. As we have noted, the very 
essence of the strong indirect horizontal effect is ensuring full compatibility of the 
court’s decision with Convention rights. As Buxton LJ put it in McKennitt: 920
 
in a case […] where the complaint is of the wrongful publication of private information, the 
court has to decide two things. First, is the information private in the sense that it is in principle 
protected by Art.8? If no, that is the end of the case. If yes, the second question arises: in all the 
circumstances, must the interest of the owner of the private information yield to the right of 
freedom of expression conferred on the publisher under Art. 10?  
 
The guidelines set out by Lord Woolf CJ, however, were not fully compatible 
for reasons suggested before. Their replacement was therefore a normal effect of the 
‘strong indirect effect;’ it is, however, by no means to be confused with a ‘direct hori-
914 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 50. 
915 C Bird, The Myth of Liberal Individualism (1999) 113. 
916 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 50 per Lord Hoffmann. 
917 Eg, G Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, ‘Horizontal effect’ and the Common Law: a Bang or a 
Whimper’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 824, 846. 
918 McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 11. 
919 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2007] 2 WLR 920 (HL) para 255. 
920 McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 11. 
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zontal effect’ of Convention rights.921 Phillipson is right that the determination of 
‘compatibility’ in turn depends on how these rights are conceptualised.922 In this re-
spect, it is important to reiterate that these indirectly applied rights operate as principles 
conferring an ‘ideal ought;’ as such, they have to be optimised to the greatest extent 
possible by means of applying the proportionality principle.923 In other words, even a 
strong indirect horizontal effect of qualified Convention rights does not lead to an op-
eration of these rights as rules.924   
  
Yet another issue is that the ECtHR has also extended the reach of art 8 ECHR 
in von Hannover.925 As Eady J stated in McKennitt v Ash, ‘it is clear that there is a sig-
nificant shift taking place as between, on the one hand, freedom of expression for the 
media and the corresponding interest of the public to receive information, and, on the 
other hand, the legitimate expectation of citizens to have their private lives pro-
tected.’926 Under s 2(1) HRA, the English courts are obliged to take the decisions of the 
ECtHR into account, but they are not bound by them.927 Section 6 (1) HRA ensures a 
minimum level of protection whereas s 2 (1) of the Act embodies the ‘margin of appre-
ciation.’928 However, inasmuch as the Strasbourg jurisprudence is clear and consistent, 
several judges opined that the jurisprudence should be followed.929 This makes perfect 
sense because the UK would be in breach of its duties under the Convention if it were 
otherwise. The rights were after all ‘brought home’, which means that they cannot con-
fer less protection on a national level than they would enjoy in Strasbourg; the English 
921 Compare N A Moreham, ‘Privacy and Horizontality: Relegating the Common Law’ (2007) 123 Law 
Quarterly Review 373, 375. 
922 G Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, ‘Horizontal effect’ and the Common Law: a Bang or a Whim-
per’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 824, 843. 
923 R Alexy, ‘Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation’ (2005) 3 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 572, 572-3. 
924 But see G Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, ‘Horizontal effect’ and the Common Law: a Bang or a 
Whimper’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 824, 832.  
925 See McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 37 per Buxton LJ. 
926 McKennitt  [2006] EMLR 178 (QB) para 57. 
927 For a helpful summary on these issues see generally R Mullender, ‘Tort, Human Rights, and Common 
Law Culture’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 301, 302-3. 
928 R Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg Jurisprudence into Account: Developing a “Municipal Law of 
Human Rights” under the Human Rights Act’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
 907, 908-9. 
929 Ibid, at 931. 
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courts can, of course, grant greater protection.930 It is, I think, for this reason that the 
English courts now have to look in the jurisprudence of arts 8 and 10 ECHR first.  
 
Notwithstanding, from a national perspective the notion of ‘clear and consistent’ 
Strasbourg jurisprudence may leave some European lawyers with a bit of a tickle in 
their throat. The ECtHR has left the scope of art 8 ECHR long unexplored.931 It is 
rather unlikely that a signatory country can rely exclusively on ECtHR jurisprudence. 
Much rather the judges’ task  
 
is not to cast around in the European Human Rights Reports like black letter lawyers seeking 
clues. In the light of s 2(1) of the HRA, it is to draw out the broad principles which animate the 
Convention.932  
 
To the present writer, those ‘broad principles’ are in this particular context first 
and foremost freedom of speech and informational privacy. The voice of reason, for 
what it is worth, would suggest that the analytical framework provided by both articles 
has much to recommend it. Similar to the law of negligence, this is a very context sensi-
tive area of the law. Both privacy and freedom of speech are now rights expressed in 
open-textured language.933 Quite apart from the influence of any Strasbourg jurispru-
dence it is, I think, most important to acknowledge that each case must be decided on its 
specific facts. The English judges have said as much.934    
 
930 See F Klug, ‘A Bill of Rights: Do we need one or do we already have one’ [2007] Public Law 701, 
707. 
931 J Morgan, ‘Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: “Hello” Trouble’ (2003) 62(2) Cambridge Law 
Journal 444, 447; for a general discussion see R Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg Jurisprudence into 
Account: Developing a “Municipal Law of Human Rights” under the Human Rights Act’ (2005) 54 In-
ternational and Comparative Law Quarterly 907, 915-7. 
932 Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2001] 3 WLR 
(CA) 1323 para 44 per Sir Andrew Morritt. 
933 See also R Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg Jurisprudence into Account: Developing a “Municipal 
Law of Human Rights” under the Human Rights Act’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 907, 914. 
934 Eg, Associated Newspapers Ltd v His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales [2007] 3 WLR 222 (CA) 
para 90 per Blackburne J; Murray [2007] EMLR 583 (Ch) para 23 per Patten J; Browne [2007] 3 WLR 
289 (CA) paras 17, 26 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR. 
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It is undoubtedly arguable to regard all this as a ‘relegation’ of the common 
law.935 As the author understands it, it would - in this particular area - nevertheless only 
relegate a particular way of thinking about the common law insomuch as it is concerned 
with ‘rules’936 and an incremental development. The possibility of such an incremental 
development is most likely as much an illusion as it is in negligence. Particularly the 
promise of this approach to provide greater certainty of the law may leave one as a, say, 
doubting Thomas.937 Hence, the jeremiad of ‘relegating the common law’ sounds like 
the beginning of the ‘retreat from Anns vol 2’ to this writer. This would of course sound 
the knell for everything an approach based on principles stood for in the first place. 
 
It is suggested, in conclusion, that English law provides a compelling approach 
to protect two equally valuable interests. Moreover, this jurisdiction sets an illustrative 
example of a ‘constitutionalised common law tort.’ The common law, as we have seen, 
is an autonomous source of law. Nevertheless, arts 8 and 10 ECHR provide an analyti-
cal framework if they are conceptualised and used meaningfully. This formal frame-
work enables an approach based on principle, which seems advantageous with regard to 
the context specific nature of the conflict between interests in free speech and privacy. 
The framework is formal, because it is derived from a quasi-constitutional instrument, 
that is to say that individual judges may not simply change the approach as they wish. 
In England since the decision in Campbell, for instance, all judges stick to what has be-
come known as the ‘new methodology’938 and therefore accept the formal framework. 
At last, we can turn to New Zealand’s legal landscape. 
935 N A Moreham, ‘Privacy and Horizontality: Relegating the Common Law’ (2007) 123 Law Quarterly 
Review 373, 375.  
936 Ibid, at p 376. 
937 For a formidable discussion see generally E W Thomas, ‘A Return to Principle in Judicial Reasoning 
and an Acclamation of judicial Autonomy’ (1993) 23 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 
Monograph 5, pp 10-6. 
938 Eg, McKennitt [2006] EMLR 178 (QB) para 48 per Eady J. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - THE LAW OF NEW ZEALAND 
 
 
 
 
While discussing the relevant law of New Zealand, we principally stick to the 
familiar distinction between macro- and micro-level analysis. Consequently, the func-
tioning of the Bill of Rights Act as New Zealand's quasi-constitutional framework and 
its effect on the common law will be illuminated first. I seek to demonstrate that a com-
pelling interpretation of the Act has not been found so far. It will be shown that New 
Zealand’s human rights instrument bears striking similarities to ECHR while significant 
differences to the US Constitution exist. Our analysis will then focus on the common 
law action itself. New Zealand, as already indicated, has effectively adopted two torts in 
Hosking. I attempt to establish that only the version following the British approach is 
consistent with the NZBoRA.  
 
1   The privacy tort in New Zealand’s constitutional framework 
1.1 The Bill of Rights Act  
New Zealand has no single document identifiable as a written constitution, but a 
constitutional framework has nevertheless been established.939 It is provided by a num-
ber of disparate sources such as legislation, the common law, the Treaty of Waitangi 
and others.940 Since Parliament is the supreme lawmaking body, statutes are most im-
portant among these sources. Particularly the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is a 
New Zealand Act of constitutional significance.941 The Act, as we will see, played a 
significant role in the process of recognising and shaping the invasion of privacy tort. 
Animated by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 and the ratification of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 in 1978, the government 
939 M McDowall and D Webb, The New Zealand legal system: Structure and Processes (4th ed, 2006) 96-
7. 
940 Ibid, at p 112. 
941 Ibid, at p 134. 
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issued a White Paper, A Bill of Rights for New Zealand, in 1985.942 Although the Draft 
Bill was not entrenched as supreme law, it was affirmed as an Act of Parliament with a 
similar catalogue of civil and political rights in 1990.943 The Act is best described as a 
quasi-constitutional instrument.944
 
In the last two Chapters, I have sought to show that the impact exerted by hu-
man or constitutional rights on the common law of the UK and the USA is decisive. As 
we know, scholars describe this phenomenon as the ‘constitutionalisation of private 
law.’945 Similarly, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Hosking is not only significant for 
the law of torts; it represents simultaneously a step towards the ‘quasi-
constitutionalisation’946 of private law. With regard to the decision’s latter significance, 
New Zealand generally faces the same problems as the aforementioned legal systems. 
However, an application of the human rights instrument to the common law would 
normally require certainty about the accurate interpretation of the instrument itself. 
Granting this clarity could be described as ‘Phase I’ of a process, which might be fol-
lowed by the constitutionalisation of the common law as ‘Phase II.’ Issues relevant to 
‘Phase I’ include the adequate impact of the NZBoRA on the common law, the appro-
priate interpretation of the scope of freedom of expression, clarity about the limitation-
process and the relationship between rights and limits. A lack of clarity, in contrast, 
means that the private law would be constitutionalised without perceiving what the 
quasi-constitutional instrument demands. In other words, a constitutionalisation of the 
common law would be premature.  
 
942 M McDowall and D Webb, The New Zealand legal system: Structure and Processes (4th ed, 2006) 
140. 
943 P A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand (2nd ed, 2001) 1020-1. 
944 P Rishworth in Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) 101. 
945 B S Markesinis and S Enchelmaier, ‘Human Rights under German Constitutional Law’ in B S Mar-
kesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) 191, 240; G Samuel, ‘The impact of European integration on pri-
vate law - a comment’ (1998) 18(2) Legal Studies 167 – see this article for a thorough analysis of the 
term’s meaning for civil and common-law lawyers. For a sceptical view on the use of this term see H 
Collins, ‘Utility and Rights in Common Law Reasoning: Rebalancing Private Law Through Constitution-
alization’ <http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS06-2007Collins.pdf> 13 March 2008. 
946 Hereinafter ‘constitutionalisation’. 
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The potential effect of the NZBoRA on the common law sphere has not been 
subject to the sustained discussion found in the UK.947 The remaining uncertainties are 
reflected in Hosking. As we will see in due course, all Judges referred to the Act and its 
importance, but they did not reach consensus on the aforementioned issues. Hosking 
rather displays considerable uncertainties about the handling of these matters, which led 
to sharp differences and diverging paths.948 Since most judgments949 fell short of dis-
cussing ‘Phase I’-issues, it is necessary to pay heightened attention to these matters in 
the following. Nevertheless, these observations may prove illuminating in order to iden-
tify the underlying issues, which is in turn necessary to explain the occasionally fine 
differences between the positions of the Judges.      
 
As a result, it will be argued that all Judges at least incidentally conceded a hori-
zontal effect to the NZBoRA. Opinions on the adequate impact of the Act, however, 
were split. The minority arguably advocated direct impact. In the majority, Tipping J 
favoured a comparatively strong indirect influence of the Act whilst Gault P and 
Blanchard J favoured a weak indirect effect. However, it will be argued that it is not 
necessary to distinguish these two positions of the majority. Instead, the author attempts 
to demonstrate that it makes a difference whether the Act is applied on long-standing 
common law or on the acknowledgement of a new tort. With regard to the latter, as will 
be suggested, there are no reasons identifiable why the courts may depart from the im-
plications of the horizontally applied framework. 
1.1.1 The horizontal effect of the NZBoRA 
In the following, the important issue why the NZBoRA should have any influ-
ence on the acknowledgement and shape of the new privacy tort will be examined. Its 
application is not apparent since the privacy tort would be part of the common law.950 
As we have seen during the discussion of the legal system of the UK, the affirmed 
rights and freedoms are traditionally understood to have a vertical effect. The term de-
947 A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 686. 
948 See U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 247. 
949 The judgment of Tipping J is an exception for reasons suggested below. 
950 See P Rishworth in Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) 100. 
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scribes the protection of citizens against breaches by public authorities.951 An invasion 
of privacy tort, in contrast, would lead to court action between two private litigants and 
the only public authority involved is the court.952 This combination of factors does not 
fall within the vertical effect of a human rights instrument and, at first sight, excludes 
the NZBoRA from governing such a dispute.  
 
Extending the impact of the NZBoRA to these disputes would mean that the Act 
has an additional horizontal effect. As for English law, Jonathan Morgan has argued 
that this additional effect is perhaps most influential in the context of protecting privacy 
interests.953 Thus, the matter demanded some judicial explanation in Hosking.954 The 
first relevant question in this context therefore is whether the NZBoRA has a relevant 
additional horizontal effect, which would mark the protection of citizens against one 
another during private litigation.955  
 
An affirmative answer to the first question raises almost automatically the query 
as to how determinative the Act should be for the court’s decision.956 If the NZBoRA 
requires, for instance, a certain interpretation of the scope of freedom of expression as 
affirmed in s 14, this analysis has to be reflected to a certain degree in the public inter-
est/public concern feature of a privacy tort depending on the influence of the Act.957 In  
brief, a decision on this point affects the shape of the new common law rule. Before we 
may turn to these issues, however, the protection of privacy and freedom of speech 
within New Zealand’s quasi-constitutional framework will be discussed first.   
951 A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 682; S Gardbaum, ‘The "Horizontal Effect" of Constitu-
tional Rights’ (2003) 102 Michigan Law Review 387, 394. 
952 See P A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law (2nd ed, 2001) ch 26.4 (5)(b). 
953 J Morgan, ‘Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: “Hello” Trouble’ (2003) 62(2) Cambridge Law 
Journal 444, 467. 
954 K Evans, ‘Was Privacy the Winner of the Day?’[2004] New Zealand Law Review 181, 182. 
955 J Norton, ‘Hosking v Runting and the Role of Freedom of Expression’ [2004] Auckland University 
Law Review 245, 248. 
956 A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 696. 
957 With regard to the German law, it had been observed that the ambit of the basic rights enshrined in the 
Grundgesetz (BasicLaw) have the same ambit in the public as well as in the constitutionalised private 
area – B S Markesinis and S Enchelmaier, ‘Human Rights under German Constitutional Law’ in B S 
Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) 191, 211.  
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1.1.2 Privacy, freedom of speech and the NZBoRA 
The impact of the NZBoRA on the new privacy tort is most relevant when it 
comes to the limitation of freedom of expression. Before turning to this issue, the rec-
ognition of privacy and freedom of expression within the NZBoRA will be illuminated. 
As in presumably every democratic society, freedom of speech has been granted recog-
nition in the NZBoRA. Because of its central fundamental stature, it has had already a 
long history within the Anglo-New Zealand legal tradition before the Act came into 
force.958 Section 14 reads: 
 
‘Everyone has the right of freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and 
impart information and opinions of any kind and form.’ 
 
The wording of this section has been taken from the corresponding clause 7 of 
the White Paper Draft Bill. The commentary on clause 7 confirms the central impor-
tance of freedom of expression but states that the freedom might conflict with other 
public or private interests.959 Laws like those of the various unlawful libels anticipate a 
threat to other interests and therefore control particularly speech interests for that rea-
son.960 This already indicates that freedom of speech is not an absolute right in New 
Zealand.961  
 
None of the provisions contained in the NZBoRA confirms a general right to 
privacy.962 New Zealand is arguably ‘unusual’ in this respect.963 However, an aspect of 
privacy has been affirmed in s 21, which protects everyone against unreasonable search 
and seizure of the person, property, correspondence or otherwise.964 The drafters none-
theless did not envisage granting a general right to privacy, although specific rules of 
958 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 13.2.1. 
959 Minister of Justice, A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper (1985) para 10.57. 
960 See also Hansen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC) para 263 per Anderson  J 
961 See also Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 113 per Gault P and Blanchard J; Hansen v R [2007] 3 
NZLR 1 (SC) para 187 per McGrath J. 
962 White Paper, para 10.144; R v Jeffries [1994] 1 NZLR 290, 302 (CA) per Richardson J. 
963 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 13.16.1. 
964 This section could be traced back to art 19 of the Draft Bill. The comment on this article defines this 
freedom as an aspect of individual privacy - White Paper, para 10.144. 
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law and legislation already protected aspects of it at that time.965 The attempt to en-
trench a right that is ‘not by any means fully recognised now, which is in the course of 
development, and whose boundaries would be uncertain and contentious’ seemed inap-
propriate.966 Two scholars later consequently suggested that it would be wrong to inter-
pret s 21 as providing a general protection of personal privacy; the section rather fo-
cuses on law enforcement activities.967  
 
Moreover, ss 10 and 11 have been interpreted as saying that they recognise the 
right to dignity and security of the person, although without direct reference to the 
wording. According to the Butlers, this interpretation includes aspects of a right to pri-
vacy.968 Nevertheless, even a broad interpretation of these sections seems to be limited 
inasmuch as they protect ‘the making of personal decisions about medical treatment and 
investigation.’969 A connection to the dissemination of personal information therefore 
cannot be inferred from these provisions.970 It is after all fair to conclude that neither a 
general right of privacy has been embodied in the NZBoRA nor has an aspect of pri-
vacy protecting against the public disclosure of private information been recognised.  
 
Given that this observation marks our starting point, New Zealand’s framework 
has more in common with the Federal Constitution of the USA than with the British 
framework provided by HRA/ECHR. The latter, as we know, has given further effect to 
a right of privacy as affirmed in art 8 ECHR whereas the Fourth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution merely protects a citizen against certain search and seizure meas-
ures. Against this background, it is perhaps not a coincidence that Tipping J’s reasoning 
on carving out recognition of the privacy value is astonishingly similar to the recogni-
965 White Paper, para 10.144. 
966 Ibid, para 10.144; see also A Geddis, ‘Hosking v Runting: A Privacy Tort for New Zealand’ (2005) 13 
Tort Law Review 5, 7-8. 
967 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 18.6.1. The main 
reasons given for this interpretation is the classification of s 21 under the subheading ‘search, arrest, and 
detention’ and the emphasis on the regulation of criminal procedure - at para 18.6.4; see also Katz v 
United States, 389 US 347, 350 (1967). 
968 Ibid, para 11.6.1. 
969 Ibid, para 11.6.2. 
970 The reference to human dignity and autonomy is nevertheless relevant with regard to the recognition 
of privacy values within the Act.   
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tion of constitutional ‘privacy’ interests in the US case of Griswold v Connecticut.971 
Tipping J stressed that those values involved in the concept of privacy are important to 
New Zealand society.972 According to his Honour, the value of privacy may have been 
‘recognised less directly, but no less significantly.’973 The values underpinning s 21 and 
New Zealand’s international obligations can be extended to unreasonable intrusions into 
personal privacy by ‘reasonable analogy.’974 This observation is akin to the ‘penum-
bras’ of the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendment, as identified by the majority of the 
Griswold Court. These enumerated rights, as we know, have ‘created zones of pri-
vacy.’975 The argumentation of the minority in Hosking, by contrast, roughly resembles 
Black and Stevens JJ’s dissenting opinion in Griswold.976 Anderson and Keith JJ em-
phasised the deliberate omission of an explicit right to privacy and the requirement of 
legislative action if an aspect should be protected.977 The omission of relevant privacy 
protection can be interpreted as a legislative rejection to grant this aspect of the privacy 
value protection.978   
 
Tipping J’s argumentation, in contrast, tackles the problem as to whether the 
courts are entitled to recognise or acknowledge rights, not enshrined in the NZBoRA, 
with the potential to limit enshrined freedoms. In this context, the argumentation of the 
US Supreme Court will be used for the good of the analysis. The recognition of the US 
‘right to privacy’ was most relevantly based on ‘The Forgotten Ninth Amendment.’979 
Likewise, New Zealand’s human rights instrument has an almost forgotten s 28,980 in 
which unenumerated rights are addressed.981 Section 28 reads:  
 
971 See above Chapter Two, 1.1. 
972 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 224. 
973 Ibid. 
974 Ibid, para 226.   
975 Griswold v Connecticut, US 479, 486 (1965). 
976 See above Chapter Two, 1.1. 
977 See also M Richardson, ‘Privacy and Precedent: The Court of Appeal’s Decision in Hosking v Runt-
ing’ (2005) 11 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 82, 90; A Geddis, ‘Hosking v Runting: A privacy 
tort for New Zealand’ (2005) 13 Tort Law Review 5, 10. 
978 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy - Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 406; 
for the, in my opinion, correct view to the contrary see Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 92 per Gault 
P and Blanchard J. 
979 Griswold v Connecticut, US 479, 492 fn 6 (1965). 
980 See the index of P and A Butler, The New Zealand of Rights Act (2005). 
981 This section was also invoked in Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC) para 229 per Thomas J. 
See his Honour’s judgment for further details. 
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‘An existing right or freedom will not be held to be abrogated or restricted by reason only that 
the right or freedom is not included in this Bill of Rights or is included only in parts.’982
 
The use of the term ‘existing’ in s 28 may suggest that only such rights should 
not be abrogated which were already created or acknowledged by the time when the 
Bill of Rights was enacted. Section 28 is based on clause 22 of the Draft Bill. The cor-
responding comment of the White Paper983 explains, however, that the rights and free-
doms granted by the proposed bill of rights were not intended to lay down an exhaus-
tive list of the fundamental rights and freedoms of New Zealanders.984 The comment 
finally concludes that ‘there is of course nothing in the Bill of Rights that would prevent 
Parliament or the courts from creating or recognising new rights.’985 The Draft Bill pro-
posed a minimum standard in several areas ‘leaving Parliament and the courts the op-
portunity as appropriate to give greater protection.’986 To my mind, it is clear that s 28 
does not differentiate between the capabilities of Parliament on one hand and those of 
the courts on the other.987 Moreover, if the untouched sovereignty of Parliament would 
be left out of consideration, not even that institution would be able to create new rights 
to limit enumerated rights or freedoms in accordance with the NZBoRA. Rather, the 
number of rights capable of limiting, for instance, freedom of expression would have 
been frozen to the status quo of the day of the Bill’s enactment. This, I suggest, is an 
unsound interpretation of this section because it would make every response to social 
changes impossible without violating the NZBoRA.988
 
The proper interpretation of s 28 therefore indicates that the courts are entitled 
to acknowledge rights in order to limit enumerated rights of the NZBoRA. Furthermore, 
privacy interests were already ‘included […] in parts’ in s 21 and with some imagina-
tion in ss 10 and 11. This did not prevent the courts from protecting a distinct aspect of 
982 Emphasis added. 
983 The White Paper clarifies the purpose of s 28. Thus, I regard the following interpretation as being con-
sistent with s 5 Interpretation Act 1999. 
984 White Paper, para 10.179. 
985 White Paper, para 10.179; Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC) para 228 per Thomas J. 
986 White Paper, para 3.6. 
987 See also Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC) para 214 per Thomas J. 
988 Like a written Constitution, the NZBoRA can therefore be approached as a ‘living’ instrument – ibid, 
para 239. 
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privacy where they deem it appropriate.989 The courts are equally entitled to protect pri-
vacy to a greater extent, as long as Parliament has not clarified its intentions.990 In sum, 
the Court of Appeal in Hosking was entitled to acknowledge a new invasion of privacy 
tort protecting against public dissemination private facts as part of a ‘right to pri-
vacy.’991 Some argue, however, that rights recognised under s 28 have not the same 
status as affirmed rights.992 The ‘status’ of the right seems be very important and this 
might indicate the need of an explicit statutory right to privacy. In any event, this was 
not saying that this aspect of privacy is generally a justified limit on the right of free-
dom expression. It is a separate matter as to whether the protected interest places a justi-
fied limitation on that right pursuant to s 5 on the merits of the case. Before we may 
turn to this difficult issue, it needs to be addressed whether the Act has a ‘horizontal ef-
fect’ in a Hosking scenario. 
1.1.3 A horizontal effect in purely private litigation? 
It is fair to stress for the purposes of this thesis that the NZBoRA generally has 
an impact on the common law. The precise quality of this influence, however, is un-
clear.993 The applicability of the Act to a Hosking scenario requires that the court’s de-
cision constitutes an ‘act done’ by the judicial branch of the government in terms of s 
3(a).994 The section is the equivalent to s 6 HRA. The term ‘judicial branch’ denotes the 
Court of Appeal, High Court and the District Court.995 A meaningful interpretation of s 
3(a), however, has apparently not been carried out so far; the reason is most likely the 
section’s complex scope.996 Elias J, as she then was, opined in Lange v Atkinson997 that 
the application of the Act to the common law follows from the language of s 3. On ap-
989 Tipping J made it clear that societal changes have arisen since 1990; the Judge believed that the time 
was right for the common law to respond - Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 226; see also paras 92, 
96 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
990 Ibid, para 228 per Tipping J; para 97 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
991 See U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 248. 
992 Privacy: concepts and issues: review of the Law of Privacy part 1 (New Zealand Law Commission 
Study Paper; 19), para 4.89. (p 92). 
993 A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 686; see also Rishworth et al, above n , at 102. 
994 P A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand (3rd ed, 2007) para 27.4.2 at p 
1153. 
995 P Rishworth in Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) 98; the term would certainly 
embrace the Supreme Court as well, because there is no reason to read s 3(a) narrowly - see fn 163). 
996 See P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 5.6.1.  
997 [1997] 2 NZLR 22, 32 (HC).  
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peal, the Court of Appeal held that s 14, has ‘to be given effect by the Court in applying 
the common law’998 - referring again to the wording of s 3.999 The Court of Appeal did 
not accord the same importance to the NZBoRA as the High Court though.1000 These 
observations nevertheless indicate that the common law has to be interpreted in view of 
the rights affirmed in the Bill of Rights.1001 By and large, a horizontal effect to some 
degree can be affirmed.1002  
 
This general observation is instructive for this analysis but not decisive. The 
English courts, for instance, had already implicitly accepted the applicability of art 10 
ECHR to the common law without seriously discussing its horizontal nature.1003 Like-
wise, the acknowledgement of the new invasion of privacy tort was arguably unex-
plored territory in New Zealand.1004 Especially the Lange litigation still involved a pub-
lic dimension, since the court’s task there was to determine how much freedom of ex-
pression a critic should enjoy when criticising the policy of an elected figure like the 
former Prime Minister.1005 The defendant in this dispute between private litigants had 
alleged a ‘chilling effect’ on the discussion about the merits of this former political 
leader caused by the plaintiff’s legal proceedings.1006 The involvement of Mr Lange 
therefore still provided a degree of verticality to the litigation.  
 
998 Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424, 431 (CA). 
999 However, there exists a dispute concerning the appropriate interpretation of the term ‘act done’ of s 3. 
In Rishworth’s opinion, it is conceptually inappropriate to regard the judicial determination of a common 
law case as an ‘act done.’ The judiciary is therefore not acting as a branch of government - see Rishworth 
in Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) 101. 
1000 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 13.17.12. 
1001 J Norton, ‘Hosking v Runting and the Role of Freedom of Expression’ [2004] Auckland University 
Law Review 245, 253. Even if one would argue that the courts are not bound by the Act, they neverthe-
less would have to apply it - P Rishworth,’ Review: Human Rights’ [2005] New Zealand Law Review 87, 
89. 
1002 Duff v Communicado [1996] 2 NZLR 89, 99 (HC) per Blanchard J (“Duff”). See also A Geddis, ‘The 
Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v Runting’ [2004] New 
Zealand Law Review 681, 691.  
1003 J Norton, ‘Hosking v Runting and the Role of Freedom of Expression’ [2004] Auckland University 
Law Review 245, 251. 
1004 Compare also A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as applied in 
Hosking v Runting [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 686. 
1005 P Rishworth in Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003)106; A Geddis, ‘The Horizon-
tal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v Runting’ [2004] New Zealand 
Law Review 681, 691. Moreover, Mr Lange was still an active MP at that time - Lange v Atkinson [1998] 
3 NZLR 424, 428 (CA). 
1006 A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 690. 
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Hosking, in contrast, is still a dispute between private litigants but each party 
lacked ‘the truly public standing held by Mr Lange.’1007 A case involving the family of 
a ‘celebrity’ TV presenter, a freelance journalist and a newspaper publisher may have 
no vertical dimension at first sight. Quite the reverse, this could be seen as an archetype 
of a purely horizontal application of the act and was therefore, according to Geddis, a 
novelty for New Zealand. However, it will be argued later that the theoretical substruc-
ture of freedom of expression shows an additional vertical dimension even in this dis-
pute. 
 
Prior to Hosking, the New Zealand Court of Appeal had repeatedly stated, ‘that 
the NZBoRA would not apply to “wholly private conduct”, on the basis that the legisla-
tion “is a limitation on governmental, not private conduct”.’1008 Without a public ele-
ment transcending the interests of the parties, the Bill of Rights had not been held to 
apply up to that point.1009 The opinion of the Court was delivered after the relevant part 
of the Lange litigation since a later appeal to the Privy Council followed by a rehearing 
by the Court of Appeal added little to the issue.1010 Moreover, Rishworth has been in-
terpreted as saying that the common law has to be developed consistently with the Act 
only where the state is a party.1011 Without an involvement of the state, there would 
consequently be no ’act done’ by the judicial branch. After all, the court would not be 
bound under s 3(a) to give effect to the NZBoRA in the event of ‘wholly private litiga-
tion.’ Particularly the Court’s decision to acknowledge a new common law tort in Hosk-
ing would then represent an entirely orthodox common law paradigm.1012 The courts 
might still take the implications of the Act into account - but because they want to, not 
because they have to. 
 
1007 Ibid, at p 697. 
1008 Ibid; R v N (No 2) (1999) 5 HRNZ 72 (CA) para 2 per Keith J (judgment for the Court). See also P A 
Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand (3rd ed, 2007) para 27.4.2 at p 1145. 
1009 See P Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) 106. 
1010 See Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 689 fn 37. 
1011 J Norton, ‘Hosking v Runting and the Role of Freedom of Expression’ [2004] Auckland University 
Law Review 245, 252-3 referring to P Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) 98; see also 
S Gardbaum, ‘The "Horizontal Effect" of Constitutional Rights’ (2003) 102 Michigan Law Review 387, 
436. 
1012 See also J Morgan, ‘Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: “Hello” Trouble’ (2003) 62(2) Cam-
bridge Law Journal 444, 470 for the situation in England. 
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The point where the extension of the NZBoRA to ‘wholly private conduct’ had 
been accomplished was, according to Geddis, in Hosking. The Court of Appeal was at a 
crossroads between denying and affirming an influence of the NZBoRA on the new 
tort. Although none of the four separate judgments in Hosking answered this question, 
all Judges unanimously applied the Act to the case.1013 Only the three Judges in the ma-
jority indicated that there even might be a problem.1014 The joint judgment, for instance, 
seemingly ended up assuming a significant impact of the Act1015 and persuasive reasons 
do exist for this decision. Scholars have observed the differences between the NZBoRA 
and the Canadian Charter in this respect.1016 The Canadian courts ruled that the Charter 
does not influence private litigation unless the action is based on legislation, which in 
turn must be tested against the Charter.1017 Moreover, the Canadian Supreme Court held 
it would not even apply the Charter indirectly to ‘purely private’ matters.1018 The Cana-
dian Charter, however, omits a reference to the judicial branch of the government as 
included in s 3(a) NZBORA.1019 Burrows points out, sensibly, that the Canadian ap-
proach would ‘fragment the law with different rules applying, depending on whether a 
public or a private actor was involved.’1020 In this context, the non-application of the 
NZBoRA to ‘wholly private conduct’ would fragment the law depending on whether a 
TV presenter or a former Prime Minister is a party of the litigation. It should be borne 
in mind that the Court in Hosking acknowledged a common law rule accessible to every 
New Zealander. A differentiation between ‘wholly private conduct’ on one hand and 
the involvement of at least one private person of ‘true public standing’ (such as an ex-
1013 P Rishworth,’ Review: Human Rights’ [2005] New Zealand Law Review 87, 89; A Geddis, ‘The 
Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v Runting’ [2004] New 
Zealand Law Review 681, 696-7. 
1014 Gault P, Blanchard J and Tipping J. 
1015 K Evans, ‘Was Privacy the Winner of the Day’ [2004] New Zealand Law Journal 181, 182. 
1016 Eg, M McDowall and D Webb, The New Zealand legal system: Structure and Processes (4th ed, 
2006) 140. 
1017 P A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2nd ed, 2001), para 26.4.2 (5) 
(b) at p 1032. The Canadian Supreme Court held in Hill v Church of Scientology Toronto [1995] 2 SCR 
1130, 1170 that ‘Charter rights do not exist in the absence of state action. The most that the private liti-
gant can do is to complain that the common law is inconsistent with Charter values’; see also RWDSU v 
Dolphin Delivery [1986] 2 SCR 573, 603 per McIntyre J for further details of the indirect application of 
the Charter in the private sphere. 
1018 J Norton, ‘Hosking v Runting and the Role of Freedom of Expression’ [2004] Auckland University 
Law Review 245, 251 referring to Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto [1995] 2 SCR 1130.  
1019 Section 32(1). See also P A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2nd ed, 
2001), para 26.4.2 (5) (b) at p 1032. 
1020 J F Burrows, Statute Law in New Zealand (2nd ed, 1999) 419-20 as cited by P A Joseph, Constitu-
tional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2nd ed, 2001) 1032 referring to. 
 
 
177 
                                                          
Prime Minister) would mean that the application of the tort would be subject to s 5 scru-
tiny only in the latter constellation. I would agree that this approach leads to an undesir-
able fragmentation of the law.1021 Furthermore, it should be noted that the Canadian 
Supreme Court has now apparently removed the distinction between public and private 
common law disputes.1022   
 
Norton brought forward a second, perhaps even more convincing reason for the 
application of the Act. She points out that freedom of expression incorporates both the 
societal interest in receiving the information as well as an individual’s interest in im-
parting it.1023 Contrary to Geddis’ opinion, this statement suggests that no ‘wholly pri-
vate conduct’ is involved at least when freedom of speech is at stake. Both parties 
themselves may lack the public standing of a former Prime Minister in a Hosking situa-
tion, but the societal interest in receiving the information may add an additional public 
component to the litigation.1024 This additional component transcends the interests of 
the private parties involved. There is merit in believing that the doctrinal basis of free-
dom of expression requires the application of the Act as well.1025 This writer would 
agree with such a conclusion. This would arguably also be in accordance with the situa-
tion in the USA. The extension of freedom of press protection from federal to state level 
by means of applying the 14th Amendment was for the benefit of all people rather than 
the press.1026 Thus, the decision in Hosking would constitute an ‘act done’ by the judi-
ciary in terms of s 3(a). The Court of Appeal was therefore right in its unanimous deci-
1021 See also J Norton, ‘Hosking v Runting and the Role of Freedom of Expression’ [2004] Auckland 
University Law Review 245, 250 (‘[t]he lack of coherent principle […] is illustrated by the fact that a case 
with the same facts, but were one party is a state actor […], the courts would be obliged to uphold free-
dom of expression’).  
1022 Ibid, at p 252 referring to RWDSU Local v Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd [2002] 31 SCR 
156. 
1023 Ibid, at p 255 referring to Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (1994) 120 DLR (4th) 12, 
55-57; see also Hosking [2003] 3 NZLR 385 (HC) para 170 per Randerson J (HC); Associated Newspa-
pers Ltd v His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales [2007] 3 WLR 222 (CA) para 90 per Blackburne J. –  
1024 See also P Rishworth,’ Review: Human Rights’ [2005] New Zealand Law Review 87, 89. 
1025 See also P Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) 106. 
1026 K Ruckdaschel-Haley, ‘The Florida Star v BJF: Balancing Freedom of the Press and the Right to Pri-
vacy upon Publication of a Rape Victim's Identity’ (1990) 35 South Dakota Law Review 94, 98. In Virgil 
v Time Inc, 527 F 2d 1122, 1128 (1975) the court argued that if the public has no ‘right to know’ (ie, 
something is not a matter of public concern) than the press no ‘right to inform.’ A potential right of the 
public to receive information incorporated in the First Amendment is nonetheless something the US 
courts still struggle with – see E B Easton, ‘Public Importance: Balancing Proprietary Interests and the 
Right to Know’ (2003) 21 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 139, 144 for further details. 
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sion to apply the NZBoRA to this legal dispute. To conclude, the privacy tort is conse-
quently subject to s 5 scrutiny regardless of the status of the parties involved due to its 
potential to inhibit freedom of expression.  
1.1.1.1 The appropriate degree of the NZBoRA’s impact 
The major difficulty in a Hosking situation is nonetheless the second aforemen-
tioned question tackling the problem to which extent the Court’s decision had to con-
sider the NZBoRA. As we recollect from the examination of the English law, the two 
arguable approaches distinguish between a strong indirect and a weak indirect horizon-
tal application of a human rights instrument. On the one hand, a strong indirect applica-
tion of the Act would place an absolute duty the courts to decide the legal dispute be-
tween purely private litigants consistent with the NZBoRA.1027 A weak effect, on the 
other hand, would merely inform the courts about a legal outcome consistent with the 
Act.1028 The main difference between the two standards is that the application of the 
former would persuade the courts to treat a common law case between two private liti-
gants in the same manner as if a branch of the government would be involved. Accord-
ing to the latter approach, the NZBoRA might still exert influence on the court's deci-
sion; it nonetheless implies the possibility of deciding a particular case inconsistently 
with the NZBoRA.1029 Particularly the judgment of Elias J in Lange left open the ques-
tion as to whether the horizontal effect of the NZBoRA was direct or indirect.1030   
 
During the discussion of the English law, we have seen that one could confuse 
particularly the ‘strong indirect impact’ with a ‘direct horizontal effect’ of the Act.1031 
1027 See G Phillipson, ‘Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy 
under the Human Rights Act’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 726, 730; S Gardbaum, ‘The "Horizontal 
Effect" of Constitutional Rights’ (2003) 102 Michigan Law Review 387, 436; A L Young, ‘Remedial and 
Substantive Horizontality: The Common Law and Douglas v Hello! Ltd’ [2002] Public Law 232, 235. 
1028 P Rishworth in Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) 100-01 differentiates whether 
‘the judicial branch, being explicitly bound by s 3(a), is obliged to develop the common law so as to en-
sure it is consistent with the Bill of Rights’ or whether the common law has to be ‘appropriately devel-
oped in the light of the rights affirmed by the legislature in the Bill of Rights’; see also S Gardbaum, ‘The 
"Horizontal Effect" of Constitutional Rights’ (2003) 102 Michigan Law Review 387, 436. 
1029 A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 692. 
1029 Ibid. 
1030 I Leigh, ‘Horizontal Rights, the Human Rights Act and Privacy: Lessons from the Commonwealth?’ 
(1999) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 57, 70. 
1031 See above Capter Three, 2. 
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A direct effect would enable a private litigant to claim for an unwarranted interference, 
for instance, with her freedom of speech directly under s 14.1032 This effect may in turn 
require the courts to manufacture a new cause of action available in litigation between 
private parties.1033 Keith J nonetheless advocated such an application of the Act in 
Hosking. This was part of his ‘lack of established need’-argument against the acknowl-
edgement of a separate tort of privacy.1034 His Honour listed the existing protections of 
privacy interests including the traditional breach of confidence doctrine and advocated 
that an obligation of confidence would be an integral part of the action.1035 Neverthe-
less, the Judge implicitly recognised that some privacy interests outside the statutory 
context are deserving of protection.1036 His Honour continued indicating that a plaintiff, 
being in a life threatening Venables1037 situation, might rely directly on her right to life 
if she is unable to claim an obligation of confidence.1038  
 
I beg to differ with his Honour’s assertion.1039 According to s 3(a), the Act ap-
plies, regardless of the fact that it has not been entrenched as supreme law,1040 to ‘acts 
done’ by the three ‘branches of the government of New Zealand.’ The provisions of the 
Act, thus, place no duties on private persons, unless they perform a public function (s 3 
(b)). The corresponding s 6 (3)(b) HRA in English law has been interpreted simi-
larly.1041 However, private litigants may turn enshrined rights and freedoms against the 
courts, because they are part of the judicial branch of the government and therefore sub-
ject to s 3(a). The courts may then in turn apply the Act in an indirect fashion whilst de-
1032 A L Young, ‘Remedial and Substantive Horizontality: The Common Law and Douglas v Hello! Ltd’ 
[2002] Public Law 232, 235. 
1033 A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 692; see also S Gardbaum, ‘The "Horizontal Effect" of 
Constitutional Rights’ (2003) 102 Michigan Law Review 387, 411. 
1034 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 177 per Keith J. 
1035 Ibid, paras 185-200. 
1036 U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 250. 
1037 Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 908. 
1038 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 201 per Keith J. 
1039 A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 692 fn 50 would presumably not share this view. He 
mentions, apparently with approval, H W R Wade, ‘Horizons of Horizontality’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly 
Review 217 and later embraces the direct applicability of the Act into his own model - at p 693).  
1040 Compare U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 250 fn 122. 
1041 Lord Steyn, ‘2000 - 2005: Laying the Foundations of Human Rights Law in the United Kingdom’ 
[2005] European Human Rights Law Review 349, 353. 
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ciding the common law case between these private litigants.1042 Thus, the response to s 
3(a) may be a strong indirect or a weak indirect application of the NZBoRA. Keith J’s 
direct application of the Act, however, is not sustainable in the author’s view. If it 
proves otherwise, the result would be a revolutionary extension of the NZBoRA into the 
private sphere.1043 In sum, it is apt to observe that this proposal does not represent a 
convincing way to fill gaps of the law occurring in Venables situations.1044    
 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal first dealt with the appropriate impact of the 
Act on the common law in a citizen-to-citizen scenario. Even though this was uncharted 
territory, none of the Judges supplied an explanation regarding this point. However, 
they gave implicit indications about their positions. Gault P and Blanchard J explicitly 
refused to tackle ‘the complex question of the extent to which the courts are to give ef-
fect to the rights and freedoms’1045 affirmed in the NZBoRA; their Honours nonetheless 
believed that their decision had to be consistent with the Act.1046 As an unqualified con-
sistency with the Act seemed to be common ground since the Lange litigation, this 
statement is too unspecific. Their Honours therefore intentionally left open whether 
their judgment was required by following an absolute duty or was merely informed by 
the NZBoRA. However, their approach implicitly marks a very indirect impact of the 
Act. Geddis observes that, in their Honours’ approach, s 5 merely ‘operates as a frame-
work within which to determine the best - or most appropriate for New Zealand - equi-
librium between freedom of speech (of some importance due to its affirmation in the 
NZBoRA) and other contemporary values (which may or may not be accorded recogni-
1042 Again, A Geddis opines that the NZBoRA might even operate ‘as a sword where there is a failure of 
the common law to provide a remedy to a plaintiff whose rights have been infringed upon by another 
private party’ - ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 702. 
1043 A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 703. In Germany, for instance, a direct application of 
human rights has also been considered, but was finally dismissed. The major reason was that a direct ap-
plication would have ‘drastic effects on private autonomy’ – K M Lewin, ‘The Significance of Constitu-
tional Rights for Private Law: Theory and Practice in West Germany’ (1968) 17(3) International Com-
parative Law Quarterly 571, 597. 
1044 U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 250. 
1045 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 114. 
1046 Ibid, para 111. 
 
 
181 
                                                          
tion in the NZBoRA).’1047 In theory,1048 this weak indirect effect of the Act enabled 
both judges to depart from the information given by the NZBoRA. 
 
Tipping J was the third judge in favour of the new tort’s acknowledgement. His 
Honour opined, ‘it will often be appropriate for the values which are recognised in [the 
NZBoRA] context to inform the common law in its function of regulating relationships 
between citizen and citizen.’1049 In his Honour’s view, the NZBoRA informs the com-
mon law in a Hosking scenario, which theoretically again leaves open the possibility of 
deciding a case inconsistently with the Act. According to Geddis, s 5 as interpreted by 
Tipping J, ‘explicitly becomes the site for a “value balancing” exercise: “Freedom of 
expression must accommodate other values which society regards as important”.’1050 
The judicial branch of the government must ‘give appropriate weight to the rights af-
firmed in the Bill of Rights’ in the event of developing the common law.1051 The Judge 
summarised his position by stating, ‘the Courts must do their best to strike the right bal-
ance between the competing values.’1052 Although his Honour’s approach still repre-
sents an indirect application, these statements tend towards a stronger indirect impact of 
the NZBoRA. 
  
The NZBoRA was applied much more directly in the dissenting judgments of 
Anderson and Keith JJ.1053 Keith J enumerated the several existing provisions protect-
ing privacy and concluded that the legislative pattern did not exclude a judge-made pri-
vacy tort; the statutory context nonetheless told strongly against its existence.1054 The 
provisional conclusion became final for his Honour due to a comparatively direct appli-
cation of s 5. Such an application meant that the new tort did not place a ‘necessary’ 
1047 A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 700. 
1048 As it will be argued below, the theoretical possibility of deciding inconsistently does not bring about 
practical consequences.  
1049 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 229 (emphasis added). 
1050 A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 700-01 citing Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 230. 
1051 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 229. 
1052 Ibid, para 230 (emphasis added). 
1053 A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 702. 
1054 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 207. 
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limit on freedom of speech.1055 Anderson J made a comment to the effect that a direct 
application of the Act would exclude freedom of speech, as an enshrined right, from 
being treated equally with privacy, which merely had the status of a value.1056 Further-
more, the Judge did not regard privacy as a necessary limit demonstrably justified in a 
democratic society in terms of s 5.1057 Both judgments reflect the view that freedom of 
speech ought to take almost automatic precedence over the privacy value.1058 The more 
direct application of the Act leads, according to the Judges of the minority, to a denial 
of the new privacy tort’s existence.  
 
The judgments of the minority in Hosking are nonetheless difficult to analyse in 
this particular context. Their Honours’ position on the appropriate impact of Act is in-
termingled with their respective interpretation of s 5. The judges seem to imply that pri-
vacy is generally an unnecessary limit on freedom of speech. A limit has to be ‘reason-
able/necessary’ on an abstract basis (regardless of the facts of the case) rather than ‘rea-
sonable/necessary’ subject to a balancing exercise (on the facts of a particular case).1059 
This issue will therefore receive further attention during the discussion of s 5.  
 
Furthermore, Anderson J‘s opinion1060 that a right (freedom of expression) can-
not be limited by a manifestation of a value (informational privacy) touches upon the 
doctrinal problem concerned with the relationship between an enshrined ‘right’ and 
‘limit.’ In other words, are only the enshrined rights fundamental or can limits, such as 
privacy, be fundamental too? This matter will receive further attention below during the 
discussion of the balancing exercise championed by Tipping J. However, the very no-
tion of s 14 operating as a right within the common law implies a direct application of 
the NZBoRA.  
 
1055 Ibid, paras 208 and 220. 
1056 Ibid, paras 265-266. 
1057 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) paras 268, 270. 
1058 A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 706. 
1059 Paul Rishworth seems to share their Honours’ position - ’Review: Human Rights’ [2005] New Zea-
land Law Review 87, 103 (‘[…] in Hosking v Runting it was necessary to decide whether a common law 
tort of invading privacy infringed s 14 of the Bill of Rights’ – emphasis supplied). 
1060 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 265. 
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After all, these judgments are confusing when trying to find an answer with re-
gard to the adequate impact of the NZBoRA on the new tort. Moreover, all separate 
opinions were given without any further explanation concerning the reasons leading to 
the respective decisions. Geddis consequently argues that Hosking was merely the be-
ginning of the debate on this issue.1061 He proposes that the courts should in practice 
‘array along a continuum between these two points [direct and indirect application of 
the Act] rather than closely conform to one of two alternative templates.’1062 However, 
Geddis indicates that flexibility is desirable in the event of other influences on the deci-
sion coming into play - influences apart from those exerted by the Act.1063  
 
Therefore, the decisive question is whether there are opposite influences. This is 
particularly questionable because the Act is applied to the acknowledgement of a new 
tort and not to long existing common law. A differentiation between a strong or weak 
indirect effect, in my view, would only be sensible if this would lead to differing practi-
cal results. Examples provided by Geddis for such ‘other influences’ on the court’s de-
cision are (1) precedential authority; and (2) judicial consistency.  
 
Firstly, the existence of precedential authority could cause uncertainty if the 
courts had applied a ‘particular [common law] rule over a period of time’ and suddenly 
change the rule because of the impact of human rights.1064 Precedential authority, how-
ever, could be ruled out straight away. The Court of Appeal acknowledged a new com-
mon law rule in Hosking and the decision represents the first authority in this area of the 
law. I suggest that this category is only relevant if long existing common law is tested 
against the horizontally applied NZBoRA. Precedential authority, then, might serve as 
an argument against an alteration of existing common law in the light of the human 
rights instrument.1065  
 
1061  A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 682. 
1062 Ibid, at p 693. 
1063 Ibid, at p 692-3. 
1064 Ibid. 
1065 See P Rishworth in Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) 107. 
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Secondly, Geddis names ‘the silence of the common law in a particular area’ as 
a reason for an inconsistent decision. If Parliament had refused to legislate in a particu-
lar area of the law and the courts have refused to grant relief so far, judges may con-
tinue to refrain from becoming involved even if this would lead to an infringement of 
an affirmed right.1066 The situation in Hosking was different though. The courts had al-
ready intervened in Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd1067 even before the NZBoRA 
had been enacted. Although Parliament has refused to legislate, the courts have not re-
fused to grant relief. There was no silence of the law in terms of Geddis’ second cate-
gory. Quite the reverse, the courts approved the existence of a tort,1068 which was (and 
still is) directly aiming at s 14 with the potential to limit this freedom. Moreover, free-
dom of expression is the only enshrined right or freedom relevant in this context. This 
freedom would have been protected - not violated - by the silence of the common law. 
 
With regard to Geddis’ argumentation, there is no reason for a judge, who is as-
suming that she was merely informed by the NZBoRA (rather than having an absolute 
duty, to render her decision compatible with the Act) to depart from the information 
given by the Act. In this particular situation, it makes, in the author's view, no differ-
ence if the NZBoRA places an absolute duty on the court or merely informs its deci-
sion. The remark of Tipping J that, ‘it will often be appropriate for the values which are 
recognised in [the NZBoRA] context to inform the common law in its function of regu-
lating relationships between citizen and citizen’ is evasive and therefore unsatisfying. It 
was more important to decide what was appropriate in the specific situation, ie in Hosk-
ing.1069 His Honour apparently refers to the argument that consistency of the common 
law with the NZBoRA does not simply involve a reflection of Bill of Rights duties in 
the private sphere.1070    
 
1066 A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 693 (emphasis added). 
1067 [1986] 2 NZLR 716 
1068 The tort was first considered as forming part of the common law in Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd 
[1993] 1 NZLR 415 - U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 246, 250 
(‘New Zealand had a tort for 10 years prior to this judgment,[…]’). 
1069 See also A Geddis ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosk-
ing v Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 698 (‘Again, the question […] when it is not ap-
propriate for the NZBoRA to “inform the common law”, received no further attention’). 
1070 See P Rishworth in Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) 107. 
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Notwithstanding, even judges favouring a weak indirect impact of the Act, such 
as Gault P and Blanchard J, had to consider what other sources of information might 
alter their decision when a new common law tort is about to be acknowledged. The ab-
sence of alternative sources, which might have the potential to alter the result found 
through a weak indirect application of the Act, would otherwise lead to the same result 
as if the decision was the response to a strong indirect effect. With regard to the ac-
knowledgement of the invasion of privacy tort, it seems fit to summarise the impact of 
the NZBoRA on the common law as follows: the impact may differ depending on  
 
• whether the courts apply the Act to an already existing common 
law remedy, with the consequence that the impact may array 
along a continuum between weak and strong indirect effect (de-
pending on other influences on the decision); or 
• whether the common law is enriched1071 by the acknowledge-
ment of a new remedy (with the consequence that there is no 
practical difference between a strong or weak indirect application 
of the Act due to a lack of other influences on the decision). 
1.1.1.2 Conclusion  
The application of the NZBoRA on the new invasion of privacy tort is afflicted 
with problems. The first point to be made is that it is not entirely evident why the Act 
had to be applied to the common law in Hosking. The important underlying issue - left 
aside here - is whether the private law should be consitutionalised in the first place. 
However, the five Judges accepted an impact and convincing reasons are indeed with 
this decision. The focus of attention rests on the question whether the privacy tort in-
volves ‘wholly private conduct’ in a Hosking scenario. This could be answered in the 
negative, inter alia, if the societal interest in receiving private information, as one func-
tion of freedom of expression, would be recognised as an element being beyond purely 
private conduct. On the other hand, assuming that this conduct would be identified as 
1071 This term has been chosen deliberately in order to evade a discussion regarding the actual role of 
common law judges as interpreters, discoverers or makers of the law.   
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‘wholly private,’ the courts have to reconsider whether the NZBoRA has any effect on 
the privacy tort at all.   
 
The second question as to which degree the Act should be determinative for 
relevant aspects of the new common law tort remained unanswered in the aftermath of 
Hosking. The Judges offered three alternatives ranging from the most indirect to a direct 
application. The differentiation between those approaches is not only a matter of aca-
demic importance, as one might argue. This is displayed in the conclusions attained by 
Keith and Anderson JJ. Both Judges in the minority turned the implication of a direct 
impact of the Act into a major argument against the very existence of the privacy tort.  
 
Gault P, Blanchard and Tipping JJ can be interpreted as saying that a strong in-
direct effect of the NZBoRA is inappropriate for New Zealand. The joint judgment im-
plies a very weak indirect impact instead whilst Tipping J seems to propagate an inter-
mediary position on the issue.1072 The author nonetheless took the liberty, not to decide 
the matter. Given that an application of the Act does not avert the invasion of privacy 
tort a priori, both of the remaining opportunities would accomplish the same result. 
Thus, a further differentiation would indeed become a purely academic exercise. The 
acknowledgement of a new common law rule is in this respect distinct from the mere 
application of the NZBoRA on long existing common law. Since no other persuasive 
influences on the decision are identifiable, it would theoretically make no difference if 
the indirect influence of the Act were strong or weak.1073 In theory, the joint judgment 
must therefore accomplish the same result as Tipping J when applying the Act to the 
new tort. However, it will be shown below that this is not the case.  
 
It has to be stressed, however, that the author’s conclusion strongly depends on 
the alternative sources to alter a court’s decision suggested by Geddis. Geddis’ argu-
mentation builds upon the basic assumption that judges considering common law ‘do so 
within the paradigm of common law reasoning, and in the light of all principles and 
1072 His position tends apparently towards an ‘as strong as possible’ influence of the Act.  
1073 This is not to say, however, that there are not other influences determining the interpretation of the 
NZBoRA itself. English law, US law and the ICCPR, for instance, may all persuade the courts in differ-
ent ways while interpreting the rights and limits contained in the NZBoRA. In my view, this is a different 
matter though.       
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values that they find persuasive.’1074 The author, as a novice to the common law, is un-
aware how far this statement might reach. Potential ‘alternative principles and values’ 
deriving from the common law regime in a Hosking situation might, hence, be a field 
deserving further dedication in a context other than this thesis.            
 
The author, for his part, finally concludes that New Zealand has joined the in-
ternational trend of constitutionalising the private or common law at the latest with the 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Hosking. Once this decision has been made, NZBoRA 
concerns have to be reflected decisively in the shape of the tort.1075 The question what 
‘constitutionalisation’ actually means in the context of New Zealand’s law follows 
naturally and will be addressed next.          
1.1.4 Justified limits of freedom of expression  
Anderson J, as already indicated, refused to acknowledge a freestanding inva-
sion of privacy tort in Hosking. His Honour saw a grave difference between freedom of 
expression as an affirmed right and privacy, which he categorised as a value.1076 Fur-
thermore, the Judge pointed out that the acknowledgement of the new common law rule 
involved the issue of ‘whether [freedom of speech] is to be limited by a particular mani-
festation of a value.’1077 These statements touch upon the problem of whether the newly 
protected privacy aspect encroaches upon freedom of speech legitimately. This is also a 
relevant issue for practical purposes, because the shaping of the public concern feature 
of the tort is influenced by the outcome of the following observation. Whatever form 
the tort will finally take, the formulation of the public interest concept is crucial to de-
termine whether the publication of private facts may occur.1078         
  
The White Paper is quite unambiguous regarding the limitation process of free-
dom of speech. The commentary to clause 7 of the Draft Bill refers to its clause 3, 
1074 See P Rishworth in Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) 107 (emphasis added). 
1075 See U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 250 (‘Tipping J agreed 
with the joint judgment, but his judgment focussed to a much greater degree on the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act[…]’). 
1076 See Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 265. 
1077 Ibid, para 266. 
1078 U J Cheer, ‘Privacy and the Public Interest’ (2005) 1 Privacy Law Bulletin 145. 
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which later became essentially untouched s 5.1079 Section 5 reads as follows: ‘Subject to 
section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights 
may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.’  
 
The court’s first task is to find out whether freedom of expression had been in-
fringed,1080 which circumscribes the necessity to determine the right’s scope. Further-
more, the White Paper comment to clause 3 clarifies that the rights contained in the Bill 
were not supposed to be absolute; it would have been misleading to suggest other-
wise.1081 In cases of an interference with the scope of a right, the courts have to figure 
out whether the limit is (1) ‘reasonable’ and ‘demonstrably justified in a free and de-
mocratic society;’ and (2) ‘prescribed by law.’1082 The practical application of this pro-
vision by the courts is unfortunately not as clear-cut, which was again reflected in 
Hosking.   
1.1.4.1 Reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society 
Little has been said by the courts about the interpretation of the ‘reasonable’ 
limit ‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’1083 The reason might be 
found in the problematic interplay between ss 4, 5 and 6.1084 It seems settled, though, 
that s 5 is relevant in the context of developing the common law.1085 The terms may 
‘involve public policy analysis and a value judgment on the part of the Court’ whether 
or not a limitation is demonstrably justified.1086 The drafters of the White Paper Bill 
expected a confrontation of the courts ‘with a difficult task trenching in some cases on 
1079 The White Paper commentary is instructive for our purposes – Hansen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC) 
para 187 per McGrath J. 
1080 White Paper, para 10.58. 
1081 White Paper, paras 10.24 and 10.26; see also P and A Butler, The New Zealand of Rights Act (2005) 
para 6.5.1; Ministry of Transport v Noort; Police v Curren [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 277 (CA) per Richardson 
J. 
1082 White Paper, para 10.26. Note that the ‘prescribed by law’ element is not discussed in this analysis. 
1083 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.10.1 
1084 See P Rishworth, ‘Lord Cooke and the Bill of Rights’ in P Rishworth (ed), The Struggle for simplicity 
in the law (1997) 309-12. See also Hansen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC) para 6 per Elias CJ; paras 88 - 92 
per Tipping J. 
1085 Ibid. 
1086 Ministry of Transport v Noort; Police v Curren [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 283 (CA) per Richardson J.  
 
 
189 
                                                          
matters of policy.’1087 The question has been raised as to whether clause 3, which later 
became s 5, conferred tasks on the courts, which should remain with Parliament.1088 
The New Zealand courts therefore might be obliged to deliver a judgment on behalf of 
society.1089 Since the Courts have to serve society, they arguably have to take all rele-
vant factors of the particular case into account during this process. These relevant fac-
tors may include, for instance, legal, social, moral and economic factors.1090 It seems 
settled that the interpretation of s 5 is a complex task arguably requiring extensive con-
text-specific consideration of various NZBoRA provisions and their relationship with s 
5.1091 The New Zealand courts, however, have not fostered a clear position. Against this 
background, Petra and Andrew Butler concluded that the New Zealand courts have 
barely scratched the surface of the complexity of s 5.1092  
 
In order to determine the reasonableness of a limit, the first task is to identify 
the values underlying the rights we recognise.1093 With reference to the importance of 
freedom of speech, the drafters of the White Paper Bill referred, for example, to rele-
vant cases decided by the ECtHR. Particularly the Sunday Times v United Kingdom1094 
case was regarded as a valuable source.1095 The ECtHR held that any limit on freedom 
of expression could only be regarded as ‘necessary in a democratic society’ if there was 
a pressing social need in the restriction.1096  
 
The New Zealand Courts, however, have later argued that a reasonable limit in 
terms of s 5 does not have to correspond with a pressing social need.1097 The wording of 
1087 White Paper, para 10.30. 
1088 Ministry of Transport v Noort; Police v Curren [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 283 (CA) Richardson J .  
1089 Moonen v Film & Literature Board of Reviews (No 1) [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA) para 18 per Tipping J; 
Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 236 per Tipping J. 
1090 Ibid; Ministry of Transport v Noort; Police v Curren [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 283 (CA) Richardson J. 
Note that the Court of Appeal made it clear that this approach was not prescriptive; it was just one possi-
ble interpretation among other possibilities - Moonen (No 2) [2002] 2 NZLR 754 (CA) para 15. 
1091 Moonen v Film & Literature Board of Reviews (No 2) [2002] 2 NZLR 754 (CA) para 13. 
1092 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.12.1. 
1093 Ibid, para 6.9.3. 
1094 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245 (“Sunday Times”). 
1095 White Paper, para 10.31. 
1096 Ibid. 
1097 R v Jeffries [1994] 1 NZLR 290, 303 (CA); Solicitor General v Radio New Zealand [1994] 1 NZLR 
48, 62 (HC) per Eichelbaum CJ and Greig J. 
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the European Convention and the NZBoRA may be similar,1098 but decisive for New 
Zealand is whether ‘reasonable’ needs to be equated with ‘necessary.’ The approach 
chosen on this matter can have a substantive effect on one’s approach to limitations.1099 
The courts found that both terms do not circumscribe the same standard. Equating the 
term ‘reasonable’ with ‘necessary’ would mean to apply a higher standard than the fol-
lowing term ‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’ indicates.1100  
 
This observation is in agreement with the ECtHR, which held in Sunday Times 
that ‘necessary’ does not contain the flexibility of expressions such as particularly ‘rea-
sonable.’1101 The ECtHR held that the UK law of contempt with its inherent interest in 
a fair administration did not outweigh the public interest in freedom of speech. In other 
words, the interest in a fair administration was not sufficiently pressing to abridge the 
right to freedom of expression in the light of the particular facts of the case.1102 In my 
view, the distinction between both terms is correct, especially when ‘reasonable’ is read 
together with the term ‘demonstrably justified.’ The wording suggests a lower standard 
compared to the less flexible ‘necessary’ standard.1103 As a result, it might be easier to 
limit freedom of expression in New Zealand in comparison to Europe.1104  
 
The differentiation between both terms does not catch the full complexity of s 5 
however. The decision in Hosking featured two distinct ways to determine the reason-
ableness1105 of a limit: (1) an approach asking whether a limit generally has to be ‘rea-
sonable’ regardless of the facts of a particular case; and (2) an approach determining 
whether the limit has to be regarded on a more context-specific basis as ‘reasonable’ in 
1098 Blanchard J described them as ‘broadly comparable’ in Duff [1996] 2 NZLR 89, 100 (HC). 
1099 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005) para 6.10.6. 
1100 Solicitor General v Radio New Zealand [1994] 1 NZLR 48, 62 (HC) per Eichelbaum CJ and Greig J. 
1101 Sunday Times (1979) 2 EHRR 245 para 59. In Germany, for instance, the Federal Constitutional 
Court has held that ‘in a democracy the legislature is entitled to pursue any purpose, provided it is not 
excluded by the constitution. The importance of the purpose is not a condition for legislative action’ - D 
Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2007) 57 University of 
Toronto Law Journal 383, 388. 
1102 See White Paper, para 10.31. 
1103 TVNZ Ltd v Quinn [1996] 3 NZLR 24, 58 (CA) per McGechan J 
1104 The ECtHR has apparently watered down the term ‘necessary’ anyway by interpreting it with a strong 
‘reasonableness’ tone, it does not appear to be reasonable to even start off with a higher standard that is 
not even reflected in the wording - P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary 
(2005) 140 fn 134.  
1105 The judges of the minority still seemed to use the term synonymously with ‘necessary.’  
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the light of a case’s facts through a weighing exercise. A similar dispute, as we know, 
arose in the context of the respective US law in Hall v Post.1106        
 
Keith J preferred the former interpretation. His Honour did not recognise the 
new tort partly because the ‘statutory context tells strongly against the existence of such 
a tort.’1107 Furthermore, and more importantly in this context, he saw this conclusion 
confirmed by his analysis of s 5. Keith J pointed out that the new privacy tort, as pro-
posed by the joint judgment, closely adapted the formulation of the US Restatement of 
Torts.1108 His Honour consequently paid special attention to the situation in the 
USA,1109 where the tort has ‘failed to become a usable and effective means of redress 
for plaintiffs.’1110 As a result, the acknowledgement of the tort in New Zealand was, in 
his Honour’s opinion, both unnecessary and of little use.1111 The learned Judge argued 
that the experience of the USA jurisdictions ‘demonstrates a lack of pressing need (the 
basic point being made in this part of these reasons) - a need which, especially in terms 
of s 5 of the Bill of Rights has to be demonstrably justified by the proponents […].’1112 
Particularly this observation has been described as a concerning aspect of the majority 
judgment.1113  
 
In my view, Keith J’s suggestions are not conclusive for three reasons. Firstly, 
the White Paper suggests that the courts may consider whether the law in other coun-
tries, such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia or (the former) 
Western Europe, do protect the limit in question.1114 Nevertheless, whilst the compara-
tive material may often be suggestive, the final decision has to be made regarding the 
1106 See above Chapter Two, 2.6.1. 
1107 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 207. 
1108 Ibid, para 210. 
1109 Ibid, paras 211, 212. 
1110 Ibid, para 216 quoting D L Zimmerman, ‘Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and 
Brandeis’ (1983) 68 Cornell Law Review 291, 362-3. 
1111 U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 250.  
1112 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 220. 
1113 J Norton, ‘Hosking v Runting and the Role of Freedom of Expression’ [2004] Auckland University 
Law Review 245, 247. 
1114 White Paper, para 10.34. 
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situation in New Zealand.1115 Keith J’s interpretation of the ‘reasonableness’ element, 
however, is limited to a conclusion drawn from foreign legal systems.   
 
I have already suggested during the discussion of the US tort that the compara-
tive material quoted by Keith J is not suggestive.1116 This is because it seems inappro-
priate to draw a direct conclusion from the ineffectiveness of the tort in practice to a 
lack of pressing need for a workable privacy tort in that country’s society. The compari-
son of legal systems demands taking the institutional context of the law into account. 
To my eyes, the small number of successful plaintiffs1117 in the USA does not indicate a 
lack of societal need; such a conclusion rather seems to involve a confusion of cause 
and effect. The, admittedly, drastic example BJF v Florida Star1118 should be recol-
lected at this point.1119 The plaintiff in that case did not succeed in preventing a news-
paper from revealing her identity as a rape victim. The defeat represents the ‘effect’ but 
it does not reflect a lack of pressing need as the corresponding ‘cause.’ Rather, the cor-
responding cause is a lacking ability of the US law to differentiate between the public 
interest in the media coverage of a capital crime itself and the genuinely questionable 
interest in divulging the identity of the victim involved. I suggest that the unrivalled 
might of the First Amendment, thus, has the potential to overshadow an existing socie-
tal need. This was, for instance, the case in BJF v Florida Star. The State of Florida 
protected the identity of rape victims through a separate Act.1120 It seems reasonable to 
suggest that this enactment - as well as any other enactment - was a response to a socie-
tal need to keep information of this particular kind private. In other words, the dissemi-
nation of a rape victim’s identity was a socially recognised violation of privacy.1121 The 
vehicle to enforce similar identity suppression under common law, however, is the pub-
1115 Ibid. 
1116 See above Chapter Two, 3. 
1117 Ibid, para 216 (‘fewer than 18’).  
1118 491 US 524 (1989). 
1119 See above Chapter Two, 1.2.4. 
1120 Florida Statute § 794.03 (1987) provided: ‘Unlawful to publish or broadcast information identifying 
sexual offense victim. No person will print, publish, or broadcast, or cause or allow to be printed, pub-
lished, or broadcast, in any instrument of mass communication the name, address, or other identifying 
fact or information of the victim of any sexual offense within this chapter. An offense under this section 
will constitute a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in § 775.083, or § 775.084’ – 
as cited in Florida Star v BJF, 491 US 524, 526 fn 1 (1989). 
1121 See D J Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 477, 
483. 
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lic disclosure tort.1122 The tort could thus be regarded as part of the response to this so-
cietal need. In short, the meaningfulness of drawing conclusions from the situation in 
the USA for the needs of New Zealand’s society is at best conditional.  
 
Secondly, Keith J has employed an inappropriate standard in the first place. As 
we recollect, a limit placed upon an affirmed right has to be ‘reasonable’ as distinct 
from ‘necessary.’ The limit, therefore, does not have to respond to a pressing societal 
need.1123 His Honour’s attempt to apply a stricter standard by requiring a ‘pressing 
need’ in the process of the acknowledgement of the new privacy tort is flawed. It is, of 
course, the same standard of reasonableness in this context as on any other occasion 
when an affirmed right or freedom of the NZBoRA is about to be limited.  
 
Thirdly, there is reason to argue that both judges of the minority stuck too 
closely to wording of s 5. The White Paper already indicates greater latitude in this re-
spect. It includes a comment to the effect that the interpretation of s 5 requires more 
than just a careful reading of the precise words.1124 According to the White Paper, the 
courts would rather end up in a weighing exercise. The aforementioned process would 
involve an assessment of (1) the importance of the right infringed, (2) the nature of in-
fringement, and (3) the importance of the interest put forward to justify the limit.1125 
For the purposes of this analysis, it is thus fair to say that the prerequisites ‘reasonable 
limit’ and ‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’ are read together 
and require some kind of balancing exercise.1126 Richardson J assumed soon after the 
enactment of the NZBoRA that the bridging inquiry under s 5 was a matter of weighing 
1122 The lawsuit in Florida Star was based on negligent violation of Fla Stat § 794.03. The judgment has, 
however, a direct impact on the public disclosure tort – see K W Bacon, ‘Florida Star v BJF: The Right of 
Privacy Collides with the First Amendment’ (1990) 76 Iowa Law Review 139, 147 (1990).  
1123 His Honour applied the stricter standard due to the influence of Art 19(3) IPCCR – Hosking [2005] 1 
NZLR 1 (CA) paras 179-180. Keith J opined already in Lange v Atkinson 3 NZLR 424, 466 (CA) that 
ICCPR limitation clauses have an effect on s 5.   
1124 White Paper, para 10.31. 
1125 Ibid. 
1126 Duff [1996] 2 NZLR 89, 100 (HC) per Blanchard J; P Rishworth in Rishworth et al, The New Zealand 
Bill of Rights (2003) 176. See also Hansen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC) para 103 per Tipping J. 
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and accordingly proposed steps to this effect in Noort.1127 Blanchard J refined these 
steps later in Duff as requiring the courts to examine:1128 
 
 (1) the significance in the particular case of the values underlying the Bill of Rights Act; 
 (2) the importance in the public interest of the intrusion on the particular rights protected by the  
 Bill of Rights Act; 
 (3) the limits sought to be placed on the application of the Act provision in the particular case;  
      and 
 (4) the effectiveness of the intrusion in protecting the interests put forward to justify those  
      limits.
 
The author fails to identify differences, significant enough for the purposes of 
this thesis, to the proportionality test envisaged in the White Paper.1129 Keith J’s ap-
proach in Hosking is, therefore, too narrow since he merely stuck to the wording of s 5. 
His Honour tried to figure out whether the privacy tort is justified in an abstract way 
rather than entering into a weighing exercise. This result is contrary to the findings of 
the New Zealand courts; whether a limit is justified therefore has to be determined on 
the merits of the case.1130     
 
At last, this result plainly leads us to the question of what would represent the 
appropriate balancing exercise in terms of s 5. Having suggested that the Act informs 
the privacy tort, this information becomes persuasive when the preferable balancing 
technique has to be determined. The technique, used to limit rights and freedoms, influ-
ences the common law in order to determine whether privacy prevails over freedom of 
speech in a particular case or vice versa. It could be a proportionality test as envisaged 
in the White Paper and performed in the UK after the enactment of the HRA, a defini-
1127 Ministry of Transport v Noort; Police v Curren [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 283-4 (CA) per Richardson J. 
1128 Duff [1996] 2 NZLR 89, 101 (HC) per Blanchard J (emphasis supplied). 
1129 The ECtHR has interpreted the corresponding ‘necessary in a democratic society’ requisite as requir-
ing the application of a proportionality test – see  M Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the 
Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 
574, 579; M Hertig Randall, ‘Commercial Speech Under the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Subordinate or Equal?’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 53, 56. See also Peck v UK (2003) 13 BHRC 
669 para 76; Associated Newspapers Ltd v His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales [2007] 3 WLR 222 
(CA) para 67 per Blackburne J. 
1130 Compare also the opinion of the ECHR in Sunday Times (1979) 2 EHRR 245 para 65: ‘[t]he Court 
has to be satisfied that the interference was necessary having regard to facts and the circumstances pre-
vailing in the specific case before it.’ 
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tional balancing test, as performed in the common law of the USA, or an original solu-
tion. The respective interpretation of each human rights instrument, as we have seen, 
has a decisive impact on the balancing exercise in the UK and the USA. It would be dif-
ficult to understand why it should be otherwise in New Zealand after the Judges in 
Hosking deliberately decided to apply the NZBoRA to the common law. 
 
Unfortunately, the New Zealand courts have not found a definite answer to the 
question. Rather, preferences ‘are scattered throughout the law reports, although the is-
sue has rarely been subject of considered analysis.’1131 This is disadvantageous for the 
present purposes since it is unclear how the new privacy tort would be constitutional-
ised. A minimum illumination of this point is unavoidable in order to analyse the limita-
tion processes proposed by the majority in Hosking. It seems settled that any formula-
tion of the limitation process is crucial whatever form the tort may take.1132 The meth-
ods applied by the courts include (1) definitional balancing; (2) ad hoc balancing; and 
(3) an approach combining both aforementioned techniques. Each approach and the re-
spective compatibility with s 5 will receive further attention in the following para-
graphs. 
Definitional balancing 
Definitional balancing ‘involves reading limitations into the definition’ of free-
dom of expression.1133 As a result, freedom of expression might therefore not embrace, 
for instance, the distribution of child pornography.1134 It appears useful to choose a 
drastic example1135 because it would be a natural reaction to decide this way. The en-
shrined right is inherently limited in cases that the distribution of child pornography is 
1131 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.6.2. 
1132 U J Cheer, ‘Privacy and the Public Interest’ (2005) 1 Privacy Law Bulletin 145. See also G Phil-
lipson, ‘The ‘right’ of privacy in England and Strasbourg compared’ in M Richardson and A T Kenyon 
(eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 184, 212-3.  
1133 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.6.1; P A Joseph, 
Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand (3rd ed, 2007) para 27.4.4 at p 1160 and N M 
Richards, ‘Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment’ (2005) 52 University of California Los 
Angeles Law Review 1149, 1172, 1177. 
1133 Ibid. 
1134 See, eg, Ashcroft v The Free Speech Coalition, 535 US 234, 245-6 (‘The freedom of speech has its 
limits, it does not embrace certain categories of speech, […] obscenity, and pornography with real chil-
dren’).  
1135 Taken from Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (No 2) [2002] 2 NZLR 754 (CA). 
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not regarded as an exercise of freedom of expression.1136 This is the mode of balancing 
performed in US law, for the most part, because the wording of the First Amendment 
does not contain explicit limits.1137 Moreover, the US Constitution does not include a 
separate limitation clause.1138 This structure of fundamental rights, as I have sought to 
show, has led to a strong opinion regarding the First Amendment as granting absolute 
rights or at least as absolute as possible. However, US Courts have found that child 
pornography is not by definition without value. Where the ‘speech is neither obscene 
nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the protection of the First 
Amendment.’1139 The protected status of the speech in question is determined by a 
(permissible) community mores test similar to the newsworthiness element in the pri-
vacy context.1140 In this regard, the US Supreme Court has held as follows:1141
 
the basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: whether "the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the pruri-
ent interest, […] (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a 
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.  
 
Once the scope of a constitutional right is infringed the courts follow an ‘inter-
mediate conception of rights;’ the rights do not operate as trumps (in Dworkin’s sense), 
but have more force than they would have if they were operating as principles in the 
light of a proportionality test.1142 As regards freedom speech, a content-based restriction 
requires the strictest review in the USA. Only an interference ‘necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and [...] narrowly drawn to achieve that end’ suffices.1143 In 
1136 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.6.1. 
1137 Note that pornography is, of course, protected by the First Amendment – see J Rubenfeld, ‘The First 
Amendment’s Purpose’ (2001) 53 Stanford Law Review 767, 824. 
1138 See also White Paper, para 10.25. 
1139 Ashcroft v The Free Speech Coalition, 535 US 234, 251 (2002). 
1140 It should come as no surprise that the use of community mores tests is equally disputed in this context 
– see, eg, F Schauer, ‘Freedom of expression adjudication in Europe and the United States: a case study 
in comparative constitutional architecture’ in G Nolte (ed), European an US Constitutionalism (CUP 
2005) 49, 68. 
1141 Miller v California, 413 US 15, 24 (1973) (emphasis added). See also New York v Ferber, 458 US 
747, 764-5 (1982); Ashcroft v The Free Speech Coalition, 535 US 234, 240.  
1142 M Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Jus-
tice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, 593; R M Dworkin, Taking Rights Seri-
ously (Duckworth, 1978) 200. 
1143 Eg, Perry Education Association v Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 US 37, 45 (1983). 
 
 
197 
                                                          
brief, the US approach consists of categorisation at the first stage and limited balancing 
at the second.1144 This, as we know, is the main reason why the public disclosure 
branch of the common law tort is defunct for practical purposes.1145 The chief advan-
tage/disadvantage of this system is that the determination of the scope of the respective 
right goes along with its limitations.1146 Therefore, the technique is appropriate for gen-
erating general rules ‘which can be employed in future cases without the occasion for 
further weighing of interests.’1147 As already indicated, this approach is ‘episodic’ 
rather than ‘systematic’ and thus akin to common law methodology.1148 Thus, it is ca-
pable of producing useful precedential authority.   
 
In New Zealand, a similar approach was taken in Solicitor-General v Radio 
NZ1149 where the court held that a contempt of court is not covered by freedom of 
speech.1150 The Court arrived at this result after balancing the abstract doctrine of con-
tempt of court against freedom of speech.1151 According to this judgment, s 14 is lim-
ited inherently by recognising a generally prevailing value of a fair administration.1152 
As a rule, there would be no need for further weighing in the future. The scope of free-
dom of expression did not embrace a contempt of court regardless of the facts of the 
particular case. A justification under s 5, however, only takes place if the ambit of s 14 
would be wide enough to embrace a contempt of court.1153 Since this was already not 
the case, there was no need for the Court to figure out whether the contempt of court 
1144 See F Schauer, ‘Freedom of expression adjudication in Europe and the United States: a case study in 
comparative constitutional architecture’ in G Nolte (ed), European an US Constitutionalism (CUP 2005) 
49, 64. 
1145 See above Chapter Two, 1.4. 
1146 This technique therefore seeks to avoid a conflict between countervailing rights and interests – see S 
Mize, ’ Resolving Cases of Conflicting Rights under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act’ (2006) 22 New 
Zealand Universities Law Review 50, 63. 
1147 T A Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 943, 979; 
see also S Mize, ’ Resolving Cases of Conflicting Rights under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act’ 
(2006) 22 New Zealand Universities Law Review 50, 63-4. 
1148 See also F Schauer, ‘Freedom of expression adjudication in Europe and the United States: a case 
study in comparative constitutional architecture’ in G Nolte (ed), European an US Constitutionalism 
(CUP 2005) 49, 59 fn 23.   
1149 [1994] 1 NZLR 48, 59-60 (HC) per Eichelbaum CJ and Greig J (“Radio New Zealand”). 
1150 See also the reference in Duff  [1996] 2 NZLR 89, 100 (HC) per Blanchard J (“Duff”). 
1151 Radio New Zealand [1994] 1 NZLR 48, 60 (HC) per Eichelbaum CJ and Greig J. 
1152 Ibid. 
1153 Ibid, at p 58. 
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was a restriction within the limits of s 5. The limitation process, therefore, may be com-
posed of two steps, but reaching the second step is not mandatory. 
 
However, this approach on limiting fundamental rights is, in the author’s view, 
incompatible with the NZBoRA. This country’s human rights instrument has a general 
limitation clause in s 5. One can therefore draw an elementary distinction between the 
law of the USA and New Zealand. An isolated view on s 5, as part of the ‘General Pro-
visions’ in Part I of the NZBoRA, suggests a limitation process necessarily consisting 
of two steps:1154 (1) scope and purpose of the civil and political rights of the NZBoRA 
have to be delineated properly; and (2) consideration has to be given to the reasonable-
ness of limits placed upon these rights on the merits of the case. In other words, the de-
termination of a right’s scope (Part II of the Act), has to be divided from the determina-
tion as to whether it is justified to place a limit on that particular right.1155   
 
A proper reading of the White Paper supports this view. Inspired by the Cana-
dian Charter, the drafters envisaged an intermediate model between the US approach 
and the one taken in Europe or by the ICCPR.1156 The basic limiting procedure in this 
country is nevertheless significantly different from the approach taken in the USA 
whilst it is not substantively different from the concept employed in the UK.1157 The 
main reason for this intermediary position was the simplicity of language.1158 The draft-
ers assumed that the greater elaboration of detail, as manifested in the ECHR, was sup-
posed to have little impact on the final judgments.1159 The practical outcome was ex-
pected to be similar, if not identical, in substance. Article 10 (1) ECHR, for instance, 
defines the scope of freedom of expression. Article 10 (2) ECHR, on the other hand, 
contains pre-conditions (elaborated in detail for the purposes of freedom of expres-
1154 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.4.4 and 6.4.1 re-
ferring to the similar approach taken in the White Paper, paras 10.27-10.29. 
1155 See also P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.6.4. 
1156 White Paper, paras 10.25 and 10.26. 
1157 See also F Schauer, ‘Freedom of expression adjudication in Europe and the United States: a case 
study in comparative constitutional architecture’ in G Nolte (ed), European an US Constitutionalism 
(CUP 2005) 49, 53-4. 
1158 White Paper, para 10.26. 
1159 Ibid. 
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sion)1160 under which a limitation of the right described in art 10 (1) ECHR might be 
justified. This approach therefore requires a two-step limitation process. Determination 
of the right’s scope is carried out on one level whilst the justification of a limit takes 
place on a second level. The second step has to be strictly distinguished from the first. 
The difference between the approaches taken in the UK and New Zealand is, thus, that 
the UK approach includes ‘in each provision stating a freedom a separate statement of 
limits.’1161 However, s 5 is the equivalent of the NZBoRA to art 10 (2) ECHR in the 
shape of a general limitation clause (written ‘in short, simple, elegant and inspiring lan-
guage’)1162 as distinct from several separate statements of limits on each right or free-
dom.1163 The specific limitation clause in the context of English law is typical of post-
World War II human rights instruments; the approach taken in Canada and New Zea-
land is a characteristic of modern codifications.1164  
 
Definitional balancing, however, is done inherently in s 14 and, on occasion, 
even excludes ‘the need to proceed to s 5’ of the NZBoRA in order to justify the 
limit.1165 This happened in Radio New Zealand. This approach largely waters down the 
substantial difference in limiting fundamental rights between the USA and New Zea-
land. A large part of the justification – if not the whole procedure – already takes place 
in the first step of the limitation process. It simultaneously waters down the similarities 
between the HRA/ECHR, on the one hand, and the NZBoRA, on the other. Notwith-
standing, the decisive point to be kept in mind is that the approach taken in Radio New 
Zealand does not necessarily lead to a second step following a definition of the scope of 
s 14 through definitional balancing.    
Ad hoc balancing 
As already indicated during the preceding exposition, an ad hoc balancing exer-
cise requires the broad definition of the rights and freedoms without any influence of 
1160 Ibid. 
1161 White Paper, para 10.25. 
1162 Ibid, para 10.26. 
1163 See also Hansen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC) para 187 per McGrath J. 
1164 See M Kumm, ‘What Do You Have in Virtue of Having a Constitutional Right? On the Place and 
Limits of the Proportionality Requirement’ at p 5-6 <http://www.lsr.nelco.org/nyu/plltwp/papers/46 at 08 
February 2008>. 
1165 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), paras 6.6.1, 6.6.7. 
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competing values or other considerations.1166 In a separate second step, a court has to 
determine whether the limit on freedom of expression is reasonable.1167 At this stage, 
competing values and/or other considerations come into play. In Moonen (No 1)1168, the 
Court of Appeal championed such an approach, which enables the courts to use both s 
14 and s 5 consistently. The Court described the ambit of freedom of expression as be-
ing ‘as wide as human thought and imagination.’1169 The broad definition of the ambit 
ascertains only the range of expressive acts or utterances falling within the scope of the 
right. Hence, it is very rare in the UK that art 10 (1) ECHR is not engaged when free-
dom of speech is argued.1170 According to this approach, freedom of expression would 
embrace, by way of illustration, the distribution of child pornography, hate speech, etc. 
This interim result might be bewildering to some; it suggests that the law protects even 
such abominable conducts. Being confronted with such an example, it is a natural temp-
tation to limit the right inherently.1171 Rishworth summarised this natural first reaction 
by mentioning that ‘the right [freedom of speech] is defined so broadly […] it includes 
much that does not deserve protection.’1172 However, this example merely shows the 
importance of making a clear distinction between the determination of the scope of a 
right, on one hand, and the justification of limits placed on the right, on the other.1173  
 
In the following second step, the court therefore examines whether the limiting 
principle, together with other influencing factors (such as policy) justifies a restriction 
on the expressive act in that particular case.1174 In the UK, this process is carried out by 
applying a proportionality balancing exercise. Ursula Cheer has argued that in ‘contrast 
to the New Zealand approach, both Law Lords [Baroness Hale and Lord Hope in 
1166 Ibid, para 6.6.1; Hansen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC) para 22 per Elias CJ. 
1167 See also A Barak, ‘Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience’ (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 369; M Kumm, ‘What Do You Have in Virtue of Having a Constitutional Right? On the Place 
and Limits of the Proportionality Requirement’ at p 5 <http://www.lsr.nelco.org/nyu/plltwp/papers/46 at 
08 February 2008>.  
1168 [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA) para 15 per Tipping J. 
1169 Moonen (No 1) [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA) para 15 per Tipping J. 
1170 A Merris, ‘Can We Speak Freely Now? Freedom of Expression under the Human Rights Act’ [2002] 
European Human Rights Law Review 750, 751. 
1171 See U J Cheer, ‘Censorship and the Bill of Rights’ [2000] New Zealand Law Journal 145, 146. 
1172 P Rishworth in Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) 312. 
1173 See also Hansen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC) para 22 per Elias CJ. 
1174 See M Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional 
Justice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, 582 who notes that an infringement of 
a right merely ‘triggers an assessment of whether the infringement is justified’). 
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Campbell] were prepared to distinguish between different types of speech, identifying 
political and artistic or educational speech as more deserving of protection than com-
mercial speech.’1175 The original statement by Baroness Hale1176 might be misleading 
since all types of speech are equally embraced and protected by the broad scope of art 
10 (1) ECHR in the first place. This equal treatment has to be distinguished from the 
fact that the aforementioned types of speech may receive different treatment under art 
10 (2) ECHR.1177 While determining the reasonableness of the limit, the court is ex-
pected ‘to have regard to the importance of the particular type of expression.’1178 By 
applying a proportionality test, different kinds of speech may carry different kinds of 
weight;1179 different weight in the balance follows from divergent importance to a de-
mocratic society at justification stage.1180 Political speech, for instance, is more difficult 
to outweigh in comparison to commercial speech.1181 However, political speech is not 
‘deserving’ of more protection in a strict sense; it is simply carrying more weight in the 
balance and is therefore less likely to be outweighed by a competing limit in a propor-
tionality test.1182 This is because of its own utmost importance to a democratic society, 
not a weight accorded to this type of speech by the British judges. It is nevertheless im-
portant to reconsider Herbert Hart’s concept of ‘open-textured law.’ These categories of 
speech are not fixed. It is arguably impossible ‘to draw a bright definitional line be-
1175 U J Cheer, ‘Privacy and the Public Interest’ (2005) 1 Privacy Law Bulletin 145, 149 (emphasis 
added).  
1176 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 148. 
1177 Eg, CC v AB [2007] EMLR 11 (QBD) para 36 per Eady J. For a brief discussion of the difference 
between ‘commercial speech’ and political speech see M Hertig Randall, ‘Commercial Speech under the 
European Convention on Human Rights: Subordinate or Equal?’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 53 
particularly pp 79-86. 
1178 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.6.1 (emphasis 
added); see also White Paper, para 10.58 (‘[…] the courts will be concerned to weigh the value of the 
particular speech (moving from political and social speech, to commercial speech, to pornography and to 
other forms of expression through conduct, […]’). 
1179 This model, as we know, cannot be transposed into the legal system of the USA without problems. It 
is incompatible with the ‘neutrality principle’ which means that the government must maintain neutrality 
as to different conceptions of good; all speech has principally the same value – see D J Solove, ‘The Vir-
tues Of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure’ (2003) 53 Duke Law Journal 
967, 984-5. 
1180 See also for the discussion in the USA: P Gewirtz, ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Re-
view 139, 172; D J Solove, ‘The Virtues Of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Dis-
closure’ (2003) 53 Duke Law Journal 967, 1010. 
1181 See Associated Newspapers Ltd v His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales [2007] 3 WLR 222 (CA) 
para 96 per Blackburne J. 
1182 See Green Corns Ltd v Claverley Group Ltd [2005] EMLR 31 (QB) para 97 per Tugendhat J; M Her-
tig Randall, ‘Commercial Speech Under the European Convention on Human Rights: Subordinate or 
Equal?’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 53, 58. 
 
 
202 
                                                          
tween facts falling within and those falling outside a certain category [of speech],’ 
which should, according to Maya Hertig Randall, not distract from the usefulness of 
categorisation.1183
 
Given that disseminated private information in the context of the new privacy 
tort consists of ‘child pornography,’ the individual privacy interest of the child would 
usually prevail over free-speech interests in Europe without much ado. In other words, 
the dissemination of child pornography is embraced by freedom of speech but out-
weighed because of its immeasurable low value to a democratic society. In the USA, in 
contrast, pornography and political speech are both subject to the same ‘strict scru-
tiny.’1184 At this point, it nevertheless seems reasonable to reiterate that it is most im-
portant to distinguish between content-based and content-neutral restrictions on free-
dom of speech.1185 In Young v American Mini Theatres Inc1186, for instance, the US Su-
preme Court declined to apply the strict scrutiny normally required for content-based 
regulations. The Court adopted instead the lower standard of scrutiny usually applied to 
content-neutral regulations, because the case at hand was arguably concerned with zon-
ing regulations to single out adult-oriented businesses (such as adult theatres).1187 How-
ever, only content-based restrictions of freedom of speech are of interest in this con-
text.1188   
 
1183 M Hertig Randall, ‘Commercial Speech under the European Convention on Human Rights: Subordi-
nate or Equal?’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 53, 57. 
1184 J Rubenfeld, ‘The First Amendment’s Purpose’ (2001) 53 Stanford Law Review 767, 824. See also 
Ashcroft v The Free Speech Coalition, 535 US 234, 263 (2002) per O’Connor J (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
1185 See above Chapter Two, 1.2. 
1186 427 US 50 (1976) 
1187 See ibid, at p 71-3. The regulation at issue in that case required that an adult-oriented business could 
not be located within 1000 feet of any two other ‘regulated uses’ or within 500 feet of any area zoned for 
residential use. The term ‘regulated use’ applied to ten types of establishments in addition to adult thea-
tres – ibid. 
1188 It should be noted that the majority argued, ‘society's interest in protecting this type of expression is 
of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate […]’ – ibid, 
at p 70. In his scathing dissent, Justice Stewart castigated this as a ‘drastic departure from established 
principles of First Amendment law;’ the Judge also noted that the ‘Court rides roughshod over cardinal 
principles of First Amendment’- at p 85. The Judge concluded by mentioning that ‘the Court invokes a 
concept wholly alien to the First Amendment’ – at p 86.
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With regard to the approach set out in the the UK, Tipping J described the vary-
ing values of different speech types to society in a strikingly similar way in Hosking1189, 
as it will be argued later. In brief, this approach is compatible with the NZBoRA. 
Moreover, this model requires a systematic approach as opposed to the episodic review 
applied in the USA.    
The Duff approach  
A third way of interpreting s 5 was elaborated in Duff. Blanchard J disagreed 
with the decision in Radio New Zealand but argued that some inherent limits must be 
read into s 14.1190 Nonetheless, his Honour stated that the term expression ‘should be 
defined widely, and that questions on limits of the right should generally be determined 
through s 5.’1191 In the course of examining the relationship between the law of con-
tempt and the NZBoRA, the Judge found three ways to approach the relationship of 
freedom of speech with the law of contempt.1192 Blanchard J described both a defini-
tional as well as an ad hoc balancing test as outlined before. He concluded that a third 
way was preferable, which should embrace both aforementioned methods.1193 The defi-
nitional balancing part was supposed to treat the matter on an abstract level while the ad 
hoc balancing part should reflect the reality by taking the facts of every case into ac-
count.1194 Even though some inherent limits could be read into s 14, the courts neces-
sarily have to consider furthermore whether the restriction of freedom of speech is justi-
fied with regard to the provisions to s 5. Being necessarily composed of two steps, this 
limitation process seems compatible at least with s 5.1195 At the same time, the neces-
sary second limitation step is the main distinction in comparison to the approach pro-
posed in Radio New Zealand.  
 
1189 [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) paras 233-235. 
1190 Duff [1996] 2 NZLR 89, 99 (HC). 
1191 Ibid. 
1192 Note that the impact of the NZBoRA on the law of contempt is an ‘example of “judicial procedural 
horizontality”, not full common law horizontality’ of the Act, see A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 
681,698 fn 75. 
1193 Duff  [1996] 2 NZLR 89, 99 (HC) 
1194 Ibid, at p 99-100. 
1195 It will be discussed later whether the process is also compatible with s 14. 
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The last two concepts can be found in the separate judgments of the Court of 
Appeal’s majority in Hosking. Tipping J’s approach, as we will see, is very similar to 
the one taken in the UK because it is based on proportionality and therefore on an ad 
hoc balancing test as proposed in Moonen (No 1). The joint judgment, by contrast, de-
fines particularly freedom of speech through definitional balancing followed by an ad-
ditional proportionality test. This approach was supposed to be guided by the approach 
elaborated in Duff.1196 Both approaches of the majority will now be addressed in further 
detail. 
1.1.4.2 Balancing according to the joint judgment   
Counsel for the Hoskings had submitted, ‘the type of speech that the respon-
dents are seeking to impart in this case should receive a lesser protection under the 
[New Zealand] Bill of Rights [Act] than political or artistic speech, because of its com-
mercially motivated gossip nature.’1197 This submission apparently attempts to define 
the scope of s 14 inherently through a definitional balancing exercise as counsel solely 
relied on US authorities.1198 
 
The joint judgment, however, refused to adopt categories such as ‘commercial’ 
and ‘non-commercial’ speech.1199 Instead, their Honours referred at first sight with ap-
proval to a proportionality test, ‘which catches the interrelationship between the com-
peting values.’1200 Even though this seemingly led to an ad hoc balancing exercise as 
employed in the UK,1201 their approach ended up as an accumulation of three different 
kinds of balancing. As I attempt to show in the following, the joint judgment employed 
(1) abstract definitional balancing to limit freedom of speech to ‘matters of public con-
1196 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 111.  
1197 Ibid, para 131 per Gault P and Blanchard J. Similar to hate speech, commercial speech was once re-
garded as not being protected by the First Amendment at all. Once it had deemed a protected form of 
speech though, this category faces the already familiar challenges of the ‘market place of ideas’ - D L 
Zimmerman, ‘Who put the Right into the Right of Publicity’ (1998) 9 DePaul University Journal of Art 
and Entertainment Law 35, 60. It consequently still ‘receive[s] high levels of constitutional protection 
under the increasingly robust First Amendment standards protecting such speech’ - see R A Smolla, ‘Pri-
vacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News’ (1999) 67 George Washington Law Review 1097, 
1115 fn 71.  
1198 Ibid, citing the older cases Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Association, 436 US 447 (1978); Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v Virgina Citizens Consumer Council Inc, 425 US 748 (1976).  
1199 Ibid para 135; see also U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 255. 
1200 Ibid, para 132. 
1201 Ibid. Their Honours referred to the work of the British scholar Gavin Phillipson.  
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cern’ for the purposes of the tort; (2) ad hoc definitional balancing to determine whether 
or not an issue is a ‘matter of public concern’ and (3) a proportionality test to catch the 
interrelationship between the competing values.     
The three balancing exercises  
 
In order to understand the first part consisting of definitional balancing, one 
needs to have a basic idea about the structure of the tort championed by both Judges and 
its inherent definitions of privacy and freedom of expression. According to this ap-
proach, an invasion of privacy is actionable if the plaintiff shows 
  
• facts in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy; 
and  
• that the violation of this expectation could be regarded as highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.1202   
 
Freedom of expression, on the other hand, protects the defendant only if the 
publication of the highly offensive facts corresponds with a ‘public concern’ as distinct 
from a public interest or curiosity.1203 Their Honours apparently found themselves 
obliged to confine freedom of speech tightly after having adopted the US highly offen-
sive test. The Judges used the term public concern deliberately in order to stress the dif-
ference to matters of general interest or curiosity to the public.1204 What the public 
might be interested in, is not the same as the public interest.1205 Their Honours indi-
cated that matters of general interest or curiosity would not suffice to outweigh the sub-
1202 See Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 117; see too Rogers v TVNZ Ltd [2007] NZSC 91 para 98 
per McGrath J. 
1203 Ibid, para 133; see also Rogers v TVNZ Ltd (2005) 22 CRNZ 668 (HC) para 22 per Venning and 
Winkelmann JJ. 
1204 Ibid, 134; see also Andrews v TVNZ High Court Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 De-
cember 2006, Allan J) para 81. In the modern Californian cases, by contrast, ‘legitimate public interest’ 
and legitimate public concern’ are identical to ‘newsworthiness’ - G L Bostwick, ‘The Newsworthiness 
Element: Shulman v Group W Prods., Inc. Muddies the Waters’ (1999) 19 Loyola of Los Angeles Enter-
tainment Law Review 225, 237. 
1205 McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 66 per Buxton LJ; U J Cheer, ‘Privacy and the Public Inter-
est’ (2005) 1 Privacy Law Bulletin 145, 146. What the public is interested in may be described as “human 
interest” – see R A Smolla, ‘Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News’ (1999) 67 George 
Washington Law Review 1097, 1098.
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stantial harm done by a ‘highly offensive’ invasion of privacy.1206 Although the judges 
rejected a categorisation of speech into ‘commercial’ and ‘non-commercial’ speech, 
they still used definitional balancing in order to define the scope of s 14. The only dif-
ference is that the judges adopted ‘matters of public concern’ and ‘matters of mere pub-
lic interest or curiosity’ as general categories.1207 The scope of s 14 is, nonetheless, in-
herently limited without reference to the facts of the case – the classic feature of defini-
tional balancing. Charitably understood, this part of the balancing exercise is neverthe-
less consonant with the Duff concept. Blanchard J opined in that case that some limits 
could be read into the scope of s 14 by using this abstract technique.1208
 
In the author’s view, this part of the limitation process is, nonetheless, not con-
spicuous for its dedication to the NZBoRA. It has been argued before that the Act has a 
decisive influence on the tort once the courts have deliberately decided to extend its im-
pact to private litigants. The joint judgment, in contrast, confined the scope of s 14 ap-
parently solely under the influence of the ‘highly offensive’ test. This is not information 
which the Judges received from the NZBoRA. Instead, it seems as if their Honours 
were taken hostage by their own delineation of the privacy interest before they moulded 
the public interest/concern feature of the tort. 
  
Furthermore, the joint judgment adopted the US standard, as proposed in the 
Restatement, as a balancing method in order to determine ‘matters of public con-
cern.’1209 Their Honours opined that community norms, values and standards should be 
taken into account in each individual case.1210 This freestanding balancing technique 
might be labelled as ‘ad hoc definitional balancing.’ The scope of freedom of speech is 
limited inherently, but on the facts of the case rather than on an abstract basis. However, 
1206 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 134; see also Andrews v TVNZ High Court Auckland, CIV 
2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) para 81. 
1207See also U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 255.  
1208 However, the limits inherent in s 14 obviously related to the Full High Courts finding in Radio New 
Zealand [1994] 1 NZLR 48, 59-60 that, for instance, acts of violence or murder are not ‘expression’ in 
terms of s 14.  
1209 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 135. 
1210 Ibid. 
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there is no direct confrontation between countervailing interests in free speech and pri-
vacy involved - hence the name ad hoc definitional balancing.1211  
 
The preferences of New Zealand’s judges may be scattered through the law re-
ports, but, as far as the author is aware, ad hoc definitional balancing has heretofore 
never been used or even pronounced as an element in order to define and limit s 14. The 
technique neither appears in Radio New Zealand nor in Duff and certainly not in 
Moonen (No1). Its adoption was rather a novelty in this country. As a result, the com-
mon law might hence be ‘constitutionalised’, but not because of the impact of this 
country’s quasi-constitutional framework. Lest we forget the words of Lord Steyn: ‘in 
law, context is everything.’1212 Privacy enthusiasts in the USA, as we know, seek to es-
tablish this common law balancing exercise as First Amendment doctrine in the after-
math of Bartnicki v Vopper.1213 It might be a way to revitalise an otherwise ‘swallowed’ 
private facts tort in that country. Getting to the core of the matter, it is a question of es-
tablishing its constitutional integrity in the USA.  
 
In my opinion, comparative law must always be a means of interpreting the do-
mestic law, not an end.1214 US judges may be obliged to use techniques of this kind be-
cause the constitutional framework does not allow different forms of balancing. How-
ever, there is no reason to believe that this is automatically a valid technique to interpret 
ss 14 and 5. Transposing the author’s understanding of comparative law into this analy-
sis, the first question must always be whether such a technique is compatible with ‘our’ 
rule of law (macro comparison).1215 Granted that this question could be answered in the 
affirmative, it would be worthwhile analysing whether the adoption of foreign law 
might be advantageous as compared to the law as it stands (micro comparison). Alas, 
their Honours’ reasoning as to why this technique fits into the legal framework of this 
1211 See also Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC) para 134 per McGrath J, who seems to paraphrase 
a similar balancing technique. 
1212 Regina (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 WLR 1622 para 28. 
1213 Eg, P J McNulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 
Drake Law Review 93, 138. See above Chapter Two, 1.2.4. 
1214 See also Hosking [2003] 3 NZLR 385 (HC) para 106 per Randerson J. 
1215 For a concise discussion of the term ‘rule of law’ in this context see Hansen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 1 
(SC) para 101 per Tipping J; Lord Steyn, ‘Democracy through Law’ [2002] European Human Rights 
Law Review 723, 727-8 and P A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand (3rd ed, 
2007) 150-2. 
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country amounts to nothing more than the following: ‘[t]here are of course analogies 
here with qualified privilege in defamation and the iniquity defence in cases of breach 
of confidence.’ 1216
 
It is obvious from their Honours’ assertion that the common law is supposed to 
be the decisive factor in interpreting s 14, which should come as no surprise. Particu-
larly Gault P seems to have followed his general attitude, according to which the 
NZBoRA only represents a restatement of the law as opposed to auguring a new ap-
proach.1217 Ian Leigh has observed similar attitudes among English judges, but convinc-
ingly rejected the premise as unconvincing.1218 Be that as it may, the implementation of 
the US standard alienates the common law of this country from the NZBoRA in a situa-
tion where the Act should have had a positive influence on the law. ‘Constitutionalisa-
tion’ is ordinarily driven by the incentive to harmonise the private law sphere with the 
public law of - the same - legal system.1219 The rationale behind this process is that both 
direct government action and (today probably even more so) private citizens in modern 
societies equally endanger enshrined rights, such as freedom of expression.1220 The 
joint judgment, however, harmonises New Zealand’s tort of privacy with American tort 
law without even asking what s 14 actually demands. This turns the very essence of 
constitutionalisation upside down. In a manner of speaking, the joint judgment produces 
a cacophony rather than harmony within New Zealand’s legal system. In brief, the im-
plementation of ad hoc definitional balancing is inappropriate. Their Honours inserted 
an additional chapter into the already diverse range of interpreting s 5. Thus, I suggest 
that this ‘legitimate public concern’ test is not a proper one.1221 This was not said with 
reference to the quality of the law; it is, in the author’s view, illegitimate a priori due to 
1216 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 135. 
1217 P Rishworth, ‘Lord Cooke and the Bill of Rights’ in P Rishworth (ed), The Struggle for simplicity in 
the law (1997) 321. 
1218 I Leigh, ‘Horizontal Rights, the Human Rights Act and Privacy: Lessons from the Commonwealth?’ 
(1999) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 57, 82. 
1219 See Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 50 per Lord Hoffmann. 
1220 See J Norton, ‘Hosking v Runting and the Role of Freedom of Expression’ [2004] Auckland Univer-
sity Law Review 245, 252; in Germany, Hans-Carl Nipperdey observed this phenomenon in his  article 
“Gleicher Lohn der Frau fuer gleiche Leistung” published in Recht der Arbeit (1950) 121 as cited in B S 
Markesinis and S Enchelmaier, ‘Human Rights under German Constitutional Law’ in B S Markesinis 
(ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) 191, 196; see also S Gardbaum, ‘The "Horizontal Effect" of Constitu-
tional Rights’ (2003) 102 Michigan Law Review 387, 395.  
1221 Compare J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.5.05 at 
p 763. 
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its incompatibility with the domestic rule of law. This renders the subsequent second 
question concerned with the ‘quality’ of the law superfluous.      
      
Finally, their Honours proposed a proportionality test as a third balancing exer-
cise. A direct confrontation - the interrelationship - between both principles in a propor-
tionality test follows if the litigants have met their respective requirements.1222 In this 
respect, their Honours assumed that the importance of freedom of expression would be 
related to the extent of legitimate public concern in the information publicised.1223 After 
a matter has been identified as one of public concern, the level of legitimate public con-
cern ‘would have to be such as outweighs the level of harm likely to be caused.’1224 The 
greater the invasion into privacy, ‘the greater will need to be the degree of “public con-
cern”’ to disseminate the material in question.1225 However, this test could be described 
as an add-on proportionality test following the definitional limitation of freedom of 
speech to matters of public concern. The proportionality test is a ‘cropped’ version 
compared to the weighing exercise outlined in Noort and Duff, because it represents 
only an aspect of the test(s) proposed in those judgments. It may seem to belabour a 
point, but this approach implies that something identified as a public concern in New 
Zealand cannot be published automatically. Privacy interests can still outweigh speech 
of this kind. One might have expected that a public concern would already be the final 
word and, therefore, prevail in a democratic society.  
 
Burrows has observed that this additional balancing exercise would often be one 
of some difficulty.1226 It does not take much empathy to speculate that he regards this 
additional test as a problem. Without going into further detail at this stage, this add-on 
1222 See J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005), para 18.5.05 at p 
763, who observes that the requirement of a ‘legitimate public concern’ and the adoption of the highly 
offensive test ‘does not preclude a proportionality approach.’  
1223 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 132. 
1224 Ibid, para 134 using the facts of the Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 908 as 
an example: if the publication was going to cause a major risk of serious physical injury or death, a very 
considerable level of legitimate public concern would be necessary to establish the defence. 
1225 J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.5.05 at p 763; 
see also U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 255. 
1226 J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.5.05 at p 763. 
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proportionality test is nevertheless necessary as a minimum reference to s 5 inasmuch 
as their Honours deliberately decided to be bound by the following standards:1227  
 
[w]hile developments in the common law must be consistent with the […] Bill of Rights Act, 
such developments are not precluded merely because they might encroach upon those rights and 
freedoms. It becomes a matter of whether such common law encroachment meets the test of a 
reasonable limit on the applicable […] freedom which is demonstrably justified in a democratic 
society in s 5. 
 
Their Honours delineated so far merely the scope of s 14 by definitional balanc-
ing. Without this add-on proportionality test, however, the courts would perform a limi-
tation process even stricter than the one applied in Radio New Zealand because a sec-
ond limitation step would structurally never take place. In other words, the courts would 
never proceed to s 5 scrutiny as a matter of justifying the limit. As a result, s 14 would 
be limited exclusively by definitional balancing and, thus, inherently. The NZBoRA 
nevertheless requires a two-step limitation process, which is why such an approach 
would not be sustainable.  
 
However, there is indeed a problem here. Their Honours stated that ‘[r]elevant 
considerations were reviewed in Duff […].’1228 As we remember, Blanchard J sug-
gested that rights should be defined broadly (with some inherent limits) whereas limits 
should be determined generally pursuant to s 5. His Honour rejected the approach taken 
in Radio New Zealand because such a second step was only deemed necessary given 
that the scope of s 14 is broad enough to embrace the particular utterance or conduct as 
‘expression.’ Instead, the courts were expected to apply both definitional and ad hoc 
balancing in every case.   
 
In contrast to their Honours’ allegation, the public concern conception in Hosk-
ing does not embrace the theoretically required second step. Given that the plaintiff 
shows a ‘highly offensive’ invasion of her privacy whilst the defendant, by way of illus-
tration, could only establish a ‘matter of mediocre public interest,’ there would be no 
1227 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 CA para 111 (emphasis added). 
1228 Ibid. 
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need to proceed to s 5 - the justification stage of the privacy limit. In my eyes, what has 
been described as a defence must rather collapse in such a scenario. The defendant has 
to fight an uphill battle.1229 Thus, the privacy interest would prevail over s 14 regardless 
of the add-on proportionality test. The scope of s 14 would simply not encompass a 
‘matter of mediocre public interest’; in other words, it would not be a relevant ‘expres-
sion’ for the purposes of the privacy tort. This would suffice to limit freedom of expres-
sion without considering any s 5 concerns.1230 This, as we know, is not the limitation 
process outlined in Duff, it is a relapse into the process championed in Radio New Zea-
land. The only variation is that the scope of s 14 is additionally determined by using ad 
hoc definitional balancing inspired by US law. The delineation of the freedom’s scope 
might therefore not be as abstract as in Radio New Zealand.  
 
Nonetheless, their Honours opined that the courts could and should act along-
side the legislature to protect privacy interests under the premise that any interference 
with s 14 is justified under s 5 scrutiny.1231 The privacy tort, however, is not a reason-
able limit demonstrably justified in a democratic society in the abstract. As we know, 
the determination of those factors has to be carried out by means of a balancing exer-
cise. During this context-specific procedure, the relative weight of limit and affirmed 
right has to be determined in an individual case.1232 Such a weighing exercise, as a nec-
essary second limitation step, is not mandatory in this concept.1233 In sum, it is sug-
gested that the joint judgment did not meet its own standards while supposedly applying 
the Duff-standard in Hosking. It is only possible to subsume the joint judgments final 
concept under their Honours’ initial premise if the defendant meets the requirements of 
the ‘public concern’ test. 
 
An anticipated objection to this result would point to supposed similarities of the 
joint judgment’s approach to the qualified privilege defence in defamation. A valid 
1229 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy - Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 396. 
1230 Exactly this stance had been criticised in Duff [1996] 2 NZLR 89, 99 (HC) per Blanchard J. 
1231 A Geddis, ‘Hosking v Runting: A privacy Tort for New Zealand’ (2005) 13 Tort Law Review 5, 8. 
1232 This is also desirable for the purposes of the common law – see U J Cheer, ‘Privacy and the Public 
Interest’ (2005) 1 Privacy Law Bulletin 145, 150.  
1233 It is a different matter that the privacy interest of the highly offended plaintiff might usually prevail in 
such a situation.  
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point, surely, since even their Honours were arguing by such an analogy.1234 I neverthe-
less beg to differ. This objection would presumably bring arguments from the Court of 
Appeal’s decision(s) in Lange v Atkinson to bear.1235 The situation there was different 
though. A defence of qualified privilege, as recommended by the report of the McKay 
Committee, was not realised in the Defamation Act 1992.1236 Thus, the common law 
development in Lange was predominantly driven by creating consistency with the 
aforementioned Act.1237 The Court considered primarily the defamation-specific statu-
tory background (most notably s 19(1) Defamation Act 1992 containing an equivalent 
to ‘actual malice’) of the defence and not s 5 in order to reconcile personal reputation 
and freedom of speech.1238 Tipping J’s unease with the ‘ill-will’ requirement, which the 
plaintiff has to show in order to strike down the defence, is otherwise difficult to under-
stand.1239 Tipping J finally accepted the view of the other members of the Court in the 
light of s 19 (1) Defamation Act 1992.1240 The joint judgment’s explicit standard in 
Hosking, by contrast, was that privacy, as a ‘common law encroachment,’ has to meet 
the tests included in s 5. There is reason to believe that this is not the case whenever a 
defendant is unable to show a matter of public concern. Similarities between both con-
stellations are scarce at best. According to my interpretation, it would therefore be in-
appropriate to draw such an analogy.           
Remarks on definitional balancing and conclusion 
 
The balancing test of the joint judgment, thus, consists of definitional balancing, 
ad hoc definitional balancing as well as ad hoc balancing. Nevertheless, a direct en-
counter between privacy and freedom of speech (as necessary for an ad hoc balancing 
test) is marginal in this approach. First, the reasonable person must be highly offended, 
1234 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 135 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
1235 Eg, [1998] 3 NZLR 424 (CA). 
1236 Ibid, at p 474 (CA) per Tipping J. 
1237 Ibid. 
1238 Ibid, at p 468 per Richardson P, Henry, Keith and Blanchard JJ.  
1239 Ibid, at pp 473-4: ‘But it is a sad fact that the necessary responsibility is not always shown. In such 
circumstances, striking an appropriate balance between freedom of expression and individual reputation 
is not easy. The striking of that balance must be informed by s 5 of the Bill of Rights which, while recog-
nising that there can be limits to individual rights, emphasises that those limits may only be such as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’ 
1240 Ibid, at p 475 (‘In spite of my anxiety about creating an erroneous balance, I nevertheless consider 
that it is in the overall public interest to develop the law of qualified privilege as indicated in the judg-
ment of the other members of the Court. I am encouraged to take that view by the existence in s 19(1) of 
the concept of taking improper advantage of the occasion’). 
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which will normally require an intense invasion of privacy1241 or the plaintiff has no 
actionable case. Secondly, freedom of speech is not defined ‘as wide as human thought 
and imagination’ for the purposes of the new privacy tort. This would require embrac-
ing, for instance, matters of general public interest or public curiosity as well as matters 
of legitimate public concern. A balancing exercise including both privacy and freedom-
of-speech concerns follows only if the litigants meet their respective tests.  
 
Although the Duff-concept was incorrectly applied in Hosking, some general 
remarks regarding the appropriateness of definitional balancing should be made. The 
combination of definitional and ad hoc balancing depends on Blanchard J’s basic as-
sumption that some inherent limits can be read into the scope of freedom of expression. 
This premise might be open to criticism. As we recall, s 14 includes the freedom to im-
part information and opinions of any kind and form. The wording makes it rather diffi-
cult to confine freedom of speech to matters of ‘public concern’ for the purposes of the 
new privacy tort. Moreover, it is not an easy task to identify how this approach could be 
aligned with Blanchard J’s own suggestions. How can such a confinement be reconciled 
with his Honour’s notion that the term expression ‘should be defined widely, and that 
questions on limits of the right should generally be determined through s 5’?1242 Keith 
J, on the other hand, was perfectly right in stating that ‘information and ideas of any 
kind’ are protected under the scope of the right.1243 Furthermore, Randerson J may have 
followed a different avenue by propagating the use of breach of confidence to protect 
privacy interests; the Judge was nonetheless right in stating:1244  
 
[t]he right under s 14 of the Bill of Rights Act is subject to justified limitations under s 5. But 
where any such limitations are proposed, […], the approach adopted should reflect the princi-
ples established by the Court of Appeal in [Moonen (No 1)]. [...]. First, any limitation on the 
guaranteed right may only be the least required to achieve the desired objective and then, only 
where it would constitute a reasonable limit which may be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. Secondly, the evaluation of these matters is a complex exercise involving 
1241 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy - Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 394. 
1242 Duff [1996] 2 NZLR 89, 99 (HC). 
1243 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 178; see also M Richardson, ‘Privacy and Precedent: The Court 
of Appeal’s Decision in Hosking v Runting’ (2005) 11 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 82, 92. 
1244 Hosking [2003] 3 NZLR 385 (HC) para 170 (emphasis added). 
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the balancing of a wide range of considerations and, ultimately, the making of a judgment on 
behalf of the society. 
 
Rishworth’s remark may finally illustrate the inappropriateness of the joint 
judgment’s approach:  1245
 
[i]t cannot be said that the right [freedom of expression] is ‘intrinsically limited’ on the basis 
that ‘some forms of expression are not within the guarantee, nor can a particular form of expres-
sion be excluded from the right simply because it is in breach of the law. The terms in which the 
right is set out in s 14 preclude this sort of definitional balancing. 
 
Apart from the wording of s 14, no systematic argument assists the joint judg-
ment. Almost ironically, s 21, which concerns privacy issues, protects merely against 
‘unreasonable search and seizure.’ The use of the term ‘unreasonable’ suggests that an 
inherent limit has to be read into the scope of the right.1246 It follows from this that the 
NZBoRA makes it clear when inherent limits have to be taken into consideration. Sec-
tion 14 precludes any form of definitional balancing and any limit has to be determined 
pursuant to s 5.  
 
Considered in aggregate, the author concludes that the joint judgment has pre-
sented a concept he finds himself incapable of sharing. The adoption of the US standard 
was already an incompatible novelty in defining and limiting NZBoRA rights. More-
over, the concept reveals logical flaws when tested against their Honours’ own stan-
dards and is for these reasons alone a red herring. In my view, another chapter should 
not be inserted into the already diverse range of interpretations of s 5. Their Honours’ 
approach should consequently be rejected. We will now turn to the balancing approach 
proposed by Tipping J.         
1245 P Rishworth in Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) 312 (emphasis added). 
1246 Although this inherent limit had been described as ‘internal modifier’ in New Zealand – P and A But-
ler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.6.9. 
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1.1.4.3 The balancing exercise of Tipping J  
Tipping J’s approach has not received much attention so far.1247 His Honour 
paid closer attention to s 5 during his separate judgment in support of the majority.1248 
This might even be the main reason for the limited interest; one might have the distinct 
impression that the NZBoRA is the ‘black sheep’1249 of New Zealand’s legal family. 
However, one has to give his Honour the respect due to him not merely for the appre-
ciation of the Act. Even apart from that, he is clearly primus inter pares among the 
Judges in Hosking. The following observations on his Honour’s judgment will explain 
why this is the case. The validity of the assertion that there is ‘much common ground 
between the two variants of the majority view’ will be analysed. 1250 As I hope to dem-
onstrate, this is not the case.   
 
Tipping J preferred, in contrast to his colleagues in the majority, a two-step ad 
hoc balancing exercise as envisaged in the White Paper and employed in the UK. This 
approach presupposes (1) a definition of the scope of s 14 as being as wide as human 
thought and imagination; and (2) a justification stage applying a proportionality test. 
The judgment, nevertheless, reveals an existing uncertainty regarding the relationship of 
enshrined rights and freedoms with limits pursuant to s 5. The following exposition will 
carve out a suggestion as to how this issue could be handled in this context.    
The two-step limitation process  
 
His Honour saw the courts engaged in reconciling competing values.1251 He 
consequently identified the values underlying freedom of speech and privacy.1252 Ac-
cording to him, the values underlying freedom of speech manifest themselves in the 
marketplace of ideas theory, the maintenance and support of democracy theory and the 
1247 For the most accomplished treatment see U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th 
ed, 2005) 248-9.  
1248 Ibid, at p 248. 
1249 Or rather the ‘unwanted child’ – see D Haywood, ‘Bill of Rights unlikely to grow up’ published in 
the New Zealand Herald on 28 August 2006. 
1250 J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.5.02 at p 756. 
1251 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 224. 
1252 See P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.9.3. 
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liberty theory.1253 This is, as we know, a keystone in achieving results other than those 
in the USA since content neutrality is not what will be maintained in this model. Fur-
thermore, this approach interprets speech ‘systemically’ as distinct from an ‘episodic’ 
approach.   
 
The first limitation step will now be examined. The definition of the scope of s 
14 was admittedly not pronounced as pithily as in Moonen (No1), where it has been de-
scribed as being ‘as wide as human thought and imagination.’ His Honour’s approach 
on limiting affirmed rights and freedoms, nevertheless, presupposes such a broad defi-
nition of freedom of speech, at least, implicitly. After describing the three aforemen-
tioned theoretical foundations of freedom of expression, Tipping J continued by sketch-
ing the general relationship of these types with privacy.1254 His Honour concluded that 
‘any pragmatic or concrete benefit’ of speech values has to pass the s 5 threshold.1255 
The Judge particularly paid attention to the benefits of the liberty theory, which he 
summarised as saying, ‘that it is for the ultimate good of society for citizens to be able 
to say and publish to others what they want.’1256 This liberty certainly embraces the 
freedom of the media to publish material of, for instance, a mere gossip character. 
Moreover, Tipping J envisaged circumstances in which ‘the publication [of personal 
information] served little or no public good, save an abstract upholding of the liberty 
theory.’1257 This, however, presupposes that freedom of speech embraces ‘low-level’ 
speech for the purposes of the new tort in the first place. 
 
The public interest feature of Tipping J’s conception of the new privacy tort, 
therefore, embraces speech of every kind. A protected expression represented in the 
context of the tort could be anything, inter alia, from material of a mere gossip, com-
mercial or artistic nature to material of political importance (ie, from the ‘lowest’ hu-
man interest to the highest public concern). In contrast to the approach of the joint 
1253 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 233 referring to P Rishworth in Rishworth et al, The New Zea-
land Bill of Rights (2003) 308. This approach was met with approval in Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 
91 para 243 per Thomas J. 
1254 Ibid, paras 233-4 observing that speech of the first two categories would normally prevail over pri-
vacy interests while substantive problems are likely to occur with speech fitting in the liberty theory. 
1255 Ibid, para 234 (emphasis added). 
1256 Ibid. 
1257Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA)  para 256. 
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judgment, the public interest can be ‘as wide as human thought and imagination’ for the 
purposes of the first limitation step.1258  
 
The difference to the joint judgment is evident: a definitional balancing exercise 
of any kind regarding the scope of freedom of speech does not take place in Tipping J’s 
approach. I am unable to identify common ground between an approach embracing 
public interests of any kind and another one tightly confining speech to ‘matters of pub-
lic concern.’1259 The scope of s 14 cannot be wide and narrow at the same time. Thus, it 
is suggested that there is no such thing as two variants of the majority view in New Zea-
land. Variants can be juxtaposed and two or more possibilities can co-exit. The two 
views of the majority, however, are rather alternatives in the sense that an alternative is 
one of two things that can be chosen. Having said that, the scope of s 14 for the pur-
poses of the tort is either wide (as proposed by Tipping J) or narrow as (propagated by 
the joint judgment). In sum, a choice between the two has to be made.1260  
 
The discussion will now turn to the justification stage, that is, the independent 
second limitation step. In this respect, his Honour’s preference for a wide interpretation 
of freedom of speech becomes even more evident. For the following independent sec-
ond step, Tipping J proposed an approach, which he characterised as a manifestation of 
proportionality.1261 In the end, the Courts have to make a ‘judgment on behalf of soci-
ety as to where the balance falls.’1262 This observation is in line with Noort where the 
Court of Appeal argued there that the interpretation of s 5 involves a ‘public policy 
1258 See also Tipping J’s judgment in Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523, 576 (CA): ‘In 
short, I would prefer to define the right (that is to be free from discrimination) with the purpose of anti-
discrimination laws in mind, and then consider whether any suggested limitation is justified or otherwise 
lawful rather than circumscribe the content of the right at the outset. This accords more with the spirit and 
purpose of the Bill of Rights. In this kind of case it is better conceptually to start with a more widely-
defined right and legitimise or justify a restriction if appropriate, than to start with a more restricted right. 
Of course any such restriction or legitimation will, as is its purpose, pro tanto abrogate the right; but if 
restrictions which may be legitimate or justified in some circumstances are built into the right itself the 
risk is that they will apply in other circumstances when they are not legitimised or justified.’
1259 In US law, the viability of the Restatement’s ‘public concern’ had been questioned by many because 
of the value of gossip – see, eg, J B Mintz, ‘The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of 
the Private Domain’ (1996) 55 Maryland Law Review 425, 445. 
1260 See also U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 248. 
1261 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 235. 
1262 Ibid, para 236. 
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analysis and a value judgment on the part of the Court.’1263 This approach is also solely 
compatible with what had been envisaged by the drafters of the White Paper Bill: the 
application of s 5 does not only involve a careful reading of the precise words of the 
provision but rather the use of a weighing exercise.1264 His Honour suggested 
 
that the nature of the information imparted may well have a bearing on the reasonableness and 
justifiability of the limitation in the issue. […] The more value to society the information im-
parted or the type of expression in question may possess, the heavier will be the task of showing 
that the limitation is reasonable and justified. […] There may well be a greater potential for le-
gitimate public concern about information imparted as part of the marketplace of ideas or in 
support of the democratic process than there is with information, the imparting of which is sup-
ported only by the abstract of the theory of liberty.1265
 
Although carefully pronounced, this statement is perfectly in line with the sec-
ond step of an ad hoc balancing test. In terms of clarity and precision, it even trumps 
Baroness Hale’s observation in Campbell.1266 In the context of the respective American 
law, we have associated a similar view with Justice Breyer’s judgment in Bartnicki v 
Vopper.1267
 
As we recollect, a court is expected ‘to have regard to the importance of the par-
ticular type of expression’ during the justification stage.1268 Different kinds of speech 
carry different importance or weight in the balance. This is because the first step hardly 
matters in limiting speech/the public interest. The first step is rather an unpretentious 
prelude to the following weighing exercise. Lest we forget that the public interest can 
also embrace, by way of illustration, an interest in the distribution of child pornography. 
According to his Honour’s terminology, speech of this type fits into the liberty theory 
and is embraced by the freedom to say and publish what citizens want.  
 
1263 Ministry of Transport v Noort; Police v Curren [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 283 (CA) per Richardson J; this 
opinion had been reiterated by Randerson J - see Hosking [2003] 3 NZLR 385 (HC) para 170. 
1264 See White Paper, para 10.31. 
1265 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 235 (emphasis added). 
1266 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 148 per Baroness Hale. 
1267 532 US 514, 536 (2001). 
1268 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.6.1. 
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Tipping J indicates that the more value the type of expression carries, the more 
difficult it would be for a competing value, such as privacy, to outweigh speech con-
cerns. The nature of the information imparted may impinge on reasonableness and justi-
fiability of the limitation. Although he described a balancing process in which freedom 
of expression could be represented by almost every ‘public interest,’ he called the fea-
ture a matter of legitimate ‘public concern’ analogous to the breach of confidence doc-
trine.1269 Nevertheless, Tipping J reiterated afterwards that this is ‘no more than another 
application of the need for proportionality.’1270 In this respect, he divided the value or 
importance of speech into three categories following the three aforementioned theories 
underlying speech. Expression fitting in the marketplace of ideas or democratic process 
segment is more valuable in comparison to speech represented by the liberty theory.1271 
Matters fitting into the first two categories have, therefore, greater potential for being of 
legitimate public concern. Speech fitting within the confines of the liberty theory, by 
contrast, has to suffer ‘some curtailment’ in an organised society.1272 His Honour con-
tinued that the weight one gives to privacy - the second interest in the balance - would 
be a matter of assessing the facts of the individual case.1273
 
The concept is very similar to the approach taken in the UK. In Campbell, as we 
know, two Law Lords distinguished different types of speech, identifying political, ar-
tistic or educational speech as more important or valuable in a democracy than com-
mercial speech.1274 In the author’s view, the respective categories may have been 
named differently in New Zealand, but that does not affect the substance of the limita-
tion process itself. The methods are strikingly similar, if not identical. Judges in both 
aforementioned legal systems do not have to afford different weight to certain types of 
speech. Due to its importance in a democracy, the respective kind of speech itself car-
ries a particular weight in the balance. Political speech, for example, does not ‘deserve’ 
more protection in a strict sense, it ‘takes care of itself’ by carrying the utmost weight in 
1269 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 257. 
1270 Ibid. 
1271 U J Cheer, ‘The Future of Privacy – Recent Legal Developments in New Zealand’ (2007) 13 Canter-
bury Law Review 169, 191. 
1272 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) 234 (‘[t]herein lies the conundrum’). 
1273 Ibid, para 237. 
1274 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 148 per Baroness Hale; para 117 per Lord Hope. 
 
 
220 
                                                          
the balance and will usually prevail.1275 In brief, there arguably exits more than one ap-
proach in New Zealand.1276 Tipping J’s account, I propose, is in tune with the law of the 
UK, whereas the joint judgment predominantly goes down the US avenue.  
 
It is beyond doubt that ‘[a]ll judges in the majority stated that the greater the in-
vasion of privacy the greater the level of public concern must be for the defence to suc-
ceed.’1277 That is why the author would describe the ‘cropped’ proportionality test 
championed by the joint judgment as a ‘variant’ of Tipping J’s proportionality test.1278 
The latter test is more complex but contains the former as an element. Both tests can 
therefore co-exist. Nevertheless, the approaches as a whole represent alternatives rather 
than variants.1279 In brief, it is suggested that the majority in Hosking contains two dis-
tinct approaches for New Zealand rather than ‘the’ approach. 
Privacy and freedom of speech in the balance 
 
However, Tipping J indicated that speech fitting only in the broad liberty theory 
might well be outweighed by privacy interests; freedom of speech would nevertheless 
have a ‘head start.’1280 Without the last statement, his Honour’s approach could be in-
terpreted as saying that privacy and freedom of speech were equal in principle. The rec-
onciliation would be carried out purely on the facts of the individual case as in the UK. 
A ‘head start’ of freedom of expression calls this equality into question. Hence, the ac-
tual relationship of freedom of expression with privacy is of additional interest and will 
be considered next. Are both equal for the purposes of a ‘constitutionalised’ common 
1275 See above Chapter Three, 1.1.3.2. 
1276 Compare U J Cheer, ‘Privacy and the Public Interest’ (2005) 1 Privacy Law Bulletin 145, 149 (em-
phasis added). 
1277 Ibid, at p146; see also J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) 
para 18.5.05 at p 763. 
1278 All judges in the majority identified what Alexy calls the ‘Law of Balancing’ – R Alexy, ‘Balancing, 
Constitutional Review, and Representation’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 572, 
573 (‘The greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater the impor-
tance of satisfying the other’). See also M Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure 
and Domain of Constitutional Justice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, 580; A 
Barak, ‘Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience’ (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 369, 
381. 
1279 What might be called the Law of Balancing is merely one of several sub-tests - R Alexy, ‘Balancing, 
Constitutional Review, and Representation’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 572, 
573.  
1280 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 234. 
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law or does a kind of successive order, triggered off by a distinction between ‘enshrined 
right’ and ‘limit’, exist? His Honour, speaking extra-judicially, clarified his position by 
mentioning that 
 
he did not regard privacy and freedom of expression as starting on an equal footing in any bal-
ancing exercise, as in the United Kingdom, because a privacy right is not included in the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. For Tipping J freedom of expression would appear to have 
greater initial weight, although it could still be trumped by privacy where appropriate.1281
  
His Honour apparently came to this conclusion by comparing the NZBoRA and 
the HRA, which gives further effect to the right to privacy (art 8 ECHR).1282 As a re-
sult, Tipping J concluded that a proportionality test treating privacy and freedom of 
speech equally in principle could not take place in New Zealand. Instead, a successive 
order exists, expressed through an ‘initial weight.’ The author interprets the term as be-
ing synonymous with a ‘head start.’ This additional remark, however, makes Tipping 
J’s whole concept difficult to apply in practice. Since freedom of speech bears some 
kind of initial weight, even a sufficient but average invasion of privacy must not neces-
sarily outweigh speech of comparatively low public interest.  
 
An ‘initial weight’ afforded  to freedom of speech seems akin to the dated posi-
tion of the Supreme Court of California that the balance always has to be weighed in 
favour freedom of speech.1283 In other words, Tipping J’s statement seems to imply 
placing a thumb on freedom of speech’s side of the balance. The outcome of the case 
may be more open in New Zealand in comparison to the USA, but still depends on the 
heaviness of thumb of the respective judge.1284 To remain in this metaphor, the thumb 
of Keith or Anderson JJ is presumably heavier than the one of Tipping J. This, it seems 
1281 Quoted in U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 249 fn 107 (empha-
sis added); see also U J Cheer, ‘Privacy and the Public Interest’ (2005) 1 Privacy Law Bulletin 145, 146. 
1282 See too Andrews v TVNZ High Court Auckland CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, 
Allan J) para 40. 
1283 Briscoe v Reader’s Digest Association Inc, 93 Cal Rptr 866, 872 (1971). 
1284 See also A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in 
Hosking v Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 702. 
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reasonable to suggest, is why one may harbour doubts as to whether an ‘initial weight’ 
on one side of the balance would produce consistent results in practice.1285  
 
Ad hoc balancing requires a clear scale to translate the value of interests into a 
‘common currency’ for comparison; the personal scale of the balancer is an inappropri-
ate standard, lest balancing becomes an arbitrary act of will.1286 McGrath J expressed an 
important observation when he stated in Booker v Police:  1287
 
[t]rue balancing has connotations of quantity and precision when used to describe relative 
weights of, for example, quantities of metal. Only if this aspect of the balancing metaphor is re-
spected will its application ensure full recognition of the significance of each competing interest 
in the particular circumstances of the case. 
 
The notion of an ‘initial weight,’ in contrast, seems incompatible with both a 
common currency and the required precision described by McGrath J. In sum, the term 
needs further specification in a context other than this analysis; the concept is otherwise 
very arguably unworkable.  
Rights and limits in the balance 
 
An unworkable approach would normally be the end of the matter, but Tipping 
J’s judgment deserves, I think, more support. Thus, we will revisit the relationship be-
tween ‘enshrined rights’ and ‘limits.’1288 This underlying issue was responsible for an 
‘initial weight’ that freedom of speech appears to carry in the balance. It should be 
noted at the outset that this is actually not a matter of practical law; it is rather a matter 
of legal theory and philosophy. Are the limitations that the judiciary places on an af-
firmed right as important as the rights themselves?1289 Does a legal system allow un-
equal rights and/or limitations?  
 
1285 For an affirmative view see U J Cheer, ‘The Future of Privacy – Recent Legal Developments in New 
Zealand’ (2007) 13 Canterbury Law Review 169, 196. 
1286 T A Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 943, 973. 
1287 [2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC) para 134 (internal citation omitted). 
1288 See also Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 paras 209 per Thomas J. 
1289 See P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.9.3. 
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At this point, we return to the phrase constitutionalisation of private law; this is 
where the common law methods, focusing on liberty rather than rights, may conflict 
with mechanisms provided by the NZBoRA. The difficulty is that constitutional or hu-
man rights doctrines are ordinarily not elaborated through the application of common 
law. This is rather a task for a specialised court. Judges in the UK may receive valuable 
information from the ECtHR whilst the Federal Supreme Court assists their counter-
parts in the USA.1290 Two scholars observed that New Zealand’s judges, by contrast, 
give answers to doctrinal and theoretical issues in the ‘unusual guise of common law 
rationality’1291 and, therefore, within the application of practical law. Common law 
judgments and doctrinal issues of this country’s Bill of Rights are apparently made in 
an all-in-one fashion based, for instance, on ‘a combination of resort to international 
provisions, comparative law, existing statute and common law.’1292 In short, it is a 
thankless task for a common law judge. While criticism of any kind is hence inappro-
priate, Tipping J’s elaboration on this point is nonetheless an apt example of this phe-
nomenon. The Judge found privacy explicitly protected in the UK and principally equal 
in the balance. This observation is, of course, correct. However, according to his Hon-
our’s following observation based on comparative law, the privacy interest has not been 
relevantly recognised in the NZBoRA and, by inference, could not start on an equal 
footing in any balancing exercise.1293  
 
It will now be analysed whether this conclusion is compelling. The whole mat-
ter, admittedly, might be aloof to some common-law lawyers. For the sake of conven-
ience, we should hence approach with a scholarly ‘Oxbridge’-competition by way of 
illustration. A scholar represents each university. Each scholar has examined the theo-
retical relationship between rights and the possibilities to place limits on them. Haber-
mas represents Cambridge and vehemently opposes a balancing exercise of constitu-
tional rights. According to Habermas, such an approach denies the strict priority of 
1290 New Zealand’s Supreme Court taken over this function - see Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 
(SC) paras 149-285 per Thomas J for an impressive example.  
1291 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.9.7. 
1292 Ibid. 
1293 The problem is essentially the same in the USA, because freedom of speech is the only explicit con-
stitutional right in play - P Gewirtz, ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Review 139, 173 fn 115. 
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rights over other interests.1294 According to this scholar, freedom of expression must 
prevail over privacy, for instance, in New Zealand simply as a matter of hierarchy. 
Moreover, this approach tends towards an absolutist position.1295 Alexy, the second 
scholar, represents Oxford. Alexy advocates balancing as an appropriate method for the 
adjudication of constitutional rights. As we recollect, balancing ‘permits recognition of 
the conflicts between individual rights and collective interests, both of which have the 
character of principles that should be optimised to the greatest extent possible.’1296 This 
theory reflects the view of a balancer and the actual optimisation process is carried out 
by means of a proportionality test.1297 Linking rights, conceptualised as principles, to a 
proportionality balancing exercise is thus understood as a conceptual necessity rather 
than one of institutional convenience.1298 This is, I suggest, why one must firmly keep 
in mind that the comparatively weak status of the right is always accompanied by the 
necessary application of the proportionality principle. 
 
For the situation in the UK after the enactment of the HRA, Oxford is leaving 
Cambridge behind in the competition. ‘Limit’ is perhaps most accurately described as a 
generic term in this respect, because it could be either another affirmed right or another 
societal interest as long as it constitutes a private right of the national law. The status of 
the limiting principle – affirmed as a constitutional or human right or not - is of minor 
interest as long as it is ‘necessary in a democratic society’, echoes a ‘pressing social 
need’ and is otherwise proportionate. In ‘Oxford methodology’, right and appropriate 
limit are equal allowing the principles to be optimised to the greatest extent possible. 
‘Optimisation’ enables the courts to identify positions between otherwise totally pre-
1294 J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (W Regh trans, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996) 256. Prior-
ity creates in Habermas’ parlance ‘rights as firewalls’; similar accounts could be found in the works of 
Ronald Dworkin (‘rights as trumps’) and John Rawls (‘priority of the Right over the Good’) - see M 
Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice’ 
(2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, 590.  
1295 See ibid, at p 259 for the possibility to place limits on rights. 
1296 R Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights Oxford University Press, 2002 summarised by P and A 
Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005) para 6.9.3 in fn 80 (emphasis added); 
see also M Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional 
Justice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, 576. 
1297 See M Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional 
Justice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, 576. 
1298 M Kumm, ‘What Do You Have in Virtue of Having a Constitutional Right? On the Place and Limits 
of the Proportionality Requirement’ at p 8 <http://www.lsr.nelco.org/nyu/plltwp/papers/46 at 08 February 
2008>. 
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vailing principles.1299 Instead, each principle might prevail only to a degree, which 
might be described as the appropriate ‘shade of grey’ between the competing principles 
depending on the facts of the case. The fact that freedom of expression and privacy are 
both enshrined rights in the UK is a mere coincidence and makes a proportionality test 
rather more difficult.1300 Phillipson addresses these difficulties by arguing, sensibly, 
that a ‘dual exercise in proportionality’ needs to be carried out.1301 However, as Baron-
ess Hale observed with irreproducible transparency: 
 
Article 10(2) [ECHR] provides for 'the protection of the reputation or rights of others' […]. The 
rights referred to may either be rights protected under the national law or, as in this case, other 
convention rights. […] Above all, the interference or restriction must be 'necessary in a democ-
ratic society'; it must meet a 'pressing social need' and be no greater than is proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued. […]  
 
The application of the proportionality test is more straightforward when only one convention 
right is in play: the question then is whether the private right claimed offers sufficient justifica-
tion for the degree of interference with the fundamental right. It is much less straightforward 
when two convention rights are in play, and the proportionality of interfering with one has to be 
balanced against the proportionality of restricting the other. As each is a fundamental right, 
there is evidently a 'pressing social need' to protect it.1302
 
As an interim result for the UK, a limit not represented by a Convention right 
can be as fundamental as an enshrined right under a doctrinal ‘Oxford regime.’1303 In 
other words, even if a right of privacy had not been enshrined in art 8 ECHR, it would 
suffice that it is a private right. Such a right may limit art 10 ECHR as long as it is ap-
propriate in the light of the facts of the case. The situation is similar, for example, in 
Israel. As Barak has observed: ‘[t]he second question [the justification stage] relates to 
1299 It should be noted that ‘optimisation’ itself is a concept disputed by those favouring the supremacy of 
individual rights over societal interests – eg, J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (OUP, 1971) 29-30. Rawls 
criticism of utilitarianism, in my opinion, applies to Alexy’s ‘rights as principles’ model as well. 
1300 ‘More difficult’ means that the court has to deal with two separate limitation clauses in the UK – arts 
8 (2) and 10 (2) ECHR. 
1301 G Phillipson, ‘The ‘right’ of privacy in England and Strasbourg compared’ in M Richardson and A 
T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 184, 214. 
 
1302 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) paras 139, 140 (emphasis added). 
1303 See also M Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitu-
tional Justice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, 590. 
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the limitation upon the scope of the [enshrined] right by non-constitutional norms 
(regular statutes or common law).’1304 Burrows points out that some rights not codified 
in the NZBoRA may still have the same force; the difference between the situation in 
the UK and New Zealand, nevertheless, should be borne in mind.1305 However, as the 
previous observation propounds, a difference between both countries does not necessar-
ily exist.1306 A comparative law analysis, which points to an ostensible difference (that 
would make no difference in the UK as such), cannot represent a compelling difference 
for New Zealand’s situation. To my mind, this simply flows as a matter of logic. This, it 
seems reasonable to suggest, illustrates that the decisive factor in this area of the law is 
the doctrinal relationship between right and limit. In the author’s view, Tipping J’s 
comparative law analysis is to be welcomed but is not compelling.1307 It provides, thus, 
no compelling reason to fortify freedom of speech with an ‘initial weight’ in this coun-
try. The development of the necessary doctrine, however, is out of the scope of this the-
sis. For the purposes of this examination, we will rather stick to our ‘Oxbridge’ compe-
tition. Hence, a doctrinal solution for New Zealand could be an ‘Oxford regime,’ a 
‘Cambridge regime’ or a mixed ‘Oxbridge regime.’ 
 
The author would like to stress that this seemingly innocuous issue is in his 
view indeed an important one. What Hosking was all about, was whether a new tort 
should form part of the common law. This tort, designed to protect an aspect of privacy, 
can be regarded as conferring a new ‘private right’ in terms of the ‘Oxford regime’ ex-
emplified by Baroness Hale. At issue was whether ‘private right’ is equipped with the 
potential to limit freedom of speech as an affirmed right. Anderson J was thus on the 
right track when he mentioned that the acknowledgement of the new tort required an 
analysis of the relationship between the privacy value as a limit of an enshrined 
right.1308 His Honour stated that, ‘cases such as the present are not about invasion of 
1304 A Barak, ‘Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience’ (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 
369, 381-2 (emphasis added). 
1305 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
397; see also J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.4.04 at 
pp 753-54. 
1306 Compare Andrews v TVNZ Ltd High Court Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 
2006, Allan J) para 40. 
1307 It should be stressed that Campbell was of course decided a few weeks after Hosking. 
1308 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 263. 
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publication; and they are not about competing values, but whether an affirmed right is 
to be limited by a particular manifestation of a value.’1309 To my mind, the term ‘pri-
vate right’ can be taken as a less cryptic synonym for ‘particular manifestation of a 
value.’ As distinct from Lady Hale’s suggestion, such a right does not seem to be suffi-
cient to limit a fundamental right in his Honour’s concept. In our methodology, Ander-
son J seems to propagate a ‘Cambridge regime.’ Enshrined rights at least tend strongly 
towards a strict priority over other interests.1310 At first sight, this was a powerful ar-
gument against the very existence of the privacy tort. However, it is possible to deprive 
such a seemingly powerful argument of its mystique if an ‘Oxford regime’ or perhaps 
an ‘Oxbridge regime’ would have been in place. Such a ‘Cambridge’ argument perhaps 
would have never been raised if the doctrinal relationship between right and limit would 
be unambiguous. It should be reiterated that Keith and Anderson JJ favoured a very di-
rect impact of NZBoRA on the private law sphere.1311 A ‘Cambridge regime’, however, 
is barely arguable in New Zealand just as the direct application of the Act to private 
litigants. Enshrined rights are not absolute under the Act. Furthermore, such an ap-
proach cannot explain why some limits, not codified in the NZBoRA, have the same 
force as enshrined rights whilst a ‘manifestation of the privacy value’ has not. I suggest 
that a legal system must provide an explanation for such an allegation.1312 If it were 
otherwise, enshrined rights would sometimes have strict priority over conflicting pri-
vate rights and societal concerns and sometimes not – this would be an unconvincing 
solution.  
 
An initial weight afforded to freedom of expression by Tipping J, however, 
points to an ‘Oxbridge regime.’ The placement of an ‘initial weight’ on freedom of ex-
pression recognises to a limited degree the priority of affirmed rights as a ‘Cambridge’ 
influence. Nonetheless, the fundamental right can still be limited in a weighing exercise 
by other interests as an influence of the ‘Oxford regime.’ A brief examination suggests 
that Tipping J’s approach is still arguable; it is compatible with the notion that rights 
1309 Ibid, para 266 (emphasis added). 
1310 See also J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (W Regh trans, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996) 
259. 
1311 See above Chapter Three, 1.1.1.2. 
1312 See J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
397. 
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and limits may be either equal or unequal.1313 In New Zealand, at least privacy would 
be unequal as a limit.1314 Inequality of right and limit suggests, however, that another 
overriding standard has to be developed in order to determine when it is appropriate for 
privacy interests to prevail over freedom of speech and its ‘initial weight.’ As we know, 
a ‘common currency’ for the comparison of interests is required for an ad hoc balancing 
exercise.  
 
Thus, the present writer supports an ‘Oxford regime.’ This decision is limited to 
the situation of the new privacy tort. Privacy, as the underlying value, is widely re-
garded as a fundamental.1315 In New Zealand, it has already been described as a quasi-
constitutional right.1316 In Radio New Zealand1317, for instance, the Full High Court 
identified the values underlying the law of contempt and concluded, ‘[t]hey are at least 
as fundamental as the freedom of expression.’ Tipping J, as we know, analysed the val-
ues underlying the new privacy action in Hosking1318 and opined that they were ‘recog-
nised less directly, but no less significantly’ in comparison to those underpinning free-
dom of speech. Thus, it would require a considerable degree of hair-splitting to argue 
that the law of contempt starts on equal footing with freedom of speech whereas privacy 
has to take on the same freedom fortified by an ‘initial weight.’ If no right to privacy is 
recognised, the test should be whether the values underlying the limit are as fundamen-
tal as those underlying the enshrined right.1319 With regard to privacy, this is the case in 
the author’s view. In short, it is suggested that it is not justified to equip freedom of 
speech with an ‘initial weight’ in the balance.     
1313 See P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.9.4. 
1314 For a view to the same effect see G Phillipson, ‘The ‘right’ of privacy in England and Strasbourg 
compared’ in M Richardson and A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 184, 213-4. 
1315 Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC) para 232 per Thomas J; P and A Butler, The New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.9.9. An emphatic statement could be found in Campbell 
[2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 12 per Lord Nicholls (‘[Privacy] lies at the heart of liberty in a modern 
state. A proper degree of privacy is essential for the well-being and development of an individual’).   
1316 U J Cheer, ‘The Future of Privacy– Recent Legal Developments in New Zealand’ (2007) 13 Canter-
bury Law Review 169, 196. 
1317 [1994] 1 NZLR 48, 64. 
1318 [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 224. 
1319 See also P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.9.9. 
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1.1.5 Conclusion 
Reconciling of freedom of expression and privacy is an onerous task.1320 Deal-
ing with this matter in New Zealand once the NZBoRA has been held applicable to the 
new tort even magnifies these complications. The constitutionalisation of the common 
law would require interpretative clarity of the relevant issues of the human rights in-
strument before they can be transposed. To ensure this clarity could be regarded as 
‘Phase I’ in a process that ordinarily has to be accomplished before constitutionalisation 
of private law as ‘Phase II’ can commence. Hosking reveals some unanswered ques-
tions in this respect, which led to the rejection of the tort by the minority and to the 
adoption of effectively two distinct torts of privacy by the majority.  
 
Particularly the judges of the minority interpreted the Act in a way that appar-
ently suited their respective preferences regarding the acknowledgement of the tort. The 
result can be described as a sophisticated form of shadow-boxing. If the underlying is-
sues of ‘Phase I’ remain unsolved, judges are likely to argue interminably at cross-
purposes in ‘Phase II.’ The arguments will always sound ‘strong’1321 if the underlying 
issues are not identified and solved. In fairness, it must be stated that this is the pre-
ferred treatment of this country’s human rights instrument.1322 Judges and scholars rec-
ognise that ‘in all discussions of [this] subject section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act must 
be kept firmly in mind.’1323 At the same time, jurists seem to believe that they are ‘free 
of those constitutional constraints’ which can be found in the UK due to developments 
in Europe.1324 Nevertheless, we have seen that NZBoRA bears striking similarities to 
the ECHR whilst similarities to the US Constitution are difficult to identify. Section 14, 
for instance, poses a (quasi-) constitutional restraint on the courts. This constraint pre-
vents judges from confining freedom of speech to matters of public concern by means 
1320 Perhaps ‘one of the most difficult and sensitive areas of judgment’ – see Mafart v TVNZ Ltd [2006] 3 
NZLR 534 (CA) para 53 per Hammond J (internal citation omitted). G Phillipson, ‘The ‘right’ of privacy 
in England and Strasbourg compared’ in M Richardson and A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Pri-
vacy Law (2006) 184, 212. 
1321 J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.5.02 at p 755. 
1322 P Rishworth, ‘Lord Cooke and the Bill of Rights’ in P Rishworth (ed), The Struggle for simplicity in 
the law (1997) 295, 307. 
1323 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
391. 
1324 Ibid, at p 397. 
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of definitional balancing. In short, given that horizontal application of the NZBoRA 
means anything, the law must certainly be aligned with the British approach rather than 
the American.  
 
However, Tipping J is a clear exception to this phenomenon. His Honour suits 
the action to the word and represents the consistency and continuity that a human rights 
instrument requires. The joint judgment, by contrast, is a disorganised and peculiar 
combination of European and US influences without paying due regard to domestic 
law. Rather than asking what the NZBoRA requires, their Honours were apparently en-
deavoured to get the best of both worlds.  
 
Tipping J’s approach is the only one capable of accommodating the complexity 
of s 5 concerns and the desirable wide interpretation of s 14 without contradictions. It 
displays the same context-specific approach to the determination of limits as employed, 
for instance, in Canada and South Africa.1325 What is more, particularly the wide inter-
pretation s 14 is preferable for the purposes of the new tort. It enables the courts to con-
sider, as Randerson J suggested, the ‘wide range of considerations’1326 that may occur 
in these cases. The major problem with Tipping J’s approach is the apparent lack of at-
tention paid to it by the courts1327 and that it might be too ‘Europhone.’ The latter issue, 
however, is more likely to be a result of New Zealand's commitment to the ICCPR, 
which in turn has many structural similarities with the ECHR.1328 It is the result of simi-
lar structures regarding the limitation process of enshrined rights that the NZBoRA has 
to be interpreted similarly to the HRA.1329 An intermingled problem is apparently that 
the flexibility of a stringently applied two-step limitation process requires building a 
‘culture of justification.’1330 New Zealand Judges, in contrast, do not think favourably 
1325 See P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.11.20; Han-
sen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC) para 21 per Elias CJ. 
1326 Hosking [2003] 3 NZLR 385 (HC) para 170. 
1327 Eg, TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 156 (CA) para 86 per O’Regan and Panckhurst JJ; see also J 
F Burrows in Todd (ed), above n , para 18.5.05 at p 763.  
1328 Particularly s 5 NZBoRA is largely derived from these human rights instruments - see Ministry of 
Transport v Noort; Police v Curren [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 283 per Richardson J 
1329 See P and A Butler, above n 72, para 13.8.2. 
1330 P and A Butler, above n 72, para 6.8.1 using a phrase coined by the South African constitutional law 
professor Etienne Mureinik. For a similar (general) suggestion to the same effect see Lord Steyn, ‘De-
mocracy through Law’ [2002] European Human Rights Law Review 723, 732. 
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of such an implication.1331 Part of the aversion might be the awareness of results pro-
duced in other jurisdictions. A result accomplished, for instance, in von Hannover v 
Germany may be a warning to those, who do not want take matters that far in this coun-
try. However, it might be a cardinal mistake to judge a content neutral legal technique 
by the results produced, for instance, within the European cultural environment. Au-
thoritative statements from the UK will always display British culture with tones of 
European values – this results from the fact that this technique requires to establish a 
culture of justification. Therefore, admonishing voices, who point out that UK cases 
might provide guidance but should not be blindly followed, must be heard.1332 Notwith-
standing, if the New Zealand media overall have shown greater responsibility than 
some of their counterparts in the UK,1333 this would represent a part of New Zealand’s 
cultural environment. Given that this statement is true, a von Hannover v Germany sce-
nario may never occur in New Zealand. 
 
The notion of ad hoc balancing concept is seductive, ‘it fits our usual concep-
tions and metaphors of justice, fairness, and reasonableness.’1334 To my eyes, it is a le-
gal requirement to yield to this temptation in New Zealand – a requirement mandated 
by the NZBoRA. Currently, the balancing concept of Tipping J is thus preferable. The 
strengths and weaknesses of both approaches are discussed next. 
1.2 The preferable balancing exercise  
Having discussed the differences between the approaches in theory, we now 
turn to the more practical differences. Naturally, there are not many New Zealand au-
thorities concerning the new tort so far.1335 However, I have already suggested that Tip-
ping J’s approach resembles the corresponding law of the UK whereas the joint judg-
ment largely emulates the US law. Since the English and Welsh law in this area is com-
1331 P and A Butler, above n 72, para 6.8.3 
1332 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
397. 
1333 A Sims, ‘”A Shift in the Gravity Centre”: The dangers of Protecting Privacy through Breach of Con-
fidence’ [2005] Intellectual Property Quarterly 27, 36; J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and 
Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 397. 
1334 T A Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 943, 962. 
1335 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
voiced his concern that some decisions have not been reported.  
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paratively young, it seems advantageous to point very briefly to the German law. This 
seems necessary to draw a complete picture of the ad hoc balancing test. Hence, the ex-
periences of these legal systems will be used for the good of the following analysis. Be-
cause this is a very abstract procedure, their pros and cons will be highlighted with the 
help of a non-fictional example enhanced by fictional elements.  
 
Let us assume that the All Blacks played the Wallabies at Jade Stadium in 
Christchurch. Players selected for the national rugby team are persons of the highest 
profile in New Zealand. Rugby is already New Zealand’s number-one sport but a match 
against the cousins from ‘over the ditch’ is of the utmost public interest/concern.1336 
The All Blacks steamrollered the Wallabies on their way to victory but one player in the 
squad unfortunately suffered from ‘urinary difficulties.’1337 Being caught short, he re-
lieved himself before joining the haka. Notwithstanding the public nature of the venue, 
the All Black managed to keep the incident secret; just one reporter realised what was 
happening and quick-wittedly took a photograph.1338 A newspaper released an article 
including information about the rugby match in general and described the misfortune of 
the player. The article was accompanied by a close-up photography of the kneeling 
player urinating on the pitch with only his, quite literally, private parts being pixe-
lated.1339  
 
Problems of this kind, however, are familiar to sportspersons of this country and 
elsewhere. The press reports similar incidents from time to time. Its readers, average 
New Zealanders, are thus well acquainted with this phenomenon. Sailors wetted them-
selves while being in a ‘championship race near Nelson.’1340 A former All Black was 
‘often spotted spending a penny […] during the interval’ of rugby matches. Further-
1336 See also U J Cheer, ‘Privacy and the Public Interest’ (2005) 1 Privacy Law Bulletin 145, 147 citing 
Black v Radio Network Ltd 1998-003. The BSA held that there is sufficient public interest in the question 
of who was to be the All Black coach.  
1337 D McPhail, ‘Jerry’s excuse a wee bit wet’ The Christchurch Press, 15 July 2006 (D8). 
1338 It will thus be likely that a New Zealand judge would confirm a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’ 
In reality, the incident was shown briefly on television, see ‘What to do when nature calls’ 
<http://www.rugbyheaven.smh.com.au/articles/2006/07/09/1152383604016.html> 02 December 2006.  
1339 The photo accompanied D McPhail’s commentary ‘Jerry’s excuse a wee bit wet’ printed in The 
Christchurch Press, 15 July 2006 (D8). 
1340 All following examples stem from T Smith, ‘Collins not the first to be caught short in sport’ The 
Christchurch Press, 15 July 2006 (F2 Sports). 
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more, a New Zealand cricketer was once ‘suffering as much as the others [from the In-
dian heat] but he still strode, manfully, in the form of a full-strength run-up as a visceral 
eruption of Vesuvius proportions struck the bowler’s bowels.’ None of the sports-
persons have been offended and protested against media coverage of this kind so far. 
The present All Black team member is unconcerned about the coverage of the rugby 
match. However, he is highly embarrassed by the report about his misfortune, espe-
cially by the close-up photograph of him passing water. In this respect, he uncompro-
misingly argues that ‘these nosey parkers should mind their own business.’1341 The All 
Black cannot understand why this particular incident should be part of the event cover-
age.  
1.2.1 Anticipated solution according to the joint judgment 
How might a court adopting the joint judgment’s approach deal with such a 
case? In accordance with the Restatement of Torts (2nd 1977) their Honours suggested 
determining matters of public concern as follows: 1342
 
[t]he line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the 
public is entitled and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own 
sake with which the reasonable member of the public with decent standards would say that he 
had no concern. The limitations, in other words, are those of common decency having due re-
gard to the freedom of the press and its reasonable leeway to choose what it will tell the public 
but also due regard to the feelings of the individual and the harm that will be done by the expo-
sure. 
 
The following suggestions aim at both the highly offensive test (defining pri-
vacy and/or the necessary level of harm for purposes of the tort) and the public-concern 
element (defining freedom of expression for the purposes of the tort). As we have seen, 
there is hardly any direct interaction between privacy and freedom of speech in the joint 
judgment’s approach. Nevertheless, both tests are based on community mores and in-
volve a form of definitional balancing of the respective interests.1343 Hence, their prac-
1341 This element is fictional. 
1342 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 135 per Gault P and Blanchard J (emphasis added). 
1343 For further details regarding the balancing of interests in liberty and security see above Chapter Two, 
para 2.5 (highly offensive test); and Chapter Two, para 1.1.3.2. (public-concern element).  
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tical implications will be dealt with together. The following basic problems have been 
identified in the USA:1344
 
• definitional balancing (and community mores tests) take no account 
of individual sensibilities; such an approach is more concerned with 
determining ‘what is’ the law rather than what ‘ought to be’ the law 
in the respective case; 
• in order to avoid judicial second-guessing on ‘matters of public con-
cern,’ judges tend to treat the issue at the highest level of generality;  
• apart from individual sensibilities, community mores tests may also 
efface existing differences within a heterogeneous society;    
• these tests also lack a transformative effect, which might be disad-
vantageous if the behaviour of the press changes from non-prying to 
prying. 
 
David Anderson has characterised both tests as empiric rather than normative 
because barely any value choice has to be made by the judge.1345 Instead, the burden of 
decision-making is shifting from the judge to the ‘reasonable objective person’ or the 
‘reasonable member of the public with decent standards.’1346 However, empirical tests 
theoretically try to distil an average result out of a wide range of views. Thus, a judg-
ment would be derived from or verifiable by experience.1347 Burrows, on the other 
hand, has pointed out that at least the ‘highly offensive’ test is essentially a matter of 
moral judgment with the inherent difficulty to give detailed reasons for the decision.1348 
In other words, the tests theoretically strive for determining ‘what is’ the law in theory 
1344 See D A Anderson, ‘The failure of American Privacy’ in B S Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy 
(1999) 139, 149-51 for further details.  
1345 See D A Anderson, ‘The failure of American Privacy’ in B Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy 
(1999) 139, 149. 
1346 See Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 225 (1998); P J McNulty, ‘The Public Dis-
closure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 Drake Law Review 93, 137 who 
points out that the Restatements standard draws upon the ‘factfinder’s perception of community mores.’ 
1347 See the explanations of the terms ‘empiric’ and ‘empirical’ in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, (5th ed, 
2002) Vol 1.  
1348 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 391, 
395.  
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while Burrows’ observation seems to indicate that their practical application rather 
leads to determinations concerned with what ‘ought to be’ the law in an individual case.  
 
As for the first aforementioned problem, it is suggested that a New Zealand 
judge would treat the determination of a matter of public concern on a very general 
level.1349 A rugby match involving the All Blacks is clearly such a matter in the sense 
Gault P and Blanchard J had in mind.1350 In the USA, judges would find it difficult to 
distinguish the coverage of the rugby match from the possibly questionable coverage of 
the particular problem of the All Black player.1351 As a result, they would tend to treat 
the latter incident as a matter of public concern simply because the rugby match itself is 
such a matter.1352 The underlying problem, therefore, is if and how both sets of facts 
could be distinguished. Likewise, the All Black in our example is complaining about 
the coverage of his personal misfortune and not about the report of the match itself. 
Judges in the USA, based on their legal tradition, would tend to believe that the inconti-
nence of the rugby player is related to the main event and therefore a public concern 
like the main event. Accordingly, the whole article – including the close-up photograph 
– would be a warranted intrusion of privacy.  
 
It remains to be seen how the New Zealand’s courts deal with this test. Recent 
judgments suggest that the community-mores test as announced in Hosking has not 
taken root. Instead, the courts seem to have adopted the ‘logical nexus’ requirement of 
some US courts either explicitly or in a different guise. In Rogers v TVNZ Ltd, the 
plaintiff sought a permanent injunction in order to restrain the defendant from broad-
casting an evidential videotape. The videotape depicted the plaintiff confessing to a 
murder charge, but the evidence was later held inadmissible in court. As a result, the 
plaintiff was acquitted, but the defendant proposed including parts of the videotape in a 
1349 See also Duff [1996] 2 NZLR 89, 99-100 (HC) per Blanchard J. 
1350 It is therefore not just a matter of general interest or mere curiosity - Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) 
para134. 
1351 The necessity to distinguish between a public interest in an area of activity and a public interest in 
private information about persons involved in these activities has been pronounced, eg, in Virgil v Time 
Inc, 527 F 2d 1122, 1131 (1975). 
1352 See D A Anderson, ‘The failure of American Privacy’ in B S Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy 
(1999) 139, 151. 
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programme about the high-profile murder trial. The plaintiff alleged that the proposed 
broadcast would be an illegitimate interference with his privacy rights.   
 
In a carefully reasoned judgement, the High Court identified a public concern if 
private information ‘may add to informed public debate.’1353 The Court found no rele-
vance of the private facts to the matter of public concern was identifiable; the privacy 
interest of the highly offended plaintiff thus had prevailed.1354 The Court of Appeal, by 
contrast, analysed the facts of the case as to where the balance lies.1355 The Court con-
tinued that the Full High Court had missed out in applying a proportionality test and 
decided the other way around.1356 This case might therefore be misleading.1357 Granted 
that both Courts started by applying the joint judgment’s approach,1358 the High Court’s 
decision is arguably correct, because it was unnecessary to apply the proportionality test 
in this case. However, the proportionality test only follows if the public concern test 
would have been made out. The High Court made it clear that there was a general pub-
lic interest in the private information involved, but it was not sufficient to make out the 
public-concern defence.1359 There was arguably no need to proceed to the proportional-
ity test. Nonetheless, the advantage of the joint judgment’s approach over US law might 
be that the consequences of the ‘reasonable person’ and ‘community mores’ tests are 
eased by an additional, albeit not mandatory, ad hoc balancing test. Gault P and 
Blanchard J stressed that it is part of the juridical function in New Zealand to determine 
‘what should or should not be published.’1360 This would involve a judicial second-
guessing of a press editor’s decision.1361
 
1353 TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 156 (CA) para 71 per Panckhurst and O’Regan JJ; see also J Wil-
son, ’Media Law Symposium: Prior Restraint of the Press’ (2006) New Zealand Law Review 551, 589 
1354 Ibid, para 85. 
1355 TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 156 (CA) para 85 per Panckhurst and O’Regan JJ. 
1356 Ibid, para 86. 
1357 It should be reiterated that expressions on the scope of the tort in Rogers may be of questionable na-
ture - Rogers v TVNZ Ltd [2007] NZSC 91 para 25 per Elias CJ. 
1358 See for the High Court decision ibid, para 18; ibid, para 52 for the decision of the Court of Appeal.   
1359 Rogers v TVNZ Ltd (2005) 22 CRNZ 668 (HC) para 76 per Venning and Winkelmann JJ. 
1360 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 132. 
1361 Although their Honours believed that this is ‘not a matter of Judges being arbiters of taste’ - ibid; 
compare Andrews v TVNZ High Court Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, 
Allan J) para 88 citing Auckland Area Health Board v TVNZ [1992] 3 NZLR 406, 407.  
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Andrews v Television New Zealand Ltd1362 suggests the opposite, however. The 
similarities of this case with Shulman v Group W were obvious. Both cases involved 
‘helping professionals;’ they were ‘ride-along reporting’ cases; these cases are named 
after situations ‘in which media representatives, for the purpose of gathering publish-
able material, accompany authori[s]ed individuals performing official duties.’1363 In a 
carefully reasoned judgment, Allan J stated that the plaintiffs enjoyed a ‘reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy’ in a public place, but the disclosure of personal information was 
not ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person.’ The Judge nevertheless mentioned that 
‘Shulman is a useful illustration albeit in a different jurisdiction, of a balancing exercise 
conducted in the context of a serious road accident case.’1364 Allan J also referred to a 
proportionality balancing exercise,1365 but continued by mentioning that the application 
of the defence had been illustrated in Shulman.1366 If it had been necessary, his Honour 
would have upheld what he characterised as the public-concern defence.1367 In Califor-
nia, as we know, this was a new test, which replaced a balancing exercise based on 
community mores.1368 To the best of my knowledge, the decisions following Hosking 
did not enter into any considerations about community mores. This is consequent inas-
much as ‘community mores’ are irrelevant with regard to a ‘logical nexus’ test.1369 The 
test can therefore easily be applied by judges without a final determination of newswor-
thiness by means of a jury verdict. Nevertheless, it may be problematic that the plurality 
opinion in Shulman treated newsworthiness, public interest and public concern as being 
synonymous.1370 Furthermore, ‘newsworthiness’ is an element of the tort in California 
1362 High Court Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J).  
1363 K M Markin, ‘An "Unholy Alliance": The Law of Media Ride-Alongs’ (2004) 12 CommLaw Con-
spectus 33, 33 fn 4 and p 57. 
1364 Andrews v TVNZ High Court Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536, (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan 
J) para 90 (emphasis added). 
1365 Ibid, para 84. 
1366 Ibid, para 85. 
1367 Ibid, para 91. 
1368 See above, Chapter Two, 2.6.2.2. 
1369 D M Worley, ‘Shulman v Group W Productions: Invasion of Privacy by Publication of Private Facts - 
Where Does California Draw the Line between Newsworthy Information and Morbid Curiosity’ (1999-
2000) 27 Western State University Law Review 535, 567. 
1370 G L Bostwick, ‘The Newsworthiness Element: Shulman v Group W Prods., Inc. Muddies the Waters’ 
(1999) 19 Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review 225, 237. Compare Andrews v TVNZ High 
Court Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) paras 81, 86. 
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and not a defence.1371 As for the lack of newsworthiness, the plaintiff carries the burden 
of proof and not the defendant.1372 A substantial practical difference between the US 
and the New Zealand law is, in the author’s opinion, unlikely to occur under these cir-
cumstances. Every prediction is almost necessarily hazardous in this early stage of the 
tort’s development. However, early cases such as Rogers suggest that the courts might 
treat almost everything as ‘relevant’ to informed public debate as it is common practice 
in many states of the USA nowadays.1373  
 
While applying the add-on proportionality test in Rogers, the Court of Appeal 
weighed the comparatively low ‘expectation of privacy’1374 against a necessarily low 
public concern.1375 This reveals an uncertainty about the interest to be put in the privacy 
side of the proportionality balance.1376 In the wake of Hosking, it remained unclear 
whether the level of offence or the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ should be taken 
into account in the balance.1377 In England and Wales, the ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’ has to be balanced. In English law, however, a ‘highly offensive’ test is not 
employed.1378 Granted that ‘it is the offensive publicity which is the gist of the ac-
tion,’1379 it is suggested that the Court has to consider the high level of intrusiveness 
while striking the balance in Rogers – and not the low ‘expectation of privacy.’ If it 
1371 Shulman v Group W Productions Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 214-5 (1998); Taus v Loftus, 40 Cal.4th 683, 
705 (2007). Compare Andrews v TVNZ High Court Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 De-
cember 2006, Allan J) para 86. 
1372 Diaz v Oakland Tribune Inc, 139 Cal App 3d 128-130 (1983); Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 
18 Cal 4th 200, 215 (1998). 
1373 P Gewirtz, ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Review 139, 174 observes that it is relatively 
easy to argue that a private matter is relevant for discussion of public issues; ‘if ‘relevance’ is the sole 
factor in determining a ‘public concern’ this might be the engine for destroying privacy.’ The same point 
was made by E Tison, ‘Straddling the Fence: Justice Breyer's concurrence in Bartnicki v Vopper gives 
Protection of Privacy and still Manages to Protect the Press: Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514 (2001)’ 
(2003) 27 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 661, 682. See also Andrews v TVNZ High Court 
Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536, (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) para 92. 
1374 This feature of the tort will be discussed later in greater detail. 
1375 TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 156 (CA) paras 59, 71 per Panckhurst and O’Regan JJ; see also 
U J Cheer, ‘The Future of Privacy – Recent Legal Developments in New Zealand’ (2007) 13 Canterbury 
Law Review 169, 186. 
1376 See also Andrews v TVNZ Ltd High Court Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 
2006, Allan J) para 84. 
1377 See A Geddis, ‘Hosking v Runting: A Privacy Tort for New Zealand’ (2005) 13 Tort Law Review 5, 
8-9. 
1378 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
394. 
1379 Ibid, at p 395. See also P J Mc Nulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after 
Florida Star’ (2001) 50 Drake Law Review 93, 104. 
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were otherwise, the ‘burden faced by the plaintiff [would be] a high one’1380 (whatever 
that may mean), but discharging this burden would not promise any advantage in the 
balance. This might seem arbitrary to some. As already indicated, it is all too soon for a 
prognosis, but this might suggest that the New Zealand courts show the same habit as 
their US colleagues.1381 Generally, the discussion about the place and appropriate con-
tours of the public interest element has barely begun in New Zealand.1382           
 
As to the second aforementioned problem, Anderson observes that definitional 
balancing generally considers the context of each individual case insufficiently while 
the gravity of privacy interests is highly context dependant. This statement aims pre-
dominantly at the ‘highly offensive’ test of the tort. The ‘reasonable person’ applied in 
our example may suggest that reasonable New Zealanders are familiar with cricketers, 
sailors and rugby players having urinary problems while performing their sport. This 
objective reasonable person could therefore be familiar with media coverage of this 
kind. The fact that particularly a former All Black player was regularly showing a simi-
lar habit might suggest that it could not be regarded as ‘highly offensive’ in the case of 
the All Black player in our example. This overlooks the context of both cases. The for-
mer All Black player might have been very extrovert and did not even care about media 
coverage of this kind. The current All Black player, however, was highly embarrassed 
by this incident. To put it plainly, the application of the ‘reasonable person’ test is at 
least vulnerable to testing the current All Black’s sensibilities on the sensibilities of his 
predecessors. The context of the particular case of the plaintiff is likely to be ignored. 
Judges in the USA would almost automatically think that ‘this has been reported several 
times before, it could therefore be no actionable invasion of privacy in the present 
case.’1383 Anderson observes that this empirical approach is likely to enter into a vi-
cious circle because the more privacy has been consumed by the public in the past, the 
1380 Andrews v TVNZ Ltd High Court Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, 
Allan J) para 49. 
1381 It should be noted, however, that the prior restraint context was decisive in this case - U J Cheer, ‘The 
Future of Privacy – Recent Legal Developments in New Zealand’ (2007) 13 Canterbury Law Review 
169, 186. 
1382 Ibid, at p 187. 
1383 D Anderson, ’The failure of American Privacy’ in B Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) 139, 
150. 
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less privacy is protected in the present case.1384 Additionally, people who voluntarily 
expose their privacy, for instance, in reality TV or talk shows could influence the rea-
sonable person as well.1385 ‘Community mores’ and the standard of the ‘ordinary rea-
sonable person’ are built through the experiences of others.1386 The law protects what 
is, not what ought to be and consequently protects privacy only to the customarily re-
spected extent.1387 Seen from the perspective of the media, ‘the capacity of the news to 
make persons and events public would be completely subordinated to the [community 
mores] enforced.’1388 In short, the test may be disadvantageous for both litigants. 
 
In my view, the law should always show the potential to have a transformative 
effect in addition to serving justice in the individual case. The conception of the joint 
judgment is likely to serve none of these purposes.1389 Firstly, these tests do not protect 
the individual plaintiff and they do not promote individual justice. The concept rather 
calls for assimilation of the individual into the majority of ‘reasonable people’ or an 
alignment with the ‘community mores.’ This is an unpalatable determination of an indi-
vidual right, at least from the point of view of a European. Secondly, a transformative 
effect is hardly identifiable; the concept rather administers the status quo, because it 
merely reproduces the average stance of society members.1390 Apart from the add-on 
proportionality test, no normative value judgment takes place in two decisive prerequi-
sites of the tort. This concept does not decide whether an individual should conceal cer-
tain information from the world; it is at least very vulnerable to decide, ‘that contempo-
rary culture does not consistently condemn such disclosures.’1391 Moreover, this con-
temporary culture is not influenced by normative decisions of the courts but – with a bit 
1384 Ibid (Anderson describes this approach as ‘self-defeating’ or ‘self-eroding’). 
1385 See, eg, Doe v Methodist Hospital, 690 NE 2d 681, 692 (1997) (‘In our “been there, done that” age of 
talk shows, tabloids, and twelve-step programs, public disclosures of private facts are far less likely to 
cause shock, offen[c]e, or emotional distress than at the time Warren and Brandeis wrote their famous 
article’). 
1386 D Anderson, ’The failure of American Privacy’ in B Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) 139, 
150. 
1387 Ibid, at p 149.   
1388 R C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 
77 California Law Review 957, 1005. 
1389 It seems, however, that this is not feasible in court decisions purely based on common law. 
1390 A similar point was made, albeit in a different context, in Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 para 
112 per McGrath J. 
1391 D A Anderson, ’The failure of American Privacy’ in B Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) 
139, 150. 
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of exaggeration – by reality TV and talk shows.1392 The author acknowledges that it is 
precisely the purpose of the common law, as inspired by the rules of precedent and the 
stare decisis doctrine, to reproduce ‘what is’ as distinct from deciding what ‘ought to 
be.’ The growing exposure of individual lives to the public gaze, consensual or not, is 
nevertheless a global phenomenon.1393 The status quo of a non-prying press might 
therefore change in New Zealand, but these tests are insufficient to take legal counter-
measures if that is desired.  
 
Finally, ‘community mores’ and ‘reasonable person’ tests are based on the as-
sumption that a homogeneous society exists. In a heterogeneous society, by contrast, 
this ideal person is pure fiction and its application may be appropriate under certain cir-
cumstances but inappropriate in others. In the present context, the latter seems to be the 
case as will be detailed below. For the situation in the USA, it has been observed that 
community norms regarding privacy will differ ‘among communities, between genera-
tions, and among ethnic, religious, or other social groups, as well as among individu-
als.’1394 The situation in New Zealand does not seem to be entirely different.1395 The 
ethnic diversity, for instance, is growing in this country.1396 In a heterogeneous society, 
the common law can become an instrument for effacing cultural differences by applying 
such standards.1397 These abstract tests therefore not only diminish differences between 
individuals, even characteristics of ethnic minorities or other social groups may be ef-
faced.1398 The immanent effect of this abstract standard is apparently desired in the 
1392 See, eg, P Gewirtz, ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Review 139, 170 for a more detailed 
elaboration on the ‘Oprahfication’ of American culture; S B Spencer, ‘Reasonable Expectations and the 
Erosion of Privacy’ (2002) 39 San Diego Law Review 843, 873. 
1393 M Richardson, ‘Privacy and Precedent: The Court of Appeal’s Decision in Hosking v Runting’ 
(2005) 11 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 82, 94. 
1394 R C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 
77 California Law Review 957, 975-6; see also R Wacks in R Wacks (ed), Privacy Volume I (Interna-
tional Library of Essays in Law & Legal Theory) (1993), xvi – Introduction.  
1395 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
395. 
1396 According to Statistics New Zealand – Tatauranga Aotearoa, <http://www.stats.govt.nz/analytical-
reports/children-in-nz/growing-ethnic-diversity.htm> 03 December 2006. From 1983 to 1996, the number 
of European children fell from 72.7 to 62.4 percent. Over the same period, the proportion of Maori (from 
20.0 to 24.5 percent), Pacific Islanders (from 5.6 to 7.6 percent) and Asian (from 1.7 to 5 percent) chil-
dren increased.     
1397 R C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 
77 California Law Review 957, 977. 
1398 The consequences will receive further attention below during the discussion of ‘highly offensive’ test.  
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USA.1399 In New Zealand, in contrast, this effect might be smoothened by a proper se-
lection of judges.1400          
1.2.2 Anticipated solution according to Tipping J 
The anticipated solution by means of applying an ad hoc balancing exercise will 
be analysed next. Such a balancing test, as championed by Tipping J, is not prone to 
being submerged into abstractions like ‘ordinary reasonable person’ or ‘community mo-
res.’ The application of the test is based on the assumption that ‘balancing is best done 
on the facts of each case’ in order to determine whether the particular interference with 
privacy ‘is so serious as to warrant overriding freedom of expression.’1401  
 
Some argue that it is nonetheless difficult to examine Tipping J’s approach 
properly, because it seemed ‘churlish to demand a greater specificity with regards to 
this value exercise.’1402 In the context of the appropriate impact of the NZBoRA on the 
common law, Geddis mused that Tipping J’s approach is simply amounting to a ‘call 
for the courts to pay heed to “the vibe”.’1403 This is a remarkably apt criticism. To catch 
‘the vibe’ in the light of the facts of the case lies at the heart of a proportionality test. 
On occasion, the appropriate ‘shade of grey’ between two stark opposites (the prevail-
ing of either privacy or freedom of expression) has to be identified. This balancing ex-
ercise may therefore be characterised as being ‘the mark of a reasonable, rational, subtle 
mind.’1404 In practice, however, the application of this technique demands a lot of sub-
1399 See P J McNulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 
Drake Law Review 93, 138 (2001) (‘Just as the constitutional protection accorded literary, artistic, scien-
tific, and political speech should not differ from community to community, neither should the public's 
right to know depend on the sensibilities of particular communities’); see also J Lenow, ‘First Amend-
ment Protection for the Publication of Private Information’ (2007) 60 Vanderbilt Law Review 235, 256, 
who argues that the ambit of free speech would be determined by prevalent cultural sensibilities if human 
emotion restricts free speech. 
1400 One of the qualities a candidate must show in this country is that she is ‘aware of, and sensitive to, 
the diversity of modern New Zealand society’ – ‘Appointing Judges: A Judicial Appointments commis-
sion for New Zealand – Appendix One: New Zealand Appointments’ 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/2004/judicial-appointment/appendixone.html> 03 December 
2006.  
1401 Duff [1996] 2 NZLR 89, 99 (HC) per Blanchard J. 
1402 A Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v 
Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681, 701. 
1403 Ibid; see also K M Lewin, ‘The Significance of Constitutional Rights for Private Law: Theory and 
Practice in West Germany’ (1968) 17(3) International Comparative Law Quarterly 571, 599. 
1404 T A Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 943, 962. 
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tlety from the judge.1405 Every relevant fact of the case has to be weighed in the bal-
ance.1406 With regard to the German law, it has been observed that the result of such a 
weighing exercise is therefore often unpredictable.1407 This was also well reflected in 
Campbell. The Law Lords were not in dispute as to whether a proportionality test as a 
method has to be applied.1408 The primary issue was how the balance had to be struck 
between arts 8 and 10 ECHR while applying this method.1409 Each right has to be lim-
ited no more than necessary. The majority, therefore, held that the press justifiably pub-
lished two sets of facts whilst the publication of three sets amounted to an unwarranted 
interference with privacy.1410 For the majority, this result represented the maximal op-
timisation of both rights – the appropriate ‘shade of grey’ in that particular case. The 
media defendant was allowed to publish the story but the plaintiff was granted a right to 
conceal certain parts of the information from the world. The minority, as we know, was 
less subtle and regarded the publication of the whole article as justified (on an identical 
factual basis).1411 The calculability of the law is impaired by applying a proportionality 
test.1412 This can contribute to an overall uncertainty that is undesirable for both liti-
gants and the law in general.1413  
 
In my view, the recognition of the full context required by a proportionality-
balancing test makes it difficult to develop the privacy tort on a case-by-case basis in 
the traditional sense. The term ‘case by case’ may easily conceal that the cases could 
rather be seen as a stringing together of individual judgments with, if any, a very slow 
1405 See B S Markesinis and S Enchelmaier, ‘Human Rights under German Constitutional Law’ in B S 
Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) 191, 238.   
1406 See, eg, the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court BVerfGE 93, 266, 296 (1995) 
(“Soldiers are Murderers II”) regarding the weighing exercise in defamation. 
1407 Ibid; the same has been predicted earlier by the US Supreme Court – see Gertz v Welch, 418 US 323, 
343 (1974). 
1408 [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 36 per Lord Hoffmann. 
1409 Ibid, para 126 per Lady Hale. 
1410 See also Browne [2007] 3 WLR 289 (CA) para 38 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR. The English Courts 
do not merely distinguish particular sets of facts, the individual items also have to be balanced separately 
by applying the proportionality test - McKennitt [2006] EMLR 178 (QB) para 67 Eady J; [2007] 3 WLR 
194 (CA) para 47 per Buxton LJ.  
1411 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 para 32 per Lord Nicholls; para 78 per Lord Hoffmann. 
1412 See H Stoll, ‘General Right to Personality in German Law’ in B S Markesinis (ed), Protecting Pri-
vacy (1999) 29, 42; K M Lewin, ‘The Significance of Constitutional Rights for Private Law: Theory and 
Practice in West Germany’ (1968) 17(3) International Comparative Law Quarterly 571, 599.  
1413 See B S Markesinis and S Enchelmaier ‘Human Rights under German Constitutional Law’ in B S 
Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) 191, 238. See also CC v AB [2007] EMLR 11 (QBD) para 27 
per Eady J.  
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or limited organic development. For the proportionality test in Germany, it has been ob-
served that ‘not a few cases abound with noble words and impressive ethics but [they] 
do not provide a clear directive to be followed in other cases.’1414 The proportionality 
test is undoubtedly compatible with the NZBoRA. However, it is to some degree in-
compatible with the common law, at least as far as the incremental development on a 
case-by-case basis is concerned. Moreover, an application of this test de lege artis is 
time consuming. It is my personal observation that particularly the lower German courts 
are often asked too much, presumably because of their high workload.1415 The theoreti-
cal structure of the proportionality balance is in the practice of these courts sometimes 
hardly recognisable. The balancing exercise then appears to take place inside a ‘black 
box’ with little discussion of the valuation standards.1416 In sum, all is therefore very 
well on paper, but difficult to apply in practice.  
 
After all, the most striking advantage of the joint judgment’s solution reveals the 
exposed flank of Tipping J’s approach. The joint judgment largely fades out the con-
text. This concept, influenced by the US law, strives ‘for as much predictability as pos-
sible within [that country’s] system of case-by-case adjudication, lest [the courts] un-
wittingly chill First Amendment freedoms.’1417 The decisions must be capable of gen-
erating rules of precedent to constrain future judicial decisions.1418 Particularly with re-
gard to the advantages of the US approach, it must be stressed that this premise will be 
met easier by adopting the standards of that country.  
 
The application of an ad hoc balancing test, by contrast, is more likely to pro-
duce individual justice. Because both principles have to be optimised to the greatest ex-
1414 H Stoll, ‘General Right to Personality in German Law’ in B S Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy 
(1999) 29, 42; E Barendt, ‘Privacy and freedom of speech’ in M Richardson and A T Kenyon (eds), New 
Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 11, 21 and T A Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balanc-
ing’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 943, 949. 
1415 The reason for this phenomenon is that ad hoc balancing stems originally from constitutional law. 
The workload of specialised constitutional courts, however, is often much lower than for judges of the 
ordinary jurisdiction – see B S Markesinis and S Enchelmaier in B S Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy 
(1999) 191, 238 for further details.  
1416 T A Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 943, 976. 
1417 Briscoe v Reader's Digest Association Inc, 93 Cal Rptr 866, 876 fn 18 (1971). 
1418 R C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 
77 California Law Review 957, 975; see also P J Mc Nulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: 
There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 Drake Law Review 93, 103. 
 
 
245 
                                                          
tent possible, three sets of facts have to be distinguished in our initial All Black exam-
ple: (1) the coverage of the rugby match, (2) the coverage of the personal incident in-
volving the All Black in written form and (3) the marginally pixelated close-up photo-
graph of the player kneeling on the pitch.1419 English authorities suggest that the first 
two sets of facts can be published. The photograph, however, would be regarded as ex-
ceedingly intrusive if balanced against the public interest in learning about the informa-
tion. The appropriate ‘shade of grey’ would therefore be that the publication of the third 
set of facts is unwarranted.        
 
Although a normative value judgment is required, a general transformative ef-
fect for the public is, at least in the short run, minimal. Each decision is highly context-
dependent, often without clear directives for following cases. An effect nonetheless oc-
curs after a passage of time when those subject to the law develop a sense of ‘catching 
the vibe’ regarding what is appropriate to publish and what is not. What develops is 
called ‘self-censorship,’ which in turn leads to a ‘chilling effect on freedom of speech’ 
in some jurisdictions. In other legal systems, the same phenomenon is described as a 
manifestation of a ‘culture of justification’ – the eye of the beholder decides once more. 
For some Europeans, for instance, it is a cultural achievement that media and citizens 
alike sometimes ask themselves ‘can I say that?’ or ‘can I publish this’ with regard to 
rights of others before they actually do it – a responsible or reasonable handling of free 
speech rights is required. However, Markesinis observes that, for instance, German law 
has ‘managed to accord speech rights protection levels similar to those found in the 
United States while also protecting personality and privacy in a way that American law 
has not managed to do.’1420  
 
Some might regard the ‘chilling effect’ argument against an ad hoc balancing 
test, thus, as overrated. It is only powerful in connection with the media’s role of a pub-
lic watchdog and protector of democracy.1421 Democratic self-governance requires a 
1419 See also McKennitt  [2006] EMLR 178 (QB) para 11 per Eady J. The Court identified five categories 
of information, which the claimant sought to restrain. 
1420 B S Markesinis and S Enchelmaier, ‘Human Rights under German Constitutional Law’ in B Mar-
kesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) 191, 242. 
1421 D J Solove, ‘The Virtues Of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure’ 
(2003) 53 Duke Law Journal 967, 1029 (2003). See also von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1 
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free flow of (at least) truthful information in order to debate the merits of a given policy 
– the public is otherwise not able to exert the influence necessary to achieve the desired 
results.1422 However, to assume, in contrast, that this concern can be sensibly invoked 
by publishing a close-up photograph of a urinating rugby player, as in our example, or 
divulge the name of a rape victim1423 seems quite daring. 
 
A proportionality test pays tribute to the pluralism of interests and values in a 
modern society rather than focusing on a single value. It is a truism that one citizen’s 
right is always the flipside of a fellow citizen’s right.1424 Furthermore, privacy is widely 
regarded as ‘constitutive’ of society, which means that privacy harms done to individu-
als might affect society as a whole, because it deters other individuals from activities 
contributing to a greater social good.1425 A ‘chilling effect’ might occur no matter what. 
The question to be posed is whether the latter effect is of importance to a society and, 
thus, identified as a problem in the first place. 
 
It should be noted, in conclusion, that Tipping J’s approach - and the ad hoc 
balancing test generally - is far from being flawless. The observation of Aleinikoff re-
mains nonetheless true for the situation in Germany: ‘[t]he attractiveness of balancing 
went beyond its practical utility.’1426 Notwithstanding, the concept is capable of accom-
plishing more goals than the one advocated by the joint judgment. One might be 
 
para 63; McKennitt [2006] EMLR 178 (QB) para 55 per Eady J; [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 12 per 
Buxton LJ; M Markin, ‘An “Unholy Alliance”: The Law of Media Ride-Alongs’ (2004) 12 CommLaw 
Conspectus 33, 35; P Gewirtz, ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Review 139, 172. 
1422 J Lenow, ‘First Amendment Protection for the Publication of Private Information’ (2007) 60 Vander-
bilt Law Review 235, 239. 
1423 But see Florida Star v B G F, 491 US 524 (1989). 
1424 W Brugger, ’The Image of the Person in the Human Rights Concept’ (1996) 18(3) Human Rights 
Quarterly 594, 603. 
1425 D J Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 477, 488 
(2006). This argument had also been elaborated in Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514, 557 per Rehnquist J 
(dissenting). See also P Gewirtz, ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Review 139, 165; R Kil-
kenney, ‘Invasion of Privacy for the Greater Good: Why Bartnicki v Vopper Disserves the Right of Pri-
vacy and the First Amendment’ (2003) 64 Ohio State Law Journal 999, 1002; D Mead, ‘It’s a Funny Old 
Game - Privacy, Football and the Public Interest’ [2006] European Human Rights Law Review 541, 546-
47; K M. Beasley, ‘Up-Skirt and other Dirt: Why Cell Phone Cameras and other Technologies Require a 
New Approach to Protecting Personal Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 31 Southern Illinois University 
Law Journal 69, 92. 
1426 T A Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 943, 961; 
compare B S Markesinis and S Enchelmaier, ‘Human Rights under German Constitutional Law’ in B S 
Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) 191, 240. 
 
 
247 
                                                          
tempted to say that the charm of a law, whose foremost purpose is to be predictable 
with regard to just one societal interest, is quite austere. The lacklustre performance of 
the US tort is only in part a result of the influence of the First Amendment. Addition-
ally, reasonable person and community mores tests inherently promote that freedom of 
speech prevails. The systemic value of speech is emphasised on both occasions whereas 
the individual’s conflicting interest in maintaining privacy is seen as ‘episodic’ or ‘at-
omistic’ rather than systemic. Even  progressive formulations of the public interest only 
led to a small number of successful privacy actions in the USA.1427 I suggest that it 
might be wishful thinking to believe that New Zealand judges will not fall into the same 
pitfall as their counterparts in the US.1428 I use the term ‘wishful’ deliberately, because 
the adoption of these tests inherently lead to the results achieved in that country. 
 
Whether the respective approach of Tipping J and the joint judgment accom-
plish the same result, thus, depends on the subtlety of the judge deciding the case. For 
the individual plaintiff, however, it represents a significant difference whether or not 
such a close-up photograph is published by the media. Legal restrictions on such disclo-
sures are more likely to be achieved by applying a proportionality test. Having decided 
that Tipping J’s approach is preferable, it is of further interest whether the proportional-
ity test should be characterised as a defence or an element of the action. This problem 
will receive further attention in the following.            
1.3 The public- concern element – defence or element of the tort?   
The characterisation of the ‘public concern’ feature is a problem of predomi-
nantly academic nature for reasons suggested below. This feature of the tort recognises 
the guarantee of freedom of expression.1429 The High Court categorised it in P v D1430 
as one of the four factors of the tort.1431 The majority in Hosking, however, character-
1427 P J Mc Nulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 
Drake Law Review 93, 109. 
1428 The joint judgment explicitly pointed out that American cases would have to be treated with caution - 
Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 76 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
1429 See J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.5.05 at 762. 
1430 P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 paras 34, 35. 
1431 See also Graham v Central Pacific Finance Ltd [2001] DCR 513 para 15; L v G [2002] NZAR 495, 
506 (DC). 
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ised it as a defence.1432 The joint judgment pointed to supposed parallels between the 
new privacy tort and the equitable remedy of breach of confidence,1433 in which the fea-
ture had been established as the iniquity defence.1434 The legal rationale behind the de-
fence is that there is no confidence regarding the disclosure of an iniquity.1435 Accord-
ing to Burrows, it would be anomalous if the nature of the feature were otherwise in in-
vasion of privacy.1436  
 
A related issue of more practical relevance is concerned with the onus of proof. 
In Californian common law, for instance, the newsworthiness test is part of the cause of 
action; the plaintiff has to discharge the burden of proof, viz, he or she has to show a 
lack of newsworthiness.1437 On a more general level, the ‘newsworthiness’ element is 
either a defence, an element of the tort or a constitutional privilege depending on the 
jurisdiction where the claim is filed.1438 As for New Zealand, it has been argued that the 
‘public concern’ feature, categorised as an element of the tort, would inconveniently 
leave the plaintiff with the onus of proving this point.1439 Instead, it has been suggested 
that it should be for the defendant to provide evidence of the concern.1440 This overall 
concept has been met with approval by scholars1441 and the courts1442  later shared this 
view.  
1432 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 129 per Gault P and Blanchard J; para 257 per Tipping J. 
1433 K Evans, ‘Was Privacy the Winner on the Day?’ [2004] New Zealand Law Journal 181, 182.    
1434 Ibid, para 129. 
1435 An iniquity was first exclusively related to fraudulent behaviour of the plaintiff but was later ex-
tended to information of public interest - Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396, 405 per Lord 
Denning MR. ‘Iniquity’ later became an instance of just cause for breaking confidence – Lion Laborato-
ries Ltd v Evans [1985] QB 526, 537-8 per Lord Stephenson; see also U J Cheer, ‘Privacy and the Public 
Interest’ (2005) 1 Privacy Law Bulletin 145, 148.   
1436 J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.5.05 at 762. 
1437 Diaz v Oakland Tribune Inc, 139 Cal App 3d 128-130 (1983); Taus v Loftus, 40 Cal 4th 683, 717 
(2007). See too G L Bostwick, ‘The Newsworthiness Element: Shulman v Group W Prods., Inc. Muddies 
the Waters’ (1999) 19 Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review 225, 228, 236.  
1438 D M Worley, ‘Shulman v Group W Productions: Invasion of Privacy by Publication of Private Facts - 
Where Does California Draw the Line Between Newsworthy Information and Morbid Curiosity’ (1999-
2000) 27 Western State University Law Review 535, 551; see also S M Scott, ‘The Hidden First Amend-
ment Values of Privacy’ (1996) 71 Washington Law Review 683, 701. 
1439 K Evans, ‘Was Privacy the Winner of the Day?’ [2004] New Zealand Law Journal 181, 184. 
1440 U J Cheer, ‘Privacy and the Public Interest’ (2005) 1 Privacy Law Bulletin 145, 146; Rogers v TVNZ 
Ltd (2005) 22 CRNZ 668 (HC) para 21 per Venning and Winkelmann JJ; Brown v Attorney-General 
[2006] DCR 630 para 84 per Spear J. 
1441 K Evans, ‘Was Privacy the Winner of the Day’ [2004] New Zealand Law Journal 181, 184; U J 
Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 254; J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The 
Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.5.05 at 762; R Tobin, ‘Invasion of Privacy’ [2000] 
New Zealand Law Journal 216, 218. 
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Subsequently, I seek to show that these observations face two problems. First, it 
is obvious that a common law analogy is the decisive factor in determining the nature of 
the public-concern element. The present writer has argued before that it is the impact of 
the NZBoRA, which has to be considered in this context. It will thus be analysed how 
the feature would be categorised according to the Act. Secondly, the current concept is 
inspired by the traditional breach of confidence doctrine, which requires the existence 
of a relationship of confidence. The new privacy tort, on the other hand, omits such a 
requirement and the conceptual structure of the action might hence be different.1443 
Moreover, the current starting point seems to overlook that the qualification of the pub-
lic concern feature may change when personal information is protected under what has 
become known as the extended breach of confidence action.1444 As we know, there are 
now two distinct branches of breach of confidence in English law.1445
1.3.1 The NZBoRA and public interest feature of the privacy tort  
Any attempt to conceal private information from the public gaze is bound to 
clash with freedom of speech.1446 Consequently, one could ask whether it is conceptu-
ally sound to recognise a guarantee by offering the defendant the possibility to defend 
herself with freedom of expression. To do so would seem inconsequent to my mind.1447 
The recognition of a guarantee might imply that the courts have to consider freedom of 
speech in every case without an additional act of will. Furthermore, freedom of speech 
 
1442 Rogers v TVNZ Ltd [2007] NZSC 91 para 98 per McGrath J; TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 156 
(CA) para 69 per Panckhurst and O’Regan JJ; Andrews v TVNZ Ltd High Court Auckland, CIV 2004-
404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) para 80. 
1443 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] 2 All ER 289 para 126 per Sedley LJ (‘What a concept of privacy does, 
however, is accord recognition to the fact that the law has to protect not only those people whose trust has 
been abused but those who simply find themselves subjected to unwanted intrusion into their private 
lives. The law no longer needs to construct an artificial relationship of confidentiality between intruder 
and victim: it can recognise privacy itself as a legal principle drawn from the fundamental value of per-
sonal autonomy’); see also J Morgan, ‘Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: “Hello” Trouble’ 
(2003) 62(2) Cambridge Law Journal 444, 451.    
1444 See Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 42 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
1445 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2007] 2 WLR 920 (HL) para 255 per Lord Nicholls. 
1446 U J Cheer, ‘The Future of Privacy – Recent Legal Developments in New Zealand’ (2007) 13 Canter-
bury Law Review 169, 187. 
1447 It seems widely excepted that the new tort has to fit alongside the requirements of the NZBoRA – see 
K Evans, ‘Reverse gear for NZ’s privacy tort: the Hosking decision’ Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/journals/PLPR/2003/35.html> 29 May 2006; see also J F Burrows, ‘Invasion 
of  Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 396 (‘In all cases involving 
privacy the right of freedom of expression must be brought into the balance’). 
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has, as we know, an additional dimension transcending the interests of the parties in-
volved – the freedom of the public to be informed about truthful matters of public inter-
est.1448  
 
Given that the role of ss 5 and 14 has to be considered in each individual disclo-
sure case, it does not seem conceptually sound that it is necessary to raise a defence. A 
defence that is inevitably to be invoked in every case is de facto an element of the tort. 
However, it may be verging on the trite to say that a defence could be raised, but it must 
not. Since one has to make up the infamous ‘overpaid but underachieving lawyer X’ for 
the distinction to take effect, it remains predominantly an academic problem. It is 
highly unlikely to happen in practice that counsel ‘forgets’ to raise the defence. For the 
sake of doctrinal purity, the public concern feature should nonetheless be regarded as an 
element of the tort. If it were otherwise, it occasionally might be difficult to identify the 
recognition of the guarantee at interlocutory stage. An ex-parte injunction such as Brash 
v Jane and John Doe1449 is an illustrative example, because the unknown defendants 
were naturally not able to raise the defence.     
 
Likewise, the situation in the England and Wales prior to the enactment of the 
HRA, the characterisation of the public concern as a defence seems to be predominantly 
influenced by the necessity to place the onus of proof for showing the public interest on 
the defendant.1450 How would an approach influenced by the NZBoRA handle this 
problem?1451 At the outset, I should like to reiterate that I presuppose a bifurcated ap-
proach to the limitation of human or constitutional rights. The first step consists in de-
termining whether the scope of the right has been infringed; if this question could be 
1448 See also Duff [1996] 2 NZLR 89, 101 per Blanchard J (emphasis added). 
1449 HC Wellington, CIV-2006-485-2605 (unreported, 16 November 2006 MacKenzie J). Former Na-
tional Party leader Dr Brash was granted an injunction, because he did not want his private email corre-
spondence broadcast to the world. Without going into too much detail, the suppressed email correspon-
dence was likely to include matters of considerable public interest. It has to be noted that Mackenzie J 
apparently relied on Mr Brash’s argument that publication of the emails would have been a breach of 
copyright. According to his Honour, a breach of copyright would normally prevail over freedom of 
speech – see ‘Brash case rings alarm bells for media’ 
<http://www.stuff.co.nz/stuff/print/0,1478,3866249a6160,00.html at 24 November 2006>. An absent 
defendant, however, cannot possibly raise the defence that the emails are not protected by copyright.   
1450 See R Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom (1995) 110.  
1451 M Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Jus-
tice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, 579.    
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answered in the affirmative, a prima facie violation of the right has occurred.1452 The 
focus, then, shifts to the question whether the infringement can be justified under a limi-
tation clause such as art 10 (2) ECHR or s 5 NZBoRA; this stage consists in determin-
ing whether a definitive violation of the right has occurred subject to a proportionality 
balancing test.1453 We approach this problem by initially asking how the system oper-
ates in the public law sphere (vertical dimension of the right) before I seek to extract the 
implications for a constitutionalised common law tort (horizontal application).  
 
In the context of public law, the plaintiff has to establish that she has experi-
enced an interference with her affirmed right (for instance, an interference with the 
scope of s 14).1454 As for the second stage, the burden of proof shifts to the state. The 
respective branch of government has to justify the interference pursuant to s 5.1455 This 
concept follows the ‘she who alleges bears the burden of proving’ principle.1456 The 
citizen, in the role of the plaintiff, is thereby defending her liberty (ie, her affirmed 
right). The state, as defendant, has to establish sufficient justification as to why an inter-
ference with the citizen’s right constitutes a reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a 
democratic society. In other words, the state has to establish that the infringement of the 
right does not amount to a violation of the right because the infringement is sufficiently 
justified.  
 
Let us now try to distil implications for the common law sphere. I suggest that 
this concept can be applied horizontally with just one logic alteration; that is to say that 
the roles of the parties change in accordance with their inversed interests in a private 
law dispute.1457 The private law scheme, as it were, has to be the negative of the public 
1452 M Kumm, ‘What Do You Have in Virtue of Having a Constitutional Right? On the Place and Limits 
of the Proportionality Requirement’ at p 5 <http://www.lsr.nelco.org/nyu/plltwp/papers/46 at 08 February 
2008>. 
1453 Ibid. 
1454 P Rishworth in Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) 174; P and A Butler, The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 6.6.5.  
1455 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), 6.6.5; P Rishworth in 
Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) 174. 
1456 Ibid; see also Ministry of Transport v Noort; Police v Curren [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 283 (CA) per 
Richardson J (‘[…] the onus is on those relying on s 5 to show that the limit is reasonable and can be de-
monstrably justified in a free and democratic society’). 
1457 Freedom of speech is the only NZBoRA right in play. The plaintiff has to argue that her privacy in-
terest overrides any public interest in learning about her personal information. It is the defendant in this 
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law scheme. In the context of private law, the plaintiff seeks to restrict an enshrined 
right whilst the defendant is trying to uphold her interests in freedom of speech. There-
fore, it would be theoretically for the plaintiff to argue that an interference with the 
value of s 14 did not occur. However, since it has been suggested that s 14 has been 
eloquently interpreted as being ‘as wide as human thought and imagination,’ there will 
be an interference with the principle in probably every situation imaginable. The burden 
of proof almost automatically shifts to the defendant, who in turn has to establish that 
the infringement of her right to freedom of expression is not1458 justified pursuant to s 
5. In brief, the defendant has to establish that a violation of her right has occurred. This 
has to be carried out by showing that the public interest in receiving the personal infor-
mation is sufficient to outweigh the privacy interest in the balance. The scheme from 
the public law remains nonetheless substantially the same for the purposes of the pri-
vate law. Particularly the ‘she who alleges bears the burden of proving’ principle ap-
plies equally. Moreover, such a theoretical scheme of argumentation is apparently not 
unfamiliar in practice.1459  
 
As a result, an ex-parte injunction against ‘Jane and John Doe’ would conse-
quently be either impossible (due to the necessary participation of the defendant) or re-
quire the plaintiff to show that the publication is not justified (because of the fact that 
the ‘public interest’ feature is an element of the tort and not just a defence).1460 It seems 
reasonable to suggest, in conclusion, that a public-concern element influenced by hori-
zontally applied quasi-constitutional rights should be categorised as an element of the 
tort. By adopting the modified burden-of-proof scheme derived from the NZBoRA, the 
parties are nonetheless required to carry the burden in the desired fashion. 
 
context who has to defend an enshrined right and not the plaintiff. The roles of plaintiff and defendant are 
inversed in comparison to the situation in public law due to the differing respective interest in private 
law. In a public law context, by contrast, the plaintiff tries to defend her enshrined right against interfer-
ence by the defendant.   
1458 Hence the description as ‘negative scheme.’ Claimant and defendant argue in the opposite way as 
they would in a public law application of the NZBoRA. 
1459 See, eg, TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 156 (CA) para 75 per Panckhurst and O’Regan JJ (‘In 
essence Mr Akel argued that legitimate public concern outweighed Mr Roger’s privacy rights’). In other 
words, the successfully claimed invasion of privacy would not represent a justified interference with 
freedom of speech. 
1460 See also X v Unknown Persons [2007] EMLR 10 (QBD) para 22 per Eady J. 
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1.3.2 The public interest feature of the traditional breach of confidence action  
We will now turn to the second aforementioned problem and examine whether it 
is appropriate to draw parallels from traditional breach of confidence doctrine in the 
context of the new privacy tort. In the broadest sense, both actions are linked because 
they are concerned with ‘information dissemination.’1461 It would appear that the three 
judges in the majority in Hosking made a logical decision by drawing an analogy from 
the traditional doctrine. It is nevertheless important to note that the precise nature of the 
public-concern element in traditional breach of confidence doctrine is less clear than the 
statements in Hosking may suggest. Furthermore, the Judges did not consider the situa-
tion of the extended version. The basic premise followed by their Honours and scholars 
alike causes unease, because it is the extended version that is supposed to protect per-
sonal information against unwarranted publication – not the traditional concept. Thus, it 
seems inconsequent to argue that the traditional concept is substantially different from 
the privacy concept while drawing analogies between them is a valid technique for de-
termining the features of the new tort.1462 Arguing by analogy requires, in the author’s 
view, similarities between both concepts.1463 Given that the major difference between 
the approaches of New Zealand and the UK regarding the protection of personal infor-
mation is a matter of labels,1464 it might be advantageous to consider the extended ver-
sion instead.       
 
It is convenient to point to the discussion in the UK. The question concerning 
the nature of the public interest test had been subject to detailed analysis even prior to 
the enactment of the HRA. With regard to the traditional concept, Wacks has stressed 
that it was unclear ‘whether its absence constitutes a substantive requirement of the ac-
tion, or whether it operates as a defence to what would otherwise be a protected confi-
dence.’1465 The classification as a defence seems to be predetermined by the conceptual 
1461 D J Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 477, 525. 
1462 Particularly granted that there is no substantial difference between the British extended breach of con-
fidence action and New Zealand’s privacy tort – see Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 247 per Tip-
ping J; M Waterfield, ‘Now You See It, Now You Don't: the Case for a Tort of Infringement of Privacy 
in New Zealand’ (2004) 10 Canterbury Law Review 182, 205.   
1463 The majority was unanimous with regard to distinctive nature of privacy and confidence – Hosking 
[2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 246 per Tipping J, paras 45 and 48 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
1464 See Rogers v TVNZ Ltd [2007] NZSC 91 para 24 per Elias CJ. 
1465 R Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom (1995) 93-4. 
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basis of the action itself. Equitable remedies are discretionary in contrast to the common 
law position.1466 A traditional breach of confidence action involves the fact that ‘the 
plaintiff has entrusted information to a confidant, whether or not its disclosure is re-
garded as being in the public interest.’1467 The traditional doctrine is concerned with 
maintaining confidences.1468 The very basis of protecting an obligation of confidence is 
grounded in the public interest.1469 The public interest in the publication of confidential 
material is an additional factor, which might appear in a particular case – but it is not an 
essential factor of the action itself. These statements reveal the more general truism that 
it cannot possibly be in the public interest to maintain a confidential relationship while 
it is at the same time in its interest to publish the information. The distinct public inter-
est in the publication is, therefore, what the present writer would regard as a proper de-
fence. The dissemination in spite of the fact that the information has been entrusted to a 
confidant beforehand is essential for the equitable action; that is to say that the breach 
of confidence is indispensable to the action. Hence, it is conceptually necessary to re-
gard the public interest element as a defence. The discretionary features of the equitable 
jurisdiction enable the courts to recognise an obligation of confidence while refusing to 
enforce it for other reasons.1470 The right of the plaintiff, in this context, seems to derive 
from the relationship of confidence already. The qualification of the public concern test 
as a defence to the traditional action makes it conceptually clear that it ‘operates to bar 
the enforcement of the right rather than to deny its existence.’1471 If the public concern 
test were instead to be treated as a substantive requirement of the action (part of the 
‘right’ itself), the existence of a public concern in the publication would mean that the 
1466 Ibid, at p 96. 
1467 Ibid, at p 94 (emphasis added); see also Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 201 per Keith J. 
1468 R Tobin, ‘Privacy: One step forward, two steps back’ [2003] New Zealand Law Journal 256, 258; see 
also A Sims, ‘”A Shift in the Gravity Centre”: The dangers of Protecting Privacy Through Breach of con-
fidence’ [2005] Intellectual Property Quarterly 27, 49.  
1469 A Schreiber, ‘Confidence Crisis, Privacy Phobia: Why Invasion of Privacy should be Independently 
Recognised in English Law’ [2006] Intellectual Property Quarterly 160, 179. The primary purpose for 
providing a remedy for breach of confidence was not to compensate the individual plaintiff whose confi-
dence had been breached, but that a particular value had been attributed to those kinds of relationships – 
L Clarke, ‘Remedial Responses to Breach of Confidence: The Question of Damages’ (2005) Civil Justice 
Quarterly 316, 334. 
1470 Y Cribbs, ‘The Public Interest defence to the Action for Breach of Confidence and the Law Commis-
sion’s Proposals on Disclosure in the Public Interest ‘ (1984) 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 361, 362.   
1471 R Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom (1995) 96. 
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obligation of confidence never came into existence.1472 Thus, ‘the courts would be de-
prived of the opportunity to exercise the discretionary features of their equitable juris-
diction.’1473 In my eyes, these remarks fortify what already flowed as a matter of logic.  
 
Nevertheless, it is sound that an existing public interest in the maintenance of 
the confidential relationship is barred from enforcement. Doctrinally, this is possible if 
the defendant raises a ‘public interest’ defence. The courts must then engage in balanc-
ing the public interest in protecting confidential relationships and the public interest in 
revealing the information protected by this relationship.1474 Since the traditional action 
focuses on protecting confidence, the defence has only rarely been made out.1475    
 
Moreover, this result is supported by the appropriate burden of proof. It is un-
usual to cast the burden of disapproving a defence upon the plaintiff.1476 The burden 
should therefore rest upon the defendant, who has to show why the public interest in 
receiving the information should prevail over the protection of confidence.1477 Hence, it 
is suggested that the public-concern element in traditional breach of confidence doc-
trine has to be categorised as a defence.  
1.3.3 The public interest element and the privacy tort  
So what differences go hand in hand with the extension of the traditional con-
cept in order to protect personal information against unwarranted dissemination? Sub-
sequently, I seek to demonstrate that the dissimilarities in English law entail (1) the dif-
ferent nature of the public interest element due to the redundancy of an obligation of 
confidence and (2) the impact of arts 8 and 10 ECHR.  
1472 Y Cribbs, ‘The Public Interest defence to the Action for Breach of Confidence and the Law Commis-
sion’s Proposals on Disclosure in the Public Interest ‘ (1984) 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 361, 363. 
1473 R Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom (1995) 96. 
1474 Eg, Associated Newspapers Ltd v His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales [2006] EWCA Civ 1776 
para 55 per Lord Phillips CJ; see also A Schreiber, ‘Confidence Crisis, Privacy Phobia: Why Invasion of 
Privacy should be Independently Recognised in English Law’ [2006] Intellectual Property Quarterly 
160, 179. 
1475 A Sims, ‘”A Shift in the Gravity Centre”: The dangers of Protecting Privacy through Breach of Con-
fidence’ [2005] Intellectual Property Quarterly 27, 49; see also Associated Newspapers Ltd v His Royal 
Highness the Prince of Wales [2006] EWCA Civ 1776 para 67 per Lord Phillips CJ. 
1476 R Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom (1995) 97. 
1477 Ibid, at p 111. An exception to this rule, however, is justified when government secrets are concerned. 
In a free society, there is a constant public interest in scrutinising and criticising the workings of govern-
ment - Spycatcher (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 283 per Lord Goff. 
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As is well known, the extended breach of confidence does not require a confi-
dential relationship that might prevent the defendant from publishing personal or pri-
vate information.1478 A ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ which replaced this re-
quirement derives in the UK from the impact of an individual right (art 8 ECHR), not 
from a public interest in maintaining this expectation.1479 As a right, it inheres in every 
person whilst the public interest is external to privacy.1480 The recognition of individual 
interests notwithstanding, it generally lies in the public interest of a free and democratic 
society to communicate the truth freely to others – especially in the absence of any ob-
ligation or contractual bond between the parties to act otherwise. The public interest, 
thus, collides with the maintenance of an expectation of privacy.1481 The individual’s 
interest in withholding truthful information is merely actionable if and only insofar as it 
is not overridden by the public interest in the publication, viz, in matters involving an 
unjustifiably intrusive exercise of freedom of speech. As this should be the tightly con-
fined exception and not the rule, it does not seem ‘anomalous’ that the public concern 
test is a mandatory feature of the tort. In the absence of a public interest in maintaining 
a relationship of confidence, it must generally be possible to publish truthful, albeit pri-
vate, information. In other words, the question as to whether or not the dissemination of 
these facts is in the public interest becomes crucial.  
 
The horizontal effect of Convention rights on the extended breach of confidence 
makes it clear that the right to privacy depends on prevailing over freedom of speech in 
the balance; a right to privacy does not exist in the absence of this conflict.1482 As we 
know, a reasonable expectation of privacy is a threshold test, which necessarily brings 
the balancing exercise into play. Although the public interest feature is still listed under 
1478 Eg, Browne [2007] 3 WLR 289 (CA) para 24 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR; Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 
(CA) para 201 per Keith J. 
1479 Ibid. 
1480 A Schreiber, ‘Confidence Crisis, Privacy Phobia: Why Invasion of Privacy should be Independently 
Recognised in English Law’ [2006] Intellectual Property Quarterly 160, 179. 
1481 Ibid. 
1482 At least as far as the public dissemination of private facts is concerned. In this area, privacy and free-
dom of speech cannot possibly co-exist peacefully. 
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‘defences’1483 to the extended action, the courts accepted that they have ‘absorbed’1484 
arts 8 and 10 ECHR for the purposes of the extended (or new) cause of action. Absorb-
ing both articles gave new strength to the action.1485 Lord Nicholls opined in Campbell, 
‘[t]he time has come to recognise that the values enshrined in articles 8 and 10 are now 
part of the cause of action for breach of confidence.’1486 Thus, the right to freedom of 
speech or public-concern element is not a defence, at least not in a technical sense. This 
would also be a proper way of recognising a guarantee of a human rights instrument. I 
should reiterate, although only in passing, that I agree with those who suggest that this 
‘development’ of the traditional doctrine has tacitly led to the invention of a privacy tort 
‘in all but name’ in English law.  Breach of confidence is now arguably subdivided 
into two separate actions.
1487
1488 This must be so, because the protected interests are com-
pletely different. However, this is not to suggest that there is no need to pay closer at-
tention to free-speech interests in cases involving the traditional breach of confidence 
doctrine.1489  
 
In sum, the opposite proportions of rule and exception therefore justify a differ-
ent characterisation of the ‘public concern’ element. It seems reasonable to suggest that 
the absence of a public concern in the dissemination of personal information constitutes 
an element of the tort. The dissemination of truthful information should otherwise be 
granted as a matter of living in a free and democratic society (and responsibly exercised 
rights). Moreover, it is the only public interest in play1490 and therefore does not to 
1483 McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 68 per Buxton LJ; M Lewis, C Hinton, H Beverley-Smith 
and G Hussey, ‘Review of the Law of Privacy’ (2005) 16 (7) Entertainment Law Review 174, 179. 
1484 A v B Plc [2002] 2 All ER 545 para 4 per Lord Woolf CJ; see also Browne [2007] 3 WLR 289 (CA) 
para 24 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR; McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 11 per Buxton LJ. 
1485 Ibid (emphasis added). 
1486 [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 17 (emphasis added); cited with approval in Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 
3)  [2006] QB 125 para 51 per Lord Phillips MR; McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 10 per Buxton 
LJ; Browne [2007] 3 WLR (CA) 289 para 22 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR. 
1487 G Phillipson, ‘The ‘right’ of privacy in England and Strasbourg compared’ in M Richardson and A T 
Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 184, 185; J Morgan, ‘Hello! Again: Privacy and 
Breach of Confidence’ (2005) Cambridge Law Journal 549, 550. 
1488 N A Moreham, ’Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 121 Law 
Quarterly Review 628, 629. See also Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2007] 2 WLR 920 (HL) paras 118 per 
Lord Hoffmann and particularly para 255 per Lord Nicholls. 
1489 On this point see Associated Newspapers Ltd v His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales [2006] 
EWCA Civ 1776 paras 67, 68 per Lord Phillips CJ. 
1490 It might be suggested that there is strong social interest in the maintenance of spheres of privacy. 
However, this public interest is in my respectful the reason why a right to privacy is (or should be) in-
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merely bar the enforcement of the right as is the case in traditional breach of confidence 
doctrine. Thus, I suggest that the initial premise chosen is problematic because similari-
ties between both concepts are conditional at best. It is therefore inadequate to draw an 
analogy from the traditional concept. An ‘analogy’ drawn from the extended version of 
the UK, however, accomplishes the same result as an application of the NZBoRA. The 
omission of specific privacy protection (in contrast to art 8 ECHR) makes no difference 
in this respect. It seems even clearer in this country that freedom of speech, as the only 
enshrined interest in play, has to be tested against the plaintiff’s privacy interest. In 
brief, recognising this public interest as an element of the tort rather than a defence 
would be natural – not anomalous.1491  
 
2   Hosking and the remaining prerequisites of the tort   
2.1 The ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’ test 
Having discussed the constitutional framework and its effect on freedom of 
speech concerns, we will now turn to the micro-level of the analysis. The new common 
law tort needs a coherent development. If it were otherwise, it would be likely to get out 
of hand.1492 This becomes particularly obvious with regard to the ‘highly offensive to a 
reasonable person’ test. It seems advantageous to discuss this prerequisite before turn-
ing to the initial test of the tort, because Tipping J’s formulation omits an additional 
‘highly offensive’ test. As we know, the adoption of the test for the purposes of the pri-
vacy tort stems from Prosser’s work.1493 In accordance with corresponding US law, the 
Court of Appeal has described both prerequisites as twin-elements.1494 According to 
Gault P and Blanchard J, the ‘highly offensive’ test is an important factor in order to 
 
cluded in human rights documents such as the ECHR. It is, I think, not a relevant consideration in context 
of an individual claim to privacy.   
1491 It may be different with regard to a possible intrusion of privacy tort. As it will be suggested below, 
the public concern test has no analogue in the ‘intrusion’ context. 
1492 See J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
408. 
1493 W L Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, 396-7; see also Campbell [2004] 2 All 
ER 995 (HL) para 94 per Lord Hope. 
1494 TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 122 per Young P. 
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confine the new privacy tort tightly.1495 The dissemination of personal facts not meeting 
the standard is one of the costs of living in a free society.1496 However, we have already 
seen during the discussion of the respective American law that the test lacks a clear le-
gal profile.1497 Subsequently, I hope to offer a structure of this legal transplant. The ul-
timate aim, as already indicated, is nevertheless to make the test altogether superfluous, 
viz, by replacing it with a proportionality balancing exercise. 
  
Three major problems have been identified in this context. Firstly, the perspec-
tive from which the reasonable person should ‘observe’ the issue is questionable.1498 
Two positions have to be distinguished: the objective reasonable person could either be 
‘in the shoes of the person the publication is about’ or a reasonable person reading, for 
instance, an article about someone else’s private information.1499 The English Court of 
Appeal in Campbell1500 and the High Court in Bradley1501 favoured the perspective of 
the ‘reasonable reader.’ In P v D1502 and the House of Lords’ decision in Campbell1503, 
the perspective of the ‘plaintiff’s shoes’ was favoured. Linked to this problem is a sec-
ond uncertainty concerning the question as to whether it is the disclosure of the respec-
tive facts or rather the facts themselves that must be regarded as offensive.1504 Ulti-
mately and most importantly, the nature of the test is questionable. The joint judgment 
in Hosking suggested that the level of offence should be determined ‘objectively, by 
reference to its extent and nature.’1505 This position has been interpreted as being in 
contrast to the approach taken in the UK where also subjective elements have been 
1495 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
394. See also Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 126; their Honours pointed out that even extensive 
publicity of private matters, which are not sensitive enough, should not give rise to legal liability.   
1496 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 125. 
1497 See above Chapter Two 2.5.1.3.  
1498 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
395-6. 
1499 J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.5.04 (3) at p 
761. 
1500 [2003] 1 All ER 224 (CA) para 54. 
1501 [1993] 1 NZLR 414, 424. 
1502 [2000] 2 NZLR 591 para 39 per Nicholson J. 
1503 [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 100 per Lord Hope. 
1504 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
395. This is often questionable in the USA as well – see P J McNulty, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private 
Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 Drake Law Review 93, 105. 
1505 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 126. 
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taken into account.1506 Their Honours nonetheless mentioned that publicity given to the 
respective facts must be truly humiliating and distressful or otherwise harmful to the 
individual concerned.1507 This formulation, on the other hand, had been interpreted as 
saying that the import of subjective elements may be allowed in New Zealand.1508 Each 
of these problems will be addressed next. 
 
2.1.1 Perspective of the reasonable person and determination of offensiveness  
The first two of the aforementioned problems, I suggest, are interdependent and 
there is reason to believe that they could and should be solved together. All judgments 
are based on one of the following two possible assumptions: the assessment of the level 
of offence of the reasonable person focuses (1) on the contents of the information dis-
closed or (2) on the context in which the communicative act occurred.1509 During the 
discussion of the respective US law, I sought to show that the perspective of the reason-
able person is a matter of general jurisprudence and thus not confined to a single 
test.1510 Legal rules can be observed either from an ‘internal’ or an ‘external point of 
view.’ The external point of view focuses on the result of an act rather than the motiva-
tion behind the act, that is to say that the reasonable person observes whether the facts 
themselves are highly offensive. By taking an ‘internal point of view,’ in contrast, the 
reasonable person would consider the whole context of the disclosure. Subsequently, 
this result will be tested against the results found in practical cases supplemented by 
some logical considerations.  
1506 U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 254. 
1507 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 126. 
1508 U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 254, see also M Waterfield, 
‘Now You See It, Now You Don't: the Case for a Tort of Infringement of Privacy in New Zealand’ 
(2004) 10 Canterbury Law Review 182, 186. 
1509 U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 253-4 differentiate between (1) 
facts or (2) disclosure for the determination of the offensiveness criterion. See also R C Post, ‘The Social 
Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 77 California Law Re-
view 957, 979; J Elford, ‘Trafficking in Stolen Information: A "Hierarchy of Rights" Approach to the 
Private Facts Tort’ (1995) 105 Yale Law Journal 727, 747. 
1510 See above Chapter Two, 2.3.2.3 – ‘Genuine duties and strict liability rules’.  
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2.1.1.1 Focussing on the contents in the shoes of the recipient 
Decisions such as Bradley1511, the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Camp-
bell1512 and a US decision in Vassiliades v Garfinckel's Brooks Bros1513 focus solely on 
the contents of the disseminated information while determining the level of offensive-
ness.1514 This assumption anticipates the solution of the second problem - it does not 
seem to exist in this context. Since the facts have to be offensive, the perspective (plain-
tiff or recipient) from which the offensiveness is observed is meaningless as an addi-
tional requirement. The reasonable person can theoretically either stand in the shoes of 
the plaintiff or orbit around these facts and they always remain offensive from each per-
spective.  
 
However, the aforementioned judgments deal with the public dissemination 
branch of the tort. If one takes the communicative act (publication/publicity) into con-
sideration, the reasonable person necessarily has to occupy the perspective of the re-
cipient. The facts are offensive with or without the communicative act; the disclosure is 
therefore not determinative for the offensiveness. Thus, the reasonable person could not 
stand in the shoes of the claimant; an additional communicative act would have no 
(logical) function in this case. The English Court of Appeal’s decision in Campbell re-
flects this suggestion by mentioning: 1515
  
[w]e do not consider that a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, on reading that Miss 
Campbell was a drug addict, would find it highly offensive, or even offensive, that the Mirror 
also disclosed that she was attending meetings of Narcotics Anonymous. 
 
The decision in L v G1516 is not that clear-cut but has the same tendency. Abbott 
J demanded ‘that the facts which were disclosed would be highly offensive and objec-
1511 Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 415 per Gallen J; 24 IPR 205 per Neazor J; see An-
drews v TVNZ Ltd High Court Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) 
para 53.  
1512 [2003] 1 All ER 224. 
1513 492 A 2d 580 (1985). 
1514 Vassiliades v Garfinckel's Brooks Bros, 492 A 2d 580, 588 (DC 1985); Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd 
[1993] 1 NZLR 414, 424. 
1515 [2003] 1 All ER 224 (CA) para 54 (emphasis added). 
1516 [2002] NZAR 495 (DC). 
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tionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.’1517 The test hence focuses on 
the contents of the information disclosed. The Judge concluded, ‘[…] the issue of ob-
jectionability to the public disclosure of such [sexually explicit] photographs must be 
judged not from her [the plaintiff’s] perspective, in the context of the circumstances in 
which the photographs were taken, but by reference to an objective ‘reasonable person 
of ordinary sensibilities’ test.’1518 His Honour’s examination of the test regrettably ends 
with this statement. The comprehensible part of the Judge’s statement with regard to the 
appropriate ‘perspective’ is most likely that the reasonable person was not supposed to 
examine from a claimant position. The circumstances under which the defendant took 
the explicit photographs were not determinative. Abbott J rather envisaged a prudent 
bystander of the incidents as reasonable person. 
 
It seems fair to suggest, in conclusion, that a focus on the contents of the dis-
closed information correlates with a reasonable person in the shoes of the recipient.1519 
This result fortifies the argument from general jurisprudence. Thus understood, the test 
would constitute an external ‘strict liability rule.’ 
 
2.1.1.2 Focussing on the context of the disclosure in the shoes of the plaintiff  
The underlying assumption of the second possible perspective of the reasonable 
person presupposes that the dissemination of the certain facts might be offensive in 
some scenarios but not in others.1520 In P v D, Nicholson J explained that the test had to 
be satisfied ‘on the basis of what a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would 
feel if they were in the same position; that is, in the context of the particular circum-
stances.’1521 As Post argues, the test requires the ‘evaluation of communicative acts;’ 
this assessment has to encompass the ‘communicative content, but also such varied as-
1517 Ibid, p 506. 
1518 Ibid (emphasis added). 
1519 I should probably point out that I do not endorse this view. 
1520 See TVNZ Ltd  v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 156 (CA) para 68 per Panckhurst and O’Regan JJ (‘[…] 
public disclosure in a controlled environment like a courtroom may not be offensive, but transmission of 
excerpts of the videotape on national television may be’); J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking 
and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 391, 395; E Paton-Simpson,’ Privacy and the Reasonable 
Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in Public Places’ (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 
328. 
1521 P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 para 39 
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pects of these acts as their timing, justification, addressees, form, and general con-
text.’1522 Thus understood, it is accurate to observe that the disseminated facts in Brad-
ley ‘were the plot [of a schlock horror movie] itself.’1523 It was not determinative that 
the tombstone [which contained the disputed ‘facts’ in a narrow sense] of the Bradley 
family itself contained offensive information. In New Zealand, the recognition of the 
full context had been encapsulated in the statement that it has to be the ‘disclosure’ of 
the facts that must be offensive.1524 Apart from P v D1525, this result is supported by the 
findings in TVNZ Ltd v Rogers1526, Andrews v TVNZ Ltd1527, the House of Lords’ deci-
sion in Campbell1528 and the appellate court’s decision in Vassiliades v Garfinckel's 
Brooks Bros1529. All these decisions, however, have in common that they assess the cir-
cumstances of the public dissemination. They also have in common that this assessment 
has been carried out from the plaintiff’s perspective, as it has been suggested in P v D. 
 
Thus, the two problems can be reduced to one due to their interdependency. Ex-
amined superficially, the recognition of the context from the internal perspective seems 
favourable. Only a few facts are offensive in themselves.1530 The very essence of this 
test is to control the subjective result based on the subjective impression of the plaintiff 
from an objective point of view.1531 Thus, the test establishes whether it is justified to 
impose legal liability for the ‘loss’ of privacy the plaintiff has suffered.1532 This quite 
naturally requires that the ‘reasonable person’ examines the matter from the same posi-
tion as the plaintiff involving the circumstances of the respective case.1533 The reason-
1522 R C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 
77 California Law Review 957, 979. 
1523 U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 253. 
1524 Ibid, at p 254; see also R Tobin, ‘Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Claus: the tort of invasion of privacy 
in New Zealand’ (2004) 12 Tort Law Journal 95, 103. 
1525 [2000] 2 NZLR 591 para 39. 
1526 [2007] 1 NZLR 156 (CA) paras 66-69 per Panckhurst and O’Regan JJ; Rogers v TVNZ Ltd (2005) 22 
CRNZ 668 (HC) paras 58-60 per Venning and Winkelmann JJ. 
1527 High Court Auckland CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) para 49. 
1528 [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) paras 99, 100 per Lord Hope. 
1529 492 A 2d 580, 588 (DC 1985). 
1530 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 391, 
395; see also J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.5.04 at 
p 761. 
1531 TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 156 (CA) para 67 per Panckhurst and O’Regan JJ. 
1532 Ibid. 
1533 See also Andrews v TVNZ High Court Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 
2006, Allan J) para 49. 
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able person, defined as a prudent bystander, would not fulfil this control function - es-
pecially not if the particular circumstances of the case are not considered in any 
way.1534 The recipient must not necessarily be aware of all circumstances, which may 
turn innocuous into offensive facts.  
 
As I will argue later, however, the perspective of the innocent bystander is none-
theless preferable. For reasons suggested below, it may be the only perspective from 
which the ‘objectivity’ of the standard can be maintained without facing considerable 
problems. In any case, this is decidedly not saying that the adoption of a ‘reasonable 
person’ test is a jewel in the circlet of sensible choices. Whether the test indeed repre-
sents such a jewel will be considered next. 
2.1.2 The nature of the test from a ‘scientific’ perspective  
With regard to the third aforementioned problem, concerned with the nature of 
the test, it might be advantageous recalling the nature of the test as proposed by Ander-
son – it is supposedly an empirical test.1535 The term ‘empiric’ derives from the Greek 
word for experience;1536 the empirical method usually requires the collection of data on 
which a scientist bases a theory, or more importantly in this context, derives a conclu-
sion. Oliver Wendell Holmes’ influential tort theory, for instance, focuses on foresight 
measured on ‘common experience’ as opposed to ‘individual experience.’1537 Prosser’s 
view on tort theory has explicitly linked ‘reasonableness to utility maximization’ and 
has thereby incorporated Holmesian concepts into modern US tort theory.1538  
 
A scientific approach to the reasonable person seems inadequate however. The 
legal profession usually does not deal with ‘science’ in a strict sense. Post consequently 
argues that the essence of the US test of the tort cannot be represented by an empirical 
1534 See Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 99 per Lord Hope. 
1535 See above Chapter Two, 1.2.1. 
1536 Shorter Oxford Dictionary (5th ed, 2002) Vol 1. 
1537 H Hovenkamp, ‘The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought’ (1993) 46 Vanderbilt Law Review 
305, 336; see O W Holmes, Jr, The Common Law (MacMillan, London 1882) 147. 
1538 J C Goldberg and B C Zipursky, ‘The Moral of MacPherson’ (1998) 146 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1733, 1757. 
 
 
265 
                                                          
and thus statistical average.1539 Notwithstanding, an initial ‘scientific approach’ might 
be instructive in order to determine the terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ in the context 
of the reasonable person of the privacy tort. Furthermore, it might be helpful for a civil 
lawyer to understand a theoretical legal framework or culture influenced by ‘empiri-
cists’ such as John Stuart Mill.1540 Subsequently, the author will attempt to sketch that 
‘experience’ plays indeed an important part when light is shed on the reasonable person 
in the law of negligence.1541 This seems necessary to understand the conflict of this sys-
tem with a human rights instrument, which will be addressed later.1542   
 
In the law of negligence, for instance, the appropriate degree of reasonable care 
in a profession ‘can usually be established by reference to long-standing practice in that 
profession.’1543 In terms of the scientific method, we have ‘data’ to derive a conclusion 
from for the purposes of the individual case in order to determine the reasonableness of 
liability. In other words, in this area of the law we often have the necessary ‘experience’ 
to draw such a conclusion.1544 As a principle of liability, the reasonable person concept 
may thus establish ‘reciprocity of care between ourselves.’1545 Simultaneously, ‘the 
harm-sufferer's entitlement and the harm-doer's obligation are mirror images of one an-
other.’1546 The negligence standard can therefore be described as objective inasmuch as 
the law ‘generally refuses to allow the peculiarities or idiosyncrasies of the defendant to 
1539 R C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 
77 California Law Review 957, 961.   
1540 See for further details M Richardson, ‘The Private Life after Douglas v Hello!’ [2003] Singapore 
Journal of Legal Studies 311, 317-8. See generally P A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative law in 
New Zealand (3rd ed, 2007) para 1.3.2 at p 7. 
1541 I am indebted to Mayo Moran’s book Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003) for many ideas in 
this context. 
1542 This is the important underlying conflict of a ‘constitutionalised’ common law tort of privacy – see 
also M Richardson, ‘Privacy and Precedent – The Court of Appeal’s Decision in Hosking v Runting’ 
[2005] New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 82, 93.  
1543 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
395; see also T Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (1999) 17. 
1544 See also O W Holmes, Jr, The Common Law (Macmillan, London 1882) 147. 
1545 J Horder, ‘Can the Law do without the Reasonable Person?’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 253, 254 citing A Brudner, The Unity of the Common Law (University of California Press, 1995) 
190. ‘Reciprocity’ denotes a standard of care ordinary people normally impose on each other - G P 
Fletcher, ‘Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 537, 560 fn 82. See also P 
Cane, ‘Distributive Justice and Tort Law’ [2001] New Zealand Law Review 401, 403; O W Holmes, Jr  
The Common Law (MacMillan, London 1882) 108; compare G C Keating, ‘Reasonableness and Rational-
ity in Negligence Theory’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 311, 313. 
1546 P Cane, ‘Distributive Justice and Tort Law’ [2001] New Zealand Law Review 401, 419. 
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diminish the degree of care she is required to exercise in her interaction with others.’1547 
While discussing American law, it has already been suggested that the reasonable per-
son expresses an idea of equality insofar as all have the same interest in both liberty and 
security.1548 If somebody bumps into a car or breaks somebody’s leg, these peculiarities 
are of minor or no interest. It is most likely the focus on material loss or damage, which 
justifies ‘drawing a hard line.’1549  
 
Idiosyncrasies are only allowed to a limited extent. The ‘reasonable care’ be-
tween lawyer and client is most likely determined by looking at the standards of the 
profession, of her peer group; she is hence tried by the standard of a reasonable law-
yer.1550 This limited recognition of the context is justified, since many would find it ab-
surd judging her by the reasonable care of an average (professional) New Zealander. In 
the end, it is sometimes a matter of ‘avoidability’ that requires recognition of the con-
text.1551 Being a lawyer is a ‘normal’ peculiarity of the defendant and therefore subject 
to ‘experience.’ Being a child is in tune with this observation inasmuch as it is a ‘nor-
mal’ state and, therefore, a ‘normal incapacity’ with regard to the law of negligence. 
The reasonable person in US law acknowledges this incapacity because ‘there is a wide 
basis of community experience upon which it is possible, as a practical matter, to de-
termine what is expected from them.’1552 In other words, it is normality or ordinariness, 
which justifies applying a more ‘subjectivised’ objective test.1553 In terms of the scien-
tific method, we have again empirical data in order to determine liability. As a result, 
1547 M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003) 234 (emphasis added); see also W L Prosser, 
Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed, 1971) 153; P Kelley, ‘Infancy, Insanity and Infirmity in the Law of 
Torts’ (2003) 48 American Journal of Jurisprudence 179, 185; D E Seidelson, ‘Reasonable Expectations 
and Subjective Standards in Negligence Law: The Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and the Mentally In-
competent’ (1981) 50 George Washington Law Review 17-8.  
1548 See above Chapter Two, 2.5.1.1; A Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (1999) 7. 
1549 J Horder, ‘Can the Law do without the Reasonable Person?’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 253, 268.  
1550 The author presupposes that a lawyer is accountable for her actions, which is apparently slowly 
evolving in New Zealand – see Lai v Chamberlains [2006] NZSC 70 (Barristerial immunity). 
1551 See generally O W Holmes, Jr, The Common Law (Macmillan, London 1882) 108 (‘The rule that the 
law does, in general, determine liability by blameworthiness, is subject to the limitation that minute dif-
ferences of character are not allowed for’).  
1552 Restatement (Second) of Torts s 283A, Comment b (emphasis added); M Moran, Rethinking the Rea-
sonable Person (2003) 24, 77; W L Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed, 1971) 154.  
1553 W L Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed, 1971) 155. 
 
 
267 
                                                          
the reasonable person may turn into the ‘reasonable child.’1554 This standard is not sub-
jective, but could be described as ‘intermediate’ between subjective and objective.1555
 
With regard to other defendants, however, this ‘experience’ is limited. Most no-
table in this context are mentally disabled human beings and other individuals with un-
familiar idiosyncrasies. These persons are treated unfavourably under the objective 
standard.1556 This is partly justified by the proposition that ‘general welfare’ requires 
individuals to sacrifice their peculiarities.1557 As Prosser mused, ‘it may be no bad pol-
icy to hold a fool according to his folly.’1558 Prosser, as we recollect, shared the views 
held by Holmes.1559 As in Holmes’ case, Prosser’s ‘policy’ correlates with a certain 
concept of those subject to the law, with a particular image of the human being. ‘The 
individual is a congenital fool,’ Prosser suggests, ‘cursed with inbuilt bad judgement, or 
that in the particular instance he “did not stop to think”, or that he is merely a stupid ox, 
or of an excitable temperament which causes him to lose his head and get “rattled”.’1560
 
However, the reasonable person test does not acknowledge the peculiarities of 
mentally disabled human beings.1561 ‘Avoidability’ is of little concern in this re-
spect;1562 these people are subject to utmost objectivity.1563 The common law’s treat-
ment of mentally disordered or disabled persons is a habit rooted in the judicial reliance 
1554 See also O W Holmes, Jr, The Common Law (Macmillan, London 1882) 109; P Kelley, ‘Infancy, 
Insanity and Infirmity in the Law of Torts’ (2003) 48 American Journal of Jurisprudence 179, 180.   
1555 T Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (1999) 34.  
1556 J Horder, ‘Can the Law do without the Reasonable Person?’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 253, 266; M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003) 149. 
1557 See O W Holmes, Jr, The Common Law (Macmillan, London 1882) 108. 
1558 W L Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed, 1971) 153; W P Keeton (ed), Prosser and Keeton 
on Torts (5th ed, 1984) 177. 
1559 J C Goldberg and B C Zipursky, ‘The Moral of MacPherson’ (1998) 146 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1733, 1750.  
1560 W L Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed, 1971) 152-3 (internal citations omitted); W P 
Keeton (ed), Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed, 1984) 176-7. 
1561 W P Keeton (ed), Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed, 1984) 177. 
1562 In US law, the standard of care is relaxed in contributory or comparative negligence – see G C 
Keating, ‘Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 311, 
371. 
1563 Restatement (Second) of Torts, s 283B comment c (‘the actor is held to the standard of conduct of a 
reasonable man who is not mentally deficient, even though it is in fact beyond his capacity to conform to 
it’); see also W P Keeton (ed), Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed, 1984) 177 (‘[…] the mentally de-
ranged or insane defendant [is held] accountable for his negligence as if the person were a normal, pru-
dent person’); P Kelley, ‘Infancy, Insanity and Infirmity in the Law of Torts’ (2003) 48 American Jour-
nal of Jurisprudence 179, 180.  
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on common sense.1564 A mentally disabled human being is ‘abnormal’ whereas the 
common law’s yardstick for judging the actions of litigants is ‘normality.’1565 These 
litigants are beyond the reasonable person’s grasp and, therefore, tried by a stricter 
standard than other defendants.  
 
In order to gain insight into the functioning of the reasonable person, one must 
contrast this to physically disabled humans. According to Prosser, these persons ‘cannot 
be required to do the impossible by conforming to physical standards which [they] can-
not’ meet.1566 Physically disabled humans are therefore subject to a lesser degree of ob-
jectivity.1567 Therefore, what makes the reasonable person tick? At least in the USA, the 
answer seems to be ‘experience.’ The Restatement explains it as follows: ‘the explana-
tion between such physical illness and the mental illness […] probably lies in the 
greater public familiarity with the former, and the comparative ease and certainty with 
which it can be proved.’1568 Thus, public familiarity with the ‘normal’ peculiarity leads 
to the transformation of the ‘objective reasonable person’ into, by way of illustration, 
the ‘objective reasonable blind person.’1569 After all, it is fair to conclude that  
 
• the reasonable person, particularly of the US negligence tort, is 
less objective whenever there is solid ‘experience’ with the ‘sub-
jectivised’ objective standard; 
1564 J Horder, ‘Can the Law do without the Reasonable Person?’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 253, 255 (‘In the ‘common sense’ view, mentally disordered or disabled people are to be judged 
to a fixed standard that, in order to maintain the supposed objectivity of the standard, makes no allowance 
even for shortcomings […]’).  
1565 See J Horder, ‘Can the Law do without the Reasonable Person?’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 253, 254; see also J C Goldberg and B C Zipursky, ‘The Moral of MacPherson’ (1998) 146 Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review 1733, 1740.  
1566 W L Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed, 1971) 152; with regard to children at p 154 (‘[…] 
obviously cannot be held to the same standard as adults, because they cannot in fact meet it’).    
1567 While a more detailed elaboration is beyond the scope of this analysis, this might constitute a so-
called intra-group discrimination – see P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commen-
tary (2005), para 17.16 for further details. 
1568 Section 283C comment b Restatement 2nd of Torts (1977); see too section 283B comment b (1); O W 
Holmes, Jr, The Common Law (Macmillan, London 1882) 109; M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable 
Person (2003) 28. 
1569 See Section 283C comment a Restatement 2nd of Torts (1977). See also the illustrative distinction 
between ‘ordinary’ and ‘abnormal’ in Attorney General for Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23 para 13 per 
Lord Goff; P Kelley, ‘Infancy, Insanity and Infirmity in the Law of Torts’ (2003) 48 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 179, 180. 
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• the reasonable person standard has to be strictly objective (due to 
the lack of experience) provided that the flesh-and-blood person 
features idiosyncrasies difficult to track with common sense (such 
as being mentally disabled).  
 
The focus on common sense might thus be problematic in a different context. 
Privacy law commonly deals to a greater extent with individuality;1570 it may often be 
difficult to find even a homogenous group such as a certain profession. During the dis-
cussion of the respective US law, I have already suggested that privacy is an individual 
concern. As such, it is not subject to empirical evaluation.1571 In fact, the words ‘idiot,’ 
‘idiosyncrasy’ or ‘peculiarity’ all derive from the Greek ‘idios,’ which means ‘own’ or 
‘private.’1572 Apart from the so-called ‘clear cases,’1573 it might hence be the rule to 
deal with those particularities of the plaintiff, whose recognition is refused with regard 
to the reasonable person standard in the law of negligence. Gregory Keating was able to 
observe that ‘judgments of negligence turn on the balance of the benefits and burdens 
associated with particular risk impositions;’ these ‘judgments cannot be made without 
some benchmark of comparison.’1574 In privacy law, by contrast, the plaintiff of the 
‘not so clear case’ belongs to the ‘foolish’ as much as it is her idiosyncrasies which may 
be the main event of the action. In sum, the application of a reasonable person test 
might therefore not be as easy in the context of the privacy tort.1575 In terms of the 
aforementioned categorisation, one would expect that the privacy plaintiff be subject to 
utmost objectivity. This is because a proper benchmark for comparison, as necessary for 
the application of the test in negligence law, might often unlikely to be found in the 
1570 E J Bloustein, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser’ (1964) 39 New 
York University Law Review 962, 971. 
1571 S Ingber, ‘Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 
772, 850. 
1572 M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003) 149. 
1573 A ‘clear case’ (eg, regarding one’s health, sexual relationships) might be identified as a violation of 
‘privacy’ with common sense.  
1574 G C Keating, ‘Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law Re-
view 311, 315 (emphasis added). 
1575 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of  Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
395; See also U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 262 (‘The Authority 
[BSA] has produced a series of decisions that have no apparent linking rationale that are simply based on 
the facts in the complaint’). 
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context of the privacy tort.1576 It is presumably for this reason that at least the highly 
offensive criterion of New Zealand’s test, despite its linking to the reasonable person, 
‘is of necessity quite subjective.’1577  
 
Speaking of subjectivity, it is worth reiterating that the Court of Appeal in 
Rogers pointed out that the test should control the subjective impression of the plaintiff 
from an objective perspective. But is it merely the ‘highly offensive’ criterion, which is 
of necessity quite subjective? We have already seen during our previous exposition that 
the reasonable person occasionally transforms, for instance, into the ‘reasonable child.’ 
Thus, one question in a privacy context could be as to how objective the objective test 
should be. In other words, from which group of people do we want to draw our conclu-
sion in order to decide the outcome of the individual case? Furthermore, what would the 
theoretical justification for the heightened subjectivity of the test be like if it were not 
‘experience’ with the plaintiff’s idiosyncrasy?   
 
At this point we recall the example of the photographed All Black player.1578 
The reasonable person standard could feature, for example, a reasonable New Zea-
lander, a reasonable NZ Samoan, a reasonable sportsperson, a reasonable rugby player 
and so forth. According to the original US test, it would be the reasonable New Zea-
lander – the highest level of abstraction lest freedom of speech is unwittingly ‘chilled.’  
 
In the author’s view, the reasonable person in Campbell1579 was a ‘reasonable 
drug addict receiving therapeutic treatment.’1580 Thus, the major difference to the appli-
cation of the test in the USA is that the reasonable person in Campbell was not a ‘rea-
1576 A mentally disabled person, for instance, is subject to utmost objectivity because of ‘the very obvious 
difficulty of proof as to what went on in his head’ – W L Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed, 
1971) 153.   
1577 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
395; see also M Waterfield, ‘Now You See It, Now You Don't: the Case for a Tort of Infringement of 
Privacy in New Zealand’ (2004) 10 Canterbury Law Review 182, 186. 
1578 See above Chapter Three, 1.2. 
1579 See Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) (‘The context was that of a drug addict who was receiving 
treatment. […] A drug addict who was trying to benefit from meetings to discuss her problem anony-
mously with other addicts would be expected to find the disclosure of those details distressing and highly 
offensive’); see also at para 98 per Lord Hope. 
1580 See also U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 254. 
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sonable Briton’ - it is the aforementioned ‘reasonable drug addict.’1581 Within the con-
fines of the English test, the recognition of the case’s context apparently leads to a 
lesser degree of abstraction, a lesser degree of objectivity without explaining why this 
should be case. The same phenomenon occurred earlier in P v D,1582 as it will be 
pointed out further on in this section. It is quite difficult to see, however, that a judge, 
who is white, upper middle class and orthodox, has any experience of the feelings of the 
‘reasonable drug addict receiving treatment.’1583 It seems to be a matter of whether or 
not the plaintiff should be tried by the ‘standards of her peers.’ The plaintiff shares, of 
course, certain features with her peers as much as a lawyer shares at least this feature 
with other lawyers – that is what makes it seemingly reasonable to draw a conclusion. 
The recognition of the context might hence create an impression of subjectivity, but it is 
theoretically still a less abstract objective test.  
 
The inherent problem might nonetheless be the lack of experience, which, as we have 
noted, traditionally justifies a ‘more subjective’ objective test. The ‘reasonable drug ad-
dict’ exemplifies this problem. In conclusion, it is suggested that an application of the 
test based on community experience does not lead to a fully satisfactory explanation. 
The remaining uncertainty, I suggest, stems from the necessity to recognise ‘individual 
experience’ at least to a certain degree. Hence, the practical consequences for the legal 
test will be considered next.  
2.1.3 The nature of the test from a legal perspective  
So what is the nature of the legal test if it is not ‘empiric’? The privacy tort in 
general and the reasonable person in particular deals with ‘offensiveness’ and ‘humilia-
tion.’1584 Lurking in the background is most likely an affront to one’s dignity as a hu-
1581 See also L Brazell, ‘Confidence, Privacy and Human Rights: English Law in the Twentieth Century’ 
(2005) 27 European Intellectual Property Review 405, 407. 
1582 The decision was cited with approval in Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 100 per Lord 
Hope. 
1583 Compare Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 98 per Lord Hope (‘I would expect a drug addict 
who was trying to benefit from meetings to discuss her problem anonymously with other addicts to find 
this distressing and highly offensive’ ) 
1584 See N A Moreham, ’Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 121 
Law Quarterly Review 628, 645 for possible differences between the two terms. 
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man being.1585 Humiliation can be interpreted as a mental process, which might be too 
complex to assess with common sense.1586  
 
‘Sticks and stones may break my bones’ is hence a misconceived concept here. 
Rather, it seems to be part of the human frailty that words sometimes hurt us. In fact, 
the dissemination of private information may even affect the physical and mental health 
and wellbeing of those concerned.1587 However, incorporating the gist of the action also 
places a heavy burden on the test. The highly offensive to a reasonable person standard 
is then meant to ‘serve as the most important part of a legal norm, and not just as the 
mental state pertaining to one element of an elaborately defined’ offence or wrong.1588 
The test seems to exemplify a hybrid standard inasmuch as it combines a ‘mental state’ 
(being highly offended) with a ‘justification’ element (‘true’ humiliation of a reasonable 
person) as parts of a general test of legal liability.1589 Furthermore, its hybrid nature 
provides a first hint as to why the test contains subjective as well as objective ele-
ments.1590   
 
With regard to the structure of the test, it would certainly be most desirable to 
draw conclusions from another reasonable person test. The author should point out that 
he asks himself how to construe an objective test, which is adjacent to a subjective 
‘highly offensive’ criterion. This should be carried out without reinventing the wheel 
and the idea of drawing an analogy follows naturally. However, tort law does not lead 
far, or so it seems.  
1585 See also J Kahn, ‘Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance’ (2003) 33 Seton Hall Law 
Review 371, 378; see also J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) 
para 18.5.04 at p 761. 
1586 See also R v Rongonui [2000] 2 NZLR 385 (CA) para 236 per Tipping J. 
1587 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 239 per Tipping J; see also R C Post, ‘The Social Foundations 
of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 77 California Law Review 957, 960. 
1588 See K W Simons, ‘Rethinking Mental States’ (1992) 72 Boston University Law Review 463, 552-3. 
1589 Ibid; see also R A Smolla, ‘Accounting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law’ (2002) 27 
Nova Law Review 289, 303. 
1590 See also U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 254; see also at p 262 
for the BSA (‘This requirement contains both subjective and objective elements’); see also N A More-
ham, ’Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 121 Law Quarterly 
Review 628, 632; R A Smolla, ‘Accounting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law’ (2002) 27 
Nova Law Review 289, 303 (‘Offensiveness has an inherently subjective quality’) and G Phillipson, ‘The 
‘right’ of privacy in England and Strasbourg compared’ in M Richardson and A T Kenyon (eds), New 
Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 184, 196. 
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Given that the test contains subjective and objective elements, it seems rational 
to compose the objective test out of a subjective and an objective (sub-) test. This 
proposition gains impetus from the apparent necessity to ‘prevent’ the decision-maker 
from delivering moral judgments, which are in the end merely a matter of impres-
sion.1591 In its present state, the test appears to be an unconvincing option. The reason-
able person was introduced to the common law in the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury.1592 Its invention was part of a positivistic movement – away from a system of dis-
pute resolution wholly based on a case-by-case development towards a system in which 
‘cases are judged in accordance with a standard independent of a given set of facts.’1593 
The idea behind the invention was avoiding the assessment of the merits of the plain-
tiff’s claim uniquely on the facts of each case. In such a system, findings of tort liability 
were always morally and legally particularistic and thus resistant to treatment as bind-
ing precedents.1594 Granted that the reasonable person test, reinvented for the purposes 
of the privacy tort, turns out morally and legally particularistic decisions, based on im-
pression of the facts of the case and resistant to binding precedent, it ought to indicate a 
problem.1595 In my view, at least the traditional premise, with which the application of 
the test had been justified, would no longer be met. Instead, the same decision would be 
delivered under the guise of a reasonable person that has to be avoided by the reason-
1591 See J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
395.  
1592 Attorney General for Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23 580, 585; J Horder, ‘Can the Law do without 
the Reasonable Person?’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law Journal 253, 253; P Kelley, ‘Infancy, In-
sanity and Infirmity in the Law of Torts’ (2003) 48 American Journal of Jurisprudence 179, 181. 
1593 J Horder, ‘Can the Law do without the Reasonable Person?’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 253, 254; see also P Kelley, ‘Infancy, Insanity and Infirmity in the Law of Torts’ (2003) 48 
American Journal of Jurisprudence 179, 181. 
1594 Ibid; see also M Richardson, ‘Privacy and Precedent: The Court of Appeal’s Decision in Hosking v 
Runting’ (2005) 11 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 82, 83 – she points out with regard to breach of 
confidence that “early equity courts notoriously had no system of precedent, their function being to de-
cide disputes according to principles of justice and fairness. However, even without a system of prece-
dent, precedents began to form. By the middle of the 19th century they were in common use” – internal 
citations omitted, emphasis hers). 
1595 This, however, is apparently the result of applying the test in New Zealand – see U J Cheer and J F 
Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 262 with respect to decisions of the BSA (‘The Au-
thority has produced a series of decisions that have no apparent linking rationale that are simply based on 
the facts in the complaint’); the Authority has stated ‘enigmatically’ that the underlying principle of the 
test therefore needs rephrasing - at p 264. A similar observation has been made in the USA. The Supreme 
Court of Colorado observed the ‘determination of whether a disclosure is highly offensive to the reason-
able person is a question of fact and depends on the circumstances of a particular case’ - Ozer v Borquez, 
940 P 2d 371, 378 (1997); see also Florida Star v BJF 491 US 524, 539 (1989).  
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able person in the first place. Such a performance of the test, however, could be re-
garded as a juridical burlesque rather than a valid option for a privacy tort.         
 
Although already an outmoded concept, it is useful to draw an analogy from the 
current provocation defence in criminal law. Even Oliver Wendell Holmes as the per-
haps most famous exponent of external objective tests saw the necessity to structure 
provocation in this way. In his view, the twofold test involved ‘actual provocation’ (a 
subjective test) and ‘sufficient provocation’ (an objective test).1596 Thus, such an anal-
ogy might provide a model to structure and determine objectiveness and subjectivity of 
the privacy tort’s test. Notwithstanding, it will be argued that a subjective-objective test 
is the preferable, albeit ill-fated, concept. The external bystander, however inappropri-
ate, seems to remain the only option to apply the reasonable person test in the context of 
the new tort.      
 
Historically, scholars and commentators were nonetheless at pains distinguish-
ing tortious from criminal conduct.1597 It does not even seem unreasonable to suggest 
that this sharp distinction led to the recognition of torts as a discrete branch of law. As 
Benjamin Zipursky notes, ‘the efforts of Anglo-American lawyers and jurists to articu-
late a law of torts has been part and parcel of a longstanding effort to distinguish tort 
and crime.’1598 As a result, one might argue that the idea of drawing an analogy from 
criminal law must be ruled out per se in the context of the modern law of torts.1599 One 
anticipated objection to the suggested analogy would consequently point to the fact that 
criminal law is generally more concerned with personal fault as distinct from the objec-
tive ‘fault’ of tort law.1600 A second objection would point out that the provocation de-
1596 W A Lindquist, ‘Oliver Wendell Holmes and External Standards of Criminal and Tort Liability’ 
(1979) 28 Buffalo Law Review 607, 611.   
1597 B C Zipursky, ‘Ten Half-Truths about Tort Law’ (2008) 42 Valparaiso Law Review 1221, 1225, 
1228. 
1598 Ibid, at p 1229. 
1599 See generally McLaughlin v O’Brian [1982] 1 AC 410 (HL) per Lord Wilberforce (‘To argue from 
one factual situation to another and to decide by analogy is a natural tendency of the human and the legal 
mind. But the lawyer still has to inquire whether, in so doing, he has crossed some critical line behind 
which he ought to stop’). 
1600 R Mullender, ‘The Reasonable Person, The Pursuit of Justice, and Negligence Law’ (2005) 68(4) 
Modern Law Review 681, 691-2; M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003) 165. 
 
 
275 
                                                          
fence is code based rather than common law.1601 These critics may indeed have a point 
particularly with regard to the law of negligence. Nevertheless, considering the context 
of the privacy tort, we will put such criticisms respectfully but firmly aside, since they 
may merely obscure the reason why it is reasonable to draw such an analogy in the first 
place.1602 First, it is not the plaintiff’s ‘fault’ that she is not humiliated enough in the 
eyes of the law.1603 Moreover, the privacy tort is not concerned with material loss or 
damage. It is about humiliation as a mental process and the conflict between privacy 
interests and freedom of speech. Apart from the conflict with speech rights, ‘humilia-
tion’ can thus be seen as ‘virtually the sole determinant’ of the defendant’s liability.1604 
Furthermore, contemporary tort theory has fostered ‘understanding of how tort theory 
intersects with the theory of the criminal law.’1605 Arguments which may have force 
with regard to the negligence tort1606 are less convincing in a privacy context. In sum, 
for the purposes of this thesis it is not inappropriate per se to draw such an analogy. 
 
The issue still merits some thought though. Considering the legal backdrop of 
the highly offensive to a reasonable person test, we apparently need a structure which 
encompasses whether the flesh-and-blood person merely has (1) an ‘excitable tempera-
ment which causes him to lose his head and get “rattled”’1607 (being highly offended) or 
(2) responded reasonably to a particular kind of ‘offence’ (being ‘truly’ humiliated).1608 
Therefore, we need a test which enables the courts to decide whether the dissemination 
1601 The codes, however seem to be based on common law – see Attorney General for Jersey v Holley 
[2005] UKPC 23 para 3 per Lord Nicholls; R v Rongonui [2000] 2 NZLR 385 (CA) para 72 per Elias CJ. 
1602 The ‘code based/common law’ supporters must explain the difference since the respective codes of 
several Commonwealth counties are based on common law  and ‘rather cryptic’ in their codified form; 
hence, they require extensive interpretation – see for Canada Re v Hill [1986] 1 SCR 313, 342 per Wilson 
J; see for Australia Stingel v Re (1990) 97 ALR 1, 324. 
1603 See also N A Moreham, ‘Recognising Privacy in England and New Zealand’ (2004) 63(3) Cambridge 
Law Journal 555, 556 (‘Not only does “offence” seem an inappropriate way to describe what is suffered 
by privacy claimants […]’). 
1604 See K W Simons, ‘Rethinking Mental States’ (1992) 72 Boston University Law Review 463, 500. 
1605 J Horder, ‘Can the Law do without the Reasonable Person?’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 253; see also P Roth, ‘Unlawful Photography in Public Places: the New Zealand Position’ [2006] 
PLPR 2 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/PLPR/2006/2.html> 23 February 2007 – Roth contrasts 
the Court of Appeal’s approach to photographs taken in public places in Hosking with the criminal law 
case R v Rowe, CA 374/04, 18 April 2005. 
1606 See R Mullender, ‘The Reasonable Person, the Pursuit of Justice, and Negligence Law’ (2005) 68 
Modern Law Review 681, 690; J Horder, ‘Can the Law do without the Reasonable Person?’ (2005) 55 
University of Toronto Law Journal 253, 268 for further details. 
1607 W L Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed, 1971) 153. 
1608 I should point out that ‘excitability’ is not a factor of the provocation defence - see Stingel v Re 
(1990) 97 ALR 1, 347. 
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of certain facts might be offensive and humiliating in some situations but not in oth-
ers.1609 The conduct of the defendant (dissemination of private facts) can be regarded as 
equivalent to an ‘insult,’ which causes humiliation. This humiliation is obviously what 
should be controlled objectively in order to determine an actionable privacy claim. In 
the author’s opinion, these are the general principles to be satisfied for drawing an anal-
ogy. 
2.1.3.1 The provocation defence and its similarities to the ‘highly offensive’ test  
We find these characteristics, as already indicated during the discussion of the 
US privacy tort,1610 in the provocation defence in criminal law (of all accessible Com-
monwealth countries). They are also laid down in a perhaps cumbersome way in s 
169(2) Crimes Act 1961.1611 The reasonable person of s 169(2)(a) Crimes Act 1961 is 
‘a person having the power of self-control of an ordinary person, but otherwise having 
the characteristics of the offender [the accused].’1612 Substantial juridical differences to 
Nicholson J’s test of the privacy tort are arguably difficult to identify. The reasonable 
person test of the tort has to be satisfied ‘on the basis of what a reasonable person of 
ordinary sensibilities would feel if they were in the same position, that is, in the context 
of the particular circumstances.’1613 At least regarding the subjective-objective structure 
of the objective test, differences rather seem to be bogged down in semantics. The much 
greater emphasis on personal ‘fault’ in criminal law is, thus, a trump to be played here 
rather than a reason for not drawing this analogy. As an ingredient of the negligence 
tort, for instance, ‘negligence’ does not need to refer to a positive mental state because 
1609 See TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 156 (CA) para 68 per Panckhurst and O’Regan JJ; Andrews v 
TVNZ Ltd High Court Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December2006, Allan J) para 51; J 
F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 395. 
1610 See above Chapter Two, 2.5.1.1. 
1611 The section reads:  
(2)Anything done or said may be provocation if - 
(a)  In the circumstances of the case it was sufficient to deprive a person 
having the power of self-control of an ordinary person, but other-
wise having the characteristics of the offender, of the power of self-
control; and 
(b)  It did in fact deprive the offender of the power of self-control and 
thereby induced him to commit the act of homicide. 
 
1612 R v Rongonui [2000] 2 NZLR 385 (CA) para 75 per Elias CJ. 
1613 P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591, 601. See also G Phillipson, ‘The ‘right’ of privacy in England and Stras-
bourg compared’ in M Richardson and A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 184, 
196.  
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the emphasis lies on the defendant’s conduct in a particular situation.1614 With regard to 
the privacy tort, the conduct of the defendant (dissemination of personal information) is 
related to a positive state of mind of the defendant (being highly offended). This con-
ceptual difference distinguishes the provocation defence from the negligence test and 
makes it simultaneously comparable to the ‘highly offensive’ test of the privacy tort.1615     
 
Furthermore, even the history of the ‘reasonable person’ in the law of provoca-
tion appears to include a duplication of events. In 1837, Coleridge J opined in R v Kirk-
ham1616 that ‘though the law condescends to human frailty’ it ‘considers man to be a 
rational being, and requires that he should exercise a reasonable control over his pas-
sions.’ In the author’s view, the law demands quintessentially the same from a plaintiff 
pleading breach of privacy. Fast-forwarding longueurs, s 169 Crimes Act 1961 replaced 
an entirely objective test, which developed afterwards, with a less harsh and supposedly 
more reasonable test.1617 Likewise, the test had been described as objective in the early 
stages of protecting privacy interests, followed by an understanding that subjective ele-
ments have to be acknowledged in a somewhat unspecified way.1618
 
Apparently, all modern defences of major Commonwealth countries are com-
posed of two tests: (1) a test that is concerned with the characteristics of the flesh-and-
blood person (the accused) in order to assess the offensive quality of the deceased’s 
conduct; and (2) a reasonable or ordinary person test, which more or less objectively 
controls the level of self-control demanded by law. The reasonable person of one of the 
Australian provocation defences had been described as follows: ‘the hypothetical ordi-
nary person is an objective test which lays down the minimum standard of self-control 
1614 K W Simons, ‘Rethinking Mental States’ (1992) 72 Boston University Law Review 463, 550. 
1615 See also ibid, at p 477 (‘Negligence and strict liability in tort law,[…], do not involve mental states in 
any direct way”’). 
1616 (1837) 8 C & P 115, 119 (emphasis added) as cited in Attorney General for Jersey v Holley [2005] 
UKPC 23 para 9 per Lord Nicholls; it was only much later that provocation turned into ‘something which 
might naturally cause an ordinary and reasonably minded man to lose his self-control and commit such an 
act’ - R v Welsh (1869) 11 Cox CC 336, 339.   
1617 See R v Rongonui [2000] 2 NZLR 385 (CA) para 75 per Elias J for further details. 
1618 See Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 97 per Lord Hope (‘But I think that it is unrealistic to 
look through the eyes of a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities at the degree of confidentiality that 
is to be attached to a therapy for drug addiction without relating this objective test to the particular cir-
cumstances’). 
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required by the law.’1619 Likewise, it could be argued that the reasonable person of the 
privacy tort denotes the quantum of humiliation the plaintiff has to suffer without hav-
ing an actionable case and thereby controls the subjectively highly offended claimant.  
 
In the Australian case of R v Stingel1620 the first aforementioned test of the 
provocation defence had been described as follows: 
 
The central question posed by the objective test - i.e. of such a nature as to be sufficient - obvi-
ously cannot be answered without the identification of the content and relevant implications of 
the […] insult and an objective assessment of its gravity in the circumstances of the particular 
case. Conduct [of the deceased or grievous bodily harmed] which may in some circumstances 
be quite unprovocative may be intensely so in other circumstances. Particular acts or words 
which may, if viewed in isolation, be insignificant may be extremely provocative when viewed 
cumulatively. 
 
The Australian Court continued to point out, the ‘content and extent of the pro-
vocative conduct must be assessed from the viewpoint of the particular accused.’1621 As 
we recollect, the ‘internal point of view’ is also preferred in the context of the privacy 
tort.1622 Traditionally recognised features of the accused for the subjectivised first test 
include age, sex, race and physical features; the Stingel Court added, ‘personal attrib-
utes, personal relationships and past history may be relevant to an objective assessment 
of the gravity of a particular wrongful act or insult.’1623 This, however, is akin to the 
acknowledgement of the context in a privacy case. Stingel essentially dealt with the first 
standard (insult),1624 which had to be handled more subjectively by recognising more of 
the accused’s background.1625  
 
1619 Masciantonio v Re (1995) 183 CLR 58, 66 involving the common law defence in Victoria. 
1620 (1990) 171 CLR 312, 325 (emphasis added). 
1621 Ibid, at p 326 (emphasis added); Masciantonio v Re (1995) 183 CLR 58, 67 (‘The provocation must 
be put into context and it is only by having regard to the attributes or characteristics of the accused that 
this can be done’). 
1622 See Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 126 per Gault P and Blanchard J - offensiveness has to de-
termined objectively ‘by reference to its extent and nature.’ 
1623 Ibid; these factors might include mental instability and weaknesses; see also the English case R v 
Morhall [1996] AC 90, 97 per Lord Goff (‘entire factual situation’) and R v Rongonui [2000] 2 NZLR 
385 (CA) para 234 per Tipping J. 
1624 The equivalent to s 169(2)(b) Crimes Act 1961. 
1625 See also R v Rongonui [2000] 2 NZLR 385, 390 (step 3) (CA) per Tipping J. 
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At this point, one might gain another clue why at least the ‘highly offensive’ cri-
terion of the privacy tort had been described as being of necessity quite subjective. The 
lessening of the test’s objectivity regarding the insult of the deceased was not a result of 
‘experience’ or familiarity with the peculiarities of the individual accused. Instead, it is 
based on the underlying doctrine of provocation.1626 According to Lord Hoffmann, the 
defence is justified because the law ‘illustrates Kant's dictum that, from the crooked 
timber of humanity, nothing completely straight can be made.’1627 Likewise, the emer-
gence of privacy as a protectable interest is often attributed to the recognition of human 
dignity as a core value of the individual.1628 Without going into too much detail at this 
point, the modern (at least European) concept of autonomy and dignity is often attrib-
uted to Kant.1629 This will merely reassure us of being still on target for drawing an 
adequate analogy. Admittedly, it may sound a bit cerebral in the context of Prosser’s 
robust ‘congenital fool’ model, but the test of the privacy tort is, I suggest, just another 
attempt to make something straight out of the crooked timber of humanity.1630 This at-
tempt may thus explain further why at least a part of the objective test is of necessity 
quite subjective. It might indicate that ‘utility’ or ‘common sense’ is not the be-all and 
end-all in both areas of the law.1631    
 
The second test of the provocation defence will now be addressed briefly.1632 In 
this respect, it has to be figured out ‘whether provocation of that degree of gravity could 
cause an ordinary person to lose self-control and act in a manner which would encom-
pass the accused’s actions.’1633 The provocative conduct of the deceased will be evalu-
1626 The not unimportant doctrine is ‘the mercy of the law [interposing] in pity to human frailty’ – Masci-
antonio v Re (1995) 183 CLR 58, 72. 
1627 R v Smith [2001] 1 AC 146, 159 (HL). 
1628 See J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389-
90. 
1629 See C E Wells, ’Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First 
Amendment Jurisprudence’ (1997) 32 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 159, 165-66. 
1630 See Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 50 per Lord Hoffmann (‘What human rights law has 
done is to identify private information as something worth protecting as an aspect of human autonomy 
and dignity’) and para 56 (‘The violation of the citizen's autonomy, dignity and self-esteem is plain and 
obvious’); Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 para 123 per McGrath J; N A Moreham, ‘Recognising 
Privacy in England and New Zealand’ (2004) 63(3) Cambridge Law Journal 555, 556 (‘[…](humiliation 
or affront to dignity would be more appropriate terms [rather than offence]’).  
1631 See also G C Keating, ‘Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory’ (1996) 48 Stanford 
Law Review 311, 314. 
1632 The problems regarding the actual ‘reasonable person’ test will be elaborated below. 
1633 Masciantonio v Re (1995) 183 CLR 58, 67. 
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ated by considering the context whilst the suitable degree of self-control is assessed by 
using the ordinary or reasonable person with apparently unimpaired capabilities.1634 Fi-
nally, it seems fair to deduce the following principles for the structure of the ‘highly 
offensive to the reasonable person’  test from the features of the provocation defence: 
 
• whether the plaintiff is ‘highly offended’ by the public dissemination of 
private facts should be assessed in a ‘subjectivised’ way by considering 
the content of the disseminated material and the circumstances of the 
dissemination (including personal characteristics such as mental and 
physical health) in each particular case;1635 
• the second part of the test determines objectively whether the dissemina-
tion of private material in the circumstances could cause a reasonable 
person humiliation (‘truly humiliating and distressful or otherwise harm-
ful’1636) if the person were in the same position as the plaintiff.1637  
2.1.3.2 Problems of the provocation defence in the privacy context 
From this point of view, venturing a prognosis with regard to the obstacles and 
final consequences of reanimating a dying concept is rather unsophisticated. The prob-
lematic part is the second sub-test. Who exactly is the objective reasonable person in 
the same position of the plaintiff? Are any, some or all characteristics of the flesh-and-
blood plaintiff to be projected onto the reasonable person?  
 
The provocation defence, for instance, is subject to vigorous criticism. This is 
because of its subjective-objective structure, which will emerge, according to the au-
thor’s prognosis, in the course of applying the test in a privacy context. Particularly the 
dichotomy of context-specific (for example, insult) and non-context-specific (loss of 
self-control) had been increasingly targeted in the law of provocation.1638 It is very dif-
ficult, not only for a jury, separating out susceptibility (to be highly offended subjec-
1634 See also Green v Re (1996-97) 191 CLR 334, 404 per Kirby J. 
1635 See s 169 (2)(b) Crimes Act 1961. 
1636 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 126 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
1637 See s 169(2)(a) Crimes Act 1961. 
1638 Eg, R v Rongonui [2000] 2 NZLR 385, 390 (CA) – per totam curiam (‘The present law is plainly un-
satisfactory’); Masciantonio v Re (1995) 183 CLR 58, 72 (‘a curious dichotomy exists’). 
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tively) and reaction (being ‘truly’ humiliated objectively).1639 Even if the distinction 
had been worked out, the test would have been ‘uneven in application.’1640 To over-
come this unevenness, it seems necessary to 'subjectivise' the objective element of the 
already subjective-objective test. What is meant by that is bridging the gap between 
both sub-tests with the projection of certain characteristics of the flesh-and-blood per-
son onto the legal construct. Commonwealth jurisdictions do this to a varying degree in 
the context of the provocation defence. Some consider age and sex as characteristics of 
the reasonable person; others only age and not gender; others consider impaired intel-
lectual function.1641 The minority in R v Rongonui opined that any characteristic dimin-
ishing the accused's power of self-control in comparison with that of an ordinary person 
may be attributed to the objective test.1642 The majority, based on the imperative draft-
ing of the Crimes Act 1961, concluded that the objective part of the test had to remain 
objective.1643 Apparently, the test’s inconsistencies ‘could be abolished only by abolish-
ing the “ordinary person” test itself.’1644  
 
However, as a matter of tort theory, the reasonable person seems to be between 
the devil and the deep blue sea if even the legal construct has to be regarded as being of 
necessity quite subjective. The difficult task with regard to the second sub-test is to en-
sure equality before the law (given that this is a concern) whilst maintaining an objec-
tive normative core of the objective test (given that this is a concern). As already indi-
cated, both reasonable persons of the privacy test and the provocation defence follow 
the same inherent logic. Experience with the provocation defence suggests that deci-
sions which ignore the plaintiff’s characteristics with regard to the objective reasonable 
1639 See R v Rongonui [2000] 2 NZLR 385 (CA) para 109 per Elias CJ. 
1640 See ibid, para 113. 
1641 Ibid; see also Green v Re (1996-97) 191 CLR 334, 368 per McHugh J (‘The only qualification I 
would make to this statement is to add considerations of “ethnic or cultural background of the accused” to 
age and maturity as relevant to any inquiry into the objective standard by which the self-control of an 
accused is measured’); see also D M Paciocco, ‘Subjective and Objective Standards of Fault for Offences 
and Defences’ (1995) 59 Saskatchewan Law Review 271, 302-5 for further details. 
1642 [2000] 2 NZLR 385 (CA) para 131 per Elias CJ, Thomas J concurring; based on the interpretation of 
s 169(2)(a) Crimes Act 1961  the ordinary man is invested ‘with the characteristics of the accused. […] 
Such characteristics must extend beyond the ill-temper, irascibility, impulsiveness, violence, or intoxica-
tion an ordinary man may experience and which he is expected to keep under control’- at para 120. 
1643 R v Rongonui [2000] 2 NZLR 385 (CA) para 235 per Tipping J. 
1644 Masciantonio v Re (1995) 183 CLR 58, 73.  
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person are likely to produce discrimination and injustice.1645 This would be in line with 
the statement of US scholars that the reasonable person obliterates individual and ethni-
cal differences regarding privacy in a heterogeneous society.1646  
 
Consequently, the underlying rationale of 'subjectivising' the objective part of 
the already mixed provocation test is equality before the law.1647 Nevertheless, the un-
derlying rationale cannot be ‘human frailty’ or ‘crooked timber’ of the individual as in 
the first sub-test. Such a rationale would deprive the test of its objective reasonable-
ness.1648 The feelings of a flesh-and-blood person would otherwise not be controlled by 
an objective standard. Hence, the appropriate justification must therefore be equality 
before the law. Granting equality, on the other hand, is problematic while using such a 
test in a bicultural (perhaps at least on the brink of being a multicultural) society with a 
strong Anglo-Saxon core such as New Zealand.  
 
The problem is still the unevenness between both sub-tests. In this respect, the 
promise of transforming the objective provocation defence into a less harsh objective 
defence with subjective and objective sub-tests has been treacherous. Instead of grant-
ing equality before the law, as originally intended, this well-meaning division still 
caused inequality. This is to say that the predominant Anglo-Saxon societal core would 
rule minorities through the reasonable person as it were.1649 In terms of stereotypes, the 
reserved Anglo-Saxon or Pakeha judge decides whether the hot-blooded (ie, ‘excit-
able’) Italian or Maori rightfully lost his self-control or is ‘truly’ humiliated. In brief, 
one could argue that the implementation of the subjective sub-test pictured the egalitar-
ian concerns gaudily coloured rather than solving them. The Australian Court in Masci-
1645 Ibid. 
1646 See also R P Bezanson, ‘The Right to Privacy Revisited:  Privacy, News, and Social Change’ (1992) 
80 California Law Review 1133, 1161-2; J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand 
(4th ed, 2005) para 18.5.04 at p 761; M Waterfield, ‘Now You See It, Now You Don't: the Case for a Tort 
of Infringement of Privacy in New Zealand’ (2004) 10 Canterbury Law Review 182, 187. 
1647 R v Rongonui [2000] 2 NZLR 385 (CA) para 128 (‘Equality before the law is not achieved by holding 
those mentally damaged to the same level of culpability as those not’). 
1648 See also TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 67 per Panckhurst and O’Regan JJ – the 
Court opined that there has to be an ‘objective overlay.’ 
1649 See M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003) 210; see also H Power, ‘Provocation and 
Culture’ [2006] Criminal Law Review 871, 878-9.  
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antonio1650 consequently concluded, ‘it would be much better to abolish the objective 
test of self-control in the law of provocation than to perpetuate the injustice of an “ordi-
nary person” test that did not take into account the ethnic or cultural background of the 
accused.’  
 
This is, of course, only an example of an ethnic problem. L v G represents a 
general example for the problem occurring in the privacy context. The plaintiff, a sex 
worker, had a sexual relationship with the defendant. The defendant took a number of 
sexually explicit photographs of the sex worker and had one of them published in an 
adult magazine. With regard to the highly offensive test, counsel for the plaintiff sug-
gested a ‘more subjective’ objective test. He argued that ‘the reasonable woman shop-
per at the Timaru Pak ‘N Save supermarket […] would be extremely unlikely to be a 
prostitute going about her work.’1651 This submission addresses the aforementioned un-
evenness between both sub-tests. It seems somewhat futile to control the subjective re-
sult of the ‘highly offensive’ criterion by using a reasonable person without any charac-
teristics of the plaintiff. The passage also illustrates the problem of lacking inherent 
logic. The reasonable person simply is, inter alia, not a sex worker and can thereby not 
sensibly control whether or not a sex worker is ‘truly’ humiliated in certain circum-
stances.1652 The formidable brain teasing conundrum is what is gained, in a juridical 
sense, by controlling the feelings of a sex worker with the standard of the ‘reasonable 
woman shopper at Pak ‘N Save.’ The problem is there is no ‘distinction between a per-
son's susceptibility’ of being highly offended and the point at which she is ‘truly’ hu-
miliated.1653 It is logically very difficult, if possible at all, to disentangle both states of 
the mind and address ‘humiliation’ without the circumstances that caused a high level 
of offence. This, however, is precisely what, for instance, Nicholson J expected from 
the reasonable person of the privacy tort in P v D.1654 The legal construct stands in the 
1650 Masciantonio v Re (1995) 183 CLR 58, 74 (emphasis added). 
1651 L v G [2002] NZAR 495, 510. See also Brown v Attorney-General [2006] DCR 630 para 80 per Spear 
J. 
1652 See R v Rongonui [2000] 1 NZLR 385 (CA) para 177 per Thomas J. 
1653 See ibid, para 179.   
1654 See also G Phillipson, ‘The ‘right’ of privacy in England and Strasbourg compared’ in M Richardson 
and A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 184, 196 (‘[…] the reasonable person is 
not cloaked with the characteristics of the applicant, but is placed in the overall situation he or she is in, 
in order to assess their hypothetical response to publication’). 
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shoes of the plaintiff, but is apparently supposed to have unimpaired capabilities to 
withstand humiliation. This runs counter to human reality.1655 This, it seems reasonable 
to suggest, indicates that both sub-tests are not separable. In Andrews v TVNZ Ltd, the 
matter was already taken quite far in this direction. Allan J opined that a court, ‘having 
satisfied itself that a plaintiff is a person of ordinary sensibilities, can proceed without 
resort to a fictitious “reasonable person”.’1656
      
The majority in the House of Lords’ decision in R v Smith1657 paid tribute to 
these inconsistencies and held that the second element of the test (loss of self-control) 
should be more flexible and therefore not a fixed standard. According to this view, the 
decision-making would be transferred to the jury and the jury must ask themselves 
whether the defendant ‘exercised the degree of self-control to be expected of someone 
in his situation.’1658 The judgment was primarily concerned with the question as to 
whether the ‘loss of self-control’ standard should be 'subjectivised' for egalitarian rea-
sons. As we know, the same concern could be found in the minority views of Elias CJ 
and Thomas J in R v Rongonui. This criticism, however, is akin to counsel’s submission 
in L v G to 'subjectivise' the reasonable person.  
 
One might now argue that, in the context of the privacy tort, no particular draft-
ing of an Act of Parliament restricts the courts, as was the case in provocation law.1659 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned solution would be consequent but equally doomed. 
Given that personal characteristics are projected onto the reasonable person, the objec-
tive test would be so thoroughly ‘subjectivised’ that it ceases to be objective.1660 A 
‘subjectivised’ objective subtest raises similar egalitarian concerns. If the plaintiff’s 
personal fears of, for example, being discriminated against, are projected onto the rea-
sonable person’s capabilities to withstand humiliation, the discriminatory tendency 
1655 Ibid. 
1656 Andrews v TVNZ Ltd High Court Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, 
Allan J) para 50. 
1657 [2001] 1 AC 146 (HL). 
1658 Ibid, at p 155 per Lord Slynn.  
1659 The findings in R v Smith were later held incompatible with the statutory drafting of the provocation 
defence; the argumentation was similar to the majority’s view in R v Rongonui – see Attorney General for 
Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23 para 22 per Lord Nicholls. 
1660 M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003) 214; see also D M Paciocco, ‘Subjective and 
Objective Standards of Fault for Offences and Defences’ (1995) 59 Saskatchewan Law Review 271, 299.  
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would infect the so-called objective test. In theory, however, the reasonable person 
should be free of those tendencies as a matter of equality before the law.1661  
 
Retrospectively, P v D1662 provides an illustrative example. P was a public fig-
ure, whose mental illness was about to be revealed by the media before the plaintiff 
successfully sought an injunction. Nowadays, it is ‘no question that the stigma once at-
tached to mental illness is less than it was;’ rather, ‘a number of well-known New Zea-
landers are prepared to appear in television marketing campaigns making no secret of 
the fact that they have been so affected.’1663 For egalitarian reasons, mental illnesses 
should hence not be regarded as a stigma or target for discrimination anymore. For the, 
say, enlightened1664 reasonable person, it should not be offensive or humiliating any-
more to be affected by such an illness – which is why well-known New Zealanders en-
tered the public limelight and revealed their ‘handicap.’  
 
Given that P’s personal fear1665 of being discriminated against by such revela-
tion is projected onto the reasonable person, it would be harmful to the quest for equal-
ity of the other aforementioned persons affected by such an illness. The law would treat 
P better and therefore unequally, because such a plaintiff might on occasion even re-
trieve damages for someone else’s revelation whereas others simply strive for being 
treated equally. If it were otherwise, being discriminated against because of a mental 
illness suddenly becomes ‘normal,’ ‘ordinary’ or ‘reasonable’ through the ‘subjectiv-
ised’ reasonable person. However, this is precisely what should not be the case objec-
tively.1666 While this may sound a bit airy, the general problem of a ‘subjectivised’ ob-
jective sub-test is that it suddenly lacks its normative core. In order to maintain a nor-
mative core, the judge in a P v D scenario must insist that the reasonable New Zea-
1661 Ibid, at p 215. 
1662 [2000] 2 NZLR 591. 
1663 J F Burrows, ‘Review: Media Law’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 787. 
1664 This term was used by Nicholson J in P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591, 601.    
1665 Ibid, para 38. After stating he or she would be devastated by such a publication, P continued the affi-
davit as follows: ‘[…]I believe my [family] will be caused serious stress and harm […]. Such is the value 
I put upon my privacy and my family that I would be prepared to cease [occupation] if I felt that my con-
tinued [occupation] would expose the most private and sensitive facts of my life to media exposure…. I 
also believe the publication would have a serious effect on my own confidence and my ability to free 
myself from rumour, speculation and innuendo …].’ 
1666 See Green v R (1996-97) 191 CLR 334, 407 per Kirby J; M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Per-
son (2003) 215. 
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lander is not ‘truly’ humiliated by such a revelation (even though P might be highly of-
fended personally).1667 The objective test would otherwise not be a fixed objective stan-
dard. This would require precluding individuals from invoking their own divergent val-
ues in response to what it means to be ‘truly’ humiliated.1668 From the perspective of 
the ‘objectivist,’ it ‘has to be the law, not the individual under scrutiny, [which] sets the 
relevant norms and values.’1669  
 
In the author’s respectful view, this was not the case in P v D. In the context of 
an objective test, equal treatment of citizens with mental illnesses involve that they do 
not retrieve damages or an injunction simply because someone disseminates informa-
tion that they have a mental illness. Because it is an objective standard, relevant norms 
and values in an enlightened society demand that this is no foothold for discrimina-
tion.1670 Nicholson J indicated that human beings are still keen to keep their personal 
medical treatment private although the public is generally more elucidated, ‘that dis-
abilities such as mental illness are no cause for exclusion, scorn or embarrassment […]’ 
anymore.1671 The learned Judge pointed out that this objective test is too idealistic and 
‘does not take into account actual human emotion and the value which people place on 
having intimate personal information […] private.’1672 This statement is undoubtedly 
true but it simultaneously illustrates the inappropriateness of a reasonable person stan-
dard in this context. 
 
1667 See M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003) 216; TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 1 
(CA) para 67 (‘The fragile sensibility of the claimant cannot prevail […]’). See also Green v R (1996-97) 
191 CLR 334, 408 per Kirby J. 
1668 See ibid, at p 234-35; see also G C Keating, ‘Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory’ 
(1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 311, 368 for the tort of negligence (‘[The reasonable person doc-
trine],[…], is firmly committed to objective valuation:  It makes its calculations of reasonableness not by 
investigating the values that the persons involved in risk impositions place on the interests at stake, but by 
insisting that injurers assign those interests “the value which the law attaches to them”’ – emphasis 
added, internal citations omitted). 
1669M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003)  235; see also D E Seidelson, ‘Reasonable Ex-
pectations and Subjective Standards in Negligence Law: The Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and the Men-
tally Incompetent’ (1981) 50 George Washington Law Review 17, 19 (‘The court will not permit the rea-
sonable person standard to be supplanted by a subjective standard reflecting the litigant’s flawed judg-
ment’). 
1670 See Green v Re (1996-97) 191 CLR 334, 407 per Kirby J 
1671 P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 para 39.  
1672 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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Observed from the viewpoint of the media, it would nevertheless not be calcula-
ble whether the reasonable person is truly humiliated although P has indicated to the 
press that he or she is highly offended individually.1673 Thus, it is suggested that a ‘sub-
jectivised’ reasonable person is undoubtedly politically correct, but has merely tenuous 
points of contact with the pursued concept of equality before the law. The result would 
rather be a purely subjective test under the guise of an objective test. The alternative, as 
we have noted, is equally undesirable due to the unevenness between subjective and 
objective sub-test with corresponding egalitarian caveats. However politically incorrect 
the opposite may seem, the media must nevertheless prevail in a P v D scenario. 
2.1.4 Conclusion   
Prosser’s original test of the US tort seems maddeningly simple. Objectively, 
this is of course an inadequate statement; according to the view taken in that country, 
the recognition of the individual’s peculiarities would unwittingly lead to a ‘chilling 
effect’ on freedom of speech. New Zealand, by contrast, seemingly follows a different 
avenue because granting equality before the law seems to be a stronger concern. This, 
however, requires ‘subjectivising’ even the objective part of the test. As the law of 
provocation suggests, this might be a path of trials and tribulations.  
 
In the relevant context, the reasonable person seems to be on an orderly retreat. 
Its application in negligence has been defended with forceful arguments whilst nobody 
seems to stand up for the current provocation defence. As a rule of thumb, the applica-
tion of the reasonable person in negligence is easier to justify, because it focuses on the 
litigant’s conduct. It is the provocation test, however, which is similar to the relevant 
test of the privacy tort. The application of the reasonable person in this context may 
well be inappropriate due to its additional focus on the litigant’s mental state. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that Prosser also had the ‘congenital fool’ in mind when he 
‘distilled’ the test as a prerequisite of the public dissemination of private facts tort. The 
options to treat litigants with humanity in a different legal environment seem restricted 
1673 This is usually a critique against a purely subjective approach – see also G C Keating, ‘Reasonable-
ness and Rationality in Negligence Theory’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 311, 372 (‘If actors were 
permitted to impose risks that were justified solely by their own subjective valuations of the ends […], 
we could not reliably predict the risks to which we might legitimately be exposed in pursuing any particu-
lar cause of action’). 
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by the architecture of the original concept. The choices given involve discriminating 
against certain plaintiffs or losing the objectivity of the objective test, both of which are 
not appealing options. The attempt at humanising the test is hence akin to what the 
French call a donquichottery1674. It is a noble and chivalrous fight, but one against 
windmills – it is difficult to be won without blurring the objective concept.  
 
The perspective of an external prudent bystander is apparently the only arguable 
approach – it avoids all problems by neglecting them. That this results in a privacy tort 
of gesture rather than substance is ‘potluck,’ as they say in English. On a brighter note, 
the tort’s potential to chill freedom of speech will be marginal. At the end of the day, it 
is a question of what should be achieved by acknowledging the new common law rule. 
Given that humiliation of a human being is indeed the gist of the action,1675 it is ques-
tionable whether the reasonable person is a sensible choice as controlling standard.  
 
Nevertheless, to argue, by way of illustration, that particularly the ‘highly offen-
sive’ test provides ‘adequate flexibility to accommodate the special vulnerability of 
children,’1676 is in the author’s respectful view not realistic.1677 This test offers the same 
flexibility to a vulnerable child as to any other individual or even social group - none 
whatsoever. Hence, the author supports the observation that the joint judgment does not 
offer a ‘coherent or workable approach’ in this respect.1678 An explanation might be 
that ‘special vulnerability’, on the one hand, and ‘community mores’ or ‘reasonable 
persons’ on the other are stark opposites. In the context of the private facts tort, the 
‘reasonable person’ does not preserve the ability of individuals ‘to develop a sense of 
their own autonomy.’1679 It is the very rationale of the test to obliterate idiosyncrasies 
and individual autonomy for the price of predictable decisions and a tight confinement 
of the tort. In other words, it might be difficult to adopt US tests and avoid US re-
1674 After the Spanish masterpiece “Don Quixote de la Mancha“ by Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra. 
1675 See J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
394-5. 
1676 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 145 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
1677 See also K Evans, ‘Was Privacy the Winner of the Day’ [2004] New Zealand Law Journal 181, 182-
3. 
1678 U J Cheer, ‘Privacy and the Public Interest’ (2005) 1 Privacy Law Bulletin 145, 147. 
1679 R C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 
77 California Law Review 957, 987. 
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sults.1680 Hence, it should be noted that the test would indeed confine the new common 
law rule very effectively. This should not be misunderstood as critique; it is a rational 
and consequent decision in order to achieve certain results. Common sense simply sug-
gests that one cannot have his cake and eat it.  
 
In brief, the test is ill-starred in the context of the new tort in the author’s mod-
est opinion. There is certainly ignorance imposed by upbringing or education involved, 
but this attempt to make ‘something straight’ out of the ‘crooked timber of humanity’ is 
most likely bound to fail. The elaboration of a new objective reasonableness standard is 
hence a topic that might require further dedication in a context other than this thesis.1681 
The decisive point is nonetheless if the author’s basic thesis is correct. It might there-
fore be of further interest whether an alternative approach could elaborate a different 
inherent logic of the test. Subsequently, we will explore whether this elaboration could 
be bypassed by taking the NZBoRA seriously. 
2.2 Reasonable persons and human rights 
With regard to the respective English law, I have suggested that the reasonable 
person test has been rendered superfluous, because the test can be replaced by a propor-
tionality test. In the following paragraphs, this suggestion will be further developed. 
According to its perhaps most sophisticated interpretation, the reasonable person signi-
fies Rawls’ distinction between the rational and the reasonable.1682 Nevertheless, the 
previous results already point to a theoretical infirmity of test inasmuch as its premise 
(an equal interest of all in both liberty and security) is not met in the privacy context.  
 
The notion of distinguishing the rational from the reasonable is nevertheless of 
momentous significance in the following. Prosser, by contrast, regarded the individual 
as a congenital fool or as being of an excitable temperament. Put mildly, this is unfamil-
iar parlance in a human rights context. The following paragraphs therefore include sug-
gestions relating to the image of the human being. Our starting point is again the sug-
gestion that privacy is predominantly an individual interest, which has to be reconciled 
1680 Compare Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 146 per Gault and Blanchard J. 
1681 See, eg, M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003) 274 for a suggestion. 
1682 See above Chapter Two, 2.5.2. 
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with societal life. With regard to Prosser's view, one might argue that the image of the 
human being differs sharply from the rational individual. In the context of the American 
negligence tort, it has been suggested that groups of people are distinguished based on 
‘community experience,’ which has been identified as problematic with regard to the 
protection of privacy. In the following, the author attempts to indicate problems which 
might have occurred after the common law tort is supposed to be consistent with the 
NZBoRA. It will be carved out that the reasonable person may occasionally conflict 
with the notion of treating people with equal concern and respect and occasionally with 
s 19 NZBoRA. In a second step, the functioning of a human rights instrument as an 
overarching standard of reasonableness will be sketched. We will use these issues as 
two levels of approximation to Tipping J’s distinct approach, which, like the respective 
English law, omits a freestanding reasonable person test.       
2.2.1 Equality before and under the law  
Firstly, an overview of the reasonable person’s possible philosophical back-
ground should be provided. The emergence of the reasonable person in the 19th century 
suggests linking it to the empiricists such as John Stuart Mill. As an enlightened thinker 
Mill, of course, does not use the surprisingly earthbound language of Prosser. Neverthe-
less, even Mill was concerned about the excitable mass. The term ‘excite’ can be traced 
back to the word mob; the term describes a group of rioters in seventeenth-century Eng-
land.1683 The idiom ‘mob’ was later used to describe disorder and helped to establish 
‘the “cultivated mores” of patrician culture at some distance from a plebeian cul-
ture.’1684 The wellbeing of the latter societal group in the future, according to Mill, ‘de-
pends on the degree in which they can be made rational beings.’1685 In other words, un-
til they have been made rational beings it might be argued that they have to be guided 
by the reasonable person that embodies the ‘cultivated mores’ of the patricians.1686 
Nevertheless, Mill develops the concept of a modern state based on liberty rather than 
rights; liberty should offer inducements for ‘varied experiments, and endless diversity 
1683 J M Roberts, ‘John Stuart Mill, free speech and the public sphere: a Bakhtinian critique’ in N 
Crossley J M Roberts (eds), After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere (2004) 67, 80. 
1684 Ibid, at p 80. 
1685 Ibid, at p 81 citing J S Mill Principles of Political Economy (Penguin, 1985)123. 
1686 See also M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003) 158. 
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of experience.’1687 In Mill’s model, as already indicated, freedom of speech is less con-
cerned with the individual’s right to utter an opinion; it rather honours the freedom of 
all individuals to hear an opinion from different perspectives.1688 However, individuals 
not engaged in either economics or politics exist in a ‘culture of cultivation.’1689 They 
should improve and become rational beings.1690 The state, on the other hand, remains 
passive and enables ‘each experimentalist to benefit by the experiment of others.’1691  
        
What might be a possible implication for the privacy tort? The Court of Appeal 
applied the NZBoRA in Hosking to the common law sphere. Crudely put, Mill’s liberal 
‘culture of cultivation’ based on liberty was confronted with a ‘culture of justification’ 
based on rights. In Kantian thought, for instance, human beings have dignity and auton-
omy.1692 In a nutshell, the essence of granting individual rights is based on the assump-
tion that the individual is rational.1693 Kantian rights, by way of illustration, ordinarily 
form an overarching instrument of universal morals, deriving from the free and rational 
will.1694 An essential part of these morals is equal treatment before and under the 
law.1695 In a 'constitutionalised' common law, equality derives its force from two rele-
vant sources: at its core, it means that people are to be treated with equal concern and 
respect; further norms of equality, such as the non-discrimination clause in s 19 
1687 J M Roberts, ‘John Stuart Mill, free speech and the public sphere: a Bakhtinian critique’ in N 
Crossley J M Roberts (eds), After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere (2004) 67, 83 citing 
J S Mill ‘On Liberty’ in J Grey (ed), John Stuart Mill on Liberty (OUP, 1998) 121 (emphasis added). 
1688 Ibid, at p 78. See also M Markin, ‘An "Unholy Alliance": The Law of Media Ride-Alongs’ (2004) 12 
CommLaw Conspectus 33, 34, D A Strauss, ‘Rights and the System of Freedom of Expression’ [1993] 
University of Chicago Legal Forum 197, 198; J J Ofseyer ‘Talking Liberty with John Stuart Mill’ [1999] 
Annual Survey of American Law 395, 410.   
1689 Ibid, at p 84. 
1690 The individual apparently merely has the freedom to perform acts that do not affect the interests of 
others. Mill calls these actions “self-regarding”; this however is the freedom ‘from legislative or other 
governmental interference in behaviour that does not harm nonconsenting others’ – see J Wagner De-
Cew, ’The Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics’ (1986) 5 Law and Philosophy 145, 163-4 (emphasis 
added). 
1691 J M Roberts, ‘John Stuart Mill, free speech and the public sphere: a Bakhtinian critique’ in N 
Crossley J M Roberts (eds), After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere (2004) 67, 83 citing 
J S Mill ‘On Liberty’ in  J Grey (ed) John Stuart Mill on Liberty (OUP, 1998) 121. 
1692 See C S Dailey, ‘Holmes and the Romantic Mind’ (1998) 48 Duke Law Journal 429, 488. 
1693 A Reath, Agency & Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory (2006) 92. See also E J Eberle, ‘Human Dig-
nity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American Constitutional Law’ [1997] Utah Law Review 
963, 973.  
1694 Ibid, at p 99 citing I Kant, Groundworks II (G 4: 431). 
1695 Eg, art 26 ICCPR. For the privacy context see generally C Fried, ’Privacy’ (1968) 77 Yale Law Jour-
nal 475, 478 
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NZBoRA,1696 may be regarded as derived from the claim of equality of status.1697 How-
ever, we can take it as axiomatic that every person has to be treated at least with equal 
concern and respect in a generally applicable law. Moreover, different treatment of 
genders, ethnicities etcetera would require sufficient justification pursuant to s 5.1698 
Section 19, which is of the same importance as freedom of speech,1699 could be turned 
(horizontally applied) against the court where applicable. Given that the privacy tort has 
to be consistent with the NZBoRA, it is suggested that the courts do not only have to 
keep s 14 firmly in mind in this context.1700
 
In order to portray the treatment of each person with equal concern and respect, 
we need to invoke an exemplary subject of the law who is not necessarily an ‘ordinary’ 
reasonable person. I refer to this person as ‘Catweazle fella.’ This was not said flip-
pantly, but should illustrate that some people may be difficult to fathom with common 
sense and, say, community experience.1701 In other words, whether or not the judge 
could approach such a person with common sense is irrelevant, because the person 
should be treated with equal concern and respect in any case.1702 Kant’s categorical im-
perative, for instance, would demand ‘do treat the Catweazle fella equally’ and not 
‘treat the litigant equally unless he is a Catweazle fella.’1703 In the former category, the 
judge treats the person equally, because the judge herself wants to be the first subject of 
such a law. The latter attitude, however, seems to be the maxim of contemporary tort 
law insofar as only ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ people are subject to experience. Neverthe-
less, equality norms have been described as one of the cornerstones of democratic so-
1696 The NZBoRA does include equality rights ‘at least in the sense of a right not to be discriminated 
against’ - P Rishworth, ‘Lord Cooke and the Bill of Rights’ in Rishworth, P (ed), The Struggle for sim-
plicity in the law (1997) 323; see also D R Knight, ‘“I'm Not Gay - Not That There's Anything Wrong 
with That!”: Are Unwanted Imputations of Gayness Defamatory?’ (2006) 37 Victoria University of Wel-
lington Law Review 249, 272. 
1697 See generally ‘Egalitarianism’ in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egalitarianism/> 08 March 2008. See also art 26 ICCPR and Lord 
Steyn, ‘Democracy through Law’ [2002] European Human Rights Law Review 723, 731-2. 
1698 P A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand (3rd ed, 2007) para 27.4.2 at p 
1145. 
1699 S Mize, ’Resolving Cases of Conflicting Rights under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act’ (2006) 22 
New Zealand Universities Law Review 50, 71 fn 72. 
1700 This, however, seems to be the dominant view - see, eg, J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking 
and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 391. 
1701 It might be advantageous to picture the great Geoffrey Bayldon in this role. 
1702 See also C Fried, ’Privacy’ (1968) 77 Yale Law Journal 475, 478.  
1703 See generally A Reath, Agency & Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory (2006) 99. 
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cieties because it values persons as being worthy of dignity and respect.1704 The com-
mon law occasionally discriminates against citizens on grounds such as age, sex and so 
on, which is why Parliament responded with a patchwork of statutes to reverse these 
tendencies.1705 It should be indicated, in conclusion, that traditional maxims might col-
lide with those of the NZBoRA once the Act has been held applicable to the common 
law.  
 
Having said that, the ‘collision’ should be briefly illustrated by using Brown v 
Attorney General of New Zealand1706 as an example. The plaintiff was a convicted pae-
dophile trying to reintegrate into society. Spear J stated that ‘[t]he [highly offensive to a 
reasonable person] test of course is not for the reasonable paedophile but of a reason-
able person in the shoes of a person that the publication is about.’1707 Why is that? I 
have already suggested that the reasonable person in Campbell was a ‘reasonable drug 
addict receiving treatment.’ A compelling legal difference to a ‘reasonable paedophile’ 
is difficult to identify. In English provocation law, the test has produced ‘monsters like 
the reasonable obsessive, the reasonable depressive alcoholic and even […] the reason-
able glue sniffer.’1708 Spear J, however, continued by stating that he was ‘just able to 
find that an objective reasonable person standing in the shoes of the plaintiff should be 
highly offended by the publication of that information about that plaintiff.’1709
 
Here we meet the problem of lacking experience with the idiosyncrasies of the 
litigant again. The decision in Brown seems to be influenced by the fact that a child 
abuser is understandably difficult to grasp with common sense. A child abuser is ‘ab-
normal’ whilst the yardstick of the common law is, as we know, ‘normality’ or ‘ordi-
nariness.’ Being a child abuser is an idiosyncrasy of the plaintiff that is not featured by 
the characteristics of a reasonable person. Similar to the situation of a mentally disabled 
1704 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 17.4.1; see also C 
L'Heureux-Dubé, ‘Realizing Equality in the Twentieth Century: The Role of the Supreme Court of Can-
ada in Comparative Perspective’ (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 35, 53. 
1705 Ibid, para 17.7.1. 
1706 [2006] DCR 630.  
1707 Ibid, para 81 (emphasis added). 
1708 R v Smith [2001] 1 AC 146, 172 (HL) per Lord Hoffmann.  
1709 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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person in the law of negligence,1710 he was therefore subject to the utmost objectivity. 
Nevertheless, the problem is that even Mr Brown as child abuser had to be treated with 
equal concern and respect. In New Zealand, the common law was already able to deal 
with the legal construct of a ‘reasonable public figure with mental health issues’ in P v 
D. If it were otherwise, Nicholson J would have dismissed the application. It seems rea-
sonable to suggest that the same ‘subjectivised’ test has to be applied to the plaintiff in 
Brown. This would in turn require us to become acquainted with the ‘reasonable child 
abuser reintegrating into society.’ Surely, a principled application of the test would in-
exorably lead to the realm of the absurd, but this is no valid reason not to treat the liti-
gant with the same respect as others.1711 Thus, it does not seem to be easy reconciling 
the current model based on liberty with individual rights. Rawls is certainly right in ob-
serving that utilitarianism is unable to maintain ‘separateness of persons’ due to the 
general welfare pursued instead.1712 The yardstick of human rights instruments is 
grounded in human dignity; a rational being ‘obeys no law other than that which he 
himself at the same time gives.’1713 Some might thus argue, ‘that justice without equal-
ity is no justice at all.’1714  
 
To briefly explain German law, ensuring equality in all areas of the law was a 
major driving force in constitutionalising private law. Its origin can be traced back to a 
scholarly article dealing with the problem that women did not receive equal payment 
for equal work.1715 This was followed only much later by the Lüth1716 decision of the 
1710 See above Chapter Three, 2.1.2. 
1711 See generally P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 
17.9.8. 
1712 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (OUP, 1971) 26. The underlying conflict is basically concerned with two 
different interpretations of social equality – C Bird, The Myth of Liberal Individualism (1999) 74; see also 
J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP, 1986) 271 for a more detailed discussion. 
1713 I Kant, Groundworks II (G 4: 433, 434) cited in A Reath, Agency & Autonomy in Kant’s Moral The-
ory (2006) 92; see also C Fried, ’Privacy’ (1968) 77 Yale Law Journal 475, 479; G C Keating, ‘Reason-
ableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 311, 318. 
1714 C L'Heureux-Dubé, ‘Realizing Equality in the Twentieth Century: The Role of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Comparative Perspective’ (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 35, 55. 
1715 B S Markesinis and S Enchelmaier, ‘Human Rights under German Constitutional Law’ in B S Mar-
kesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) 191, 196; see also K M Lewin, ‘The Significance of Constitu-
tional Rights for Private Law: Theory and Practice in West Germany’ (1968) 17(3) International Com-
parative Law Quarterly 571, 583. 
1716 BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958); see also K M Lewin, ‘The Significance of Constitutional Rights for Private 
Law: Theory and Practice in West Germany’ (1968) 17(3) International Comparative Law Quarterly 
571, 587-8. 
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German Federal Constitutional Court and the edifice of the private law, as it stood, be-
gan to crumble. This is decidedly not saying that the same decisions have to be made in 
New Zealand. Nevertheless, the joint judgment in Hosking applied the NZBoRA to a 
private dispute and - nothing happened. This, at least, is not enough in my view.  
 
Suffice to say that the reasonable person is in conflict with a human rights in-
strument generally and occasionally with s 19. New Zealand’s non-discrimination right 
is a great deal more protective in comparison to the 14th Amendment to the US Consti-
tution.1717 In the author’s view, a test is not consistent with the NZBoRA just because it 
is used in the USA. Furthermore, the USA is one of the few jurisdictions not taking part 
in the modern international dialogue concerned with the right to be free from discrimi-
nation.1718 ‘Constitutionalisation’ of the private law without any idealism might be a 
quite anaemic procedure if it does not bring about any changes; this would be a consti-
tutionalisation without a cause. In sum, it is suggested that their Honours’ standard may 
occasionally conflict with the NZBoRA on grounds of equality. 
2.2.2 The NZBoRA as a standard of reasonableness 
One might ask now how a human rights instrument could supplant a reasonable-
ness standard and that would be a splendid question indeed. Simply granting equality is 
honourable but certainly does not provide a fully fledged standard. Rather, it seems 
necessary to accept that the problem hiding in the background of the equality debate is 
‘discretion.’1719 We have noted that the courts primarily consider the context of the case 
and deliver moral decisions based on impression.1720 The decision in Brown provides a 
good example, because Spear J held that an objective reasonable person should (or 
ought to be) highly offended under the circumstances.1721 Moreover, the BSA’s experi-
ence with the test suggests that a series of decisions has no apparent linking rationale 
1717 See C L'Heureux-Dubé, ‘Realizing Equality in the Twentieth Century: The Role of the Supreme  
Court of Canada in Comparative Perspective’ (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 35, 
35 for a comparison between Canadian and US equality rights; see also G C Keating, ‘Reasonableness 
and Rationality in Negligence Theory’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 311, 320. 
1718 Ibid. 
1719 M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003) 281.  
1720 See also P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 13.16.5 
(‘In this area, like in other areas involving limits on freedom of expression, Judges tend to evaluate the 
facts of the particular case’). 
1721 Brown v Attorney General of New Zealand [2006] DCR 630 para 81. 
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apart from recognising the context of each case.1722 In the light of these circumstances, 
one could also argue that the current interpretation of the reasonable person simply pro-
vides discretionary space for the courts. In brief, the test does not lead to useful prece-
dential authority as arguably intended by the historical introduction of the test to the 
common law.    
 
With regard to New Zealand’s privacy tort, one can admittedly only hear the 
echo of this ‘call to context’1723 rather than the call itself - we merely meet the notion of 
paying regard to the particular facts of the case in virtually every test.1724 Nevertheless, 
one possible response is to connect the operation of the common law closer to an over-
arching legal system, which is usually a human rights instrument.1725 The idea of con-
necting a moral decision (which has to be made in practice anyway) to the overarching 
morals perpetuated by the NZBoRA makes sound sense to this writer. Indeed, Richard 
Mullender observed parallels to the discussion in the UK regarding the horizontal effect 
of the HRA in this context.1726 As Mayo Moran observes, the idea has received little 
attention so far, but the ‘question of the influence of constitutional norms is beginning 
to receive serious attention as constitutionalism becomes more expansive.’1727  
 
In New Zealand, quasi-constitutionalism became theoretically more expansive 
since Hosking. As I have sought to show, the NZBoRA rules out maxims such as un-
equal treatment in the name of general welfare as well. In England, the quasi-
constitutional HRA established some ‘fundamental requirements of distributive justice’ 
in the context of the extended breach of confidence action.1728 The NZBoRA, contrary 
to the suggestion of the joint judgment, is in my view not taking part in this distribution 
process however. The concept of distributive justice, as we know, is part of the famous 
1722 U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 262. 
1723 M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003) 282. 
1724 See also J Lenow, ‘First Amendment Protection for the Publication of Private Information’ (2007) 60 
Vanderbilt Law Review 235, 246 (Lenow observes with regard to the US law that ‘[t]he private facts tort 
is highly fact-sensitive and requires the application of principles that are somewhat vague and not easily 
defined or applied’ - emphasis added). 
1725 See R Mullender, ‘The Reasonable Person, The Pursuit of Justice, and Negligence Law’ (2005) 68(4) 
Modern Law Review 681, 686. 
1726 Ibid. 
1727 M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003) 283.  
1728 See R Mullender, ‘The Reasonable Person, The Pursuit of Justice, and Negligence Law’ (2005) 68(4) 
Modern Law Review 681, 686. 
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Aristotelian concept of justice and has to be distinguished from corrective justice.1729 
According to Peter Cane, tort law in general can be described as a ‘set of rules and prin-
ciples of personal responsibility, the main function of which is to justify the imposition 
of obligations to repair harm.’1730 ‘Justification’ and ‘personal responsibility’ for one’s 
freedom of choice are also major themes of modern human rights instruments.1731 The 
NZBoRA, it seems reasonable to suggest, could therefore be utilised for present pur-
poses. However, the importance of the role of distributive justice within tort rules is not 
fully clarified yet; the reason is most likely that the relevant literature is pitched at a 
high level of abstraction.1732 A resolution of this issue is outside the scope of this analy-
sis, but the role of distributive justice in tort theory is nonetheless an important point. 
English law, as we know, can be interpreted as incorporating a mixed conception of 
corrective justice – both forms of justice are therefore relevant in this context.1733 The 
most important detail about distributive justice that needs to be recalled is that its prin-
ciple is ‘proportionality.’1734     
 
Be that as it may, Tom Garety was able to observe that connecting the law to a 
higher value system ‘alone promises to bring together perspectives upon both the nor-
mative and descriptive of a right such as privacy.’1735 In a truly constitutionalised pri-
vacy tort, harmonised with such a higher value system, the reasonable person is super-
fluous. Firstly, only a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ is actionable. Second and 
more importantly, relevant privacy interests are appropriate merely if they represent 
reasonable limits on freedom of speech.1736 Both tests offer room for discretionary and 
1729 See P Cane, ‘Distributive Justice and Tort Law’ [2001] New Zealand Law Review 401, 405-7; see 
also his ‘The Anatomy of Private Law Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 203, 215. Refer to Chapter Two, 2.3.3.2 for a brief discussion.  
1730 Ibid, at p 403 (emphasis added). 
1731 Eg, W Brugger, ’The Image of the Person in the Human Rights Concept’ (1996) 18 (3) Human Rights 
Quarterly 594, 603. 
1732 P Cane, ‘Distributive Justice and Tort Law’ [2001] New Zealand Law Review 401, 419. 
1733 See above Chapter Two, 2.3.3.3. 
1734 See above Chapter Two, 2.3.3.2. 
1735 T Garety, ’Redefining Privacy’ (1977) 12 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Law Review 233, 239 (emphasis 
added). He also argues, ‘[f]or with time, definitions must yield to realities just as precedents must yield to 
ideals.’ See also J Kahn, ‘Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance’ (2003) 33 Seton Hall Law 
Review 371, 381.  
1736 See also von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1 per Mr Justice Zupančič (‘The “reasonable-
ness” of the expectation of privacy could be reduced to the aforementioned balancing test’); Campbell 
[2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) paras 21, 22 per Lord Nicholls; McKennitt  [2006] EMLR 178 (QB) para 58 
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at the same time normative decisions. One could argue that these two tests suffice to 
control even a purely subjective ‘highly offensive’ test – without an additional reason-
able person.1737      
 
The second aforementioned reasonableness standard stems from the NZBoRA. 
Mullender envisages difficulties given that two incommensurable objective values have 
to be ranked which cannot be measured on a common scale.1738 Here we have to differ-
entiate again between negligence (where these arguments are forceful) and the relevant 
law concerning privacy. With regard to the reconciliation of privacy and freedom of 
speech, the gravity of the argument from incommensurability is at least diminished. The 
notion of ‘incommensurability’ touches upon the problem of whether a balancing exer-
cise could follow rational principles as distinct from producing purely subjective re-
sults.1739 Alexy answers the question in the affirmative but concedes ‘[i]f balancing or 
weighing were incompatible with correctness, objectivity, and justification, it would 
have no place in constitutional law.’1740 For our more practical purposes, discretion (or 
if you want, ‘ranking’ of both principles) is guided by the proportionality test, which is 
ordinarily composed of three or four sub-tests.1741 John Alder argues forcefully that 
proportionality is primarily a non-rational evaluation and thus ‘an expressive matter as 
to what kind of society we wish to be;’ Alder concedes for his part, however, that 
‘Alexy makes strong claims for the rationality of a multi-factorial cost-benefit balanc-
 
per Eady J; T A Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 
943, 962. 
1737 See also N A Moreham, ‘Recognising Privacy in England and New Zealand’ (2004) 63(3) Cambridge 
Law Journal 555, 556; R Wacks in R Wacks (ed), Privacy Volume I (International Library of Essays in 
Law & Legal Theory) (1993), xvii – Introduction. 
1738 R Mullender, ‘The Reasonable Person, The Pursuit of Justice, and Negligence Law’ (2005) 68(4) 
Modern Law Review 681, 687. The notion of the incommensurability was particularly embraced by Isaiah 
Berlin. ‘Incommensurability means that, where there are clashes of value, although any given accommo-
dation may be rationally defensible in itself, we cannot rationally compare and rank competing accom-
modations’ - J Alder, ‘The Sublime and the Beautiful: Incommensurability and Human Rights’ [2006] 
Public Law 697, 698.  
1739 Eg, J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (W Regh trans, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996) 259. 
1740 R Alexy, ‘Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation’ (2005) 3 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 572, 574. 
1741 See J Alder, ‘The Sublime and the Beautiful: Incommensurability and Human Rights’ [2006] Public 
Law 697, 699. See also T Garety, ’Redefining Privacy’(1977) 12 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Law Review 
233, 238 – Garety describes the difficulties in defining privacy and addresses a middle ground between 
abstract philosophical and concrete legal applications. He names the ‘principles of law” such as liberty, 
fairness and so on ‘undergirding the legal system as whole’ that ‘mediate between the legal rules of deci-
sion for every case and the political concepts.’  
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ing exercise based on proportionality.’1742 Although it is indeed an important issue with 
strong arguments on both sides, a more elaborated discussion would be outside the 
scope of this thesis. Alexy’s account is practical and thus preferable in this context; crit-
ics raise predominantly philosophical objections. Moreover, an alternative practical ap-
proach is not identifiable. As Kumm points out, ‘there is no other structural account 
[than proportionality balancing] available to capture better the liberal idea of rights-
based justice.’1743
 
It is important to note that discretion is not taken away from the judge, but it is 
not boundless.1744 The values of a higher ‘constitutional’ order (such as ss 5, 14, 19) 
‘both positively shape and constrain’ the judge’s reasoning if she determines limits on 
freedom of speech.1745 Lamer CJC described the impact of the Canadian Charter on 
discretionary decisions of the common law by suggesting that  
 
[a] common-law rule conferring discretion cannot confer the power to infringe the Charter. Dis-
cretion must be exercised within the boundaries set by the principles of the Charter; exceeding 
results in a reversible error of law.1746
 
A ‘Catweazle fella,’ as our exemplary subject of the law, is not discriminated 
against because he is abnormal. However, he might additionally be a public figure or 
has courted public attention in the past.1747 This may weigh to his disadvantage in a 
principled balancing exercise. At this point, it should be reiterated that distributive jus-
tice is concerned with the distribution of burdens and benefits based on merit.1748 The 
privacy claim of public figure is less meritoriuous as it were. Therefore, he could and 
should be treated differently in comparison to other individuals (for example, a private 
1742 J Alder, ‘The Sublime and the Beautiful: Incommensurability and Human Rights’ [2006] Public Law 
697, 699. 
1743. See also M Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitu-
tional Justice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, 592. 
1744 For such a view see E W Thomas, The Judicial Process (2005) 202. 
1745 See M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003) 284. 
1746 Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, (1994) 120 DLR (4th) 12, 36 (SCC). It is intriguing that 
Lamer CJC also attributes personal characteristics of the accused to the ‘reasonable person’ in criminal 
law cases - see D M Paciocco, ‘Subjective and Objective Standards of Fault for Offences and Defences’ 
(1995) 59 Saskatchewan Law Review 271, 283. 
1747 See also His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd  [2008] EMLR 66 
(Ch) paras 103-110 per Blackburne J; Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 54 per Lord Hoffmann. 
1748 See above Chapter Two, 2.3.3.2. 
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person) because of his own actions. The individual is in the driving seat – for richer, for 
poorer. This, however, is not discrimination but a justified differentiation in the light of 
a human rights instrument (most notably s 5). Moreover, ignoring these differences of 
the individual plaintiff would place an unreasonable, that is, disproportionate limit on 
freedom of speech. 
 
It should be reiterated that the delineation of the privacy interest is best sepa-
rated from subsequent considerations concerned with freedom of speech or the public 
interest.1749 In Andrews v TVNZ Ltd,1750 Allan J pointed out that ‘[t]he ultimate out-
come of the [Campbell] case turned upon an assessment of reasonableness.’1751 The 
aforementioned ‘reasonableness’ (whether Ms Campbell may prevail even though she 
has courted public attention extensively) was determined through the application of the 
proportionality test however.1752 The fact that Ms Campbell is a public figure, in con-
trast, had only minor impact on the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test.1753    
 
Nevertheless, the contemporary English approach could be regarded as advanta-
geous if juxtaposed to the moral reasoning of the ‘pre-reasonable person’ era of the, in-
ter alia, 18th century. Given that the two-step limitation process pursuant to ss 5, 14 is 
carried out properly, it is possible to restructure the exercise of discretion, for instance, 
1749 See above Chapter Two, 2.5.2. 
1750 High Court Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) para 36. 
1751 Ibid (emphasis added). 
1752 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 36 per Lord Hoffmann. His Lordship pointed out that the 
importance of the case centred on the principles, with ‘which the law should strike a balance between the 
right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression, on which the House is unanimous.’ Lord Hoff-
mann continued by mentioning, ‘[w]hat is said to make this case different is, first, that Ms Campbell is a 
public figure who has sought publicity about various aspects of her private life and secondly, that the 
aspects of her private life which she has publicised include her use of drugs, in respect of which she has 
made a false claim. The Mirror claims that on these grounds it was entitled in the public interest to pub-
lish the information and photographs and that its right to do so is protected by art 10 of the convention’ – 
at para 54 (emphasis added). The learned Judge continued, ‘[o]ne must therefore proceed to consider the 
grounds why the Mirror say there was a public interest in its publication of information about Ms Camp-
bell which it would not have been justified in publishing about someone else. First, there is the fact that 
she is a public figure who has had a long and symbiotic relationship with the media. In my opinion, that 
would not in itself justify publication’ – at para 57 (emphasis added). 
1753 Compare Andrews v TVNZ High Court Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 
2006, Allan J) paras 23-35; see also von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1 per Mr Justice Zupan-
čič (‘Of course, one must avoid circular reasoning here. The “reasonableness” of the expectation of pri-
vacy could be reduced to the aforementioned balancing test’ – emphasis added); McKennitt [2007] 3 
WLR 194 (CA) para 11 per Buxton LJ; Associated Newspapers Ltd v His Royal Highness the Prince of 
Wales [2007] 3 WLR 222 (CA) para 45 per Blackburne J.  
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on appeal.1754 In the context of the current ‘reasonable person’, by contrast, it can ‘often 
be difficult to give detailed reasons for one’s judgment.’1755 It should be noted, how-
ever, that this could happen with a poorly applied proportionality test as well. At last, 
Tipping J’s approach will be addressed. 
2.2.3 Tipping J’s distinct approach 
Tipping J’s approach, as already suggested, differs from the joint judgment in 
many respects. One scholar regretted that the majority in Hosking did not bring clarity 
regarding the appropriate level of offence. Instead, further litigation and litigation ex-
pense might be required to determine whether the difference ‘amounts to anything more 
than a verbal quibble.’1756 This concern is barely justified because it presupposes that 
the courts would regard his Honour’s opinion as a valid option. Significant decisions in 
the wake of Hosking, however, did not echo or even mention Tipping J’s proposal.1757   
 
Evans is right in stating that the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ and the 
‘highly offensive’ test ‘coincide and are adequately summed up by the ‘reasonable ex-
pectations’ phrase.’1758 Tipping J advocated a ‘substantial level of offence rather than a 
high level of offence.’1759 His Honour argued that the level of offence should be con-
trolled within the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test.1760 The latter test of the pri-
vacy tort ‘controls the subjective expectation of the individual.’1761 The plaintiff has to 
show that her expectation of privacy is a reasonable one.1762 By determining the rea-
sonableness of the claim, the ‘Court has to make a value judgment.’1763 There is, thus, 
no need for an additional ‘reasonable person’ test. In Andrews v TVNZ1764 the High 
1754 See M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003) 285. 
1755 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
395. 
1756 A Geddis, ‘Hosking v Runting: A privacy tort for New Zealand’ (2005) 13 Tort Law Review 5, 10. 
1757 See, eg, Rogers v TVNZ Ltd [2007] 1 NZLR 156 (CA) paras 59-69. 
1758 K Evans, ‘Was Privacy the Winner of the Day’ [2004] New Zealand Law Journal 181, 184; see also 
N A Moreham, ‘Recognising Privacy in England and New Zealand’ (2004) 63(3) Cambridge Law Jour-
nal 555, 556.  
1759 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 256. 
1760 Ibid. 
1761 Ibid, para 250 (emphasis added). 
1762 Ibid. 
1763 Ibid (emphasis added). 
1764 Andrews v TVNZ High Court Auckland CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) 
para 67. 
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Court applied the ‘highly offensive’ test but conceded that ‘there may be cases in which 
a reasonable expectation of privacy, and that high degree of offence, will amount to one 
and the same thing’ and these cases might even be in the majority.  
 
Tipping J’s approach is preferable, particularly if we revisit the joint judgments’ 
justification for a freestanding ‘reasonable person’ test. It is fair to say that the joint 
judgment has no identifiable concept as to whether the tort’s first test requires a ‘private 
fact’ or a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’ Therefore, their Honours deemed it unre-
alistic to contemplate ‘legal liability for all publication of all private information.’1765 
Nevertheless, if it had been clear that the first limb requires a ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’ it would be transparent that legal liability would not be imposed with regard to 
‘all publication of all private information.’ The requirement that not all but merely rea-
sonable expectations are actionable would have no (logical) function if it were other-
wise. Their Honours continued justifying an additional reasonable person test by men-
tioning that ‘[i]t would be absurd, for example, to consider merely actionable informing 
a neighbour that one’s spouse has a cold.’1766 This argument is rather in the 
‘Prosser/Holmes’ category because it presupposes an individual with poor judgment 
capabilities rather than a rational agent. We therefore meet the conflict between the two 
conflicting outlooks on human nature again.  
 
Nevertheless, the joint judgment has addressed an important point with regard to 
a rights-based model: ‘how to motivate the subject to act rationally, when acting ration-
ally means self-regulation, that is, acting against your own inclinations and desires.’1767 
This is indeed quite problematic. If the individual is empowered with, say, a ‘right to 
privacy,’ what should stop her from invoking it in a ‘one’s spouse has a cold’ scenario? 
Habermas proposes that the individual must meet the needs of living in a free society 
halfway; there has to be a ‘modicum of congruence between morality and the practises 
of socialisation and education.’1768 Rawls indicated a similar view; his individual, pur-
1765 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 125. 
1766 Ibid. 
1767 K Hirschkop, ‘Justice and Drama: on Bakhtin as a complement to Habermas’ in N Crossley and M 
Roberts (eds) After Habermas: New Perspectives on the public Sphere (2004) 49, 63. 
1768 Ibid, citing J Habermas, ‘Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel’s Critique of Kant apply to Discourse 
Ethics?’ in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press 1990) 208-9; 
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suing an individually chosen plan of life, faces the same societal restrictions.1769 Grant-
ing qualified rights to the individual seems to go hand in hand with some demands as to 
how the individual has to function in the public sphere. A certain confidence in the in-
dividual’s ability to integrate into society is demanded after granting individual rights. 
Rawls argued in his later work to distinguish between the rational and the reason-
able.1770 Merely rational agents, says Rawls, ‘lack a sense of justice and fail to rec-
ogni[s]e the independent validity of the claims of others.’1771 This distinction, as we 
know, has also been made in the context of the reasonable person in tort law.1772 To this 
writer, the respective image is important to understand the conflict of ‘private’ and 
‘public interests.’ Furthermore, it might be instructive as to how the balance is finally 
struck.  
 
How could the distinction between the rational and the reasonable be drawn in 
the context of qualified (quasi-)constitutional rights? The German Federal Constitu-
tional Court, merely as an example,1773 suggests the following:1774
 
The image of the human person that underlies the Basic Law [the German Constitution] is not 
the isolated individual. Instead, the Basic Law has solved the tension between the individual and 
 
the passage reads as follows: ‘[t]his much is true: any universalistic morality is dependent upon a form of 
life that meets at half way. There has to be a modicum of congruence between morality and the practices 
of socialisation and education. The latter must promote the requisite internalization of superego controls 
and the abstractness of ego identities. In addition, there must be a modicum of fit between morality and 
socio-political institutions. Not just any institutions will do. Morality thrives only in an environment in 
which post-conventional ideas about law and morality have already been institutionalised to a certain 
extent.’ 
1769 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (OUP, 1971) 6, who notes that life plans of individuals have to be ‘fitted 
together so that their activities are compatible with one another.’ See also C Bird, The Myth of Liberal 
Individualism (1999) 35 fn 21; B C Zipursky, ‘Rawls in Tort Theory: Themes and Counter-themes’ 
(2004) 72 Fordham Law Review 1923, 1928. 
1770 J Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993) 48-54. See also M Laughlin, ‘Constitutional Theory: A 25th An-
niversary Essay’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 183, 188-9 for further details. 
1771 Ibid, at p 52. 
1772 A Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (1999) 7. 
1773 Human rights instruments such as ECHR and those of countries like Germany and Israel or Canada 
may differ in drafting but all employ an proportionality test in order to delimit human rights -  see A Ba-
rak, ‘Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience’ (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 369, 370. 
The same holds true for the Constitution of South Africa, where a similar suggestion had been made - see 
E Grant, ‘Dignity and Equality’ (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 299, 313.   
1774 BVerfGE 7, 15-6 (“Investment Aid”) (1954). 
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the community in such a way as to emphasize the communitarian ties and obligations of the per-
son without intruding on the latter's intrinsic and autonomous worth. 1775
 
This concept starts from ‘the independence and individuality’ of every human 
being ‘as a basic constitutional value;’ these values are, as we know, a reason for guar-
anteeing human rights.1776 However, the individual has ‘communitarian ties and obliga-
tions’ and by recognising this element, the truism had been emphasised that rights abso-
lutism is impossible with regard to the sociability of human beings.1777 Particularly the 
proportionality test denotes the reconciliation of individual rights (for example, keeping 
private information secret from the world) and societal duty (allowing the public to 
learn about certain facts of overriding public interest).1778 This may in turn illustrate the 
‘shades of grey’ system of limiting conflicting rights no more than necessary or reason-
able.1779      
 
The German system, for instance, treasures the worth of the individual. Like 
Tipping J, the Courts approach the protection of privacy by emphasising dignity and 
personal autonomy.1780 This approach, however, does not allow the superego to flour-
ish. In this model, there is room for both private seclusion and societal interaction. As 
we know, it is very difficult to draw a bright line between private and public facts.1781 
1775 See also R Wacks in R Wacks (ed), Privacy Volume I (International Library of Essays in Law & Le-
gal Theory) (1993), xi – Introduction; McKennitt [2006] EMLR 178 (QB) para 50 per Eady J; von Han-
nover v Germany (2005) 40 ECHRR 1 para 50.  
1776 W Brugger, ’The Image of the Person in the Human Rights Concept’ Human Rights Quarterly 18.3 
(1996) 594, 599; E J Eberle, ‘Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American Consti-
tutional Law’ [1997] Utah Law Review 963, 971. 
1777 Ibid; see also E J Eberle, ‘Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American Consti-
tutional Law’ [1997] Utah Law Review 963, 975; C E Wells,’ Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and 
Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence’ (1997) 32 Harvard Civil Rights-
Civil Liberties Law Review 159, 161 (Wells argues that the Kantian autonomy concept ‘attempts to rec-
oncile, rather than divorce, individuality and community’). 
1778 See also C Bird The Myth of Liberal Individualism (1999) 31; A Reath, Agency & Autonomy in 
Kant’s Moral Theory (2006) 106. 
1779 See also W Brugger, ‘The Image of the Person in the Human Rights Concept’ (1996) 18 (3) Human 
Rights Quarterly 594, 608; E J Eberle, ‘Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and Ameri-
can Constitutional Law’ [1997] Utah Law Review 963, 989. See also M Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as 
Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 574, 591; A Barak, ‘Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience’ (2007) 57 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 369, 382. 
1780 P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 13.16.13. 
1781 See ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty (2001) 185 ALR 1 paras 40, 41; McKennitt [2006] EMLR 178 
(QB) para 57 per Eady J; Andrews v TVNZ High Court Auckland CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 
December 2006, Allan J) para 29. 
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In Europe as in Tipping J’s version of the tort, the line is drawn with a value judgement 
as embodied in the ’reasonable expectation of privacy’ test and even more so through 
the application of an ad hoc proportionality balancing test. This requires, however, a 
certain readiness to decide the merits of a privacy claim on the facts of the case.          
 
In short, modern human rights instruments grounded in human dignity presup-
pose a self-confident human being, who is aware of and sensitive to the rights of oth-
ers.1782 Rawls has formulated a similar idea by mentioning that agents are reasonable 
insofar as ‘they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of coopera-
tion and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do 
so.’1783 Herein manifests the responsibility element as a flipside of granting individual 
rights. 
 
The insistence on the objective standard in the law of provocation has its roots 
in legal history leading back to the 19th century.1784 The privacy tort, by contrast, had no 
such legal history in this country. Its acknowledgement here could therefore involve 
challenging the legitimacy of the US test. This is what Tipping J did by replacing the 
test with the reasonableness element exerted by the domestic human rights instrument. 
It is in my view also of little assistance that the domestic BSA has applied the same test 
for some time. As we know, even the BSA intends to rephrase the test.1785 Hold on, one 
might say, we still do not deal with criminal law here. A valid point, but his Honour ap-
parently felt that one could not sufficiently control the mental state of humiliation by 
using a reasonable person in the common law tort of privacy. Instead, the subjective 
level of offence is controlled through the reasonable expectation and the reasonable 
limit on freedom of speech. Thus, his Honour’s approach can be interpreted as saying 
1782 E J Eberle, ‘Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American Constitutional Law’ 
[1997] Utah Law Review 963, 972 who points out that the concept of dignity has a communitarian di-
mension in itself (in the context of German law); C E Wells ,’ Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and 
Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence’ (1997) 32 Harvard Civil Rights-
Civil Liberties Law Review 159, 161 (Wells observes that autonomy in this sense is not about atomistic 
individuals but about social creatures entitled to respect for their dignity’ - emphasis added).   
1783 J Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993) 49. See also G C Keating, ‘Reasonableness and Rationality in 
Negligence Theory’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 311, 318; B C Zipursky, ‘Rawls in Tort Theory: 
Themes and Counter-themes’ (2004) 72 Fordham Law Review 1923, 1928. 
1784 See, eg, Green v Re (1996-97) 191 CLR 334, 400 per Kirby J. 
1785 U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 262. 
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that it ‘implicates the deeper connection between a system of private law and the over-
arching norms of the constitutional order – including […] equality norms.’1786 Simulta-
neously, it is a compelling way of reconciling two very important values in modern so-
cieties because it is in accordance with this country’s human rights instrument.  
2.2.4 Conclusion  
Tipping J’s approach, it seems reasonable to suggest, is fundamentally different 
from the joint judgment’s proposal. The differences are stark and there is thus more 
than one approach in New Zealand. From my point of view, Tipping J’s approach is 
preferable. The Judge advocates a modern, streamlined, consistent but nonetheless 
complex system, capable of producing rewarding results. Moreover, it is the only ver-
sion of the tort consistent with the NZBoRA.  
 
The joint judgment’s acknowledgement of the privacy tort should be very posi-
tively stressed. Compared to the tort as outlined by Tipping J, however, their Honours’ 
proposal is not characterised by a profound amount of ambition. Particularly with re-
gard to mental states, it is conspicuous for its robust insistence on tests of predomi-
nantly historical significance. This, however, might again look differently from a do-
mestic perspective. Given that the harm protected by the tort is ‘humiliation’ as opposed 
to an infringement of an individual right, a reasonable person test of some kind might 
be unavoidable.   
 
Tipping J’s version of the tort is perhaps difficult to communicate in this coun-
try.1787 The presupposition would be that the ‘unwanted child’ might guide the legal 
fate of New Zealand’s privacy tort to a considerable degree. The silence of the judg-
ments following Hosking explains a lot in this respect. Hence, his Honour’s tort could 
be labelled as the ‘Sir Geoffrey Palmer tort’ because it is the fulfilment of ‘radical poli-
tics’ of the Fourth Labour Government.1788 Similarly, it would require a peaceful ‘pere-
1786 M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (2003) 283.  
1787 See also M Richardson, ‘Privacy and Precedent: The Court of Appeal’s Decision in Hosking v Runt-
ing’ (2005) 11 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 82. 
1788 T Arseneau, ‘A Bill of Rights’ in M Holland and J Boston (eds) The Fourth Labour Government: 
Politics and Policy in New Zealand (2nd ed, 1990) 22.  
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stroika’1789 in parts of the common law through the application of a human rights in-
strument. Either this version of the tort was therefore 14 years too late or its time is still 
to come. In any case, it is an interesting approach because it shows what New Zealand 
law might look like. 
 
The approach of the joint judgment is also symptomatic for the present state of 
the NZBoRA. The only proof of consistency is their Honours’ allegation that the tort is 
consistent with the Act – that is the already familiar ‘lip service’ argument. This distinct 
version of the tort seems nonetheless preferable because it is communicable law. How-
ever, both approaches cannot be consistent with the Act.1790 In a Westminster system 
with a subordinate human rights instrument (which includes an additional horizontal 
dimension), the supreme Parliament has to enact a law inconsistent with the 
NZBoRA.1791 The notion of a supreme law, at its heart, simply means elevating a cer-
tain set of principles or values above the rule of the democratic majority.1792 In the 
broadest sense, the result could be described as a separation of the democracy principle 
on one the hand and the liberty principle on the other.1793 Where this elevation has not 
taken place, authority over civilian liberties remains vested in the hands of the democ-
ratically elected parliament. Parliament, in other words, is left to be the ‘fox guarding 
the henhouse.’1794 To turn the argument on its head, the judge is no such fox however. 
Given that he or she may appear to be one, a separation of power issue occurs in the au-
thor’s respectful view. Hence, the tort either should be shaped according to Tipping J’s 
approach or needs parliamentary authorisation if it is to be moulded differently. This 
would nevertheless only legalise the problem rather than solving it.  
1789 The Government had been described as being responsible for a ‘perestroika’ with a particular New 
Zealand flavour – see ibid, at p 1.  
1790 The approach of the joint judgment, as I have argued before, cannot be consistant with the NZBoRA, 
because their Honours’ approach largely emulates the US tort – see above, eg, Capter Two, 3.  
1791 T Arseneau, ‘A Bill of Rights’ in M Holland and J Boston (eds), The Fourth Labour Government: 
Politics and Policy in New Zealand (2nd ed, 1990) 22, 33; see also D Haywood, ‘Bill of Rights unlikely to 
grow up’ printed in the New Zealand Herald on 28 August 2006.  
1792 See also Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC) para 170 per Thomas J. 
1793 See generally M Laughlin, ‘Constitutional Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 183, 192. 
1794 T Arseneau, ‘A Bill of Rights’ in M Holland and J Boston (eds), The Fourth Labour Government: 
Politics and Policy in New Zealand (2nd ed, 1990) 22, 33.   
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2.3 The initial test of the privacy tort 
The remaining prerequisite is concerned with the nature of the disseminated in-
formation. In a chronological order, this has to be tested before the optional ‘highly of-
fensive’ test of course. However, we have seen that New Zealand's law features two 
quite distinct versions of the tort. This in turn very much complicates our final analysis. 
The question concerned with the appropriateness of the initial test cannot be examined 
in isolation. Appropriateness rather depends on multifarious factors such as whether the 
tort is to be developed incrementally or based on principles. It may also strongly depend 
on the harm protected by the cause of action, because its outlook could take quite dif-
ferent forms depending on whether the gist of the action is identified as humiliation or 
distress as opposed to the invasion of an individual right to privacy. 
 
Tipping J’s proposition, as we know, omits an additional ‘highly offensive’ test. 
Instead, his Honour propounded a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test requiring a 
value judgment.1795 In that case, it seems plain that the initial test must necessarily carry 
a greater burden, because one element of the so-called twin elements is missing. Gener-
ally, the present writer favours the solution that we have attributed to English law and to 
Tipping J’s proposition.1796 Because this is not necessarily a realistic solution for New 
Zealand’s law, we may confine preliminary observations largely to the approach of the 
joint judgment. In this respect, it will be expounded as to whether their Honours’ first 
test is concerned with ‘private facts’ or ‘facts in respect of which there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.’1797 I will argue that an initial ‘private facts’ test suits an incre-
mental development of the tort. The ‘reasonable expectation’ formula, in contrast, 
represents a more ambitious approach. Such a test, as will be suggested, should be sub-
divided. Adopting Wacks’ approach, the initial test should be concerned with (1) per-
sonal information that has to give rise to (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy. This 
test would also be part of an ‘ideal’ privacy tort. Furthermore, we will explore whether 
a theoretical concept of privacy could be utilised. I seek to show that privacy interests 
(despite numerous efforts) arguably cannot be confined to a single overarching defini-
1795 see Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) paras 249, 256. 
1796 As outlined, eg, in McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA) para 11 per Buxton LJ. 
1797 J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.5.03. 
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tion.1798 Instead, I suggest the application of a concept dovetailed for the purposes of 
the newly adopted tort, viz, a suitable concept for the unwarranted dissemination of per-
sonal information based on ‘control.’  
2.3.1 ‘Private facts’ or ‘reasonable expectation’? 
In the wake of Hosking, the definition of the privacy interest remained an area 
of difficulties since it only seemed ‘clear that domestic matters such as behaviour or 
personal or family circumstances will be private.’1799 According to the joint judgment’s 
official statement of the first test, the plaintiff has to show ‘the existence of facts in re-
spect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.’1800 During the discussion 
of this element, their Honours referred instead to ‘private facts’ at various points.1801 
The question arose as to whether both expressions convey the same meaning.1802 Par-
ticularly the ‘reasonable expectation’ formula may encompass a broader application of 
the tort.1803 However, this would contradict their Honours’ intention to keep the tort in 
close confinement.1804
 
It has already been argued that a privacy tort forming part of the common law in 
a particular jurisdiction does not reinvent tort law itself. The answer to this question 
should be viewed in the broader context into which a new common law rule must fit. As 
the late Lord Cooke once said: ‘in contract as in other fields, the reasonable expecta-
tions of persons in the shoes of the respective parties may be seen as a governing con-
cept permeating the common law.’1805 This statement can be interpreted as alluding to a 
1798 Compare N A Moreham, ‘Privacy and the Common Law’ (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 628 for 
a recent suggestion to the contrary. 
1799 U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 252. 
1800 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 117. See also R Tobin, ‘Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Claus: 
the tort of invasion of privacy in New Zealand’ (2004) 12 Tort Law Journal 95, 102. 
1801 J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.5.03; see also his 
‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 392 fn 16. 
1802 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 392 
1803 Ibid, at p 394; see too M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 para 127. 
1804 See ibid, at p 391. 
1805 As cited in J A Farmer, ‘Lord Cooke and Judicial Decision-making: A perspective from the Commer-
cial Bar’ in P Rishworth (ed), The struggle for simplicity in the law (1997) 53, 65 (emphasis provided); 
see also J Smillie, ‘Formalism, Fairness and Efficiency: Civil Adjudication in New Zealand’ [1996] New 
Zealand Law Review 254, 261 (Smillie is opposed to this view but cites another reference to the same 
effect). 
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general structural form of common law rules.1806 Given that this opinion would consti-
tute the prevailing view among judges in New Zealand, there would be no further query 
as to whether the initial test would be concerned with ‘private facts’ or a ‘reasonable 
expectation of privacy.’ Acknowledging a privacy interest in the common law would 
simply lead to an extension of the general structural form to the specific situation – the 
test consequently would have to satisfy reasonable expectations of privacy observed 
from an internal point of view. The adoption of rules or tests examined from an ‘exter-
nal point of view,’ in contrast, would be rejected because its structural form would not 
pass muster. Instead, they would be identified, for example, as ‘quite unreal.’1807 How-
ever, Lord Cooke’s views are not widely shared for reasons we do not need to explore. 
The courts have interpreted the ‘facts in respect of which there is a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy’ requisite in two ways, both of which are discussed next. 
2.3.1.1 A single initial test 
In TVNZ Ltd v Rogers, the Court of Appeal summarised the meaning of the first 
limb by asking the following: ‘[i]s it a fact in respect of which there is a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy? If so, it is a private fact.’1808 This view accords with the joint 
judgment’s official statement, because the second limb of the tort, insofar as is relevant, 
reads: ‘publicity given to those private facts.’1809   
 
Their Honours reasoning reveals that the identification of ‘private facts’ would 
often be analogous to the test of ‘information with the necessary quality of confidence’ 
as employed in traditional breach of confidence.1810 This test usually determines that 
‘something which is public property and public knowledge’ cannot be protected.1811 
The test was later refined inasmuch as the confidential nature of information is not 
1806 See generally R S Summers, ‘How Law is Formal and Why it Matters’ (1997) 82 Cornell Law Re-
view 1165, 1209. 
1807 See Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 99 per Lord Hope. 
1808 Ibid; see also Andrews v TVNZ Ltd High Court Auckland CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 De-
cember 2006, Allan J) para 27. It should be noted that expressions on the scope of the tort in Rogers may 
be of questionable nature - Rogers v TVNZ Ltd [2007] NZSC 91 para 25 per Elias CJ. 
1809 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 117; see also Rogers v TVNZ Ltd [2007] NZSC 91 para 98 per 
McGrath J. 
1810 Ibid, para 119; Andrews v TVNZ Ltd High Court Auckland CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 De-
cember 2006, Allan J) para 28. 
1811 Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1968] FSR 415, 419 per Megarry J (internal citation omitted). 
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automatically lost given that it had been disclosed to a limited part of the public as op-
posed to the world at large.1812 This would be in line with their Honours’ following 
contention that ‘[p]rivate facts are those that may be known to some people, but not to 
the world at large.’1813 Thus understood the application of the tort might be limited to 
photographs not taken in a public place.1814 According to the Court’s unanimous opin-
ion, ‘the law in New Zealand did not recognise a tortious cause of action in privacy 
based upon the publication of photographs taken in a public place;’ ‘[t]he law should 
not do so, for various broad policy reasons.’1815 Likewise, relevant decisions of the 
BSA indicate that incidents occurring in public places are generally not actionable.1816
 
The ‘reasonable expectation’ formula, in contrast, was used predominantly in 
order to restrain privacy expectations of public persons including their family and chil-
dren.1817 However, it is rather questionable whether their Honours afforded any sub-
stantial meaning to the reasonableness standard. New Zealand judges rather seem to 
share the predilection of their colleagues in the USA to conflate the plaintiff’s privacy 
interests with the public interest in learning about the disputed information.1818 A clear 
separation of the two countervailing interests is apparently not intended. As we recol-
lect, one commentator has addressed this issue as flat legal thinking.1819 Particularly the 
line of argument to the effect that a public person has necessarily reduced expectations 
of privacy because the public has a legitimate interest in being informed is an illustra-
tive example. To this writer, the status of a person is distinct from the question whether 
1812 Eg, Stephens v Avery [1988] ch 449, 455 per Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC. See N A Moreham, 
‘Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 65(3) Cambridge Law Review 606, 610-3 for further details. 
1813 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 119; see too Rogers v TVNZ Ltd [2007] NZSC 91 para 99 per 
McGrath J; Andrews v TVNZ Ltd High Court Auckland CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 
2006, Allan J) para 28. 
1814 See U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 251; see also Andrews v 
TVNZ Ltd High Court Auckland CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) para 20. 
1815 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA); see also J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ 
[2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 393.  
1816 E Simpson-Paton,’ Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in Public Places’ 
[2000] Toronto Law Review 305, 319. 
1817 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) paras 120-123. 
1818 Ibid, para 123. In the context of US law, this observation has been made by J B Mintz, ‘The Remains 
of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain’ (1996) 55 Maryland Law Review 
425, 441. 
1819 G P Fletcher, ‘The Right and the Reasonable’ (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 949, 951-2. 
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there are ‘facts in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.’1820 Par-
ticularly a ‘culture of justification’ is unlikely to develop under these circumstances. 
This would require retaining an initial sense of ‘wrongness,’ it specifically requires that 
the dissemination of the same sort of information might be justified if it relates to a 
‘public figure’ while it might not be justified given that personal information about a 
private person is at issue.1821 In brief, the status of the person is relevant to the question 
as to whether a ‘wrongful loss’ of privacy has occurred. 
 
That their Honours gave no substantive meaning to the reasonableness element 
may also be inferred from their justification for a freestanding highly offensive to rea-
sonable person test. Their Honours suggested, ‘[i]t would be absurd, for example, to 
consider actionable merely informing a neighbour that one's spouse has a cold.’ It does 
not seem unfair to observe that ‘one's spouse has a cold’ consequently constitutes a ‘fact 
in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy’ in their Honours’ rea-
soning. Liability should explicitly not be imposed in such a scenario, but the tool to 
achieve this goal is unambiguously the highly offensive to a reasonable person test.1822 
The Judges explicitly stated that the latter test relates to publicity and is not part of 
whether the information is private.1823 Actionable ‘private facts’ have been determined 
at that stage already.1824 The joint judgment’s formulation closely resembles the re-
quirements of the American cause of action, which features an initial private facts test. 
The reasonable expectation formula, in contrast, is invoked occasionally in order to dis-
tinguish between the protection in public and private places.1825 As Tipping J correctly 
pointed out: ‘it is conventional in the American jurisprudence to measure expectations 
of privacy and whether any expectation of privacy is reasonable by the level of of-
fence.’1826 The level of offence is measured by means of the highly offensive to a rea-
1820 U J Cheer, ‘The Future of Privacy – Recent Legal Developments in New Zealand’ (2007) 13 Canter-
bury Law Review 169, 184. 
1821 See generally G J Postema, ‘Risks, Wrongs and Responsibility – Coleman’s Liberal Theory of Com-
mutative Justice’ (1993) 103 Yale Law Journal 861, 876-8. 
1822 U J Cheer, ‘Privacy, the Bill of Rights and the BSA’ [2005] New Zealand Law Journal 222, 223. 
1823 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 127; see also Andrews v TVNZ High Court Auckland CIV 2004-
404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) para 25; U J Cheer, ‘Privacy, the Bill of Rights and 
the BSA’ [2005] New Zealand Law Journal 222, 223. 
1824 TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 156 (CA) para 68 per Panckhurst and O’Regan JJ. 
1825 Eg, Shulman v Group W Prod Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 213 (1998) 
1826 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 255 (emphasis provided). 
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sonable person test however. To my eyes, their Honours rather caused an imbalance 
with the subsequent ‘highly offensive’ test by implementing an additional reasonable-
ness element into the original ‘private facts’ element.1827  
 
It seems settled that their Honours intended a tight confinement of the tort. In 
order to achieve this goal, they have arguably chosen to develop the new cause of action 
by means of the more pedestrian incremental method.1828 This legal method lends itself 
easily to the cautious approach of protecting privacy interests in New Zealand.1829 Most 
conspicuously, I suggest, is the defiance of this method to systematisation. It enables 
the courts to hold, for instance, that privacy is in ‘exceptional cases’1830 protected in 
public places or that the courts may take ‘culpability and the blameworthiness of the 
plaintiff’ into account ‘on occasion.’1831 In short, it is suggested that the joint judg-
ment’s overall reasoning rather bespeaks a preference for a ‘private facts’ test.1832 The 
conclusion is based on what their Honours presumably intended to lay down as law and 
not the wording of their official statement. 
 
Such an approach would also not necessarily exclude the Court of Appeal’s 
suggestion in Rogers that the tort’s ambit is not confined to inherently private mat-
ters.1833 The incremental method allows a limited development of the law on a case-by-
case basis. ‘Private facts’ could be used as a generic term, which seems broad enough to 
embrace ‘public places,’ ‘voluntary public figure’ and the like as subgroups in order to 
define whether a ‘private fact’ can be identified in particular cases.  
1827 For the practical consequences of this imbalance see Andrews v TVNZ High Court Auckland CIV 
2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) paras 25, 50. 
1828 See particularly Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 117. 
1829 See also M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 para 51. 
1830 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 164; Andrews v TVNZ Ltd High Court Auckland CIV 2004-
404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) para 31. 
1831 Andrews v TVNZ High Court Auckland CIV 2004-404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan J) 
para 42. 
1832 But see J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 
389, 392, 394, 408. 
1833 TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 156 (CA) para 59 per Panckhurst and O’Regan JJ. 
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2.3.1.2 A subdivided first limb of the tort 
Having suggested the preferable test for the tort in its present state, a more am-
bitious approach will be attempted. Such a test would involve reasonable expectations 
of privacy, but the term ‘reasonable’ should have a meaningful purpose in such a sce-
nario. Information regarded as belonging to the privacy paradigm is within anyone’s 
conception of what is private.1834 The privacy paradigm circumscribes the settled core 
of personal information that is ‘generally considered private.’1835 However, because in-
formation about one’s health, family matters or sexuality is paradigmatic, its protection 
is in many situations already covered by non-legal regulation.1836 A more ambitious ap-
proach would indeed extend the net to information that ought to be protected from dis-
semination. Such an extension might in turn require a more systematic approach since 
almost every fact whose publication seems unfair could be covered if it were other-
wise.1837 A major candidate for a more systematic approach is a first element subdi-
vided into, for instance, a ‘private facts’ element which would have to give rise to a 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’1838 The High Court echoed this interpretation in 
Rogers v TVNZ Ltd.1839 The Court asked ‘whether there are private facts and, if so, 
whether they are of a character to give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy.’1840  
 
The Court of Appeal found this division to be unnecessary,1841 but the test is 
nevertheless not as tautological as it may seem at first sight. The dissemination of 
‘one’s spouse has a cold’ information, by way of illustration, could be interpreted as 
being a ‘private fact.’ The example is quaint, but a cold is primarily a medical condition 
and, thus, forming part of the privacy paradigm. However, its dissemination would not 
give rise to a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy;’ the formula suggests that not all 
1834 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
392. For a similar suggestion see T I Emerson, ‘The Right to Privacy and Freedom of the Press’ (1979) 
14 Harvard Civil Rights – Civil Liberties Law Review 329, 343. 
1835 J Lenow, ‘First Amendment Protection for the Publication of Private Information’ (2007) 60 Vander-
bilt Law Review 235, 248. 
1836 See R Wacks (ed), Privacy Volume I (International Library of Essays in Law & Legal Theory) 
(1993), xii – Introduction. 
1837 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 393 
1838 U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 251. 
1839 (2005) 22 CRNZ 668 (HC) paras 40-53 per Venning and Winkelmann JJ.  
1840 As summarised in TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 156 (CA) para 41 per Panckhurst and O’Regan 
JJ. 
1841 Ibid. 
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medical conditions are prima facie actionable.1842 Furthermore, tribute has to be paid to 
the fact that the same information may in some contexts be regarded as private while it 
is not private at all in others.1843 This writer, nevertheless, shares Wack’s preference for 
the term ‘personal information’ in order to determine relevant information about an in-
dividual.1844 Wacks counsels, sensibly, that the initial prerequisite should satisfy two 
requirements: (1) the quality of the information has to be identified as personal; and (2) 
there have to be ‘reasonable expectations of the individual concerning its use.’1845 
These requirements consequently lead to the proposed structure of the privacy tort’s 
first limb: it should be composed out of (1) a ‘personal information’ test and (2) a ‘rea-
sonable expectation of privacy’ test.1846 This structure of the tort’s first limb leads us to 
the remaining question concerned with the implementation of a particular concept of 
privacy.  
2.3.2. Contemporary concepts of privacy   
Conceptualising privacy is difficult and can be confusing. In the aftermath of 
Hosking, it remained undetermined ‘exactly what kinds of harm are relevant in a pri-
vacy action; or alternatively, what kinds of interests the new tort protects.’1847 Privacy 
is notoriously hard to define, but the subscription to generalised values is nothing new 
for the common law. According to Wacks, similar criticisms could be put forth against 
the notions of ’freedom,’ ‘security’ and ‘liberty.’1848 A counsel for the defendant in the 
Douglas v Hello! Ltd-litigation, for instance, confronted actor Michael Douglas on 
cross-examination with his suspicion that the ‘celebrity’ couple’s privacy was not their 
1842 See N A Moreham, ‘Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 121 
Law Quarterly Review 628, 642. 
1843 Ibid; see too R Wacks in R Wacks (ed), Privacy Volume I (International Library of Essays in Law & 
Legal Theory) (1993), xvi – Introduction; R C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and 
Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 77 California Law Review 957, 980. 
1844 R Wacks in R Wacks (ed), Privacy Volume I (International Library of Essays in Law & Legal The-
ory) (1993), xiv – Introduction; see too his ‘Why there will never be an English common law privacy 
tort’ in M Richardson and A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 154, 179-80. 
1845 Ibid, xvi – Introduction; see also Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2006] QB 125 para 83 per Lord Phillips 
MR; Associated Newspapers Ltd v His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales [2007] 3 WLR 222 (CA) para 
33 per Blackburne J. 
1846 This is also the direction, in which the English law might develop - McKennitt [2007] 3 WLR 194 
(CA) para 11 (CA) per Buxton LJ. 
1847 J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.5.04 at p 760. 
1848 R Wacks in R Wacks (ed), Privacy Volume I (International Library of Essays in Law & Legal The-
ory) (1993), xiv – Introduction 
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primary concern. Instead, counsel identified the plaintiffs’ supposed interest in main-
taining control over the information and doing business. Douglas replied, ‘[c]ontrol is 
what gives you privacy’1849 and counsel’s original remark seemed to have backfired on 
his client.  
 
We have already noted that the protected interest in New Zealand is most likely 
humiliation,1850 which has been regarded as an interest grounded in human dignity.1851 
We may also recollect that Prosser took a ‘reductionist’ approach to privacy and re-
garded the gist of the public disclosure tort as that of reputation with overtones of men-
tal distress.1852 Taking up this stance was criticised, particularly because the scholar dis-
tilled the four branches of the privacy tort from a number of unrelated cases without an 
external or neutral conception of privacy.1853   
 
In their numerous critical responses, scholars tended to the other extreme - they 
have developed numerous external theories usually by resorting to fictional examples 
rather than practical cases. United probably only in their dissatisfaction with Prosser’s 
conclusion, the results are often very evocative and useful when examined in isolation. 
Their discussion nevertheless tends to enter into vicious circles when considered in the 
light of competing concepts of privacy. One scholar illustrated this observation by not-
ing, ‘[t]he method de rigueur in legal scholarship has been for the author to examine the 
previously-favo[u]red definition of privacy, tear it down to its bones, expose its falla-
cies, and establish a new contender for the crown.’1854 An actual coronation never took 
place however. It seems as if it is always possible to identify a particular concept of pri-
vacy as either too narrow or too broad.1855 Owing to the lack of space, the following 
discussion features only a fragmented overview of the plethora of possible privacy con-
1849 J Rozenberg, Privacy and the Press (2004) 70. 
1850 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 128 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
1851 Eg, ibid, para 239 per Tipping J. 
1852 W L Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, 398. This view, however, does not 
seem to be shared in New Zealand – see Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716, 732 
per McGechan J (‘The gist of the action, unlike defamation, is not injury to character and reputation, but 
to one’s feelings and peace of mind’). See also Hosking [2003] 3 NZLR 385 (HC) para 167 per Rander-
son J. But compare TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 52 per Panckhurst and O’Regan JJ 
(‘[…] the gist of this tort is an interference with privacy brought about by publicity’). 
1853 R Gavison, ’Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Review 421, 460. 
1854 B Gormley, ‘A Hundred Years of Privacy’ [1992] Wisconsin Law Review 1335, 1338. 
1855 D J Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1094. 
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cepts. There are, however, broad classes of definitions, the most prominent of which 
will be briefly sketched next. 
 
Bloustein was probably Prosser’s first critic and rejected both the reputational 
and emotional distress arguments. He pointed out that considerable confusion remained 
about the nature of the interest which the ‘right’ to privacy is designed to protect.1856 
Confusion about it ‘offends the primary canon of all science that a single general prin-
ciple of explanation is to be preferred over a congeries of discrete rules.’1857 He re-
sponded to Prosser that the tort protects ‘our dignity as individuals’ with the right to 
privacy representing a ‘social vindication of the human spirit.’1858 Bloustein’s impetus 
to refer to privacy as an aspect of human dignity was to unite all four branches of the 
tort under one heading.  
 
Gavison’s influential concept defines privacy from a neutral point of view fo-
cussing on ‘accessibility’ of the individual.1859 Similar to Bloustein, her aim was to in-
clude within her definition of privacy all branches of the law and under any label.1860 
Gavison’s concept includes three independent elements (secrecy, anonymity and soli-
tude), all of which are elements of accessibility.1861 A loss of privacy could occur 
through a change in any of these characteristics.  
 
Westin has proposed another popular concept. In his opinion, ‘privacy is the 
claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and 
to what extent information about them is communicated to others.’1862 In a similar but 
distinct manner Gross defines privacy as having ‘control over acquaintance with one’s 
1856 E J Bloustein, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An answer to Dean Prosser’ (1964) 39 New 
York University Law Review 962. 
1857 Ibid, at p 963. 
1858 Ibid, at p 1003 (emphasis added). 
1859 Supporters of this concept include, eg, K Evans, ‘Was Privacy the Winner of the Day?’ [2004] New 
Zealand Law Journal 181, 182; E Simpson-Paton,’ Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection 
of Privacy in Public Places’ (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 308; M Waterfield, ‘Now 
you see it, now you don’t: the Case for an Infringement of Privacy in New Zealand’ (2004) 10 Canter-
bury Law Review 182, 207; N A Moreham, ‘Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical 
Analysis’ (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 628, 636. 
1860 R Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 421, 462.  
1861 Ibid, at p 433. This approach has been adopted in U J Cheer and J F Burrows, Media Law in New 
Zealand (5th ed, 2005) 234. 
1862 A F Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1970) 7.  
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personal affairs.’1863 This definition also captures the interrelationship of privacy no-
tions concerned with ‘accessibility’ on one hand and ‘control’ on the other;1864 this in-
sight will later prove illuminating. According to these concepts, privacy is, thus, about 
having ‘control’ over personal information.1865
 
This is, of course, a crude overview,1866 but it seems as if it is not even neces-
sary to outline all possible concepts of privacy. Recently, Solove’s influential ac-
count1867 posited that privacy has too many facets to be captured by a single con-
cept.1868 It is just a personal observation, but it is nevertheless intriguing to remark that 
women are apparently most worried about ‘accessibility’ whereas men usually favour 
the ‘control’ rationale. However, the flexibility needed to address a wide variety of 
situations where privacy interests are important is impeded by the application of a sin-
gle overarching concept of privacy.1869 Solove suggests, sensibly, that there might not 
be one but a multiplicity of answers depending on a variety of factors. He summarises 
this notion by mentioning, ‘[t]he moral is: Look to the circumstances!’1870 Hence, to 
regard privacy as a multi-facetted interest seems preferable.  
 
Solove made an important and rightfully acclaimed contribution to the legal dis-
course and this writer agrees with his initial proposition that privacy is not susceptible 
1863 H Gross, Privacy and Autonomy as cited by R Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89 
Yale Law Journal 421, 426. 
1864 See, eg, M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 para 4.5; D J Solove, ‘Con-
ceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1092. 
1865 Other proponents of privacy as ‘control’ include, eg, J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking 
and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 391; M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Pri-
vacy’ NZLC MP19 para 4.5.; T Garety, ’Redefining Privacy’ (1977) 12 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Law 
Review 233, 236; R P Bezanson, ‘The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 
1890-1990’ (1992) 80 California Law Review 1133, 1150; C Fried, ’Privacy’ (1968) 77 Yale Law Jour-
nal 475, 482-3. 
1866 See D J Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1099-1124 for a 
more thorough discussion. 
1867 M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 paras 2.1, 39. 
1868 D J Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 477, 485; 
see also M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 paras 37-9 for further references.  
1869 Ibid, at pp 1146-7; see also J Kahn, ‘Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance’ (2003) 33 
Seton Hall Law Review 371, 409. 
1870 D J Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1098-9 (internal cita-
tion omitted); see too his ‘The Virtues Of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclo-
sure’ (2003) 53 Duke Law Journal 967, 1037 and ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ (2006) 154 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 477, 485. See also R C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community 
and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 77 California Law Review 957, 980. 
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to a single definition. It is essential to note, however, that the consequences inferred 
from this insight are not necessarily stringent. Solove utilises Wittgenstein's notion of 
‘family resemblances’ as a device to reject a universal, all-embracing concept of pri-
vacy.1871 From this initial proposition, he embarks on an attempt to develop a pragmatic 
account. To the best my knowledge, the implications of this seemingly innocuous term 
have not been fully appreciated so far. The New Zealand Law Commission, for in-
stance, has categorised pragmatism as a theory of privacy.1872 This view is not shared 
here. To my eyes, invoking Wittgenstein only serves as a peg on which to hang a prag-
matist theory of law on. We have already noted that, according to Summers, ‘pragmatic 
instrumentalism’1873 is the only indigenous theory of law ever developed in the 
USA.1874 Like his predecessors, Solove draws decisive inspiration from the ideas of 
John Dewey and William James.1875 At this point, a cautionary word might be due 
though. These two philosophers already signed for the legal pragmatism of, for exam-
ple, Oliver Wendell Holmes (and therefore at least indirectly Prosser).1876 This influ-
ence was responsible for the rejection of fundamentals such as ‘right’ and ‘duty’ (re-
garded as unduly formalistic).1877 Solove invokes, for instance, Dewey by contending 
that ‘individual rights need not be justified as the immutable possessions of individuals; 
1871 Ibid, at p 1126. 
1872 Privacy: concepts and issues: review of the Law of Privacy part 1 (New Zealand Law Commission 
Study Paper; 19), para 2.32 (p 40). 
1873 There is no actual definition of these terms. ‘Pragmatic instrumentalism’ is Robert Summers’ label 
for a number of ideas about law ‘to which an influential group of early twentieth century American legal 
theorists subscribed’ – M S Moore, ‘In Need for a Theory of Legal Theories: Assessing Pragmatic In-
strumentalism’ (1984) 69 Cornell Law Review 988, 988-9. Unifying rationales of this line of thought in-
clude, for example, the ‘command theory’ and the observation of legal rules from an ‘external point of 
view.’ We have discussed those ideas during the examination of the American tort. For further details 
refer to Chapter Two, 2.3.1; 2.3.2.2; 2.3.2.3. 
1874 R S Summers, ‘Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century Legal Thought – A Synthesis and 
Critique of our Dominant Legal Theory about the Law and its Use’ (1980-81) 66 Cornell Law Review 
861, 862. 
1875 D J Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1127-8. 
1876 D Lyons, ‘Legal Formalism and Instrumentalism – A Pathological Study’ (1980-81) 66 Cornell Law 
Review 949, 949. Lyons explains the similarities between instrumentalism and positivism - at p 960. See 
also R S Summers, ‘Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century Legal Thought – A Synthesis and 
Critique of our Dominant Legal Theory about the Law and its Use’ (1980-81) 66 Cornell Law Review 
861, 869 and his ‘On Identifying and Reconstructing a General Legal Theory – Some Thoughts Prompted 
by Professor Moore's Critique’ (1984) 69 Cornell Law Review 1014, 1018-9. This is not to say that 
Holmes fully subscribed to the work of Dewey and James - see generally C S Dailey, ‘Holmes and the 
Romantic Mind’ (1998) 48 Duke Law Journal 429 for further details.   
1877 Ibid; R S Summers, ‘Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century Legal Thought – A Synthesis 
and Critique of our Dominant Legal Theory about the Law and its Use’ (1980-81) 66 Cornell Law Re-
view 861, 866. 
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instead, they are instrumental in light of “the contribution they make to the welfare of 
the community”.’1878 Suffice to reiterate that this philosophical framework led to a tort 
regime, which entirely focuses on the conduct of the defendant.1879 Its most widely ac-
cepted tenet was the ‘prediction theory’ of law based on externally observable behav-
iour.1880 Another unifying rationale of this line of thought is viewing law as a matter of 
exerting coercion or force on those who are subject to it.1881 We have discussed this 
point as ‘law as commands’ in the context of the current US tort.1882
 
Solove falls prey to the same fallacies with his eyes open, because he subscribes 
to a recent ‘renaissance of pragmatism’ in American legal thought.1883 The learned 
scholar regards a single overarching concept or grand theory of privacy as overly for-
malistic and even his perceived remedy sounds strangely familiar. Privacy protection, 
Solove counsels, means guarding ‘against disruptions to certain practices.’1884 The re-
sulting basic tenet of his taxonomy thus attempts ‘to shift focus away from the vague 
term “privacy” and toward the specific activities that pose privacy problems.’1885  
 
This approach, as Mark Hickford has very succinctly put it, is ‘rather odd’ be-
cause it presupposes privacy as something already existing.1886 Solove’s approach actu-
ally begs the question wherein the substantial difference to Prosser's approach lies. The 
point at issue is whether Solove indeed advances a new approach as he would us have 
believe. Although his contributions deserve the utmost respect, I should like to venture 
1878 D J Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 477, 489 
(emphasis supplied); see generally N M Richards, ‘The Information Privacy Law Project’ (2006) 94 
Georgetown Law Journal 1087, 1092. 
1879 See above Chapter Two, 2.3.2.2. 
1880 R S Summers, ‘Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century Legal Thought – A Synthesis and 
Critique of our Dominant Legal Theory about the Law and its Use’ (1980-81) 66 Cornell Law Review 
861, 872. 
1881 R S Summers, ‘On Identifying and Reconstructing a General Legal Theory – Some Thoughts 
Prompted by Professor Moore's Critique’ (1984) 69 Cornell Law Review 1014, 1019. 
1882 See above Chapter Two, 2.3.2.3. 
1883 Solove lists several other proponents - D J Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California 
Law Review 1087, 1091 fn 19, 1092 fn 20. 
1884 Ibid, at p 1129. 
1885 D J Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 477, 482 
(emphasis supplied); see also at p 485.  
1886 M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 paras 57, 60. See also A Bartow, ‘A 
Feeling of Unease about Privacy Law’ (2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 52, 52 – Bar-
tow, sensibly, questioned ‘the ultimate usefulness of the privacy framework that Solove has developed.’ 
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that his claim does not hold water. To be fair to Solove, he alludes to Prosser’s contri-
bution right at the beginning of his taxonomy; he criticises Prosser’s work, however, 
solely on the ground that it is exclusively concerned with tort law and therefore too nar-
row in focus whereas US privacy law is considerably vaster in scope.1887 Moreover, So-
love reproduces the popular assumption that Prosser’s ‘contribution was to synthesi[s]e 
the cases’ that emerged from Warren and Brandeis' law review article.1888 It has been 
argued here that this would vastly underestimate Prosser’s influence.1889 For our narrow 
purposes, it is important to observe that Solove utilises the same methods that we have 
already associated with Prosser's public disclosure tort. In the typical manner of the 
pragmatist, Solove merely identifies gaps in existing law,1890 but he naturally does not 
question the pragmatist’s legal methods. Regrettably, the scholar does not provide any 
hint as to why this ‘renaissance of pragmatism’ should provide more satisfactory results 
than the original legal pragmatism as embodied in Holmes’ work and Prosser’s tort.1891 
Without further elaboration on this point, one may doubt whether expanding the meth-
ods of a dysfunctional privacy tort regime to other areas of the law serves a useful pur-
pose. As we recollect, this tort is largely instrumental in ensuring an almost uninhibited 
liberty of the defendant, which protects freedom of speech and therefore the defendant’s 
interest. How, one may wonder, can an account focussing on the very same conduct of 
the defendant simultaneously ensure a meaningful protection of the plaintiff’s privacy 
interests? Moreover, it remains once more opaque how these countervailing external 
goals can be reconciled in practice.1892 Solove treats privacy at best as an additional 
‘external goal’1893 unrelated to, for instance, tort law itself. In his view, privacy prob-
1887 D J Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 477, 482-
83. For a similar critique see also A Bartow, ‘A Feeling of Unease about Privacy Law’ (2007) 155 Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review 52, 52. 
1888 Ibid, at p 483. 
1889 I understand that Solove has acknowledged Prosser’s influence recently - N M Richards and D J So-
love, ‘Privacy’s other Path: Recovering the law of Confidentiality’ (2007) 96 Georgetown Law Journal 
123, 148-51.  
1890 See generally D Lyons, ‘Legal Formalism and Instrumentalism – A Pathological Study’ (1980-81) 66 
Cornell Law Review 949, 949. 
1891 Oddly enough, Solove describes Prosser’s contribution as ‘far too out-of-date’ - ‘A Taxonomy of 
Privacy’ (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 477, 562. 
1892 See also the discussion concerned with the problem of coming to grips with ‘the nature of law’s goals 
and goal structures’ in R S Summers, ‘Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century Legal Thought – 
A Synthesis and Critique of our Dominant Legal Theory about the Law and its Use’ (1980-81) 66 Cornell 
Law Review 861, 883-5. 
1893 See generally R S Summers, ‘On Identifying and Reconstructing a General Legal Theory – Some 
Thoughts Prompted by Professor Moore's Critique’ (1984) 69 Cornell Law Review 1014, 1017. 
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lems are ultimately a matter of ‘social design’ rather than a problem of individualised 
injuries.1894 Prosser, as we recollect, thought that tort law was predominantly a matter 
of ‘social engineering’ rather than a problem of individualised injuries.1895 Thus, it is 
doubtful whether a substantial difference to Prosser’s views exists. The difference be-
tween both approaches, it seems reasonable to suggest, is semantic. As a result, the pre-
sent writer doubts that this is indeed a ‘harm-orientated’ approach.1896 Moreover, I also 
do not share Hickford's impression that Solove’s methodology lends itself to the induc-
tive common law method.1897 Quite the reverse, the fixation of the US courts on the de-
fendant’s conduct led in the relevant context to uncompromising deductive syllogisms. 
We have conveniently described this adjudication technique as formalistic.1898
 
While I am by no means unsympathetic to Solove’s work, it should be noted, in 
conclusion, that his account ultimately amounts to the picaresque attempt to proffer old 
wine in new bottles. Most importantly, this approach leads us away from a law exam-
ined from an ‘internal point of view’ towards a command based solution.1899 Therefore, 
I propose to reject Solove’s rejuvenated pragmatic instrumentalism. We will adamantly 
follow the ‘justice tradition’ instead. 
 
For the purposes of this analysis, it is convenient for us to pause here and reca-
pitulate that an overarching concept of privacy arguably does not exist; pragmatism as a 
legal theory, by contrast, should be rejected as a valid alternative. As we know, how-
ever, privacy interests had been recognised as a matter of respect for the human dignity 
and autonomy. As Tipping J pointed out: ‘[i]t is of the essence of the dignity and per-
sonal autonomy and wellbeing of all human beings that some aspects of their private 
1894 N M Richards, ‘The Information Privacy Law Project’ (2006) 94 Georgetown Law Journal 1087, 
1096. 
1895 W L Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941) 17 as cited by C P Goldberg, ‘The Constitutional 
Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs’ (2005) 115 Yale Law 
Journal 524, 582. 
1896 Compare M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 para 53. 
1897 Compare ibid, para 56. 
1898 See above Chapter Two, 2.3.1. 
1899 For a recent rejection of sanction-based legal theories see also S J Shapiro, ‘What is the Internal Point 
of View?’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1157, 1170. 
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lives should be able to remain private if they wish so.’1900 Burrows has cautioned, sen-
sibly, that dignity alone is too broad a concept to be the only rationale of granting a pri-
vacy remedy.1901 Likewise, one scholar has observed that the concept promotes a hu-
mane and civilized life; ‘[t]he protection of human dignity allows a broader scope of 
action against treating people in intrusive ways.’1902 As a result, it has been persuasively 
argued that certain violations of dignity and autonomy do not involve losses of pri-
vacy.1903  
 
However, these concepts merely illustrate the reason for protecting privacy. 
They also signify the basis of a broader concept of individual liberalism as embodied in 
the NZBoRA or HRA. Similarly, claims to retain privacy are sometimes regarded as 
general claims to liberty.1904 We have modified Anderson J’s terminology and de-
scribed human dignity as the last trench in the protection of individual liberty.1905 As 
Lord Walker put it, it is ‘the high principle’1906 or, as Jonathan Kahn suggests, the 
‘normative end of the continuum’1907 in this context. Its protection should nevertheless 
not be equated with a concept of privacy.1908 According to Kahn: ‘[w]hereas dignity 
broadly implicates a consideration of the inherent value of human beings, privacy in-
volves the more focused right to protect the conditions necessary to individuation.’1909
 
1900 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 239. See also Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 50 per 
Lord Hoffmann; Associated Newspapers Ltd v HRH the Prince of Wales [2007] 3 WLR 222 (CA) para 
119 per Blackburne J. See also E Volokh, ‘Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking about You’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1049, 
1112 who identifies human dignity as the strongest argument to regulate some forms of personal informa-
tion. 
1901 J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 
390. 
1902 L E Rothstein, ‘Privacy or Dignity? Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace’ (2000) 19 New York 
Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 379, 383; see also E J Eberle, ‘Human Dig-
nity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American Constitutional Law’ [1997] Utah Law Review 
963, 1007. 
1903 R Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 421, 438. 
1904 D Mead, ‘It’s a Funny Old Game - Privacy, Football and the Public Interest’ [2006] European Hu-
man Rights Law Review 541, 546; M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 para 
171. See too Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 12 per Lord Nicholls. 
1905 See above Chapter Two, 1.2.2. 
1906 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2007] 2 WLR 920 (HL) para 275. 
1907 J Kahn, ‘Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance’ (2003) 33 Seton Hall Law Review 371, 
381. 
1908 See, eg, D Feldman, ‘Human Dignity as a Legal Value: Part 1’ [1999] Public Law 682, 690.  
1909 J Kahn, ‘Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance’ (2003) 33 Seton Hall Law Review 371, 
378. 
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Solove has very helpfully pointed out that human dignity and personal auton-
omy are not independent of other theories. As an underlying rationale, these concepts 
can therefore be used in conjunction with more specific concepts of privacy.1910 Hence, 
to argue that privacy is ‘not a tidy concept’1911 seems too negative. Instead, it could be 
argued that different concepts work best in different contexts.1912 In that case, however, 
it is suggested to regard these concepts not as external and therefore detached from the 
legal protection of privacy. Instead, they should have an impact on the law itself. The 
‘formalistic’ basis of the privacy interest can nevertheless be maintained; it also clari-
fies that we deal with an individualised injury caused by a particular conduct of the de-
fendant - not with privacy as an external goal pursued as a matter of social engineering 
or design. Consequently, I consider next which concept fits the needs for present pur-
poses. Furthermore, it will be discussed whether ‘identification’ of the plaintiff is nec-
essary for making out the action.1913 The reason why these two issues should be dis-
cussed together is that the problem concerned with ‘identification’ does not seem to 
have a legal profile. This issue is rather related either to a certain privacy concept or to 
the ‘publicity’ requirement.1914
2.3.3 The appropriate concept of privacy  
Apart from a tort protecting against the dissemination of personal information, 
an intrusion tort is most likely to occur as a distinct common law rule. The remaining 
two branches of the US privacy tort, in contrast, are unrelated to privacy interests in a 
strict sense.1915 Thus, it should be noted at the outset that I do not comprehend what 
judges and scholars mean when they refer to a ‘general tort of privacy.’1916 Intrusion 
and dissemination represent two distinct ‘wrongs’ in my view. As causes of action, they 
1910 D J Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1116. See too Pri-
vacy: concepts and issues: review of the Law of Privacy part 1 (New Zealand Law Commission Study 
Paper; 19), para 2.23. (p 37). 
1911 This argument has been raised by J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] 
New Zealand Law Review 389, 408. 
1912 D J Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1147. 
1913 This issue is still open to debate in New Zealand - J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in 
New Zealand (4th ed, 2005), para 18.07.05; see too his ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ 
[2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 410. 
1914 Evans, for instance has noted that an initial ‘reasonable expectation’ test arguably does not solve the 
issue - ‘Was Privacy the Winner of the Day’ [2004] New Zealand Law Journal 181, 184. 
1915 J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.4.01 at p 751 
1916 Eg, Wainwright v Home Office [2003] 4 All ER 969 (HL) para 27 per Lord Hoffmann. 
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ideally may be traced to the infringement of a common law right to privacy. Both 
aforementioned actions also seem to accord with Hickford’s categories of ‘local pri-
vacy’ and ‘informational privacy.’1917 As we will see in due course, each ‘wrong’ also 
requires distinguishable forms of conduct by the defendant. New Zealand’s private facts 
tort was acknowledged in Hosking - a case which may also be interpreted as an intru-
sion case because the disputed photographs were taken surreptitiously.1918 The query 
about the appropriate concept for present purposes may therefore be confined to the dis-
tinction between both torts. Subsequently, we follow Weinrib’s notion of an inherent 
ordering of the tort, that is to say that a particular ‘wrong’ done to the plaintiff should 
be inseparably linked to a particular form of conduct.1919 The result constitutes a single 
whole rather than tort comprised of independent elements. 
 
One scholar described the US intrusion tort as protecting an ‘ideal sphere 
[which] lies around every human being;’ this sphere ‘cannot be penetrated, unless the 
personality value of the individual is thereby destroyed.’1920 The disclosure tort, in con-
trast, regulates the communication of personal information to others rather than physical 
behaviour (such as eavesdropping etcetera); the requirement of communicating infor-
mation to other people has no analogue in the US intrusion tort.1921 It is, however, the 
communicative element, which causes the conflict between freedom of speech and pri-
1917 M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 paras 165.2, 165.3. 
1918 See P and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005), para 13.16.13. 
Counsel for the claimant in Campbell, for instance, conceded basing the claim not on the intrusive taking 
of the photographs at issue – Campbell [2003] 1 All ER 224 (CA) para 31. See also A Sims, ‘”A Shift in 
the Gravity Centre”: The dangers of Protecting Privacy through Breach of Confidence’ [2005] Intellec-
tual Property Quarterly 27, 43-4. 
1919 E J Weinrib, ‘Understanding Tort Law’ (1989) 23 Valparaiso University Law Review 485, 511; see 
also his ‘Causation and Wrongdoing’ (1987) 63 Chicago Kent Law Review 407, 410 
1920 R C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 
77 California Law Review 957, 971. 
1921 Shulman v Group W Prod Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200, 231 (1998); Taus v Loftus, 40 Cal 4th 683, 725 (2007); 
R C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 77 
California Law Review 957, 978; R L Rabin, ‘Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on Re-
covery for Intangible Loss’ (2006) 55 De Paul Law Review 359, 367; J Siprut, ‘Privacy Through Ano-
nymity: An Economic Argument for Expanding the Right of Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 33 Pepper-
dine Law Review 311, 317; Note ‘In the Face of Danger: Facial Recognition and the Limits of Privacy 
Law’ (2007) 120 Harvard Law Review 1870, 1876. 
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vacy.1922 Although both actions are frequently related,1923 they should be distinguished 
from the very beginning.1924  
 
The only New Zealand judgment determining ‘private facts’ (as the initial test 
was called at that time) by adopting a concept of privacy was L v G1925. Coincidentally, 
this case is also formidably suited for the illustration of the aforementioned distinction. 
Despite the defendant’s submission that the genitals of a sex worker could not be a pri-
vate fact per se, Abbott J found the test to be satisfied. His Honour opined that this was 
an untenable argument, because the sex worker did not display his or her genitals to 
everyone. Only clients had access to them in return for payment and they consequently 
remained private for the purposes of the tort.1926 The Judge’s argument states as fol-
lows:  
 
[…] privacy is seen by the community as a value which is peculiarly personal, in the sense that 
it reinforces a “psychological need to preserve an intrusion-free zone of personality and family”, 
with the consequence that “there is always anguish and stress when that zone is violated” 
[…].1927  
 
This is by no means an exotic way of thinking about privacy, particularly the 
notion of privacy as a ‘zone’ makes appearances in English and European cases.1928 
According to the concept adopted by Abbott J, special emphasis seems to lie on an ‘in-
trusion-free zone’ of every human being (and therefore every plaintiff), which is pro-
tected by a ’personal shield of privacy.’ Its violation by the defendant is supposed to 
cause anguish and stress. In brief, the defendant’s conduct is the cause of a particular 
harm done to the plaintiff. We have already noted that the application of arguably any 
1922 J Morgan, ‘Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: “Hello” Trouble’ (2003) 62(2) Cambridge 
Law Journal 444, 445. 
1923 D M Worley, ‘Shulman v Group W Productions: Invasion of Privacy by Publication of Private Facts - 
Where Does California Draw the Line Between Newsworthy Information and Morbid Curiosity’ (1999-
2000) 27 Western State University Law Review 535, 566; D J Solove, ‘The Virtues Of Knowing Less: 
Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure’ (2003) 53 Duke Law Journal 967, 1017. 
1924 J Morgan, ‘Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: “Hello” Trouble’ (2003) 62(2) Cambridge 
Law Journal 444, 445. 
1925 [2002] NZAR 495. 
1926 Ibid, at p 509. 
1927 Ibid, at p 507-8 (emphasis added; internal citation omitted). 
1928 Eg, McKennitt [2006] EMLR 178 (QB) para 50 per Eady J; von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 
ECHRR 1 para 50; P Gewirtz, ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Review 139, 154-5. 
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advanced concept of privacy requires recognising both aforementioned aspects – the 
relationship at least between both litigants has to be of momentous significance.1929 In-
herent in Abbott J’s proposition is also a causation element, which links doer and suf-
ferer of harm. A tort regime focusing, by contrast, entirely on the defendant’s conduct 
omits these factors and is rather unlikely to lead very far. These aspects of his Honour’s 
judgement are, thus, to be welcomed. 
 
We must nonetheless clarify whether the specific ‘wrong’ brought about by the 
particular form of conduct is appropriate for present purposes. It is plain from Abbott 
J’s suggestion that the actionable ‘wrong’ is already committed by violating the per-
sonal shield protecting an intrusion-free zone.1930 Another act of the defendant (such as 
the dissemination of the acquired information) is therefore not the decisive factor for an 
interference with the plaintiff’s privacy interests. Instead, his Honour seems to para-
phrase the penetration of the ideal sphere lying around every human being, which we 
have associated with the US intrusion tort. The chosen concept in turn explains perhaps 
the most puzzling aspect of his Honour’s judgment. According to the Judge’s sugges-
tion, identification of the plaintiff was unnecessary.1931 This was because the interests 
protected by the tort did not relate  
 
to issues of perception and identification by those members of the public whom the information 
is disclosed but to the loss of the personal shield of privacy of the person to whom the informa-
tion relates. The “loss” seems to be after all sufficient for a successful claim; it is in any case un-
important if others learned which individual had to suffer this particular loss.1932
 
The present writer shares Katrine Evans’ view that the answer to the identifica-
tion issue depends on one’s perception of what privacy actually entails.1933 In L v G, 
identification of the plaintiff did not contribute to the harm done by losing a shield of 
privacy. And, that said, if the communication of information is not a decisive factor, 
1929 See above Chapter Two, 2.3.2.3. 
1930 See also K Evans, ‘Of Privacy and Prostitutes’ (2002) 20 New Zealand University Law Review 71, 
91-2. In Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 75, Lord Hoffmann seems to indicate that the intrusion 
into a private place constitutes a distinguishable actionable ‘wrong.’ 
1931 See also Graham v Central Pacific Finance Ltd [2001] DCR 531 paras 17, 18.  
1932 [2002] NZAR 495, 508 (emphasis provided). 
1933 K Evans, ‘Of Privacy and Prostitutes’ (2002) 20 New Zealand University Law Review 71, 75. 
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this is consequent.1934 As Evans pointed out, identification is ‘inherent in the idea of 
divulging private information.’1935 However, given that a communicative act does not 
contribute to an actionable wrong, it is difficult to see why any form of dissemination is 
necessary for making out the cause of action.1936 In the context of the ‘publicity’ ele-
ment of the US public disclosure tort, I have agreed with Weinrib’s proposition that 
once the plaintiff’s suffering is inseparably linked to the conduct of the defendant, the 
cause of action is not divisible into independent components. The aspects of the remedy 
rather constitute a single whole.1937 This is not the case here. Rather, the dissemination 
element (the defendant’s conduct) is unrelated to the wrong and, thus, a divisible inde-
pendent component of the remedy. It is suggested that the appropriate concept for pre-
sent purposes should recognise the communication element as contributing to the ac-
tionable wrong rather than emphasising the information gathering.1938 In sum, Abbott 
J’s concept of privacy is most suitable for a distinct intrusion tort. 
 
But what is the appropriate concept for a tort concerned with the dissemination 
of personal information?1939 In this context, concepts chiefly devoted to the notions of 
either ‘access’ or ‘control’ dominate the discussion.1940 Nicole Moreham, for example, 
favours the access-rationale and disagrees with the notion of privacy as a matter of 
‘controlling’ private information.1941 According to her critique, a person can already 
lose control over personal information without it actually being accessed; theories based 
1934 See U J Cheer, ‘The Future of Privacy – Recent Legal Developments in New Zealand’ (2007) 13 
Canterbury Law Review 169, 178. 
1935 K Evans, ‘Of Privacy and Prostitutes’ (2002) 20 New Zealand University Law Review 71, 73; see too 
U J Cheer, ‘The Future of Privacy – Recent Legal Developments in New Zealand’ (2007) 13 Canterbury 
Law Review 169, 178 and M Waterfield, ‘Now You See It, Now You Don't: the Case for a Tort of In-
fringement of Privacy in New Zealand’ (2004) 10 Canterbury Law Review 182, 209. 
1936 See also D J Solove, ‘The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections against Disclo-
sure’ (2003) 53 Duke Law Journal 967, 1016-7. 
1937 E J Weinrib, ‘Understanding Tort Law’ (1989) 23 Valparaiso University Law Review 485, 511; see 
also his ‘Causation and Wrongdoing’ (1987) 63 Chicago Kent Law Review 407, 410 and C R Sunstein, 
‘On Analogical Reasoning’ (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 741, 789. 
1938 See also J F Burrows in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005) para 18.07.04 at 
p 770. 
1939 This particular aspect is usually addressed as ‘informational privacy.’ Anita Allen defines the term as 
‘confidentiality, secrecy, data protection, and control over personal information’ - ‘Coercing Privacy’ 
(1999) 40 William and Mary Law Review 723.  
1940 Both concepts are also sometimes combined - M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ 
NZLC MP19 para 4.3. 
1941 N A Moreham, ‘Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 121 Law 
Quarterly Review 628, 638, 640. 
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on control are said to inadequately distinguish between the risk of being accessed and 
the interference itself.1942 It should be noted, however, that Moreham has developed a 
general external concept as opposed to a concept focusing on a particular tort-law 
wrong. With regard to a tort requiring dissemination of information, the defendant has 
already accessed information and either has or is about to communicate it to others. The 
problem of distinguishing between the risk of being accessed and the access itself is, 
then, academic. Furthermore, Moreham contends that a person cannot maintain control 
over information unless one refrains from disclosing it to anyone.1943 The learned 
scholar nevertheless suggests, sensibly, that this problem is avoided ‘if control is seen 
as a means of bringing privacy about rather than as privacy itself.’1944 I agree, but this is 
precisely the point of applying a specific concept of privacy as a means to determine 
tort liability as opposed to a general external concept.1945 As I translate the terms into 
German, access and accessibility also lend themselves more easily to the acquisition of 
information rather than their dissemination. Similar to Abbott J’s suggestion in L v G, 
the focus on access seems more appropriate for a distinct intrusion tort.1946  
 
It crystallises out of the previous discussion that a concept focusing on ‘control’ 
is most appropriate for present purposes. Such an approach has already received atten-
tion by some English courts.1947 To bring the control over personal information into fo-
cus also accords with Wacks’ subdivided initial limb of the tort, particularly with the 
second sub-test requiring the plaintiff to show a ‘reasonable expectation concerning its 
use.’ This appears to imply that an individual can (or ought to) exert control over the 
dissemination of such information under certain circumstances. In other words, the 
maintenance of control over private information (the plaintiff’s interest) is ‘wronged’ 
1942 Ibid, at p 638. 
1943 Ibid. 
1944 N A Moreham, ‘Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 121 Law 
Quarterly Review 628, 639; see also M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 para 
150. 
1945 See also M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 para 150. 
1946 Virtually all examples provided in her account are concerned with the acquisition of information – 
see eg, ibid at p 640 (although Moreham claims that informational access also encompasses storage and 
dissemination); see also her definition of ‘access’ in N A Moreham, ‘Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 
65(3) Cambridge Law Journal 606, 617. 
1947 Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) para 51 per Lord Hoffmann; HRH Prince of Wales v Associated 
Newspapers Ltd  [2008] EMLR 66 (Ch) para 119 per Blackburne J; see particularly Green Corns Ltd v 
Claverley Group Ltd [2005] EMLR 31 (QB) para 53 per Tugendhat J. 
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by dissemination (the defendant’s conduct). The result would be an inherently ordered 
tort, in which harm and conduct are inseparably linked. I suggest, in conclusion, adopt-
ing a control-based concept of privacy in the context of disseminating certain types of 
information whereas Moreham’s rationale based on access might be a major candidate 
in the context of a possible intrusion tort. This means consequently that the notion of 
privacy as ‘control over access’ should be rejected for practical purposes.1948
 
Wacks nevertheless maintains that both sub-tests are important in determining 
prima facie actionable ‘personal information.’1949 How, then, could the quality of the 
information (the initial part of the tort’s subdivided initial test) be identified as per-
sonal? A precise definition will be difficult to ascertain,1950 but it is common ground 
that analogy to statute may influence the development of the common law.1951 Accord-
ing to Keith J, the ‘statutory context [can] help [to] resolve questions about whether li-
ability in tort is to be recognised or imposed.’1952 For England and Wales, an analogy to 
the Data Protection Act 19981953 springs to mind. Section 6 of the Act defines ‘sensitive 
information’ as information relating to a person’s physical or mental health or condi-
tion, sexual life, and the commission or alleged commission by him of any offence. We 
may infer from this definition that these types of information are roughly identical with 
‘clearly private’ and ‘obviously private’ information; they are mostly also in line with 
the ‘privacy paradigm.’ Nevertheless, this definition would not help much since it has 
been argued that a definition must be broad enough to encompass information that is 
not ‘inherently private.’ 
 
Article 2(a) of the Data Protection Directive of the European Union 19951954 
provides a broader definition. It circumscribes personal data as ‘any information relat-
1948 For such a view see M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 para 122. 
1949 R Wacks ‘Why there will never be an English common law privacy tort’ in M Richardson and A T 
Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 154, 179-80. 
1950 M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 para 5. 
1951 South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd; 
Mortensen v Liang [1992] 2 NZLR 292, 298 (xiii) per Cooke P for further references; see also Hosking 
[2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 6 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
1952 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) para 177. 
1953 See particularly Green Corns Ltd v Claverley Group Ltd [2005] EMLR 31 (QB) para 62 per Tugend-
hat J. 
1954 Directive 95/46EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995. 
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ing to an identified or identifiable natural person.’1955 Likewise, s 2 of the Privacy Act 
1993 (NZ) defines personal information as ‘information about an identifiable individ-
ual;’ the term ‘individual’ is in turn defined as ‘a natural person, other than a deceased 
natural person.’ Murphy has proposed a similar concept, which contends that an indi-
vidual can control the dissemination of ‘any data about an individual that is identifiable 
to that individual.’1956 It has to be stressed that the identifiable individual has to be the 
plaintiff herself. Lord Phillips MR has suggested that ‘private information [...] must in-
clude information that is personal to the person who possesses it and that he does not 
intend will be imparted to the general public.’1957  
 
Solove has criticised this definition as too broad because ‘there is a significant 
amount of information identifiable to us that we do not deem as private.’1958 This, how-
ever, is unpersuasive. For the purposes of this analysis, we apply this definition to the 
law. One would assume that there simply would be no plaintiff for a privacy tort if 
someone does not deem information to be private. Furthermore, such a formula is nec-
essarily followed by an additional ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test in order to 
determine (prima facie) actionable personal information. To my mind, a meaningful 
limitation of the plaintiff’s interest is thereby achieved. 
2.3.4 Benefits of applying the concept   
The benefits of applying such a definition are nevertheless quickly enumerated. 
The context sensibility of the law defies a more elaborated definition, which is also re-
flected in the well-known limited success of legislative efforts in this area. The reason-
able expectation concerning the use of personal information is therefore of central im-
portance. Two modest points can be made, however. 
 
1955 The British transposition into national law (s 1 Data Protection Act 1998) reads as follows: personal 
data means data which relate to a living individual who can be identified – (a) from those data, or (b) 
from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the posses-
sion of, the data controller.  
1956 R S Murphy, ‘Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy’ (1996) 84 
Georgetown Law Journal 2381, 2383-4. 
1957 Douglas v Hello! (No 3) [2006] QB 125 para 83. 
1958 D J Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1111-2; M Hickford, 
‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 para 6. See also Harder v Proceedings Commissioner 
[2000] 3 NZLR 80 (CA) paras 23, 24 per Tipping J. 
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Firstly, personal information should be concerned with the individual plaintiff; a 
privacy claim should not be just the echo of someone else’s music. Gavison refers to 
this problem as a part of the ‘relationship between an individual and pieces of informa-
tion.’1959 She points out that plaintiffs occasionally allege breaches of privacy while the 
disputed information effectively relates to their wife, husband, parents or children.1960 
She explains that this so-called ‘extension of self’ phenomenon stems from the fact that 
these plaintiffs have chosen their spouses which makes the spouse ‘part’ of their private 
life.1961 The privacy interests of the plaintiff may not be affected, but the choice of the 
spouse reflects on him or her and may therefore provoke legal action. Where no such 
choice is involved, for example, where privacy interests of the plaintiff's child are at 
stake, Gavison argues that the ‘extension of self’ is ‘based on a feeling of responsibility 
for or identification with the other person.’1962  
 
The plaintiff in Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd might have felt responsibility or 
identification in the aforementioned sense. The facts which were about to be disclosed 
did not relate to Mr Bradley as an individual, but to deceased family members including 
his son.1963 This would not be ‘personal information’ for the purposes of a privacy tort. 
Neazor J was therefore right to indicate that the information had to be about the plain-
tiff.1964 Moreover, the plaintiff was neither identified nor identifiable in that case. In 
Hosking, on the other hand, the Court of Appeal implicitly solved the ‘extension of self’ 
problem differently. The plaintiffs claimed that their children's privacy was about to be 
invaded.1965 The Hoskings seemed to have acted with a mixture of ‘responsibility and 
identification,’ because they alleged that their children could be kidnapped if the defen-
1959 R Gavison, ’Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Review 421, 431. 
1960 Ibid, fn 31. B C Murchison points out that, for instance, the disputed information in Cox Broadcast-
ing Corp v Cohn related the plaintiff’s deceased daughter - ‘Revisiting the American action for public 
disclosure of private facts’ in M Richardson and A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy 
Law(2006) 32, 45. 
1961 R Gavison, ’Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Review 421, 431 fn 32. 
1962 Ibid. 
1963 Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd 24 IPR 205, 211 per Neazor J. 
1964 Ibid, at pp 210-1. 
1965 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 para 13 (CA) per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
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dant was allowed to disclose certain information about them.1966 That would also not be 
‘personal information’ for the purposes of a privacy tort.1967
 
Secondly, the reach of the tort is confined to natural persons; companies are 
therefore not protected even if financial information would be at issue.1968 The same 
holds true for claims which are effectively brought on behalf of a deceased natural per-
son. In this context, it seems not even necessary to draw an analogy to statute. In fact, 
one of the oldest English common law rules is actio personalis moritur cum persona. In 
the context of defamation law, this ‘rule was an instantiation of the more general com-
mon law maxim holding that the death of a tort victim barred any action for the 
tort.’1969 With regard to the protection of the privacy interest, the decisive question 
would thus not be whether a deceased dead person is vested with a right of privacy. In-
stead, it would be more important to ask whether the corresponding cause of action has 
to be classified as ‘actio personalis.’ If so, it dies with the person and any action for the 
tort is barred.  
1966 Ibid, para 124. 
1967 For a preferable solution see Murray [2007] EMLR 583 (Ch) paras 1, 7 per Patten J. 
1968 This issue is also subject to debate in New Zealand – see J F Burrows, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosk-
ing and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389, 409. 
1969 B C Zipursky, ‘Ten Half-Truths about Tort Law’ (2008) 42 Valparaiso Law Review 1221, 1230. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
 
This analysis has sought to portray the protection of personal information as an 
aspect of privacy in three legal systems. The relevant law of the UK and the USA is 
strikingly different. After extensive consideration, however, it is at least possible to 
identify basic sets of coordinates or a frame of reference in both jurisdictions according 
to which the law develops. The New Zealand law, in contrast, remained to some extent 
obscure to this writer. That, however, is perhaps partly due the fact that there is no in-
digenous concept identifiable. Instead, the law seems to be torn between the approaches 
taken in the UK and the USA.  
 
Privacy is a notoriously broad concept and a meaningful protection almost nec-
essarily requires a systematic approach. In this respect, two methods of systematisation 
seem conceivable: statute or a close connection of the common law tort to the 
NZBoRA. An orthodox development of the common law does not seem to be an option, 
however. To my mind, the chief problem of the common law in this area is the reluc-
tance to endorse and protect two interests (such as reputation and freedom of speech or 
privacy and freedom of speech) at the same time. The law seems to aim at a harmoni-
ous cohabitation of these interests, that is to say that judges seem to avoid a direct con-
flict of countervailing interests if possible. Furthermore, the situation has become more 
intricate because the courts now consider English cases alongside US authorities. It 
might at least be doubtful whether these sources can be combined meaningfully in this 
particular context. Given that a combination would be possible, it seems as if the num-
ber of cases occurring in New Zealand does not suffice to ensure a consistent develop-
ment of the tort. In sum, the courts should not be left alone with the development of the 
privacy tort. 
 
At first sight, the constitutionalisation of the tort may also be crossed out as a 
viable way of developing the law or so it seems. The standing and appreciation of the 
Act within the legal system appears much too weak as to provide a meaningful frame-
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work for the tort. This has, in my view, nothing to do with the fact that the Act has not 
been entrenched as supreme law. At least from the perspective of an outside observer, it 
might sometimes seem as if it is not even treated as having the rank of an Act of Par-
liament. Only references to s 14 are consistently repeated.  
 
It would appear that legislative action is inevitable. The New Zealand Law 
Commission recently entered into a process of approaching privacy conceptually. Mark 
Hickford has managed to provide ‘a star to navigate by’1970 and that is, I think, what is 
most needed. The legal recognition of privacy does raise questions concerned with the 
reconciliation of individual and societal interests. It also does invite discussions con-
cerned with positive and negative liberty or the equality of freedom. These are largely 
matters of political and constitutional theory. The work of the Law Commission is, of 
course, not to be criticised; it has so far presented the most rigorous and penetrating ac-
count of all Law Commissions including recent suggestions from Hong Kong and Aus-
tralia. However, given that only a tiny fraction of these thoughtful contributions would 
have been made in the context of the NZBoRA, a lot of ink could be spared in the con-
text of approaching privacy.1971 English law is instructive in this respect. As I have 
sought to show, it is capable of dealing with most, if not all, problematic areas to which 
the Law Commission has rightfully drawn attention. 
 
The number of unsuccessful attempts to provide a workable statutory basis for 
such a tort is often stressed. One of the most important reasons might be that privacy is 
an individual interest, which has to be reconciled with the rights of others and society as 
a whole. The conflict between privacy and freedom of speech will pose a moral di-
lemma in many cases, which means that distributive justice will be a key element in this 
area of the law. Given the moderate performance of the highly offensive to a reasonable 
person test, a strong case for the ‘constitutionalisation’ of the common law tort exists. 
In my view, the connection of the common law to an overarching framework represent-
ing the shared values of a society provides the most compelling answer to the problem. 
1970 M Hickford, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ NZLC MP19 para 1. 
1971 See also U J Cheer, ‘The Future of Privacy – Recent Legal Developments in New Zealand’ (2007) 13 
Canterbury Law Review 169, 170. 
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Whether privacy is among those values in New Zealand cannot be answered. If so, the 
law should be prepared to protect it as a right. In my ideal solution, the only desirable 
legislative act would be an amendment of the NZBoRA to include a right to privacy. An 
ideal tort would be a constitutionalised common law tort of privacy, which would entail 
the steps set out in the following paragraphs. 
 
Parliament should amend the NZBoRA to include a right to privacy (a quasi-
constitutional right to privacy). As an autonomous source of law, a common law right to 
privacy should be recognised. The quasi-constitutional right of privacy should be ac-
knowledged as providing the democratic underpinning for the common law right to pri-
vacy. 
 
The infringement of the common law right of privacy should give rise to a cause 
of action. The reach of the cause of action should be limited to a specific ‘civil wrong,’ 
which was caused by a specific conduct of the defendant. In other words, this cause of 
action should cover just one aspect of privacy, that is, the dissemination of personal or 
private information. The appropriate concept of privacy should be based on control. By 
applying the elements of the cause of action, the court should determine whether the 
circumstances of the infringement are as such that the plaintiff should be left to a rem-
edy. The plaintiff should have a right if and only to the extent that she could hold the 
defendant under an obligation not to disseminate the information identified as private. 
 
The cause of action itself should be ‘constitutionalised’ due to the horizontal ap-
plication of freedom of speech as affirmed in s 14 and the amended right of privacy. 
The horizontal effect should be indirect, that is to say that the rights contained in the 
NZBoRA do not directly bind private actors. Instead, they are turned against the court. 
These rights should operate in the horizontal sphere between two private individuals in 
essentially the same manner as they would operate in their vertical dimension between 
state and individual. Consequently, they should be conceptualised as principles confer-
ring an ‘ideal ought.’ As optimisation requirements, they have to be realised to the 
greatest extent possible, which should be ensured by means of a proportionality balanc-
ing exercise. As for the adjudication technique, normative and inductive reasoning on a 
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principled basis would be required. The cause of action would be comprised of the fol-
lowing elements: 
 
•  personal information in respect of which there is reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy 
• (optionally) the defendant must have known or ought to have known that the 
claimant had such a reasonable expectation; 
• a proportionality balancing exercise. 
 
In the perhaps more realistic event of creating a statutory tort, it is suggested to 
consult also tort specialists. The Law Commissions of other countries seem to regard 
the problems involved largely from the privacy side. Privacy may be a newly protected 
interest, but it is nevertheless a tort like any other. Whatever the outcome will be, the 
Law Commission has made impressive first steps towards a meaningful protection of 
privacy. At the end of the day, the protection of privacy and freedom of speech may not 
be as problematic as the initial dialogue between Winston and Sir Geoffrey may have 
suggested. It is not all about conflict; both interests are also frequently interrelated and 
depend on one another. On a closer second look, Winston Smith and Sir Geoffrey 
Winston Palmer may have more in common than they probably think. 
 
  338  
TABLE OF REFERENCES 
 
 
Table of Legislation 
 
 
New Zealand 
 
Crimes Act 1961. 
 
Defamation Act 1992. 
 
Interpretation Act 1999. 
 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.  
 
Privacy Act 1993. 
 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Human Rights Act 1998. 
 
Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
 
United States of America 
 
Constitution of California. 
 
Florida Statute § 794 (1987). 
 
United States Constitution 
 
 
Supranational and other countries 
 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 
1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953). 
 
Data Protection Directive of the European Union 1995 (Directive 95/46EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 24 October 1995). 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (entry into force 23 March 1976). 
 
 
 
Table of cases 
 
Australia 
 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty (2001) 185 ALR 1 (HCA). 
  339  
 
Green v Re (1996-97) 191 CLR 334 (HCA). 
 
Masciantonio v Re (1995) 183 CLR 58 (HCA). 
 
Stingel v Re (1990) 97 ALR 1 (HCA). 
 
Canada 
 
Hill v Church of Scientology Toronto [1995] 2 SCR 1130. 
 
Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp (1994) 120 DLR (4th) 12. 
 
Law v Canada [1999] 1 SCR 497. 
 
Re v Hill [1986] 1 SCR 313. 
 
RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery [1986] 2 SCR 573. 
 
Somwar v McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Ltd 263 DLR (4th) 752. 
 
Shred-Tech Corp v Viveen [2006] OJ No 4893. 
 
 
Europe 
 
Earl Spencer v United Kingdom (1998) 25 EHRR CD 105. 
 
Halford v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 523. 
 
Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 13 BHRC 669. 
 
PG & JH v United Kingdom 2001-IX Eur Ct HR 546. 
 
Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245. 
 
von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1. 
 
 
Germany 
 
BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958) (“Lüth”). 
 
BVerfGE 7, 15-6 (1954) (“Investment Aid”). 
 
BVerfGE 93, 266, 296 (1995) (“Soldiers are Murderers II”). 
 
 
New Zealand 
 
Andrews v TVNZ Ltd High Court Auckland, CIV 2004 -404-3536 (unreported, 15 December 2006, Allan 
J). 
 
Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 415. 
 
Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC). 
  340  
 
Brash v Jane and John Doe HC Wellington, CIV-2006-485-2605 (unreported, 16 November 2006 
MacKenzie J). 
 
Brown v Attorney-General [2006] DCR 630. 
 
Duff v Communicado [1996] 2 NZLR 89 (HC). 
 
Graham v Central Pacific Finance Ltd [2001] DCR 513. 
 
Hansen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC). 
 
Harder v Proceedings Commissioner [2000] 3 NZLR 80 (CA). 
 
Hosking v Runting [2003] 3 NZLR 385 (HC). 
 
Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA). 
 
Lange v Atkinson [1997] 2 NZLR 22 (HC). 
 
Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424 (CA). 
 
Lai v Chamberlains [2006] NZSC 70. 
 
L v G [2002] NZAR 495 (DC). 
 
Mafart v TVNZ Ltd [2006] 3 NZLR 534 (CA). 
 
Ministry of Transport v Noort; Police v Curren [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA). 
 
Moonen v Film & Literature Board of Reviews (No 1) [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA). 
 
Moonen v Film & Literature Board of Reviews (No 2) [2002] 2 NZLR 754 (CA). 
 
P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 (HC). 
 
South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd; 
Mortensen v Liang [1992] 2 NZLR 292 (CA). 
 
Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA). 
 
R v Jeffries [1994] 1 NZLR 290 (CA). 
 
R v N (No 2) (1999) 5 HRNZ 72 (CA). 
 
R v Rongonui [2000] 2 NZLR 385 (CA). 
 
Rogers v TVNZ Ltd (2005) 22 CRNZ 668 (HC). 
 
Rogers v TVNZ Ltd [2007] NZSC 91. 
 
Rolls Royce New Zealand Ltd v Carter Holt Harvey Ltd [2005] 1 NZLR 324 (CA). 
 
Solicitor General v Radio New Zealand [1994] 1 NZLR 48 (HC). 
 
Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716. 
 
TVNZ Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 1 (CA). 
  341  
 
TVNZ Ltd v Quinn [1996] 3 NZLR 24 (CA). 
 
 
United Kingdom 
 
A v B plc [2002] 2 All ER 545 (CA). 
 
Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728 (HL). 
 
Associated Newspapers Ltd v His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales [2007] 3 WLR 222 (CA). 
 
Associated Newspapers Ltd v His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales [2006] EWCA Civ 1776. 
 
Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2001] 3 WLR (CA). 
 
Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109.   
 
Attorney General for Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23. 
 
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2003] 1 All ER 224 (CA). 
 
Campbell v MGM Ltd [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL). 
 
CC v AB [2007] EMLR 11 (QBD). 
 
Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1968] FSR 415. 
 
Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office [1970] 2 All ER 294 (CA) 
 
Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No1) [2001] 2 All ER 289 (CA). 
 
Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2006] QB 125. 
 
Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2007] 2 WLR 920 (HL). 
 
Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 5) [2003] 3 All ER 996 (Ch). 
 
Green Corns Ltd v Claverley Group Ltd [2005] EMLR 31 (QB). 
 
Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 4 All ER 473. 
 
His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2008] EMLR 66 (Ch). 
 
Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396. 
 
International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] QB 728. 
 
John v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EMLR 27 (QB). 
 
Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 (CA). 
 
Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans [1985] 1 QB 526. 
 
Lord Browne of Madingley v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EMLR 19 (QB). 
 
Lord Browne of Madingley v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] 3 WLR 289 (CA). 
 
  342  
McKennitt v Ash [2006] EMLR 178 (QB). 
 
McKennitt v Ash [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA). 
 
McLaughlin v O’Brian [1982] 1 AC 410 (HL). 
 
Murray v Express Newspapers [2007] EMLR 583 (Ch). 
 
Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691. 
 
R v Broadcasting Standards Commission, ex parte British Broadcasting Corporation [2001] QB 855. 
 
R v Morhall [1996] AC 90 (HL). 
 
R v Smith [2001] 1 AC 146 (HL). 
 
Regina (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 WLR 1622 (HL). 
 
Venables and another v News Group Newspapers and others [2001] 1 All ER 908 (Fam). 
 
Wainwright v Home Office [2003] 4 All ER 969 (HL). 
 
Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57. 
 
X v Unknown Persons [2007] EMLR 10 (QBD). 
 
 
 
 
United States of America 
 
Abrams v United States 250 US 616 (1919). 
 
Alvarado v KOB-TV LLC, (2007) Westlaw 2019752. 
 
American Broadcasting Companies Inc v Gill, 6 SW 3d 19 (1999). 
 
Anderson v Fisher Broadcasting Companies Inc, 712 P 2d 803 (1986). 
 
Ashcroft v The Free Speech Coalition, 535 US 234, (2002). 
 
Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514 (2001). 
 
Barnhart v Paisano Publications LLC, 457 F Supp 2d 590 (2006). 
 
Batts v City of Baton Rouge, 501 So 2d 302 (1987). 
 
Beaumont v Brown, 237 NW 2d 501 (1976). 
 
Benally v Hundreds Arrow Press Inc, 614 F Supp 969 (1985). 
 
Bodah v Lakeville Motor Express Inc, 663 NW 2d 550 (2003). 
 
Bonome v Kaysen and Random House, (2004) Westlaw 1194731. 
 
Borquez v Ozer, 923 P 2d 166 (Colo App 1995). 
 
Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186 (1986). 
  343  
 
Brents v Morgan, 299 SW 967 (1927). 
 
Briscoe v Reader's Digest Association Inc, 93 Cal Rptr 866 (1971). 
 
Campbell v Seabury Press, 614 F 2d 395 (1980). 
 
Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942). 
 
Cordts v Chicago Tribune Comp, 860 NE 2d 444 (2006). 
 
Cox Broadcasting Corp v Cohn, 420 US 469 (1975). 
 
Cumrine v Harte-Hanks Television, 37 SW 3d 124 (2001). 
 
Daily Mail Pub Co v Smith, 443 US 97 (1979). 
 
Daily Times Democrat v Graham, 162 So 2d 474 (1964). 
 
Daly v Viacom Inc, 238 F Supp 2d 1118 (2002). 
 
Diaz v Oakland Tribune Inc, 139 Cal App 3d 128, 130 (1983). 
 
Dietz v Finley Fine Jewellery Corp, 754 NE 2d 958 (2001). 
 
Doe v Methodist Hospital, 690 NE 2d 681 (1997). 
 
Duncan v Peterson, 835 NE 2d 411 (2005). 
 
New York v Ferber, 458 US 747 (1982). 
 
Fernandez Wells v Beauvais, 983 P 2d 1006 (1999). 
 
Florida Star v BGF, 491 US 524 (1989). 
 
Forsher v Bugliosi, 163 Cal Rptr 628 (1980). 
 
Four Navy Seals v Associated Press, 413 F Supp 2d 1136 (2005). 
 
Furman v Sheppard, 744 A.2d 583 (2000). 
 
Gates v Discovery Communication Inc, 131 Cal Rptr 2d 534 (2003). 
 
Gilbert v Medical Economics Co, 665 F 2d 305 (1981). 
 
Green v Chicago Tribune Comp, 675 NE 2d 249 (1996). 
 
Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965). 
 
Hall v Post, 372 SE 2d 711 (1988). 
 
Haynes v Alfred A Knopf Inc, 8 F 3d 1222 (1993). 
 
Hogan v Hearst Corp, 945 SW 2d 246 (1995). 
 
Huskey v National Broadcasting Company Inc, 632 F Supp 1282 (1986). 
 
Jaubert v Crowley Post-Signal Inc, 375 So 2d 1386, 1388 (1979). 
  344  
 
Johnson v K Mart Corp, 723 NE 2d 1192, 1197 (2000). 
 
Kaletha v Bortz Elevator Co Inc, 383 NE 2d 1071 (1978). 
 
Katz v United States, 389 US 347 (1967). 
 
Kitt v Capitol Concerts Inc, 742 A 2d 856 (1999). 
 
Kuczaba v Pollock, 742 NE 2d 425, 435 (2000). 
 
Lake v Wal-Mart Stores Inc, 582 NW 2d 231 (1998). 
 
Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558 (2003). 
 
Mayall v Dennis Stuff Inc, (2002) Westlaw 32113761. 
 
McNamara v Freedom Newspapers Inc, 802 SW 2d 901 (1991). 
 
Mc Surely v McClellan, 753 F 2d 88 (1985). 
 
Melvin v Reid, 112 Cal App 285 (1931). 
 
M G v Time Inc, 107 Cal Rptr 2d 504 (2001). 
 
Miller v California, 413 US 15 (1973). 
 
Miller v Motorola Inc, 560 NE 2d 900 (1990). 
 
Morgan by and through Chambon v Celender, 780 F Supp 307 (1992). 
 
Munsell v Hambright, 776 NE 2d 1272 (2002). 
 
New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964). 
 
Olson v Red Cedar Clinic, 681 NW 2d 306 (2004). 
 
Ozer v Borquez, 940 P 2d 371 (1997). 
 
Pachowitz v LeDoux, 666 NW 2d 88 (2003). 
 
Pavesich v New England Life Ins Co, 50 SE 68 (1905). 
 
Perry Educators Association v Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 US 37 (1983). 
 
Police Department of the City of Chicago v Mosley, 92 S Ct 2286 (1972). 
 
RAV v City of St Paul, 505 US 377 (1992). 
 
Reeves v Fox Television Network, 983 F Supp 703 (1997). 
 
Reid v Pierce County, 961 P 2d 333 (1998). 
 
Richard v Wal-Mart Stores Inc, (2007) Westlaw 1521467. 
 
Roberson v Rochester Folding Box Co, 64 NE 442 (1902). 
 
Roe v Heap, (2004) Westlaw 1109849. 
  345  
 
Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973). 
 
Roehrborn v Lambert, 660 NE 2d 180 (1995). 
 
Romaine v Kallinger, 537 A 2d 284 (1988). 
 
Ross v Midwest Communications Inc, 870 F 2d 271 (1989). 
 
Shattuck-Owen v Snowbird Corp, 16 P 3d 555 (2000). 
 
Shulman v Group W Production Inc, 18 Cal 4th 200 (1998). 
 
Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535 (1942). 
 
Solomon v National Inquirer Inc, (1996) Westlaw 635384. 
 
Star-Telegram Inc v Doe, 915 SW 2d 471 (1995). 
 
Stien v Marriot Ownership Resorts Inc, 944 P 2d 374 (1997). 
 
Swinton Creek Nursery v Edisto Farm Credit ACA, 483 SE 2d 789 (1998). 
 
Taus v Loftus, 40 Cal 4th 683 (2007). 
 
Time Inc v Hill, 385 US 374 (1967) 
 
Turnbull v American Broadcasting Companies Inc, (2004) 32 Media Law Reporter 2442. 
 
Uranga v Federated Publications Inc, 67 P 3d 29, 35 (2003). 
 
Urbaniak v Newton, 226 Cal App 3d 1128 (1991). 
 
Vassiliades v Garfinckel's Brooks Bros, 492 A 2d 580 (1985). 
 
Virgil v Time Inc, 527 F 2d 1122 (1975). 
 
Virginia v Black, 538 US 343 (2003). 
 
White v Township of Winthrop, 116 P 3d 1034 (2005). 
 
Whitney v California, 274 US 357 (1927). 
 
Wilson v Grant, 687 A 2d 1009 (1996). 
 
Winstead v Sweeney, 517 NW 2d 874 (1994). 
 
Wynne v Loyola University of Chicago, 741 NE 2d 669 (2000). 
 
Young v American Mini Theatres Inc, 427 US 50 (1976). 
 
 
Books 
 
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (Second), Torts (1977). 
 
Anderson, D A, ‘The Failure of American Privacy Law’ in Markesinis, B S (ed), Protecting Privacy 
(1999) 139. 
  346  
 
Aristotle, Selections from Nicomachean Ethics and Politics (The Collector’s Library of Essential Think-
ers, 2004). 
 
Arseneau, T, ‘A Bill of Rights’ in Holland, M and Boston J (eds), The Fourth Labour Government: Poli-
tics and Policy in New Zealand (2nd ed, 1990) 22. 
 
Barendt, E, ‘Privacy and freedom of speech’ in Richardson, M and Kenyon A T (eds), New Dimensions 
in Privacy Law (2006) 11. 
 
Bird, C, The Myth of Liberal Individualism (1999). 
 
Blackstone, Sir W, Commentaries on the Laws of England (16th ed, 1825) Book I. 
 
Burrows, J F in Todd, S (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, 2005). 
 
Butler, P and A, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2005). 
 
Cheer, U J and Burrows J F, Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 2005). 
 
Cooley, T, The Elements of Torts (1895). 
 
Coppel, J, The Human Rights Act 1998 (2000). 
 
Duxbury, N, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (1995). 
 
Dworkin, R M, Law’s Empire (1986). 
 
Dworkin, R M, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1978).  
 
Habermas, J, Between Facts and Norms (W Regh trans, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996). 
 
Hart, H L A, The Concept of Law (Clarendon 2nd ed, 1994). 
 
Hegel, G W F, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (A W Wood ed; H B Nisbet trans, CUP 1991). 
 
Hirschkop, K, ‘Justice and Drama: on Bakhtin as a complement to Habermas’ in Crossley, N and Rob-
erts, M (eds), After Habermas: New Perspectives on the public Sphere (2004) 49. 
 
Holmes, O W, Jr, The Common Law (Macmillan, London 1882). 
 
Honoré, T, Responsibility and Fault (1999). 
 
Joseph, P A, Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand (2nd ed, 2001). 
 
Joseph, P A, Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand (3rd ed, 2007). 
 
Keeton, W P (ed), Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed, 1984). 
 
Keith, K J, ‘A Bill of Rights for New Zealand? Judicial Review Versus Democracy’ in A Bill Of Rights 
For New Zealand (1985) 
 
Kelsen, H, Pure Theory of Law (M Knight trans, University of California Press 1967). 
 
Kenyon, A T and Richardson, M, ‘New dimensions in privacy: Communications technologies, media 
practises in law’ in Kenyon, A T and Richardson, M (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 1 
 
Lucy, W N R, Philosophy of Private Law (2007). 
  347  
om-
 
Markesinis, B S and Enchelmaier, S, ‘Human Rights under German Constitutional Law’ in Markesinis, B 
S (ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) 191. 
 
McDowall, M and Webb, D, The New Zealand legal system: Structure and Processes (4th ed, 2006). 
 
Minister of Justice, A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper (1985). 
 
Moran, M, Rethinking the Reasonable Person - An Egalitarian Reconstruction of the Objective Standard 
(2003). 
 
Murchison, B C, ‘Revisiting the American action for public disclosure of private facts’ in M Richardson 
and A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 32. 
 
Nowak, J E, Constitutional Law (5th ed, 1995). 
 
Orwell, G, Nineteen Eighty-Four (Everyman’s Library 1992). 
 
Phillipson, G ‘The right of privacy in England and Strasbourg compared’ in Richardson, M and Kenyon, 
T A (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 184. 
 
Prosser, W L, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed, 1971). 
 
Rawls, J, A Theory of Justice (OUP, 1971). 
 
Rawls, J, Political Liberalism (1993). 
 
Raz, J, The Morality of Freedom (OUP, 1986). 
 
Reath, A, Agency & Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory (2006). 
 
Richardson, M and Hitchens, L, ‘Celebrity privacy and the benefits from simple history’ in M Richardson 
and A T Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 250. 
 
Ripstein, A, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (1999). 
 
Rishworth, P, ‘Lord Cooke and the Bill of Rights’ in Rishworth (ed), The Struggle for simplicity in the 
law (1997). 
 
Rishworth, P; Hushcroft, G; Optician, S and Mahoney, R, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003). 
 
Roberts, J M, ‘John Stuart Mill, free speech and the public sphere: a Bakhtinian critique’ in N Crossley 
and J M Roberts (eds), After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere (2004) 67. 
 
Rozenberg, J, Privacy and the Press (2004). 
 
Schauer, F, ‘Freedom of expression adjudication in Europe and the United States: a case study in c
parative constitutional architecture’ in G Nolte (ed), European an US Constitutionalism (CUP 2005) 49. 
 
Scragg, R, New Zealand’s Legal System (2005). 
 
Singh, R, ‘Privacy and the Media: The Impact of the Human Rights Bill’ in Markesinis, B S (ed), Pro-
tecting Privacy (1999) 169. 
 
Stoll, H, ‘General Right to Personality in German Law’ in Markesinis, B S (ed), Protecting Privacy 
(1999) 29. 
 
Thomas, E W, The Judicial Process (2005). 
  348  
 
Todd, S, ‘Negligence and Policy’ in Rishworth, P (ed), The struggle for simplicity in the law (1997) 
 
Vetri, D, Tort law and practice (1998). 
 
Wacks, R, Privacy and Press Freedom (1995). 
 
Wacks, R (ed), Privacy Volume I (International Library of Essays in Law & Legal Theory) (1993). 
 
Wacks, R, ‘Why there will never be an English common law privacy tort’ in M Richardson and A T 
Kenyon (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (2006) 154. 
 
Waldron, J, Liberal Rights (1993). 
 
Westin, A F, Privacy and Freedom (1970). 
 
White, G E, Tort law in America: An Intellectual History (expanded ed, 2003). 
 
Wright, J, Tort Law and Human Rights (2001). 
 
Zweigert, K and Kötz, H, An Introduction to Comparative Law (T Weir trans, 3rd ed, 1998). 
 
 
Articles 
 
Ackerman, B, ‘Tort Law and Communitarism: Where Rights Meet Responsibilities’ (1995) 30 Wake 
Forest Law Review 645. 
 
Alder, J, ‘The Sublime and the Beautiful: Incommensurability and Human Rights’ [2006] Public Law 
697. 
 
Aleinikoff, T A, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 943. 
 
Alexy, R, ‘Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Con-
stitutional Law 572. 
 
Allen, A, ‘Coercing Privacy’ (1999) 40 William and Mary Law Review 723. 
 
Aplin, T, ‘The Development of the Action for Breach of Confidence in a Post-HRA Era’ [2007] Intellec-
tual Property Quarterly 19. 
 
Atiyah, P S, ‘The Legacy of Holmes through English Eyes’ (1983) 63 Boston Law Review 341. 
 
Bacon, K W, ‘Florida Star v B J F: The Right of Privacy Collides with the First Amendment’ (1990) 76 
Iowa Law Review 139 
 
Bagshaw, R, ‘Unauthorised Wedding Photographs’ (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 550 
 
Bains, S, ‘Personality Rights: Should the UK Grant Celebrities a Proprietary Right in Their Personality?’ 
(2007) 18 Entertainment Law Review 165. 
 
Barak, A, ‘Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience’ (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 
369. 
 
Bartow, A, ‘A Feeling of Unease about Privacy Law’ (2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
52. 
 
  349  
Beasley, K M, ‘Up-Skirt and other Dirt: Why Cell Phone Cameras and other Technologies Require a 
New Approach to Protecting Personal Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 31 Southern Illinois University 
Law Journal 69. 
 
Bezanson, R P, ‘The Developing Law of Editorial Judgment’ (1999) 78 Nebraska Law Review 754. 
 
Bezanson, R P, ‘The Right to Privacy Revisited:  Privacy, News, and Social Change, 1890-1990’ (1992) 
80 California Law Review 1133. 
 
Blasi, V, ‘Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas’ [2004] Supreme Court Review 1. 
 
Bloustein, E J, ‘Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Uncon-
stitutional as Well?’ (1968) 46 Texas Law Review 611. 
 
Bloustein, E J, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser’ (1964) 39 New 
York University Law Review 962. 
 
Bostwick, G L, ‘The Newsworthiness Element: Shulman v Group W Prods., Inc. Muddies the Waters’ 
(1999)19 Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review 225. 
 
Brown Scott, W, ‘Oliver Wendell Holmes on Equality and Adarand’ (2003) 47 Howard Law Journal 59. 
 
Brazell, L, ‘Confidence, Privacy and Human Rights: English Law in the Twentieth Century’ (2005) 27 
European Intellectual Property Review 405. 
 
Brugger, W ’The Image of the Person in the Human Rights Concept’ (1996) 18 (3) Human Rights Quar-
terly 594. 
 
Butler, D, ‘A Tort of Invasion of Privacy in Australia?’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 
339. 
 
Burrows, J F, ‘Invasion of Privacy – Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 389. 
 
Burrows, J F, ‘Review: Media Law’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 787. 
 
Burrows, J F ‘Review: Media Law’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 769. 
 
Buxton, R, ‘The Human Rights Act and Private Law’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 48. 
 
Cane, P, ‘Distributive Justice and Tort Law’ [2001] New Zealand Law Review 401. 
 
Cane, P, ‘The Anatomy of Private Law Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 203. 
 
Cheer, U J, ‘Censorship and the Bill of Rights’ [2000] New Zealand Law Journal 145. 
 
Cheer, U J, ‘The Future of Privacy – Recent Legal Developments in New Zealand’ (2007) 13 Canterbury 
Law Review 169. 
 
Cheer, U J, ‘Privacy and the Public Interest’ (2005) 1 Privacy Law Bulletin 145. 
 
Cheer, U J, ‘Privacy, the Bill of Rights and the BSA’ [2005] New Zealand Law Journal 222. 
 
Chriss, W J, ‘Personhood and the Right to Privacy in Texas’ (2007) 48 South Texas Law Review 575. 
 
Clark Kelso, J, ‘False Light Privacy: A Requiem’ (1992) 32 Santa Clara Law Review 783. 
 
  350  
h 
008.
Clarke, L, ‘Remedial Responses to Breach of Confidence: The Question of Damages’ (2005) Civil Jus-
tice Quarterly 316. 
 
Coleman, J L, ‘The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice’ (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 427. 
 
Coleman, J L, ‘Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice’ (1992) 67 Indiana Law Review 349. 
 
Coleman, J L and Kraus, J, ‘Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights’ (1986) 95 Yale Law Journal 1335. 
 
Collins, H ‘Utility and Rights in Common Law Reasoning: Rebalancing Private Law Through 
Constitutionalization’ < http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS06-2007Collins.pdf> 13 Marc
2 
Coyle, S, ‘Positivism, Idealism and the Rule of Law’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 257. 
 
Cribbs, Y, ‘The Public Interest defence to the Action for Breach of Confidence and the Law Commis-
sion’s Proposals on Disclosure in the Public Interest ‘ (1984) 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 361. 
 
Dailey, C S, ‘Holmes and the Romantic Mind’ (1998) 48 Duke Law Journal 429. 
 
Dendy, G, ‘The Newsworthiness Defense to the Public Disclosure Tort’ (1997) 85 Kentucky Law Journal 
147. 
 
Dickler, G, ‘The Right of Privacy – A Proposed Redefinition’ (1936) 70 United States Law Review 435. 
 
Dworkin, R M, ‘Hart's Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 1. 
 
Easton, E B, ‘Public Importance: Balancing Proprietary Interests and the Right to Know’ (2003) 21 Car-
dozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 139. 
 
Eberle, E J, ‘Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American Constitutional Law’ 
[1997] Utah Law Review 963. 
 
Eberle, E J, ‘Public Discourse in Contemporary Germany’ (1997) 47 Case Western Reserve Law Review 
797. 
 
Edelman, P B, ‘Free Press v Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black’ (1990) 68 Texas Law Re-
view 1195. 
 
Elder, D A, ‘Rhode Island Privacy Law - An Overview and some Important Recent Developments’ 
(1998) 31 Suffolk University Law Review 83. 
 
Elder, D A, ‘Truth, Accuracy and Neutral Reportage: Beheading the Media Jabberwork’s Attempts to 
Circumvent New York Times v Sullivan’ (2007) 9 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology 
Law 551. 
 
Elford, J, ‘Trafficking in Stolen Information: A "Hierarchy of Rights" Approach to the Private Facts Tort’ 
(1995) 105 Yale Law Journal 727. 
 
Emerson, T I, ‘The Right to Privacy and Freedom of the Press’ (1979) 14 Harvard Civil Rights – Civil 
Liberties Law Review 329. 
 
Englard, I, ‘Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel's Constitutional Framework’ (2000) 21 
Cardozo Law Review 1903. 
 
Evans, K, ‘Of Privacy and Prostitutes’ (2002) 20 New Zealand University Law Review 71. 
 
  351  
Evans, K, ‘Reverse gear for NZ’s privacy tort: the Hosking decision’ Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/journals/PLPR/2003/35.html, at 29 May 2006. 
 
Evans, K, ‘Was Privacy the Winner of the Day’ [2004] New Zealand Law Journal 181. 
 
Feldman, D, ‘Human Dignity as a Legal Value: Part 1’ [1999] Public Law 682. 
 
Fletcher, G P, ‘The Right and the Reasonable’ (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 949. 
 
Fletcher, G P, ‘Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 537. 
 
Fried, C, ’Privacy’ (1968) 77 Yale Law Journal 475. 
 
Fuson, J H, ‘Protecting the Press from Privacy’ (1999) 148 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 629. 
 
Gardbaum, S, ‘The "Horizontal Effect" of Constitutional Rights’ (2003) 102 Michigan Law Review 387. 
 
Gardbaum, S, ‘Where the (State) Action is’ (2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 760. 
 
Garety, T, ’Redefining Privacy’ (1977) 12 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Law Review 233 
 
Gavison, R, ‘Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 421. 
 
Gavison, R, ‘Too Early for a Requiem: Warren and Brandeis were Right on Privacy v Free Speech’ 
(1992) 43 South Carolina Law Review 437. 
 
Geddis, A, ‘Hosking v Runting: A privacy tort for New Zealand’ (2005) 13 Tort Law Review 5. 
 
Geddis, A, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v Runt-
ing’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 681. 
 
Gewirtz, P, ‘Privacy and Speech’ [2001] Supreme Court Review 139. 
 
Gielniak, P, ‘Tipping the Scales: Courts Struggle to Strike a Balance Between the Public Disclosure of 
Private Facts Tort and the First Amendment’ (1999) 39 Santa Clara Law Review 1217. 
 
Goldberg, J C, and Zipursky, B C, ‘Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart 
on Legal Duties’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1563. 
 
Goldberg J C and Zipursky, B C, ‘The Moral of MacPherson’ (1998) 146 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1733. 
 
Goldberg, C P, ‘The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Re-
dress of Wrongs’ (2005) 115 Yale Law Journal 524. 
 
Gómez-Arostegui, H T, ‘Defining Private Life Under The European Convention on Human Rights by 
Referring to Reasonable Expectations’ (2005) 35 California Western International Law Journal 153. 
 
Gonzalez, E W, ‘”Get That Camera Out of my Face!" An Examination of the Viability of Suing "Tabloid 
Television" for Invasion of Privacy’ (1997) 51 University of Miami Law Review 935. 
 
Gormley, B ‘A Hundred Years of Privacy’ [1992] Wisconsin Law Review 1335. 
 
Grant, E, ‘Dignity and Equality’ (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 299. 
 
Green, L, ‘The Right of Privacy’ (1932) 27 Illinois Law Review 237. 
 
Grey, T C, ‘Holmes and Legal Pragmatism’ (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 787. 
  352  
 
Grimm, D, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2007) 57 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 383. 
 
Halberstam, D, ‘Desperately Seeking Europe: On Comparative Methodology and the Conception of 
Rights’ (2007) 5 International Journal of Constitutional Law 166. 
 
Halpern, S W, ‘Rethinking the Right of Privacy: Dignity, Decency, and the Law’s Limitations’ (1991) 43 
Rutgers Law Review 539. 
 
Halpern, S W, ‘The ‘Inviolate Personality’ Warren and Brandeis after One Hundred Years’ (1990) 
Northern Illinois University Law Review 387. 
 
Hart, C, ‘Y.G. v Jewish Hospital of St. Louis: Breathing Life into the “Disclosure of Private Facts” Tort’ 
(1991) 35 Saint Louis University Law Journal 931. 
 
Hart, H L A, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593. 
 
Heffernan, W C, ‘Privacy Rights’ (1995) 29 Suffolk University Law Review 737. 
 
Herget, S E and Wallace, S, ‘The German Free Law Movement as the Source of American Legal Real-
ism’ (1987) 73 Virginia Law Review 399. 
 
Hertig Randall, M, ‘Commercial Speech under the European Convention on Human Rights: Subordinate 
or Equal?’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 53. 
 
Heyman, S J, ‘Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expres-
sion’ (1998) 78 Boston University Law Review 1275. 
 
Hickford, M, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ New Zealand Law Commission M P19. 
 
Hilmert, J M, ‘The Supreme Court Takes on the First Amendment Privacy Conflict and Stumbles: Bart-
nicki v Vopper, the Wiretapping Act, and the Notion of Unlawfully Obtained Information’ (2002) 77 
Indiana Law Journal 639. 
 
Hilzendeger, K, ‘Unreasonable Publicity: How Well Does Tort Law Protect the Unwarranted Disclosure 
of a Person’s HIV-Positive State?’ (2003) 35 Arizona State University Law Journal 187. 
 
Horder, J, ‘Can the Law do without the Reasonable Person?’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law Jour-
nal 253. 
 
Hovenkamp, H, ‘Knowledge about Welfare: Legal Realism and the Separation of Law and Economics’ 
(2000) 84 Minnesota Law Review 805. 
 
Hovenkamp, H, ‘The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought’ (1993) 46 Vanderbilt Law Review 305. 
 
Hunt, J H, ‘Bartnicki v Vopper: Another Media Victory or Ominous Warning of a Potential Change in 
Supreme Court First Amendment Jurisprudence?’ (2003) 30 Pepperdine Law Review 367. 
 
Hunt, M, ‘The “Horizontal Effect” of the Human Rights Act’ [1998] Public Law 423. 
 
Ingber, S, ‘Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 772. 
 
Ingber, S, ‘The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth’ [1984] Duke Law Journal 1. 
 
Jansen, N, ’Duties and Rights in Negligence: A Comparative and Historical Perspective on the European 
Law of Extracontractual Liability’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 443. 
 
  353  
Jennings, L M, ‘Paying the Price for Privacy: Using the Private Facts Tort to Control Social Security 
Number Dissemination and the Risk of Identity Theft’ (2004) 43 Washburn Law Journal 725. 
 
Joyce, G, ‘Keepers of the Flame: Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (Fifth Edition) and the Prosser 
Legacy’ (Book review) (1986) 39 Vanderbilt Law Review 851. 
 
Jurata, J A, ‘The Tort That Refuses To Go Away: The Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure of Pri-
vate Facts’ (1999) 36 San Diego Law Review 489. 
 
Kagan, E, ’Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doc-
trine’ (1996) 63 University of Chicago Law Review 413. 
 
Kahn, J, ‘Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance’ (2003) 33 Seton Hall Law Review 371. 
 
Kalven, H, Jr, ‘Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?’ (1966) 31 Law and Contempo-
rary Problems 326. 
 
Kay, R S, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and the Control of Privacy Law’ [2005] Euro-
pean Human Rights Law Review 466. 
 
Keating, G C, ‘Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 
311. 
 
Kelley, P, ‘Infancy, Insanity and Infirmity in the Law of Torts’ (2003) 48 American Journal of Jurispru-
dence 179. 
 
Kennedy, D, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1975) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685. 
 
Kersch, K, ‘The New Legal Transnationalism, the Globalized Judiciary, and the Rule of Law’ (2005) 4 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 345. 
 
Kilkenny, R, ‘Invasion of Privacy for the Greater Good: Why Bartnicki v Vopper Disserves the Right of 
Privacy and the First Amendment’ (2003) 64 Ohio State Law Journal 999. 
 
Klug, F, ‘A Bill of Rights: Do we need one or do we already have one’ [2007] Public Law 701. 
 
Knight, D R, ‘“I'm Not Gay - Not That There's Anything Wrong with That!”: Are Unwanted Imputations 
of Gayness Defamatory?’ (2006) 37 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 249. 
 
Knudson, J, ‘The Influence of the German Concepts of Volksgeist and Zeitgeist on the Thought and Ju-
risprudence of Oliver Wendell Holmes’ (2002) 11 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 407. 
 
Kreimer, D F, ‘Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension between Privacy and Disclosure in 
Constitutional Law’ (1991) 140 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1. 
 
Ku, A, ‘Talk is Cheap, but a Picture is Worth a Thousand Words: Privacy Rights in the Era of Camera 
Phone Technology’ (2005) 45 Santa Clara Law Review 679. 
 
Kumm, M, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice’ 
(2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574. 
 
Kumm, M, ‘What Do You Have in Virtue of Having a Constitutional Right? On the Place and Limits of 
the Proportionality Requirement’ available at http://www.lsr.nelco.org/nyu/plltwp/papers/46 at 08 Febru-
ary 2008.  
 
Lahav, P, ‘Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican Justifications for Free Speech’ (1988) 4 
Journal of Law and Politics 451. 
 
  354  
Laughlin, M, ‘Constitutional Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Stud-
ies 183. 
 
LeBel, P A, ‘The Right to Privacy One Hundred Years Later: Rights-Talk and Torts-Talk’ (1991) 41 
Case Western Reserve Law Review 811. 
 
Leebron, W, ’The Right to Privacy’s Place in the Intellectual History of Tort Law’ (1991) 41 Case West-
ern Reserve Law Review 769. 
 
Leigh, I, ‘Horizontal Rights, the Human Rights Act and Privacy: Lessons from the Commonwealth?’ 
(1999) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 57. 
 
Lenow, J, ‘First Amendment Protection for the Publication of Private Information’ (2007) 60 Vanderbilt 
Law Review 235. 
 
Letsas, G, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 705. 
 
Lewin, K M, ‘The Significance of Constitutional Rights for Private Law: Theory and Practice in West 
Germany’ (1968) 17(3) International Comparative Law Quarterly 571. 
 
Lewis, M; Hinton, C; Beverley-Smith, H and G Hussey, ‘Review of the Law of Privacy’ (2005) 16 (7) 
Entertainment Law Review 174 
 
Lewis, J, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ [2007] Public Law 720. 
 
L'Heureux-Dubé, C, ‘Realizing Equality in the Twentieth Century: The Role of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Comparative Perspective’ (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 35 
 
Lindquist, W A, ‘Oliver Wendell Holmes and External Standards of Criminal and Tort Liability’ (1979) 
28 Buffalo Law Review 607. 
 
Lisle, R, ‘The Right of Privacy (A Contra View)’ (1930) 19 Kentucky Law Journal 137. 
 
Logan, D A, ‘Masked Media: Judges, Juries, and the Law of Surreptitious Newsgathering’ (1997) 83 
Iowa Law Review 161. 
 
Logan, D A, ‘Tort Law and the Central Meaning of the First Amendment’ (1990) 51 University of Pitts-
burgh Law Review 493. 
 
Lum, A J, ‘Don’t Smile, Your Image Has Just Been Recorded On A Camera-Phone: The Need For Pri-
vacy In The Public Sphere‘ (2005) 27 University of Hawaii Law Review 377. 
 
Lyons, D, ‘Legal Formalism and Instrumentalism – A Pathological Study’ (1980-81) 66 Cornell Law 
Review 949. 
 
Markin, M ‘An “Unholy Alliance”: The Law of Media Ride-Alongs’ (2004) 12 CommLaw Conspectus 
33. 
 
Masterman, R, ‘Taking the Strasbourg Jurisprudence into Account: Developing a “Municipal Law of 
Human Rights” under the Human Rights Act’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
907. 
 
Mayer-Schonberger, V and Foster, T E, ‘More Speech, Less Noise: Amplifying Content-Based Speech 
Regulations Through Binding International Law’ (1995) 18 Boston College International and Compara-
tive Law Review 59. 
 
Merris, A, ‘Can We Speak Freely Now? Freedom of Expression under the Human Rights Act” (2002) 6 
European Human Rights Law Review 750. 
  355  
-
 
Meyer, L R, ‘Unruly Rights’ (2000) 22 Cardozo Law Review 1. 
 
McClurg, A J, ‘Bringing Privacy out of the Closet: A Tort Theory for Intrusions in Public Places’ (1995) 
73 North Carolina Law Review 989. 
 
McClurg, A J, ‘Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy through Implied Contracts of 
Confidentiality’ (2006) 74 University of Cincinnati Law Review 887. 
 
McNulty, P J, ‘The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star’ (2001) 50 Drake 
Law Review 93. 
 
Michelman, F I, ‘The Bill of Rights, the Common Law, and the Freedom-Friendly State’ (2003) 58 Uni
versity of Miami Law Review 401. 
 
Mintz, J B, ‘The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain’ (1996) 55 
Maryland Law Review 425. 
 
Mize, S, ’ Resolving Cases of Conflicting Rights under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act’ (2006) 22 
New Zealand Universities Law Review 50. 
 
Moon, G and Allen, A, ‘Dignity Discourse in Discrimination Law: A Better Route to Equality’ (2006) 6 
European Human Rights Law Review 610. 
 
Moore, M S, ‘In Need for a Theory of Legal Theories: Assessing Pragmatic Instrumentalism’ (1984) 69 
Cornell Law Review 988. 
 
Moreham, N A, ‘Privacy and Horizontality: Relegating the Common Law’ (2007) 123 Law Quarterly 
Review 373. 
 
Moreham, N A, ’Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 121 Law 
Quarterly Review 628. 
 
Moreham, N A, ‘Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 65(3) Cambridge Law Review 606. 
 
Moreham, N A, ‘Recognising Privacy in England and New Zealand’ (2004) 63(3) Cambridge Law Jour-
nal 555. 
 
Moretti, B, ‘Outing: Justifiable or Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy? The Private Facts Tort as a Remedy 
for Disclosures of Sexual Orientation’ (1993) 11 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 857. 
 
Morgan, J, ‘Hello! Again: Privacy and Breach of Confidence’ (2005) Cambridge Law Journal 549. 
 
Morgan, J, ‘Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: “Hello” Trouble’ (2003) 62(2) Cambridge Law 
Journal 444. 
 
Mulheron, R, ‘A Potential Framework for Privacy? A Reply to Hello!’ (2006) 69(5) Modern Law Review 
679. 
 
Mullender, R, ‘The Reasonable Person, The Pursuit of Justice, and Negligence Law’ (2005) 68(4) Mod-
ern Law Review 681. 
 
Mullender, R, ‘Tort, Human Rights, and Common Law Culture’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Stud-
ies 301. 
 
Murphy, R S, ‘Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy’ (1996) 84 
Georgetown Law Journal 2381. 
 
  356  
Norton, J, ‘Hosking v Runting and the Role of Freedom of Expression’ [2004] Auckland University Law 
Review 245. 
 
Note ‘Holmes: A Legend in Search of Demystification’ (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 800. 
 
Note ‘In the Face of Danger: Facial Recognition and the Limits of Privacy Law’ (2007) 120 Harvard 
Law Review 1870. 
 
Note ‘The Right of Privacy’ (1906-07) 12 Virginia Law Register 91. 
 
Ofseyer, J J, ‘Talking Liberty with John Stuart Mill’ [1999] Annual Survey of American Law 395. 
 
Paciocco, D M, ‘Subjective and Objective Standards of Fault for Offences and Defences’ (1995) 59 Sas-
katchewan Law Review 271. 
 
Palmer, G, ’Privacy and the Law’ [1975] New Zealand Law Journal 747. 
 
Pannick, D and Lester, A, ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act on Private Law: The Knight's Move’ 
(2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 380. 
 
Paradis, D P, ‘Bartnicki v Vopper: Cell Phones and Throwing Stones’ (2003) 37 New England Law Re-
view 1117. 
 
Paton-Simpson, E, ’Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in Public Places’ 
(2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305. 
 
Pedersen, B L, ‘Florida Star v B J F: The Rape of the Right to Privacy’ (1990) 23 John Marshall Law 
Review 731. 
 
Peikoff, A L, ‘The Right to Privacy: Contemporary Reductionists and their Critics' (2006) 13 Virginia 
Journal of Social Policy and the Law 474. 
 
Perry, S R, ‘The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice’ (1992) 15 Harvard Journal of Law and Public 
Policy 917. 
 
Phillipson, G, ‘Judicial Reasoning in Breach of Confidence Cases under the Human Rights Act: Not Tak-
ing Privacy Seriously’ (2003) European Human Rights Law Review (Special Edition) 54. 
 
Phillipson, G, ‘The Human Rights Act, ‘Horizontal effect’ and the Common Law: a Bang or a Whimper’ 
(1999) 62 Modern Law Review 824. 
 
Phillipson, G, ‘Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under the 
Human Rights Act’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 726. 
 
Poole, T, ‘Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law Constitutionalism’ (2003) 23 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 435. 
 
Post, R C and Siegel, R, ‘Originalism as a political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution’ (2006) 75 
Fordham Law Review 545. 
 
Post, R C, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 77 
California Law Review 957. 
 
Post, R C, ‘Three Concepts of Privacy’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2087. 
 
Postema, G J, ‘Risks, Wrongs and Responsibility – Coleman’s Liberal Theory of Commutative Justice’ 
(1993) 103 Yale Law Journal 861. 
 
  357  
Power, H, ‘Provocation and Culture’ [2006] Criminal Law Review 871. 
 
Prosser, W L, ‘Palsgraf Revisited’ (1953) 52 Michigan Law Review 1. 
 
Prosser, W L, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383. 
 
Rabban, D M, ‘The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine’ (1983) 50 University of Chicago 
Law Review 1205. 
 
Ragland, G, ‘The Right of Privacy’ (1929) 17 Kentucky Law Journal 85. 
 
Rappaport, A J, ‘Beyond Personhood and Autonomy: Moral Theory and the Premises of Privacy’ [2001] 
Utah Law Review 441. 
 
Reed, T A, ‘Holmes and the Paths of the Law’ (1993) 37 American Journal of Legal History 273. 
 
Richards, D A, ‘Public and Private in the Discourse of the First Amendment’ (2000) 12 Cardozo Studies 
in Law and Literature 61. 
 
Richards, N M, ‘Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment’ (2005) 52 UCLA Law Review 1149. 
 
Richards, N M, ‘The Information Privacy Law Project’ (2006) 94 Georgetown Law Journal 1087. 
 
Richards, N M and Solove, D J, ‘Privacy’s other Path: Recovering the law of Confidentiality’ (2007) 96 
Georgetown Law Journal 123. 
 
Richardson, M ‘Privacy and Precedent: The Court of Appeal’s Decision in Hosking v Runting’ (2005) 11 
New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 82. 
 
Richardson, M, ‘The Private Life after Douglas v Hello!’ [2003] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 311. 
 
Richardson, M, ‘Whither Breach of Confidence: A Right of Privacy for Australia?’ (2002) 26 Melbourne 
University Law Review 381. 
 
Rishworth, P, ’Review: Human Rights’ [2005] New Zealand Law Review 87. 
 
Rolfs, J R, ‘The Florida Star v B J F: The Beginning of the End for the Tort of Public Disclosure’ [1990] 
Wisconsin Law Review 1107. 
 
Rosen, J, ‘Continental Divide’ [2004] Legal Affairs 49. 
 
Rosen, J, ‘The Purposes of Privacy: A Response’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2117. 
 
Roth, P, ‘Unlawful Photography in Public Places: the New Zealand Position’ [2006] PLPR 2 available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/PLPR/2006/2.html, at 23 February 2007. 
 
Rothenberg, L E, ‘Re-Thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and the Failure of Criminal Law 
to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space’ (2000) 49 American University 
Law Review 
1127. 
 
Rothstein, L E, ‘Privacy or Dignity? Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace’ (2000) 19 New York Law 
School Journal of International and Comparative Law 379. 
 
Rubenfeld, J, ‘The First Amendment’s Purpose’ (2001) 53 Stanford Law Review 767. 
 
Ruckdaschel-Haley, K, ‘The Florida Star v B J F: Balancing Freedom of the Press and the Right to Pri-
vacy upon Publication of a Rape Victim’s Identity’ (1990) 35 South Dakota Law Review 94. 
  358  
 
Samuel, G, ‘The impact of European integration on private law - a comment’ (1998) 18(2) Legal Studies 
167.
 
Sandeen, S K, ‘Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn From Trade Secret Law’ [2006] 
Michigan State Law Review 667. 
 
Schadrack, M, ‘Privacy and the Press: A Necessary Tension’ (1985) 18 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Re-
view 949. 
 
Sebok, A J, ‘Misunderstanding Positivism’ (1995) 93 Michigan Law Review 2054. 
 
Schreiber, A, ‘Confidence Crisis, Privacy Phobia: Why Invasion of Privacy Should Independently recog-
nised in English Law’ [2006] Intellectual Property Quarterly 160. 
 
Scott, S M, ‘The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy’ (1996) 71 Washington Law Review 683 
 
Sedley, Lord (Stephen), ‘Sex, Libels and Video-surveillance’ (The Blackstone Lecture 2006)’ 
<www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications_media/speeches/2006/sp130506> 16 January 2008. 
 
Seidelson, D E, ‘Reasonable Expectations and Subjective Standards in Negligence Law: The Minor, the 
Mentally Impaired, and the Mentally Incompetent’ (1981) 50 George Washington Law Review 17. 
 
Shapiro, S J, ‘What is the Internal Point of View?’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1157. 
 
Simons, K W, ‘Rethinking Mental States’ (1992) 72 Boston University Law Review 463. 
 
Sims, A, ‘”A Shift in the Gravity Centre”: The dangers of Protecting Privacy through Breach of Confi-
dence’ [2005] Intellectual Property Quarterly 27. 
 
Smillie, J, ‘Formalism, Fairness and Efficiency: Civil Adjudication in New Zealand’ [1996] New Zealand 
Law Review 254. 
 
Smillie, J, ‘The Future of Negligence’ (2007) 15 Tort Law Journal 300. 
 
Smolla, R A, ‘Accounting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law’ (2002) 27 Nova Law Review 
289. 
 
Smolla, R A, ‘Information as a Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in 
Speech’ (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1099. 
 
Smolla, R A, ‘Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News’ (1999) 67 George Washington 
Law Review 1097. 
 
Singer, J W, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld’ [1982] 
Wisconsin Law Review 975. 
 
Siprut, J, ‘Privacy Through Anonymity: An Economic Argument for Expanding the Right of Privacy in 
Public Places’ (2006) 33 Pepperdine Law Review 311. 
 
Solove, D J, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 477 
 
Solove, D J, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087. 
 
Solove, D J, ‘The Virtues Of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure’ (2003) 
53 Duke Law Journal 967. 
 
  359  
Spencer, S B, ‘Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy’ (2002) 39 San Diego Law Review 
843. 
 
Steyn, Lord (Johan), ‘2000 - 2005: Laying the Foundations of Human Rights Law in the United King-
dom’ [2005] European Human Rights Law Review 349. 
 
Steyn, Lord (Johan), ‘Democracy through Law’ [2002] European Human Rights Law Review 723. 
 
Strauss, D A, ‘Rights and the System of Freedom of Expression’ [1993] University of Chicago Legal 
Forum 197. 
 
Summers, R S, ‘How Law is Formal and Why it Matters’ (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review 1165. 
 
Summers, R S, ‘On Identifying and Reconstructing a General Legal Theory – Some Thoughts Prompted 
by Professor Moore's Critique’ (1984) 69 Cornell Law Review 1014. 
 
Summers, R S, ‘Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century Legal Thought – A Synthesis and Cri-
tique of our Dominant Legal Theory about the Law and its Use’ (1980-81) 66 Cornell Law Review 861. 
 
Sunstein, C R, ‘On Analogical Reasoning’ (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 741. 
 
Taslitz, A, ‘The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy and Human Emo-
tions’ (2002) 65 Law and Contemporary Problems 125. 
 
Thomas, E W, ‘A Return to Principle in Judicial Reasoning and an Acclamation of judicial Autonomy’ 
(1993) 23 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review Monograph 5. 
 
Tiritilli, E W, ‘You Never Call Me Anymore: Bartnicki v Vopper and the Supreme Court's Abridgement 
of the Right of Privacy in Favor of the First Amendment Right of a Free Press’ (2002) 35 Creighton Law 
Review 729. 
 
Tison, E, ‘Straddling the Fence: Justice Breyer's concurrence in Bartnicki v Vopper gives Protection of 
Privacy and still Manages to Protect the Press: Bartnicki v Vopper,  532 US 514 (2001)’ (2003) 27 
Southern Illinois University Law Journal 661. 
 
Tobin, R, ‘Privacy: One step forward, two steps back’ [2003] New Zealand Law Journal 256. 
 
Tobin, R, ‘Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Claus: the tort of invasion of privacy in New Zealand’ (2004) 
12 Tort Law Journal 95. 
 
Todd, S, ‘Review: Tort’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 585. 
 
Todd, S, ‘Twenty Years of Professional Negligence in New Zealand’ (2005) 21(4) Professional Negli-
gence 257. 
 
Tushnet, M, ‘An Essay on Rights’ (1984) 62 Texas Law Review 1363. 
 
Twining, W, ‘Other People’s Power: The Bad Man and English Positivism, 1897-1997’ (1997) 63 Brook-
lyn Law Review 189, 195 (1997). 
 
Vickery, A B, ‘Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort’ (1982) 82 Columbia Law Review 1426. 
 
Volokh, E, ‘Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop 
People from Speaking about You’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1049. 
 
Wade, Sir H W R, ‘Horizons of Horizontality’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 217. 
 
Wagner De Cew, J, ’The Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics’ (1986) 5 Law and Philosophy 145. 
  360  
 
Warren, S D and Brandeis, L D, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193. 
 
Waterfield, M ‘Now You See It, Now You Don't: the Case for a Tort of Infringement of Privacy in New 
Zealand’ (2004) 10 Canterbury Law Review 182. 
 
Weinrib, E J, ‘Causation and Wrongdoing’ (1987) 63 Chicago Kent Law Review 407. 
 
Weinrib, E J, ‘Corrective Justice’ (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 403. 
 
Weinrib, E J, ’Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice’ (2001) 2 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 107. 
 
Weinrib, E J, ‘Understanding Tort Law’ (1989) 23 Valparaiso University Law Review 485. 
 
Wells, C E, ’Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First 
Amendment Jurisprudence’ (1997) 32 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 159. 
 
Wells, C P, ‘Reinventing Holmes: The Hidden, Inner, Life of a Cynical, Detached, Ambitious and Fascis-
tic old Judge without Values’ (2002) 37 Tulsa Law Review 801. 
 
Weston, N A, ‘The Metaphysics of Modern Tort Theory’ (1994) 28 Valparaiso University Law Review 
919, 989. 
 
Whitman, J Q, ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty’ (2004) 113 Yale Law 
Journal  
1151. 
 
Wilson, J, ‘Media Law Symposium: Prior Restraint of the Press’ [2006] New Zealand Law Review 551. 
 
Woito, L N and McNulty, P, ‘The Privacy Disclosure Tort and the First Amendment: Should the Com-
munity decide Newsworthiness?’ (1979) 64 Iowa Law Review 185. 
 
Worley, D M, ‘Shulman v Group W Productions: Invasion of Privacy by Publication of Private Facts - 
Where Does California Draw the Line between Newsworthy Information and Morbid Curiosity’ (1999-
2000) 27 Western State University Law Review 535. 
 
Young, A L, ‘Remedial and Substantive Horizontality: The Common Law and Douglas v Hello! Ltd’ 
[2002] Public Law 232. 
 
Zimmerman, D L, ‘Who put the Right into the Right of Publicity’ (1998) 9 DePaul University Journal of 
Art and Entertainment Law 35. 
 
Zimmerman, D L, ‘Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort’ 
(1983) 68 Cornell Law Review 291. 
 
Zipursky, B C, ‘Rawls in Tort Theory: Themes and Counter-themes’ (2004) 72 Fordham Law Review 
1923. 
 
Zipursky, B C, ’Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts’ (1998) 51 Vanderbilt Law Review 1. 
 
Zipursky, BC, ‘Ten Half-Truths about Tort Law’ (2008) 42 Valparaiso Law Review 1221. 
 
Governmental Sources  
 
Hickford, M, ‘A Conceptual Approach to Privacy’ New Zealand Law Commission M P19. 
 
Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Report: Privacy and Media Intrusion (2004). 
  361  
 
Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, Consultation Paper 1 (2007) – Invasion of Privacy. 
 
New Zealand Law Commission, Privacy: concepts and issues: review of the Law of Privacy part 1 (Study 
Paper; 19). 
 
Other Sources 
 
 
‘Appointing Judges: A Judicial Appointments commission for New Zealand – Appendix One: New Zea-
land Appointments’ <http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/2004/judicial-
appointment/appendixone.html> 03 December 2006. 
 
‘Brash case rings alarm bells for media’ 
<http://www.stuff.co.nz/stuff/print/0,1478,3866249a6160,00.html> 24 November 2006>. 
 
Black, J, ’Privacy: To every attack a Defence’ published on 22 July 2003 in Business Newsweek 
<http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jul2003/tc20030722_9870_PG3_tc125.htm> 02 De-
cember 2006. 
 
‘Egalitarianism’ in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egalitarianism/> 08 March 2008>. 
 
Haywood, D, ‘Bill of Rights unlikely to grow up’ printed in the New Zealand Herald on 28 August 2006.  
 
McPhail, D, ‘Jerry’s excuse a wee bit wet’ printed in The Christchurch Press, 15 July 2006 (D8). 
 
Shorter Oxford Dictionary (5th ed, 2002) Vol 1. 
 
Smith, T ‘Collins not the first to be caught short in sport’ printed in The Christchurch Press, 15 July 2006 
(F2 Sports). 
 
Statistics New Zealand – Tatauranga Aotearoa <http://www.stats.govt.nz/analytical-reports/children-in-
nz/growing-ethnic-diversity.htm> 03 December 2006. 
 
